

THE INFLUENCE OF LESSING
UPON THE INTERPRETATION OF
FAITH AND HISTORY
IN THE WRITINGS OF
BULTMANN, TILLICH AND BARTH

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis endeavours to uncover the influence of Lessing's "ugly, broad ditch" in the theological thought of R. Bultmann, P. Tillich and K. Barth. As background and preparation, consideration is given to the thoughts and conceptions of Ritschl, Herrmann, Harnack and Troeltsch. The suggestion is made that these men provide the initial starting-point for theology's bout with the eternal truths of faith and the accidental truths of history. As an alternative to Liberalism, S. Kierkegaard is examined. Special interest is given to his interpretation to Lessing's determination of history. Further, his understanding of the Absolute Paradox in the midst of history is considered. R. Bultmann represents a contemporary endeavour to utilize the background set by Liberalism and Kierkegaard in coping with Lessing's problem. To evaluate his approach Bultmann's exposition of Christology and history as eschatology is examined. A similar approach is utilized in evaluating P. Tillich. In both cases, the proposition is advanced that Bultmann and Tillich place heavy emphasis upon the meaning and significance of Christ while de-emphasizing and possibly de-valuating His facticity. And as a consequence, both men approach the sphere of history with the intention of interpreting it in personal, human terms. As a result, it is suggested that both men only handle Lessing's "ditch" from a subjective, personal perspective without adequately considering the objective, historical. By contrast, Barth's exposition of Jesus Christ and history is considered. Armed with the epistemological tools of Anselm,

he views Christ in biblical, historic terms. He understands Him to be the real revelation of God in space and time. As a consequence, history opens to the actual presence of God who is the beginning and the end of all time. The personal dimension which Bultmann and Tillich considered is not ignored. However, Barth attempts to take seriously the actuality and supra-temporality of God. As he does this, the gap which Lessing perceived between eternal and accidental truths is undone. Barth no longer interprets Lessing's problem in ontological terms. Rather, God's creativity and grace do not recognize the artificial barrier conceived by Lessing. The "ditch" over which Lessing could not leap does not and cannot infringe upon the absolute freedom of God. In the end, Lessing's problem appears to be neutralized in confrontation with Barth's epistemology and God's grace.

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INTRODUCTION

A fair amount of paper and print has been used by theologians in order to explicate and to present a view of faith that is relevant and immediate to its understanding and practice. The problems and issues seem pressing and pertinent for its credibility and sustenance in today's world. Often times, these central questions loom forward as revolutionary and unique for the time and place in which they are formulated and discussed. It would appear that theologians are constructing new interconnections and offering new insights into new problems and areas of concern. But a consideration occasionally arises which gives pause for reflection and for taking stock of the real novelty and uniqueness of its problems and issues. At first glance, such a consideration may not occur. But as the pages are turned and the content digested, one may be prompted to ask, "How really new is this question?" On the surface, the words and phrases theologians employ may reflect the modernity of the times, but upon closer inspection the vestiges of past concerns and issues may lie hidden, waiting to be revealed and to be understood. In the light of this consideration, theology's newness takes on a more mature and weathered demeanour. Understanding the present as set in past contexts does not diminish the seriousness nor the relevancy of the endeavour, rather it clarifies its tradition and sharpens the scope and options within which the project is set and pursued. The variations of particular issues and problems are seen to have resulted in an assortment of

conclusions and working-hypotheses which are themselves the material for new, though seasoned, resolutions.

It is in this context that the role of Jesus Christ in present theological enterprise shows itself as an intricate and central theme. In the recent publication of various systems, theologians have found it incumbent to reflect upon and to decide the interpretation of His person which, in turn, displays the Christian faith's relation to history. The centrality of His person seems to be an undoubted presupposition. As well, its interpretation appears to enjoy, at least, a recent tradition which affects the present choices and discussions. Indeed, the theological-critical pursuits of the nineteenth century have accentuated this point. The historical-critical approach to Jesus Christ implicitly, if not directly, seems to assume that faith is irrevocably bound-up with the life and work of this man. In the course of exhaustive research and controversy, the "Life of Jesus" scholars unrelentlessly pursued Him and attempted to bring Him from the concealment of faith. The approach of this movement was to portray Christ in His full humanity. To accomplish this task, these men scrutinized the biblical texts and sought to reconstruct the life-situation of His times in order to explain and thus to comprehend not only the constituency of His life-style but also the fabric and weave of His faith. It would appear to be the case that various implicit and explicit assumptions guided and limited the work at hand. Initially, the historical-critical scholars seem to have assumed the full humanity of Christ. This assumption would presumably allow

the treatment of the biblical text to be done in a thoroughgoing, objective manner. This is to say, the text would be handled as an historical document from which certain facts could be gleaned. The accumulation and organization of the objective data could be utilized to build a portrait of the Christ in a way which would reveal Him as a man of His times. To reach the objective facts, the scholar needed to peel away the accretions of the faith-claims. Again, this interpretive "house cleaning" ostensibly presupposed a climate of opinion which found it difficult, if not impossible, to accept faith's claim to mediate the reality of God in an empirical fashion. In a sense, the world-view of the scholar found itself qualified by the supremacy of Reason. This dimension of the human prowess appears to function in an objective, material and causal manner. The rationality and intelligibility of reality apparently becomes dependent upon the verdict of Reason. This function of life disposes of perceptual experiences in that it contains a system of beliefs and values which ultimately decide the sense or nonsense of an issue. (For an introductory discussion to world-views and their systems of belief and value, Stephen C. Pepper's World Hypotheses provides a valuable survey.) No doubt the ascendancy of Reason possesses correlation to the ascendancy of a successful technical, scientific method. In the midst of this climate of opinion, the historical-critical scholar endeavours to be scientific in his own right by being objective. If faith claims that Jesus Christ is very man and very God, it would seem to follow that Reason can uncover the possibility or probability of this claim. Unfortunately,

Reason and its method do not seem to be able to cope with the alleged non-empirical reality of God. The scholar finds it difficult to comprehend the transcendent or infinite dimension of Christ's person given the assumption of the non-objective reality of God. "How is it possible to know and to understand His divinity in transcendental terms within a climate of opinion which appears unable to grasp or to accept what cannot be scientifically investigated?" The justification and the rationale for His interpretation in human terms finds its well-spring in the working-hypothesis of the world-view. As a consequence, the scholar strives to view Jesus and His message in anthropological terms. At least man, past or present, can be scientifically observed and considered. If one asks, "Who is Jesus Christ?"; the historical-critical scholar understandably portrays Him as a religious man with a God-consciousness. The "degree" of God-consciousness and the "type" of religious man would ostensibly be conditioned by the relevant facts of the matter, not to mention the interpretation given these facts by the investigator. In this way, Jesus Christ, the man, becomes the occasion for man's pathway to God. His divinity is defused in transcendental terms. Therefore He cannot be a demonstration of God's presence but only an illustration. An outgrowth of this method was the intellectualization of faith. It belongs to the prowess of the scholar to sift through the empirical material. His painstaking research and exhaustive comparisons culminating in his "Life of Jesus" represents an intellectual investment of time and talent. As well, the continued centrality of Jesus in His human form

seems to suggest that His way to God and His belief-patterns were accorded normative value. The scholar's inquiry into His person reveals the patterns and forms of faith, and presumably He becomes its paradigm. Consequently, the believer initially comes to faith through an exercise of Reason. The believer assents to Him and therefore faith becomes an augmenting of Reason's capacity. Further, the historical-critical approach not only affects the understanding of Christ's person but also the content of faith. With the credibility of the transcendent placed in doubt, faith like Jesus undergoes a this-worldly transformation. He mediates the way to God, but the content of God and of the way need to be seen in finite terms. As a result, faith becomes the ethical and moral teacher of man. Man's relation to God is keyed by the ethical teachings of Jesus Christ. This seems reasonable and intelligible in that faith cannot be seen to be openly controverting the assumed rationality of reality. The historical-critical way to Jesus Christ permits an assortment of interpretive forays into the facts of faith. It was the criticism of Martin Kähler and Albert Schweitzer which called into question the fancifulness and errancy of the "Life of Jesus" undertaking. Kähler took issue with the objective and intellectualizing assumptions which viewed Christ without the ingredient of faith's claims. And Schweitzer sought to display the purely reasonable though highly personal inventions created by the scholar's imagination. Nonetheless, the thrust of this method appears to have signalled the importance of Christ's person for faith's understanding of itself and of the world to which it relates. As

well, it has accentuated the importance of the objective grounding of faith in order to avoid fanciful inventions of a subjective nature.

However, the intricacy and centrality of His person has not exhausted itself with the empirical inquiry. As a counter-balance to the position of this theology, the nineteenth century appears to have proffered a subjective and valuational method for the interpretation of His person. Again, this method seems to exist in the wake of Reason's ascendancy as the sole arbiter of reality. It may possibly be viewed as an attempt to preserve the transcendental contents of faith. But in a sense, the method may also be seen to move "underground" into the personal and intimate experience of the believer. Schleiermacher is one of the prominent forebearers of this understanding of faith. In his Speeches to the Cultured Despisers of Religion and in The Christian Faith, he may be seen to set the tone for the subjective, personal view. Man's experience, internally valuated and understood, permits an outlet for maintaining faith's integrity in the face of the objective, scientific onslaught. Man cannot pretend to demonstrate the presence of God in the world, but he can feel and believe Him to be working there. Though tenuous, the verification of this feeling is individually obtained through the effects He bestows. In this way, the person of Jesus Christ can be seen to be the Godman in the effects of His God-consciousness upon man. In an undemonstrable manner, He possesses the power to initiate and to mediate the God-consciousness to His followers. Christ makes man aware of his absolute dependence upon the Father.

This approach appears to transpose the importance of Christ from the factual, objective sphere to the subjective, valuational. The material dimension is apparently superseded by His significance for the believer. However, the material dimension is not completely abandoned. One may possibly interpret this shift of emphasis as a reaction to the objectivity of the former method. And again, this shift may also represent a complementary additive to a one-sided analysis. Faith becomes a matter of private, personal concern. Man is called upon to dispose of faith in his own intimate way. At this point, a certain amount of concreteness and realness seems to be extracted from Him. His ultimate disposition lies in the attitude of man and in the decision he takes. The intellectualism of the historical-critical method seems to give way to the relativism of the subjective, valuational. No doubt, man retains a consciousness of the divine and the infinite, but these categories appear to be diluted with an overdose of the finite -- of man. His finitude gives substance to the content of the infinite. Indeed, this consequence does not seem unjustified or even unreasonable given the climate of opinion. If man cannot really and rationally turn to the reality of God in an intelligible and conceptual manner, it seems to follow that he will turn to an investigation of himself and of the effects of faith upon him. After all, man plays an integral part in the relevancy of faith. The problem is finding a normative content for the God-consciousness Christ mediates. Without faith's real and certain grounding in lived experience, man

presumably needs to improvise this basis. The apparent inability to organize and to normalize the improvisation results in the entailing relativism. The centrality of Christ's person is maintained, but the seed of subjectivism seems to have been sown. To explain Jesus Christ, man looks to the effects He produces within him.

Given the climate of opinion of the past century, theology has devised at least two modi operandi for inter-connecting the ground and content of faith. As the ground of faith, Jesus Christ's centrality is upheld in both approaches. Indeed, this seems to be a most basic operating assumption or "pre-understanding". To protect faith's content against becoming an idea, illusion, or mere rational assent, theology today may pick and choose from the past traditions with modifications. But faith's grounding must also be protected in its integrity. "Who is Jesus Christ?" -- man, God, or Godman? These appear to be some of the alternatives which the nineteenth century has passed onto the present. It has been the great fame (or infamy?) of Gotthold Lessing to have drawn the distinction between the choices so clearly. "Accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason." In this one sentence, Lessing has made a great stride in clarifying the present issues and problems for theology. "How can a contingent man of history maintain 'the whole weight of eternity' or the necessary content of faith?" It would seem to be the case that both modi operandi work within this simple though baffling framework. Observation shows reality to be contingent and accidental, yet Reason

assumes the content of faith to be eternal and necessary. Apparently, this distinction did not overly concern Lessing in that he understood man already to be in the possession of faith's content. For him, it is a natural phenomenon which is obtainable through the faculty of Reason. It is this function which manifests the power to extract the permanent and the necessary truths for life. While Reason may deal with the contingent and material realities, these things are only occasions or illustrations of truths or ideals which are more lasting and infinite. These latter truths remain constant and necessary even though history moves along. In this characterization, Lessing seems to have succeeded in driving a logical or a priori wedge between the ground and content of faith -- the accidental versus the necessary. If one asks Lessing, "Who is Jesus Christ?"; he would presumably retort that He is one of man's teachers. Through His insights and illuminations, man has become aware of another and more basic truth -- immortality. He is the "reliable" teacher who has made this enlightenment possible and understandable. Jesus Christ illustrates and occasions this truth. However, He does not demonstrate it. Indeed, the accidental characterization of His person cannot become the proof for the necessary truth He delivers. Lessing would vocally proclaim that one cannot really expect him to re-think and to re-interpret his entire understanding of the world because faith claims this one man to be the Godman incarnate. There is no real proof for this and to expect him to interpolate from the contingent historical facts some necessary truth is the "ugly, broad ditch" over which he

cannot leap. In part, Lessing's stand was aimed at disarming the argument from miracles as a proof for Christ's divinity. While he did not question that the biblical material may be quite correct in its assertions, the fact still remains that miracles are not part of present experience and that the narrative is not really conclusive enough. The force and the logic of Lessing's position seems terribly formidable. While a theologian may not completely agree with Lessing's interpretation, it has evidently become his responsibility for proposing an alternative interpretation to his problem. In the face of this situation, theology reiterates the who-question in regard to Jesus Christ. The two possible methods developed and utilized in the nineteenth century take on a more serious demeanour because of Lessing's resounding statement. To approach Christ's person objectively involves the risk of finalizing the split between Him and faith -- i.e., see the Wolfenbüttel Fragments or D.F. Strauss' The Life of Jesus Critically Examined. Alternatively, theology may choose to view Him subjectively and valuationally. But again, this method runs the risk of severing Him from reality and thus defusing the concreteness and application of faith's content -- i.e., see Schleiermacher. Taking the formulation of the problem defined by Lessing, theology pursues its task between these two pitfalls.

Therefore, one approach for discerning faith's inter-relationship with itself and with history is to begin with the interpretation Lessing gives to the ground and content of faith. It would seem that how one interconnects these elements will affect faith's relation to history. That is,

by deciding the internal connection of faith, the resulting understanding will affect its interpretation of history. Indeed, theology makes decisions about its understanding of the latter as it decides about the correlation between faith's content and Jesus Christ's historicity. For example, Lessing's characterization of the internal dynamics of faith in rational terms reflects his decision about the accidental nature of history. The interpretive question becomes a bit more clarified if his definition of the propositions establishes the initial ground rules for the discussion. On the one hand, faith's content presumably contains value, truth and the eternal. According to him, these things are necessary and constant in their determination and qualification. In matters of faith, Reason can evidently only deal with a sure and certain foundation which is unchangeable and constant. On the other hand, the ground of faith consists of the historical, empirical level and places the accent on the historicity of Jesus Christ. Again according to Lessing, His person partakes of the same historical probability and possibility as do all phenomena. For the purpose of clarifying and defining the theological issues, Lessing seems to provide a concise and provocative beginning. However though he presents the initial interpretation and thus sets the framework for discussion, theology reserves the right to improvise, interpolate and interpret his terms and categories. Consequently, it appears to be incumbent upon theology to deal interpretively and meaningfully with faith's historical grounding and necessary content. In the first respect, it will ostensibly answer the who-question -- "Who is Jesus

Christ?" -- in terms which reflect a decision about faith's ground. Thus for example if one follows Lessing and presumes Jesus Christ to be characterized as an accidental figure, faith's point of contact with historical life is evidently portrayed in probable and approximate terms. In Lessing's understanding, Jesus Christ is one of man's teachers. His person is important yet ancillary to the on-going nature of His message. Following on the heels of this presumption, one encounters the task of moving from Christ's accidental historicity to the assumed necessity of His message. In the second respect, theology will attempt to understand what this lasting content really is. After a decision has been rendered about the who-question -- about the historicity of Jesus Christ, theology will endeavour to interpret faith's substance and relevance for historical life. Continuing with Lessing, his decision about Jesus Christ would seem to entail some re-interpretation and retranslation of faith's meaning. Without benefit of a sure and certain demonstration of Christ's person, His message requires a comprehensive re-formulation of its transcendental, objective content into finite and rational terms. For Lessing, rational content was more desirable and comprehensible than transcendental and supernatural unknowns. Therefore, theology's problem can be seen from the perspective of two interrelated and interpretive questions -- (1) "Who is Jesus Christ?" and (2) "What is the message of faith?" -- which leads to a third question -- (3) "How does faith's internal connection (1 & 2) affect its understanding of history?" Once again returning to Lessing, his decision for Christ's accidental nature and

for faith's rational content did not disturb him, in that man as a rational creature can obtain the truth of faith even though he lives in the contingencies of life. Man with his rational faculty is the bridge between the accidental and the eternal. Lessing's "ugly, broad ditch" was an artificial problem for him since his understanding of the propositions already presuppose a solution. Armed with Reason, man can engage the accidental truths of history and discover there a sure and certain basis for his eternal happiness. With Lessing's characterizations of faith's ground and content as the embarkation point, it is possible to review theology's attempt to modify and to reconcile his position in order to bring Jesus Christ and His message together in a manner which is relevant and applicable to historical existence. But Lessing has made the exercise quite interesting. His legacy is the dreaded obstacle of the "ditch" which separates faith's ground and content. Theology's success in negotiating and bridging this pitfall will substantiate faith's connection with historical living.

As a matter of method, the approach of this paper will be to review and to comment upon representatives of late nineteenth century Protestant Liberalism, Kierkegaard, Bultmann, Tillich and Barth. The review and comment will centre around the various attempts to handle Lessing's propositions. As well, various vestiges of other theological systems in the work under consideration will also be suggested in order to point out the contextualism of past and present endeavours. In the main, the three questions posed above

will guide and limit the inquiry. On this basis, each chapter deals with (a) an introduction into the theological method, (b) an interpretation of Jesus Christ and of faith's message, (c) the effects of this understanding in relation to an understanding of history, and (d) concluding remarks.

IN THE SHADOW
OF
LESSING

ABBREVIATIONS TO FOOTNOTES

Dilthey:

Patterns = Pattern and Meaning in History

Existence = Philosophy of Existence

Harnack:

Christianity = Christianity and History

Dogma = History of Dogma

Protestantism = Thoughts on Protestantism

What? = What is Christianity?

Herrmann:

Communion = Communion with God

Systematic = Systematic Theology

MacKintosh:

Types = Types of Modern Theology

Ritschl:

J&R = Justification and Reconciliation

Troeltsch:

Absoluteness = The Absoluteness of Christianity

Die = Die Bedeutung Der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu Für Den Glauben

"Dogmatics" = "The Dogmatics of the
'Religionsgeschichtliche Schule'",
American Journal of Theology, Vol. 17
(1913) pp.1-21.

A. PROLEGOMENA TO A BEGINNING: A CLUE FROM LESSING

But to jump with that historical truth to a quite different class of truths, and to demand of me that I should form all my metaphysical and moral ideas accordingly; to expect me to alter all my fundamental ideas of the nature of the Godhead because I cannot set any credible testimony against the resurrection of Christ: if that is not a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*, then I do not know what Aristotle meant by this phrase.

Accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason. ¹

These words of Lessing set the stage for a discussion of import in the theological world of nineteenth century Liberal Protestantism. There is a clear and unmistakable line of demarcation drawn between the truths of history and those of reason. In terms of theological significance, the bifurcation deals more directly with the interrelationship of faith's Jesus Christ to the structure and ground of historical life. No doubt, certain assumptions and underlying propositions frame the ground work for the distinction made. During the course of Liberalism, prevalent conceptions of history included the characteristics of relativity, finitude, movement and temporality. This historical nature of life was seen to pervade the entire context of the human world. Man's life in the nineteenth century revealed itself to be enmeshed in the dynamics of historicity. And more, coupled with this was the pervading quality of immanentism which circumscribed the world in a self-contained and self-sufficient entity. Liberal theologians worked within the

1. Lessing, Lessing's Theological Writings, pp. 53, 54.

assumptions of this world-view and climate of opinion where, "Reason or cognition has thus become and must remain, as long as Western man's outlook persists, the unwitting arbiter of reality."¹ In contradistinction to the historical, theologians embraced the contents of the Christian faith and in particular the person of Jesus Christ. Faith made various claims regarding this person. For instance, it was claimed that He was the Incarnate Word, the revelation of God. The proof of His divinity rested upon the fact of the resurrection. Therefore in Jesus Christ, the historical world found itself penetrated and transcended by the infinite. Theology assumed the inviolability of God's eternity and thus His necessity. In the face of nineteenth century's understanding of the world and of faith's claims for Christ, Liberal theologians encountered a situation which demanded immediate attention. Lessing's dictum was assumed to demonstrate the futility of arguing for the uniqueness of Christ on the basis of transcendence. The theologians were called upon to set about to explain and to interpret this historical fact in the total context of the climate of opinion of the time. How was one able to bind together enough facts to demonstrate the claim of Christ's divinity? Indeed, how are finite and accidental truths to demonstrate, beyond doubt, the necessity and the infinity of God in time? Lessing had made it quite explicit that for him there could be no demand made to rethink and to re-interpret his

1. Azkoul, "Prolegomena to a Critique of Western Culture", Greek Orthodox Theological Review, Vols.3-4, p. 151.

metaphysical and moral conceptions of the world. Because of their very temporal and inconclusive nature, historical facts could not command the power or the persuasion to effect a metamorphosis in Lessing's world-view. It is questionable whether the Liberal theologians would disagree with the thrust of this particular declaration. Confronted with the advances of science and the power of Reason, these men aligned themselves with the order of the day. It could not be a question of demanding modern men and women to reconstruct their assumptions of reality on the basis of an historical claim based on a past fact. The quantitative accumulation of facts was not viewed as possessing the impetus to convert and to re-align modern human thinking. No, the weight of evidence and the claim to a larger portion of certainty lay with the modern climate of opinion. Surely anatomy and biology and the other human sciences possessed the ability to check, if not to refute, the claims of faith regarding the person of Christ. Theology enlisted its forces and checked its intellectual supplies for the coming manoeuvres. Faith could not be allowed to perish quietly and simply in the steady advance of Reason's progress. No doubt, Reason arbitrated the boundaries of the intelligible and rational world. Theology did not perceive its task to be the unseating of such a formidable power. Indeed, it is questionable whether Liberal theologians had harboured such a notion. The time had thus come to re-evaluate the thrust of faith and to bring it into line with the metaphysical, epistemological, and scientific views of the day. Like physics, theology possessed the potential to be

scientific. Of course, this was the order of the day. Intelligibility and rationality demanded one to be somewhat scientific. And it would seem that to be scientific not only involved an adherence to method but also an acceptance of basic and fundamental metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. In an historical world the claims of faith must be seen in their historical dimensions. This involves the tempering of faith with various measures of finitude, temporality, movement and immanentism. While faith's facts may not be able to remould the order of the day, there remained the possibility of striking a partnership. Nineteenth Century Protestantism endeavoured to negotiate the terms of this agreement on the acceptance of the pre-conditions and "pre-understandings" of the day. Striking such an agreement depended in large measure upon the role Jesus Christ could be accorded within the limits of space and time as arbitrated by Reason. This person moved into the forefront of concern and discussion because faith's claims about Him provided the stumbling-block for history's claims about relativity and faith's pronouncement about absoluteness. This difference of opinion established the basis upon which the theologian could negotiate his position. What to do with Jesus Christ, the Godman -- this became a focal point of concern and an issue demanding suitable but equitable resolution. The role of faith in any modern conception of history would be affected and tempered by the understanding and interpretation of His person. Christ becomes the centre of attention. The theologians found themselves working on the presupposition

that "accidental truths of history" could not demonstrate or prove the divinity and necessity of Christ. Nonetheless, faith revolved around His person. Theology thus set out to establish His place and to secure His abiding importance within the context of history.

Like Lessing before them, Ritschl, Herrmann, Harnack and Troeltsch were not able to leap "the ugly, broad ditch" separating historical uncertainty from faithful conclusiveness. However, these men sought accommodation and assimilation with the dominant intellectual assumptions of their day. With this in hand, they endeavoured to re-work the content of faith within the limits set by historical existence. The relevance of Jesus Christ was transposed from the ontological and metaphysical to the realm of value, significance, and meaning. His importance was seen to lie in His conveyance of an attitude of life which fulfils and completes this life. Moral value and purpose become more significant and momentous than transcendent considerations. Besides, it is a "pre-understanding" of the day that only phenomena in their empirical and perceptible embodiment can form the bedrock of hard factual knowledge. In this atmosphere, it becomes more prudent to hold speculation in abeyance in lieu of moral and purposeful considerations, understandings and interpretations. To speak of Jesus Christ from this perspective permits His treatment as an historical figure contained within the mesh of space and time reality. By avoiding speculation in regard to His divinity, theology found it possible to maintain His historicity as a flesh and blood man. The absoluteness

of His divine authority evaporates and condenses into an authority historically conditioned and qualified. In this way Christ retains the position of importance in a limited and temporalized manner. However, His centrality is maintained if nonetheless qualified. By reinterpreting the centrality of Christ in historical terms of purpose, value and meaning, theology establishes a negotiated position within the context of the modern order. Science and its related disciplines are permitted to discourse in terms of fact, data, phenomena and perception. For its own part, theology could infuse teleological determination into the mechanical and empirical discussions of Reason. Theology establishes its sphere of influence upon the categories of worth, value, meaning and purpose. But these categories are to be taken in conjunction with the historical person of Jesus Christ. Theology's claim to relevance and pertinence depends upon insuring and clarifying His role in the discernment and dispatch of the "spiritual" dimension of immanent existence. The interpretation and implementation of this second aspect of life affords faith a cognitive, intelligible and rational role in a world governed by Reason. Faith can assert itself within this area of life, taking its lead from the person of Christ, without directly confronting or challenging the role of Reason. Indeed, faith's own sphere rests upon the powers of Reason and its strictures and limitations. Reason can therefore accept faith within the fold of reality and allow it to remain sovereign and free in its discipline as long as faith observes

the guidelines and groundrules governing the rational and real from the non-rational and un-real.

The interrelationship of faith and history finds itself modified and qualified by the arbitration of Reason. Within the limits set, Ritschl, Herrmann, Harnack and Troeltsch conceived and carried out their respective theological enterprises. Their work was to set the stage for those who came after them and who were theologically nurtured and reared in the tradition of historical immanentism. Even this tradition finds itself enmeshed within the confines of space and time as arbitrated by Reason. The theological tradition was to prove itself helpful to later men in that it attempted to prepare the ground for the serious consideration of historical questions. No doubt, this is essential for the task of theology since the person of Jesus Christ is lodged within the past structures of space and time. It belongs to the influence of one particular historian who exemplifies the preparation and explication of value, purpose and meaning in history to open the discussion of this chapter. Wilhelm Dilthey provides the incentive and the structure which accepts the historicity of existence while attempting to explicate its intelligibility systematically. Similar to theology's project to explicate faith, Dilthey seeks to expound the subject matter of history. And by this attempt, Dilthey endeavours to illuminate the purposeful and structural qualities of historical life.

B. A BEGINNING:AN HISTORICAL APPROACH TO THE ORDER OF THE HUMAN WORLD:WILHELM DILTHEY

In a vein similar to that of the nineteenth century Protestant Liberals, Dilthey pursued history in order to understand and to know it. For him, understanding becomes an essential mode of perceiving the past. The possibility for it rests upon the category of meaning.

Experience in its concrete reality is made coherent by the category of meaning. This is the unity which...joins together what had been experienced either directly or through empathy. Its meaning does not lie in something outside the experiences which gives them unity but is contained in₁ them and constitutes the connections between them.

Meaning performs the task of connecting and interrelating the fibres of experience into a whole. Meaning allows one to speak of a connectedness instead of fragmented realities. This unity and wholeness attributes coherency and consistency to the realm of experience. Of equal importance, Dilthey points out that meaning does not come from outside of experiences. This would be to allow for the imposition of a pattern and meaning on historical life from somewhere other than history. Metaphysical theories and speculations are extinguished straightaway. "The significance which a fact receives as a fixed link in the meaning of the whole is a relation in life and not an intellectual one, not an insertion of reason or thought into a part of the event."² What begins to emerge is the dependence of history upon nothing outside

1. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 74.

2. Ibid., p. 75.

of itself. For Dilthey, it is approached as a self-contained entity of lived experiences¹ held together in a unity and coherence on the basis of a meaning inherent and immanent within its own structures. Historical life does not find it necessary to rely upon any premises or reasons or thoughts beyond itself. Indeed, this insight into Dilthey makes unmistakable his emphasis upon a world contained within itself. Meaning flows from the context of life. To think historically involves one in meaningful experiences "through which life becomes comprehensible."² The constituent members of the whole are connected and related in a comprehensible manner.³ "Meaning is the special relation which the parts have to the whole within life."⁴ Dilthey goes on to point out that life has no meaning beyond itself and that it means nothing other than itself.⁵ In these terms, it is not a question of looking "behind" or "beyond" life. Life produces significance and value in itself. The more pressing problem for Dilthey is the relation of meaning to understanding.⁶ He intends to make it clear that "...understanding passes from something already grasped to something new which can be understood through it. The inner relationship lies in the possibility of reproduction

1. Gritsch, "Wilhelm Dilthey and the Interpretation of History," Lutheran Quarterly, Vol. 15, p. 61f.

2. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 105.

3. Ibid., p. 106.

4. Ibid., p. 107.

5. Ibid., p. 107; (vide, Holborn, "Wilhelm Dilthey and the Critique of Historical Reason," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 11, p. 106).

6. Ibid., p. 107.

and empathy."¹ What Dilthey appears to be asserting is that one can approach the historical given the fact that man already stands within it as a man.² He is a part of the whole and participates in the meaning of that whole by his constituency in time and space. The unity and coherency of experience manifests itself because man partakes of the meaning of life which makes this wholeness possible. "The fact that the investigator of history is the same as the one who makes it, is the first condition which makes scientific history possible...."³ For Dilthey, history shows itself to be a dynamic and on-going process which involves an element of commonality. It is man who makes history and it is man who investigates it.⁴ The human being stands out as the common denominator in the historical realm. Understanding is thus not an impossible task. It is "...the rediscovery of the I in the Thou..."⁵ Meaning and understanding are created by man in the process of living in interaction with the environment, other people and things.⁶ Historical life possesses a certain inscrutable and fundamental unity which Reason cannot sift out.⁷ Meaning prevails in life because man works out his intentions and purposes there. He becomes something of a unifier, centre and principle. To think

1. Ibid., p. 107.

2. Gritsch, p. 61.

3. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 67.

4. Jenson, "Wilhelm Dilthey and a Background Problem of Theology," Lutheran Quarterly, Vol. 15, pp. 214-215.

5. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 67.

6. Ibid., p. 78.

7. Ibid., p. 73.

historically requires man to reflect upon himself and mankind.¹ He comes to an understanding of life as he becomes able to think empathically and sympathically with what has gone before.² Human life represents the content of experience and it is history which explores what this life is.³ Dilthey is not simply dealing with another academic discipline; rather he sees the subject matter as the intricacies and intimacies of human life in time.⁴ History deals with what life is because it displays its own meaningfulness and coherency. The parts stand in relation to the whole and the whole is in relation to the parts by the power of intrinsic meaning. It is this category which holds together life, its expressions and understandings.⁵

Understanding depends upon the connectedness and interrelatedness of life to its expressions and objectifications.⁶ The connection assumes the presence of man and the working out of his inner state in a meaningful and empirical manner. His interaction with the environment, people and things creates, what Dilthey calls, the "mind-affected" world.⁷ The interaction that takes place results in the creation of values and purposes.⁸ These creations come about since man is engaged in living which itself pre-

1. Ibid., p. 71.

2. Kluback, Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophy of History, pp. 46-49.

3. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 74.

4. Gritsch, p. 59.

5. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 72.

6. Holborn, pp. 103-104.

7. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 128.

8. Ibid., p. 129.

supposes the creation of meaning. Dilthey refers to this construction as "the immanent teleological character" of the system. "By this I mean an interaction inherent in the structure of a dynamic system. Historical life is creative; it constantly produces goods and values and all concepts of these are reflections of its activity."¹ Man leaves a trail of empirical expressions as he comes into contact with life. His inner motivational and intentional experiences express themselves empirically.² These expressions do not demonstrate a haphazard field of connection. Rather they form themselves into a continuum, into a system.³ The impetus and the dynamics for human action and re-action results from "... pressures and tension and the feeling of the insufficiency of the existing state of affairs..." which "...form the basis for action which is sustained by positive valuations, desirable goals and ends."⁴ Life provides the stimulus for human response which endeavours to secure itself against the on-going pressure, tension and frustration concomitant with living. What happens occurs through the process of contingency; there appears to be no necessary reasons or laws for events unfolding as they do. Man and life act and react upon one another in a type of pleasure-pain model. The obstacles and frustration inherent in life such as insufficiencies, pressure, tension, and death motivate man to

1. Ibid., p. 129.

2. Ibid., p. 101.

3. Ibid., p. 101.

4. Ibid., p. 145.

react by securing his position against such uncertainties and instabilities.¹ The immanent teleological character of life represents the on-going process of shoring-up his position against finitude, transitoriness and uncertainty. A type of struggle for survival smoulders between man and the power of life which remains beyond his immediate control. As this action and reaction recurs various values and purposes manifest themselves.² Expressions as objectifications of life resolve into systems of interaction displaying a common, general purpose and value, and these systems express themselves in such things as law, politics, religion, social and economic life, nations and cultural epochs.³ Man's relatedness with life results in organizations and expressions and objectifications which physically and perceptibly manifest the inwardness of human coping and struggling with existence.⁴ Understandings of the past are possible because these features of the objective world contain a common feature expressing the relationship between man and life.⁵ There remains a part of the "Thou" in the objective world which the "I" can experience.⁶ In this way what past ages and past epochs have left behind possess the objectification of their copings and strugglings.⁷ Throughout the change and movement in history, man remains the common denominator in his intentions with life to secure

1. Dilthey, Existence, p. 24.

2. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 123.

3. Ibid., pp. 142-151.

4. Ibid., p. 120.

5. Ibid., p. 121.

6. Gardiner (ed.), Theories of History, pp. 213-217.

7. Gritsch, p. 66.

and to assure his position.

A very dynamic and on-going expression of life and man comes into view from Dilthey's system. History reveals man's interaction with life in his bid to stabilize it against movement and change. "This is the point which separates Dilthey completely from Hegel. The real is not the rational; the real is always irrational."¹ Life moves on ambiguously. It is the human factor with the creation of fact and value² that imputes structure and stability. In a sense, life imposes a constant need upon man to come to terms with the movement and flux he finds present everywhere. The fixed and stable points which it lacks man creates and objectifies in the valuational and purposeful systems of interactions with which he surrounds himself. It appears that these systems can really be no more than sand castles attempting to withstand the full force of life's tides. Because of the continuousness and the on-goingness of man and existence, adaptations and new creations must be developed, tried and tested. Dilthey appears to be suggesting that man imputes value, purpose, meaning and ideals into life as a result of his attempts to cope with it and because he is a man. He becomes a creature of values and purposes who surrounds himself with meaning in an endeavour to establish his life. To man's Reason, Dilthey appears to add the category of meaning. In his system man becomes a two-dimensional phenomenon composed of

1. Ibid., p. 65.

2. Jenson, p. 215.

rational and valuational directives. This quality comes to light as Dilthey explains the creation of world-views. Of course, there comes into view a multiplicity of view-points, but this is to be expected given the countless variations and permutations of life.¹ However, it is a feature of each world-view that it claims to be self-exclusive and absolute; nonetheless the development and continuousness of life must call into question all such claims.² The contradiction and exclusiveness of each view can be brought into agreement and understanding if one approaches the difficulty with a sense of historical awareness.³ World-views are rooted in the fibres and contexts of life.⁴ This becomes the common ground between all world-views.⁵ A type of challenge-response-resolution pattern recurs in the human encounter.⁶ Regular repetition and generalized life-responses result in a traditional approach adopted for the handling of the repetition.⁷ Generalized life-responses attempt to create reality out of life and to make knowledge possible.⁸ Man endeavours through the method of world-view to integrate and establish relationships with existence.⁹ This becomes necessary since life approaches

1. Dilthey, Existence, p. 17.

2. Ibid., pp. 18-20.

3. Ibid., pp. 20, 39 and (vide, Holborn, pp. 113-114).

4. Ibid., pp. 21, 48, 50.

5. Ibid., p. 22.

6. Ibid., p. 22.

7. Ibid., p. 22.

8. Ibid., p. 22.

9. Ibid., p. 24, and (vide, Holborn, p. 102).

man as different, strange and frightful. But in response to this, he moves to stabilize and to secure himself against the apparent transitoriness.¹ World-views based on repeated experiences and refined through the ages seek to temper the "enigma of life" which constantly threatens.² Uniformities result from these views which seek to encapsulate and to take life.³ These uniformities impute value, meaning, and purpose to the experiences of living.⁴ Life becomes a reality and a world which achieves value and comprehensibility through the medium of man and the construction of his views. But it is important to be aware of the fact that these world-views are themselves the products of history. They are rooted in the dynamics of life and fulfil the need of man to secure his position against the relativities and uncertainties of life.⁵ They result from man's need to cope with existence and its ongoingness. Therefore, as long as life and man interact, world-views will fulfil an important role in the human "will to stability."⁶ They will provide the raw structures which import intelligibility to human consciousness.⁷ Because man and life are placed in bi-polar tension; significance, value, purpose and ideals permeate the historical world and yield a unitary, coherent and meaningful whole which unites the

1. Ibid., p. 24.

2. Ibid., p. 25.

3. Kluback, p. 65.

4. Dilthey, Existence, pp. 26-7.

5. Ibid., pp. 29-30.

6. Ibid., p. 30.

7. Holborn, pp. 101-102.

constituent members under the guidance and direction of a common point of reference. The whole comes to intelligibility through an understanding of the parts and conversely, the parts come to intelligibility through an understanding of the whole.¹ This reciprocal and contextual interrelationship permits the possibility for understanding under the pervasive rubric of meaning. World-view, life and man provide the integral components to the complex and integrated dimensions and dynamics of history. It seeks to grasp and to understand this complexity for the benefit of man, the individual, who comes to know himself.² This is the vital task of history. "Man knows himself only in history...; indeed, we all seek him in history."³ Human self-knowledge results as one inquires into the objectifications of life. In this way he grasps and understands how others have coped and how he too may approach the complexity of individual existence within the contextualism of the whole. Man is thus the germinal cell of the historical world.⁴ He figures prominently into the context of history because of his value-giving interaction with life.⁵ He creates modes and means by which to harness and to control the tides of life.⁶

History itself produces principles which are valid because they make the relations contained in life explicit. Such principles are the obligation which

1. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 106.

2. Ibid., p. 85.

3. Ibid., p. 138.

4. Ibid., p. 140.

5. Kluback, p. 57.

6. Ibid., pp. 50-51.

is based on a contract and the recognition of the dignity and value of every individual simply as a man. These truths are universally valid because they impart order to every aspect of the historical world.¹

These principles of connectedness and interrelatedness assume universal validity in that they make explicit the valuational and purposeful struggle of the individual. And further, they are universally valid because it is man who creates them.² His own dignity and value underwrite and guarantee the validity of what he creates and purposes. Through these principles, man imposes meaning and structure to the irrational experiences of life.³ He gives something of his inner motivational and intentional structure to his objectifications, to his systems of interaction, and to his all-encompassing world-view. To study these expressions is to learn about oneself in confrontation with life. This is where the significance and importance of history resides. It is in the ability of man to obtain a clearer consciousness and awareness of human striving in the face of life's ambiguities.⁴ Understanding remains a possibility because man remains throughout the principle of value and purpose and the primary actor in life's drama. Past meaning becomes present when the "Thou" of the past is fathomed out and reproduced by the "I" through a process of intuition and empathy.⁵

1. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 74.

2. Kluback, p. 66.

3. Gritsch, p. 62f.

4. Hodges, Wilhelm Dilthey, pp. 11-35.

5. Gardiner (ed.), pp. 220-225; (vide, Pannenberg, "Hermeneutics and Universal History," Journal for Theology and Church, Vol. 4, pp. 122-152; Kimmerle, "Hermeneutical Theory or Ontological Hermeneutics," Journal for Theology and Church, Vol. 4, pp. 107-121.)

Various latent and implicit themes emerge in Dilthey's approach to the order of the human world. The coping and struggling with life has already been indicated as describing the dynamics and the motivation perceived in historical activity. Of significance as well, the emphasis upon man as a creature imparting value and purpose becomes integral in that meaningful activity provides the basis for historical cognition and understanding. The past does not simply become lost; rather it empirically contains the values and purposes of a by-gone era where man was confronted with the recurrent need to cope with the transitoriness of life. To facilitate this matter, the creation of attitudes, empirically expressed in laws, religion, politics, nations, come to be developed and implemented. The world without these creations is a hostile, frightful, strange and finite realm. Indeed, because of these very qualities man resolves to soften and temper life with the principles that develop through the passage of time. By coming to an understanding of the past one also comes to understand himself. An historical awareness arises which opens the totality of life. Man calls this "bad" and that "good", but such value-judgments are themselves the products of history. By being historically aware, one comes to the consciousness of the relativity of life and its conceptions. World-views and systems of interaction are all man-made phenomena designed by the "will to stability". They are recurring but they are not eternal. Their validity depends upon the purposes and intentions of man. But then what is the overall significance of historical awareness, if all that

one discerns is the ultimate relativity and ambiguity of man's encounter with life? To this question, Dilthey offers the resounding notion of liberation and freedom from all of the dogmatic disciplines and notions which would imprison or hinder man's total experience of life.

The historical consciousness of the finitude of every historical phenomenon, of every human and social condition and of the relativity of every kind of faith, is the last step towards the liberation of man. With it man achieves the sovereignty to enjoy every experience to the full and surrender himself to it unencumbered, as if there were no system of philosophy or faith to tie him down. Life is freed from knowledge through concepts; the mind becomes sovereign over the cobwebs of dogmatic thought. Everything beautiful, everything holy, every sacrificed relived and interpreted, open perspectives which disclose some part of reality. And equally, we accept the evil, horrible and ugly, as filling a place in the world, as containing some reality which must be justified in the system of things, something which cannot be conjured away. And, in contrast to relativity, the continuity of creative forces¹ asserts itself as the central historical fact.

This appears to be the climactic fulfilment of Dilthey's historical approach. All of man's objectifications of life, systems of interaction, and world-views, can only contain a portion of life's vast diversity and totality. To be unknowingly encumbered within the framework of any such points of reference will result in the aberration of life and in a lack of realistic perspective on its kaleidoscope which possesses countless references. Historical consciousness and awareness open one to the relativity of any and all views and to the vastness of experience that lies beyond the province and dominion of any point of view. The

1. Dilthey, Patterns, pp. 167-168.

awareness of the historicity of all life and its creations liberates man from all dogmatic and doctrinaire obstinacy incumbent with the feeling of absoluteness and finality.¹ All of life's objectifications are historical phenomena conditioned by the passage of time and founded upon the common ground of life. As one comes to recognize and to acknowledge the historicalness of life, the possibility avails itself of freeing experiences from the control and circumspection of these principles. All of life is seen to have a place in the world and to be of such a nature that it cannot be conjured away. Relativity of historical phenomena assures the creative continuity of life and the freedom of man to experience the multi-dimensional complexities of life's essence. No doubt, the systems of interaction and the world-views will continue to offer logical and comprehensible direction and guidance in the world of change. But these value-laded institutions must be seen in their temporality and historicity. The world's meaning is seen to arise only in man, for he alone is open to the possibility which life accords to this value-giving creature.² Man comes to know himself in history because "man is something historical."³ History can be conceived as an educational process which brings man to maturation and fulfilment in confrontation with life. It affords the opportunity to come to consciousness and awareness of the

1. Holborn, p. 118.

2. Dilthey, Patterns, p. 168

3. Ibid., p. 168.

intricacies of existence from the perspective of human meaning.¹ History possesses the power to illuminate and to illustrate the direction of value and the course of purpose.² In this sense, it possesses an immanent teleological character, for it directs the way to life where human action and reaction are seen to create a temporary equilibrium along the path.

For Dilthey, it would appear to be the case that values and purposes represent a considerable portion of man's nature as a man. More than Reason and rationality is involved, for these qualities are not able to resolve and to move behind the essential and fundamental category of life which stimulates man to action. This aspect of the world seems to remain a thing in itself which remains beyond the grasp of man while nonetheless interacting with him. Life cannot be dissolved and dissected nor can it be analyzed and resolved. It simply is a given condition and aspect of man's being-in-the-world. But yet he reacts to it by creating meaning and expressing these creations empirically through the creation of a reality. The hostility of the world is shaded and controlled by the man-made structures of value and purpose. He can learn about the givenness of his situation as he comes to understand the meanings of the past in the present. This understanding depends upon man and upon a reconstruction of the past through empathy and intuition. A type of subjectivism appears to enter the

1. (vide, Ratenstreich, "The Ontological Status of History," American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 9, pp. 49-58.)

2. Kluback, pp. 26, 40-41.

hermeneutical task. To understand and therefore to bridge the historical distance, one intuitively the inner motivational and intentional processes on the basis of empirical constructions. The common feature is man and his coping with the world. While one does begin with the objective data, one nonetheless seeks to ferret the inner and subjective values and purposes of man individually and collectively expressed. This motivational interpretation to understanding assumes a concentrated concern on the phenomenon of man and his purposes and ideals. One must wonder (1) if this motivational approach to understanding really provides an adequate basis for coming to terms with the full import of the past and (2) if the concentration of the approach on man is really a broad enough spectrum upon which to come to terms with the diversities of history. However, the direction set by Dilthey seems to echo in the theological constructions of Liberalism.¹ The keen emphasis on man, the category of immanent meaning, the characterization of the world as potentially hostile, the use of intuition and empathy to understand, the limitation of Reason to satisfy man's quest for purpose, and finally the liberation of man from the confines of a purely dogmatic and rational world -- these themes which Dilthey incorporates into his historical approach to the order of the human world provide a format for theology's attempt to accommodate the person of Christ into the context of history. Given the historical and the emphasis upon its value and purpose, theology

1. (vide, Gogarten, "Theology and History," Journal for Theology and Church, Vol. 4, pp. 35-81.)

reiterates similar themes and features which seem to imply a perspective similar to that of Dilthey. No doubt, a refinement and a restructuring of the themes occurs in the religious context, but yet one must wonder if the aims and goals are not somewhat synonymous. Jesus Christ forms the centre of concern for theology. It becomes a question of relating His message to the reality of the present, remembering the pervasiveness and imminence of the historical. Dilthey provides man, meaning, relativity, liberation and understanding, as potential categories. Theology adds the person of Christ and His message to these in order to develop and to create an approach which considers not only man as the germinal cell of history but also Christ as the valuational cell of man.

C. THE MEANING OF CHRIST FOR THE HISTORICAL ORDER:
RITSCHL, HERRMANN, HARNACK.

The sense of the historical is also felt in the world-view developed by Ritschl, Herrmann and Harnack.¹ It would seem to be the case that their emphasis upon the

-
1. Orr, Ritschlianism, pp. 53-75; David W. Lotz, Ritschl and Luther, Abingdon Press, Nashville, 1974. Dr. Lotz re-examines the importance of Ritschl as a Luther scholar. Dr. Lotz argues that a clearer understanding and appreciation of Ritschl is acquired as one comes to know his great concern to re-discover Luther for his own day. According to Lotz, Ritschl has over-concentrated on the early Luther. In turn, this has lead him to aberrate Luther's thought. Unfortunately, it may well be the case that Dr. Lotz has not given enough space to appreciate the climate of opinion of Ritschl's day. The desire to explain faith historically as well as to play down the supra-temporality of God were quite prevalent. And possibly, Lotz should have reviewed that climate of the time in order better to suggest Ritschl's preference for the early Luther, as well as for his aberration of Luther's thought.

historical leads them to consider the value-claims and personality of Jesus Christ in contradistinction to the finiteness and movement of history. While there remains consensus regarding the flux of historical life and the immanence of Reason as the arbiter of reality, a point of reference with fixed and stationary value is offered. The propounding of this point moves theology into the domain of the moral and valuational dimensions. History must be approached from within itself since there can be no appeal to a transcendent beyond which imprints life with an indelible standard. An immanent approach to reality must deal with the problem of movement and change. Theology attempts to counter the relativism and the lack of meaning by arguing for a point of fixity and a standard of value and worth for man gripped by the tempest of history. Life's activities and movements demand direction and purpose. Theology moves to satisfy this need by concentrating upon the relevance and importance of Christ. He looms into theological exposition as the value-giving and purposing personality in the midst of apparent meaninglessness and change. By focusing upon His person, theology seeks to determine ideals and goals given by history itself.¹ The task of theology is no longer the determination and definition of the nature of Christ. Rather it attempts to present His significance and contribution to a life-consciousness aware of historical dynamics.²

1. MacKintosh, "The Liberal Conception of Jesus in its Strength and Weakness," American Journal of Theology, Vol. 16, pp. 410-425.

2. Pauck, Harnack and Troeltsch, pp. 26-27.

It would appear that in order for theology to engage in this task, it must embrace the historical as an integral component for the project at hand. Jesus Christ is seen as a concrete reality of history and as a personality having direct bearing upon the interpretation of life.¹ Harnack asserts that the centrality of Christ calls into question the bifurcation of truth suggested by Lessing.² Lessing had assumed that man possesses an innate wealth of religious truth which made supplementation by history quite unnecessary.³ But if one assumes that religious truth is not a possession, the historical categories of personality and development call Lessing's proposals into question.⁴ General ideas of truth can no longer erase the problem of historical distance.⁵ Theology begins by perceiving the influence of personalities upon historical development, discovering the place of Christ in particular. His personal significance offers a complementary balance to the category of existence.⁶ "In every religion what is sought...is a solution of the contradiction in which man finds himself...For in the former rôle he is a part of nature, dependent upon her, subject to and confined by other things; but as spirit he is moved by the impulse to maintain his independence against them."⁷ Apparently, man is perceived to exist in a state of

1. Deegan, "The Ritschlian School," Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 16, pp. 390-407.

2. Harnack, Christianity, p. 24.

3. Ibid., p. 21.

4. Ibid., pp. 24-25.

5. Harnack, Christianity, p. 9.

6. Ritschl, J&R, pp. 23-24, 30-33.

7. Ibid., p. 199.

contradiction in the world. On the one hand, he knows himself to be a component part of the whole mechanical world.¹ But on the other hand, he feels an independence from this engulfing contextualism. There exists a feeling of liberation and freedom from the subjection of the world. Man's existence can be seen as maturing within but not completely subject to the confines of nature and its immanentism. Theology seeks to explicate and to resolve the mechanical \ teleological experience of existence. He senses himself to be drawn between these dichotomous but simultaneous notions.² The paradoxical situation acquires solution in the function of religion.³ Jesus Christ stands out as the resolution to man's tense and paradoxical predicament.⁴ He functions as a mediating personality who bridges the divided experiences of man. "For His historical appearance denotes...the organizing centre of the world-whole with which the spiritual self-feeling of Christians receives its permanent and specific satisfaction..."⁵ Christ organizes historical life. He brings about satisfaction and resolution both to man's dependence upon and independence of the world. Man seeks for an organizing principle by which he can correlate and secure his position in the world void of meaning.⁶ Theology looks to the solution of this problem in the dynamic personalities of history who possess the lasting

1. Herrmann, Systematic, p. 31.

2. Ritschl, J&R, p. 502.

3. Ibid., p. 503.

4. MacKintosh, Types, pp. 148-152.

5. Ritschl, J&R, p. 593.

6. Harnack, Christianity, p. 32.

power and influence to affect and to determine the development of existence.¹ Life-forces require valuational direction and heuristic guidance.² This analysis assumes, in part, a feeling in man moving toward orientation and value.³ On his own, he does not possess ready-made solutions as Lessing had presupposed. Life's structures of meaning must be given in the context of history and man comes to a realization of his purpose and value as he focuses upon the developmental processes influenced by men.⁴ Here the person of Christ is recognized as a distinct fact.⁵ This rests upon the performance He displays as an historical personality. What He did signifies His importance.⁶ "By making the aim of His own life the aim of mankind...He is before all else the Founder of a religion and the Redeemer of men from the dominion of the world."⁷ Jesus Christ establishes a sequence of events which elevates man above the mechanical dominion of life.⁸ He authors a "spiritual religion" which brings man into contact with God as the consummation and end of creation.⁹ Material actuality finds itself complemented by the spiritual dimension. He demonstrates the mode and

1. Ibid., p. 31.

2. Schwab, "A Plea for Ritschl," American Journal of Theology, Vol. 5, pp. 27-33.

3. Ibid., pp. 35-40.

4. Herrmann, Systematic, pp. 32-33.

5. Harnack, Christianity, p. 38.

6. MacKintosh, Types, p. 161; (vide, Stuckenberg, "The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl," American Journal of Theology, p. 28, Vol. 2).

7. Ritschl, J&R, p. 414.

8. MacKintosh, Types, p. 170; (vide, Rumscheidt, Revelation and Theology, pp. 106-109.)

9. Ritschl, J&R, p. 414.

manner of life. Through His activity, vocation and exertion, new possibilities arise in history.¹ Jesus correlates His activity to the aim of mankind, and He accomplishes this task by calling all men to God.² In this exercise, He offers a self-understanding of His person. Jesus Christ in His humanity shows Himself to be "the complete self-revelation of God."³ His demonstration of the ethico-religious way of life being synonymous with the life of God⁴ represents His distinction from other men. "It follows...that, as the historical Author of this communion of men with God and with each other, Christ is necessarily unique in His own order."⁵ It is important to point out that His distinction does not rest "with any inborn qualities or powers" but with His conduct, conviction and motives.⁶ Therefore, the significance of Christ can be traced to His work and activity rather than to some undemonstrable and hidden quality in His person.⁷ In this sense His extra-ordinary personality affects the possibility of historical development. Jesus affects history through the effects of vocation, consisting of calling men to fellowship with God and with each other and of giving him dominion over the world.⁸

1. Harnack, Christianity, pp. 33-35.

2. Ritschl, J&R, p. 446.

3. Ibid., p. 436.

4. Ibid., pp. 450-451.

5. Ibid., p. 465.

6. Ibid., p. 413.

7. MacKintosh, Types, p. 142f.

8. Schwab, pp. 21-26.

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Of course, this raises the problem of apprehending the consequences of Christ now in what He did then. Because theology has taken its stand with the person, it is now required to illustrate and to point out the definite determination of this man. When one looks at the fact of Christ, one is required to focus upon His personality.¹ There one discovers the "deepest humility" united with "a purity of will."² Contained within the depths of His personality resides a self-evidencing proof and power which supplements all historical facts and possesses the over-riding ability to convince.³ The life-source and -power of this man insures and guarantees the facts and their certainty.⁴

Now we Christians hold that we know only one fact in the whole world which can overcome every doubt of the reality of God, namely, the appearance of Jesus in history, the story of which has been preserved for us in the New Testament. Our certainty of God may be kindled by many other experiences, but has ultimately its firmest basis in the fact that within the realm of history to which we ourselves belong, we encounter the man Jesus as an undoubted reality.⁵

Jesus Christ represents a point of reference for human contact with the Deity. In the complex of world-historical realities, He stands out as the one fact of undoubtable certainty in the divine revelation. The persuasiveness of this fact rests, in part, upon its basis in history which provides a point of common ground between then and now. The

1. Harnack, Christianity, p. 38.

2. Ibid., p. 37; (vide, Ritschl, J&R, pp. 45-46.)

3. Harnack, Dogma I, pp. 59, 70.

4. Rumscheidt, Revelation and Theology, pp. 76-77; (vide, Garvie, The Ritschlian Theology, p. 205.)

5. Herrmann, Communion, pp. 59-60.

historicity of His person displays an unquestionable reality which contains relevance and significance for today.¹ But there is more to this man than His factuality. There is something about His inner personality which speaks out beyond the facts. The inner quality finds expression in "...the self-evidencing picture of Jesus' inner life drawn in the New Testament [which] is capable of gripping us with all the power of a personally experienced reality."² The certainty of Christ's vocation and consequently of His person does not simply rest upon reliable evidence.³ Coupled with the factual data is the inner life which has the power to span the gap of time and space and become contemporaneous. This "self-evidencing picture" provides the basis for a personal encounter and experience. Theology does not simply press for a factual demonstration of His message and person. This only establishes the initial embarkation into the inner life. "Everything depends...on whether we really know the picture of Jesus..., and experience in him a Power which...we know ourselves completely subject. Each one of us must have this personal realization...."⁴ Simple objective and empirical demonstration will not generate the certainty and assurance of His work and self-interpretation. One must become personally involved and convinced of the power of Christ.⁵ This

1. Ibid., p. 65.

2. Herrmann, Systematic, p. 50.

3. Deegan, "Wilhelm Herrmann : A Re-assessment," Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 19, pp. 195-197.

4. Herrmann, Systematic, p. 52.

5. Ritschl, J&R, p. 593; (vide, Reardon, Liberal Protestantism, p. 36.)

subjective and personal element must accompany any and all facts.¹ On this basis, the reality of His person becomes real and actual now.² In the intimacy of the individual, Christ comes to life and guarantees that what He has done and said through His person finds its authenticity in His power to span the course of time.³ But indeed, theology does not merely portray the personal reality of Christ per se. As "the complete self-revelation of God", His person becomes a transparent medium directing one to the Power behind His inner life. As the Founder of a spiritual religion, He performs a task of mediating God to man, since this is the aim of religion.⁴ The personal experience of His self-evidencing rests upon man's decision to opt for God against the world.⁵ The doubts that linger regarding his place in the world and the aim of his earthly being find resolution in the person of Christ. "When God and everything that is sacred threatens to disappear in darkness, or our doom is pronounced;...it is then that the personality of Christ may save us."⁶ He stands within the context of history as the sign-post pointing the direction to God who remains while all else changes. Christ functions as the "Way of Knowledge" for man in the world.⁷ "In Jesus, as His historical work shows...., we

1. Garvie, pp. 203, 212.

2. Deegan, "Wilhelm Herrmann...", pp. 197-201.

3. Herrmann, Communion, pp. 65, 176-177.

4. Harnack, Christianity, pp. 39-46.

5. Herrmann, Systematic, p. 116.

6. Harnack, Christianity, p. 47.

7. Herrmann, Systematic, p. 73.

have before us the inmost will of God, to which everything is subject, and we experience it to be a power constraining and emancipating our souls."¹ The importance of Christ's position gains ascendancy as one apprehends the historical evidence of His person and appropriates this data by means of a personal realization. The dynamic triangle of man and God related through the person of Christ comes into view by the power of man's personal decision and appropriation. In the final analysis man performs a pivotal rôle in apprehending the effects of Christ within the developmental processes of history.

No doubt, this involves one in making a distinction between facts and facts. Theology does not want to grant the historian academic privilege in demonstrating and proving the person of Christ on the accumulation of evidence. It will grant that the complete story about Him contains elements which reflect the enthusiasm of the disciples.² However, one cannot illustrate the proper estimate of Christ by merely assuming the reliability of the scriptural narratives.³ Indeed, theology must admit the probablistic characterization of all such evidence.⁴ "Even to him [the historian] it appears once more to be a disadvantage that no historical judgment...ever attains anything more than probability."⁵ In this respect the characterization of

1. Herrmann, Communion, p. 137.

2. Ibid., p. 59.

3. Ibid., p. 60.

4. Ibid., p. 58.

5. Ibid., p. 60.

historical and eternal truths set by Lessing comes to the fore. The accidental truths surrounding the historical and spiritual significance of Christ do not possess the power to prove and to demonstrate. "The actual external details are always a matter of controversy; and in this sense Lessing was perfectly right when he warned against... hanging the whole weight of eternity on a spider's thread."¹ Beyond the influence of external details rests the importance of personality which transmits the spiritual purport of His life.² It is this category which links man to Christ.³ Again the point appears to be that along with the external and objective data of historical judgments, theology must also consider and accept the internal workings of the observer. Christian religion has been defined as a spiritual mode of mediation between God and man. The "highest concern" of religion is the establishment of the God/man communion.⁴ Here is the criterion of evaluation which theology also employs to discern and select the general features portraying the Christ. His importance arises from His centrality in the relationship between God and man.⁵ But this relationship is mediated in the empirical realm which serves as a means toward a spiritual end.⁶ The theological perspective has its grounding in the empirical

1. Harnack, Christianity, p. 61.

2. Ibid., p. 61; (vide, Reardon, Liberal Protestantism, p.45).

3. Ibid., p. 62.

4. Herrmann, Communion, pp. 57-58.

5. Garvie, pp. 195-203.

6. Ritschl, J&R, pp. 279-280.

actuality of Christ, but the content of the religious sphere reflects the spiritual or valuational dimension. In this respect, external details will not suffice. While providing the bedrock of inquiry, the main thrust of the investigation must be guided by the "highest concern" of religion expressed in terms of meaning. In effect, man needs to take the data at hand and decide for himself.

The value of a truly great man...consists in his increasing the value of all mankind. It is here that the highest significance of great men lies: to have enhanced, that is, to have progressively given effect to human value, to the value of that race of men which₁ has risen up out of the dull ground of Nature.¹

The dimension of worth and meaning delimits the thrust of theology's enterprise. In religion, one is concerned with increasing man's personal value and significance. Though man begins upon "the dull ground of Nature", a great man inspires mankind to arise out of this dullness and to recognize and to appreciate the full worth of himself. Jesus Christ is such a man of greatness in that He

was the first to bring the value of every human soul to light....We may take what relation to him we will: in the history of the past no one can refuse to recognize that it was he who raised humanity to this level.²

His insight and revelation of the worth of man distinguishes Him from all others. He proclaimed man's value and esteem in freedom from the confinement of Nature and in dependence upon God.³ This is the internal dimension of Christ's

1. Harnack, What?, p. 67.

2. Ibid., pp. 67-68.

3. Ibid., p. 68f; (vide, Reardon, pp. 20, 26, 30).



personality which the external data cannot hope to capture. The peripheral facts are open to interpretation and controversy, but the essential items of the Gospel which reveal its fundamental emphasis upon communion with God and man's worth are "timeless".¹ "Not only are they so; but the man to whom the Gospel addresses itself is also 'timeless', that is to say, it is the man who, in spite of all progress and development, never changes in his inmost constitution and in his fundamental relations with the external world."² The basis of commonality between the personality of Christ and the internal personal realization of His truth reflects a timeless element inherent in all men. This element remains despite the progress and development of the material, technical world. Between the human spirit and the external world a basic and primary continuum continues which finds expression and resolution in Christ. He is the man among men proclaiming the ultimate worth of all men as they stand in communion with each other and with God. This proclamation does not denounce the reality of the empirical world; it merely provides a complement of value and meaning to a context without purpose and worth.³ Theological reflection upon Christ fulfils an inward and subjective need which man experiences in his encounter with life. This need for meaning and stability finds satisfaction in the message of Him who delivers man from the dullness and instability of the world to the certainty and assurance of his personal

1. Ibid., p. 149f.

2. Ibid., p. 149.

3. Rumscheidt, pp. 81-83.

worth and dominion over it as guaranteed by God. Theology presents a personal and intimate matter of viewing which no accumulation of historical evidence can establish. In the true spirit of Lessing, it must be re-affirmed that no amount of evidence can effect the qualitative change of mind fundamental to the province of faith. What the external cannot give; the internal and personal can intimate. Indeed, to speak of the historical Christ actually involves one in a query of His inner Life and of His personal existence.¹ This remains the dimension of life's continuum beyond the scrutiny and surveillance of pure reason.² Lessing's problem thus remains in the facts of history though partially resolved in the mind of man.

The ramifications of Christ's vocation influence and affect the position of man in the world. An added determination qualifies and interprets the human phenomenon. The dull and unfeeling world dissipates while still threatening the valuational construction.³ Christ raises the issue of human worth and propagates the message that man has significance and value as he submits himself to the constraint and emancipation of God.⁴ He functions to alert man to his need for communion with God and of his inability to effect it on his own.⁵ He receives His uniqueness and distinctiveness from other great men in the performance of this task.

1. Herrmann, Communion, p. 64.

2. Ritschl, J&R, pp. 207-208.

3. Halliday, Facts and Values, p. 144.

4. Ritschl, J&R, pp. 597-599.

5. Herrmann, Communion, p. 153; (vide, Halliday, p. 143.)

What gains prominence is the Fatherhood of God and the importance of morality.¹ "Men are not so base that they can find satisfaction in the gratification and the service of their individual existence; they require convictions as to the meaning of life."² Christ's message seeks to anticipate and to satisfy this human requirement. The individual perspective requires convictions which open one outward beyond oneself. "The Gospel teaches us that we escape from a barren existence only when we are ready to live for others of our own free will."³ Meaning and value in human life deliver man from dependence upon the world to fellowship with others based upon the Fatherhood of God. Individual existence finds its complementary function in the social emphasis upon fellowship.⁴ Christ proclaims communion with God and thereby prepares man for the social dimension. "Still, however pregnant the ideas so freely bestowed upon us by the messengers of the Gospel, they can never do more than stimulate the nature that we have: they cannot transform us."⁵ The Christian message proclaims the worth of man in communion with other men and with God. But the vitality and the veracity of this proclamation rely upon the personal apprehension and appropriation of Christ. The human element in the epistemological process reveals both the subjective and personal quality involved in coming to

1. Harnack, Protestantism, p. 55; (vide, Rumscheidt, p. 81).

2. Harnack and Herrmann, The Social Gospel, p. 73.

3. Ibid., p. 145.

4. Garvie, The Ritschlian Theology, pp. 16-19.

5. Harnack and Herrmann, pp. 145-146.

faith as well as the conditionedness and limitedness of all historical phenomena. The Gospel effects a spiritual revelation in man but yet it remains part and parcel of the processes and contexts of history. Consequently, there can be no ontological metamorphosis concomitant with the adoption of faith's perspective. What does transpire is the stimulating and inspiring of man to action in conjunction with other men and God.¹ The love of neighbour and of God coupled with a recognition of what is in comparison with what ought to be provides the impetus for action.² Christian faith revealed through the person of Christ, illustrates and portrays one possible approach for man's being-in-the-world. The Christian understanding vies with other options for interpreting existence. However, theology seeks to advance its own cause by referring to the estimate of man³ and to the personal dimension of life.⁴ "For the Christian view of the world, disclosing as it does the all-inclusive moral and spiritual end of the world, which is also the proper end of God Himself, evidences itself as the perfect religion."⁵ Theology opts for the personal interpretation of life as opposed to any other view which might impair and detract from the moral and spiritual quality of existence as perceived by faith. The dependence of the worth of man and the world upon the power of God expresses theology's stand and criterion for coming to terms with the contextualism of

1. Harnack, What?, p. 300.

2. Herrmann, Faith and Morals, p. 61.

3. Ritschl, J&R, p. 211.

4. Herrmann, Faith and Morals, p. 61.

5. Ritschl, J&R, p. 211.

history, and for offering man a feeling of independence and freedom from the constraints of a mechanically conceived reality.¹ From this perspective, theology affirms the personal worth and value of each man while it looks at the personality of Christ to verify and to certify this affirmation.

As well, there are ramifications of this stance which apply to the interpretation of Christ Himself. Of immediate significance is theology's position with regard to miracle. The impact of faith's message relies upon the vocation of Christ and upon the visible motives, convictions and conduct which He displayed and which are recorded in the New Testament. For one, Harnack was quite adept at recovering the simple and plain reality of the "fifth Gospel"² of God's Fatherhood and man's worth.³ Several hundred years separate Christ from the man of today. But this is no problem since the external details of His existence are discernible and can alert one to the fact of His life and since man finds in His inner, personal life the possibility of a personal experience. Christ possesses the unique quality of standing in history and of mediating the Deity.⁴ His distinctiveness also entails the revelation of the spiritual religion which brings to light the value and worth of all men. This dimension of reality offers heuristic

1. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

2. Harnack, What? and Dogma? (vide, Capps, "Harnack and Ecumenical Discussion," Journal of Ecumenical Studies, Vol. 3, pp. 486-502.)

3. Harnack, What?, p. 14.

4. Herrmann, Systematic, pp. 77-80, 97f; (vide, Reardon, p.24.).

guidance and an ultimate point of view which facts and data are not able to support or to deny. This non-phenomenal aspect contains a subjective slant as opposed to any that might infringe on the significance of man. No doubt, such a position reveals a certain anthropocentric bias, but what is more it also reveals both the immanent grounding and the non-empirical element of faith.¹ It has been pointed out that Christianity is a world-view portraying the worth of man in conjunction with the self-end of God. Dilthey has already argued that all world-views are products of history and only present one possible way of standing in the world. Theology's emphasis upon the historicity of Christ in addition to the category of meaning reveals its bid to be another alternative. The exclusiveness of this system rests in its personal valuation and in its emancipation of man from the limits of Nature. But it would appear that theology's position on miracle betrays the system's ultimate grounding in immanence.² The past and the future seem to disappear into the present of man's concern about himself in the machinery of Nature.³ Theology does not want to represent faith as depending upon the contravening of the natural laws of empirical reality to demonstrate faith.⁴ Faith rather "sees" events in Nature as representing the work of God.⁵ "Against the approach of others that this is logically

1. For point of non-empirical content of faith vide Ritschl, J&R, pp. 222-223 and Harnack, What?, p. 300.

2. Orr, Ritschlianism, pp. 129-131.

3. Halliday, Facts and Values, pp. 97-98; (vide, Rumscheidt, pp.10,77.)

4. Herrmann, Systematic, p. 84; (vide, Orr, pp. 243-261.)

5. Ibid., p. 84.

impossible, faith cannot defend itself."¹ The logic of the situation is provided by Reason which is the arbiter of reality.² Because faith represents another aspect of the natural order,³ it cannot presume to undo the entire understanding of the empirical on the basis of miracle. Rather theology must abandon any notion of objective miracle as the in-breaking of God into the natural order.⁴ While it is discerned that the miraculous functions in the world-view of Jesus' time, such as aspect today is both unnecessary⁵ and contradictory to the laws of Nature.⁶ Man today no longer shares the conceptions of the people of the Gospel.⁷ A new world-view prevails in which law and order signify the characteristics of life. But indeed, it is possible to have a sense of the miraculous only as one is convinced by the impression and power of Christ's personality.

Every individual miracle remains historically quite doubtful, and a summation of things doubtful never leads to certainty. But should the historian...be convinced that Jesus Christ did extraordinary things, in the strict sense miraculous things, then, from the unique impression he has obtained of this person, he infers the possession by him of supernatural power. This conclusion itself belongs to the province of religious faith....⁸

Theology does not attempt to vault the "ugly, broad ditch" of Lessing by means of the miraculous.⁹ While Lessing

1. Ibid., p. 84.

2. Deegan, "Wilhelm Herrmann...", pp. 189-192; (vide, Reardon, pp. 33,35,47).

3. Ritschl, J&R, pp. 195-197.

4. Herrmann, Systematic, p. 85.

5. Herrmann, Communion, p. 180.

6. Harnack, What?, pp. 26-27.

7. Harnack and Herrmann, pp. 175-179.

8. Harnack, Dogma I, p. 65, ftnt. # 3.

9. Pauck, Harnack and Troeltsch, p. 20.

himself did not deny the possibility of miracle, he nonetheless did question the testimony of the narratives on the basis of the non-happening of the miraculous in his time.¹ The lack of first-hand experience establishes something of a stumbling-block for him. With a world-view based on law and order, theology can now seriously question and doubt the possibility of miracle both in Jesus' time as well as now. Theology does not appear to be willing to defend the miraculous on empirical grounds. Rather, one can associated the miraculous of Christ with a personal estimation of His person. This subjective evaluation lifts the discussion from the grounds of simple historical argument to the province of religious faith. On this level, facts and figures take a secondary role to the valuational dimension. Thus, on an empirical basis, Christ's miracles appear rather dubious while on a religious level, their association with Him reveal an indication of one's personal estimate of Him. This manner of interpreting the biblical witness displays the grounding of faith in the complexes and developments of history. There can be no cognitive and intelligible appeal to a factor outside of existence to demonstrate the validity of a faith which is inside history and which attempts to make life meaningful.² With the disarmament of the miraculous, a reinterpretation of Christ's death arises. Its importance becomes associated with His person and the communion which He endeavoured to establish between man and God. Death

1. Lessing, Lessing's Theological Writings, p. 55.

2. Halliday, pp. 73-77.

signifies the accomplishment of this communion.¹ It is now difficult to see this event as an expiation or sacrifice compelled by God.² What one can perceive is a turning-point in history effected by His death; it is an act which affects the moral sensitivities of mankind.³ Death marks the beginning of man's partnership with God. The resurrection must not now be seen as a proof for His accomplishment or as a necessary element of faith.⁴ Faith began at the grave; to go further than this would take one out of the realm of fact and into the sphere of speculation.⁵ Christ dealt with man and with his present condition. What concerned Him must also determine theology's task now. Faith's appeal is to the subjective element of life -- to man in his inner struggling with the external world -- where the empirical and objective lose their cogency and power to convince. Faith's sphere appeals to life's emotive and meaning category which seeks to regulate and to understand reality not only on the basis of fact but also in conjunction with ideals and goals.⁶ The understanding represents "another class" of judgments⁷ distinct from but equal to the empirical cognitions.⁸ Faith based upon Christ, who is the key to the

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1. Ritschl, pp. 542-543; (vide, Herrmann, Systematic, pp. 121-124.)
 2. Harnack, What?, pp. 156-158.
 3. Ibid., pp. 158-160.
 4. Herrmann, Systematic, pp. 125-127; (vide, Orr, pp. 46-108.)
 5. Harnack, What?, pp. 160-164.
 6. Ritschl, J&R, sec. 28, p. 203f.
 7. Ibid., p. 205.
 8. Ibid., pp. 207-208; (vide, Orr, pp. 265-279; Orr, The Ritschlian Theology, Chapter 3; Brightman, "Ritschl's Criterion of Religious Truth," American Journal of Theology, Vol. 21, pp. 212-224; Keirstead, "Metaphysical Presuppositions of Ritschl," American Journal of Theology, Vol. 9, pp. 677-718.)

Christian world-view,¹ assumes its position in the context of history while presenting itself as the organizer of experience. Like faith, Christ also enjoys participation in this complex of experience. His distinctiveness does not depend upon what He was in Himself but what He did and effected for all men.² Indeed, while miracles cannot be presumed to disrupt the causal order of reality, this same causal order provides another criteria for discerning and understanding Him. Ontological speculation must cease and desist while the observation of His work provides the data to be interpreted and understood. "The theological solution of the problem of Christ's Divinity must therefore be based upon an analysis of what He has done for the salvation of mankind in the form of His community."³ From theology's understanding of miracle; faith, Christ and His message emerge as historical phenomena founded upon the immanence of life, affecting the human attitude toward existence, making no appeal to extra-historical phenomena, and relying upon personal conviction and realization for their certainty and affirmation.

Similar to Dilthey's approach to the order of the human world, the late nineteenth century Liberal Protestantism of Ritschl, Herrmann and Harnack reveals its presentiment for man and his place in the world. Value, meaning and purpose occupy central roles in the presentation of this

1. Ibid., p. 202.

2. Rumscheidt, p. 180.

3. Ritschl, J&R, pp. 416-417.

theology. For it is on this basis that these men erect the foundation of faith. Their meaning-approach to existence entails the propounding of a Christian view of the world. Faith endeavours to explicate man's position in reality not from the categories of empirical reality but from the perspective of meaning.¹ This is the dimension of life which concerns man and demonstrates his distinction from the mechanical world. The assumption appears to be that man alone is capable of apprehending the significance of life. Within the limits of humanity, meaning arises and organizes the world. Here the historicity of Christ gains importance. Through the influence of His personality in and upon history, the true worth and value of every man has come to light. This effect is ever significant because no matter how the empirical and outside world changes and develops man within himself fundamentally requires adjustment to the reality of the external world. Like Dilthey, there is a constant dynamism between man's estimate of himself as a creature of worth and the active and neutral medium of the world where he lives. This relationship illustrates the need and the importance of Christ and His work. He attempts to regulate and to organize the happenings in life by relating them to man as a means for his ultimate fulfilment in communion with other men and God. Faith offers a point of view to the activities of life. The power and the persuasiveness of this entire framework rest upon the inner and personal life of Christ which is capable of

1. Ibid., p. 20.

becoming a present and personal experience. This capacity appears to permit the Christ of a bye-gone era to maintain the concreteness of faith's system. On the bedrock of history, faith's position began and through the person and effects of Christ it will remain there. But another pivotal point is the reality of man and his deciding to view life from the perspective of faith. Faith's relevance and significance depends upon man and the values for which he opts. Further, faith's framework underlines the limitation of empirical Reason to establish or dis-establish it. The veracity of faith begins with fact but ultimately concludes with a personal and intuitive experience and insight effected through the consequences of Christ. Empirical Reason understands the causal connections of the world. However, the religious grasp of reality builds upon this connectedness to correlate it with the unity of the world perceived by Christ. In this way the teleological dimension of the Christian world-view expresses the inclusiveness of man and world. Man utilizes Nature as a means to the realization of his partnership with God. Inclusiveness, connectedness and interrelatedness become the hallmarks of faith's position. And through these determinations man comes to an awareness and consciousness of his freedom from because of his utilization of the world as a means to his self-end. The contradictions of life dissipate through the power of the Christian view. Man stabilizes his position by means of the message of faith. The relativities and ambiguities of existence become encompassed by the values and purposes shared by man and God. Ultimately the universality of the Christian view

emerges. But unlike Dilthey, theology adheres to the absoluteness of its position. It would seem that theology admits the historicity of its system without the limitations which this entails. Instead, theology apparently places the weight of its claim upon the personality of Christ and the Power which He reveals. The fundamental constitution of man in his relations with the external world appears to insure the relevance of Christ, God and the Christian world-view for the duration of human life. But Dilthey has already argued that each and every world-view reflects the concerns, logic and values of that system alone and not those of the entire spectrum of life. The function of life resists absolute and universal domestication by any and all historical systems. Indeed, man and his need to secure his life are fundamental to all world-views. But while man devises and submits to them, life remains active and non-committal to the operations of the human mind. For in the end of the day, faith does present another set of judgments which reflect the operation of his rational copings with the life-situation. Faith represents another rational way of being-in-the-world. And ultimately faith must be regarded as another rational product of the "mind-affected" world. It must be seen as a product of history circumscribed by the indefiniteness but constancy of life. Man is a part of this and as a part he can generate meaning for the whole. And the whole can be understood in terms of its parts, but man does not represent the sum total of life. From Dilthey's perspective, faith would be seen as a selective approach to life-experiences and as a systematizing and encumbering of life with a particular set of values

and purposes. Dilthey can, no doubt, empathize with theology's endeavour to liberate man from a dull and unfeeling world. But he would undoubtedly proceed to unshackle life-experiences from the hold of faith. For Dilthey, all dimensions and experiences are real and cannot be conjured away. In his terms, liberation results not from adherence to a world-view but from the realization of the relativity of history. Therefore, theology can be seen to have both a friend and a foe in Dilthey. He provides vistas and insights into historical life, but he also maintains the relativity of all. But theology and its claim persists due to the importance of Christ's personality and His power to unite both fact and value under the auspices of His person. This is the view of theology. In the face of Dilthey's "relativity clause", it argues for the absoluteness and definitiveness of faith's position in the order of the historical world.

D. THE ABSOLUTENESS OF CHRISTIANITY AND CHRIST FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF HUMAN HISTORY: ERNST TROELTSCH

When one comes to the theological work of Troeltsch, a somewhat similar variety of thought emerges as that of Ritschl, Herrmann and Harnack. A concern to establish and to preserve the freedom and personality manifest in history displays itself. Troeltsch recognizes and appreciates the historicity of life and the change and development which this entails.¹ But he is also interested

1. Little, "Ernst Troeltsch and the Scope of Historicism," Journal of Religion, Vol. 46, pp. 343-364.

in discovering and explicating a point in history from which to perceive the values and intricacies that are affected by and affect man. Because of the seriousness with which he accepts the historical, Troeltsch is willing to admit that such a point will necessarily be an historical one. To be faithful to history does not allow one to impose or seem to impose some reality or principle from beyond as absolute.¹ What transpires in space and time reflects the limitedness and contingency of this realm. However, this ought not to dissuade one from attempting to find a sure foothold within the set limits. Indeed, Troeltsch has certain lines of thought by which he perceives the historical to yield the required protection for freedom and personality. He takes his stand in the theological circle, and from this initial point, he attempts to explicate the importance of Christ for man.² But he appears to distinguish himself from his predecessors in that he recognizes and admits, like Dilthey,³ the futility of claiming absoluteness and universality for any historical product -- even faith. Thus Troeltsch sets about to present a Christian view of the world relying upon the person of Christ and displaying a pervading sense of relativity.

To begin, it is essential to be perfectly clear on one important issue. When one speaks of Christianity's absoluteness and its place in history, it is imperative to dispose

1. Van Harvey, The Historian and the Believer, pp. 29-30.

2. Pauck, p. 67.

3. Ibid., p. 60.

of all appeals and reliances upon the supernatural.¹ "From the scientific point of view one's attitude toward the religious life of men can no longer be that of a supernatural ...defense of one's own religion...."² Christianity has attempted to subordinate history to a universal principle which is working itself out.³ However, scientific theology is aware of the fact that all historical phenomena have existence for their common denominator and that any and all claims for absoluteness and universality arise from this basis.⁴ "Nowhere is Christianity the absolute religion, an utterly unique species free of the historical conditions that comprise its environment at any given time."⁵ It is of no use to make appeal to some miraculous and supermundane dimension. Whatever Christianity claims in the way of uniqueness and absoluteness can be discerned from the environment of history. This must be the initial premise for any and all understandings which one can hope to attain.⁶ This does not abrogate the possibility of speaking about the distinctiveness of faith. One must simply admit that this quality can no longer be sustained and nourished from an extra-historical sphere. The inquiry, of necessity, leads to a re-interpretation of faith's uniqueness in terms of the environment of history. Here the claim to absoluteness

1. Ibid., p. 62.

2. Troeltsch "Dogmatics...." p. 2.

3. Troeltsch, Absoluteness, p. 66.

4. Ibid., pp. 64-65.

5. Ibid., p. 71.

6. Ibid., pp. 79-80.

finds itself in conflict with the presumed historicity of life.¹ Historicity involves relativity which is supposedly antithetical to absoluteness. But the recognition of faith to be an historical phenomenon forms the beginning-point of inquiry.² It requires a shift in conception from an either absoluteness/or relativism choice to a discernment of tendencies and lines of development.³ To discover these lines and tendencies requires the assumption of similarity through time.⁴ In approaching the investigation in this manner, one is not confronted with an inordinate plurality of choices, rather there becomes visible only a few possibilities in the religious realm.⁵ What one discerns is the importance of personality in the context of religious ideas.⁶ Of course, this feature is present in all of the major religions and the evaluation of its strongest expression and development will ultimately be based on personal and subjective grounds.⁷ But to discover this common feature is to identify a form that expresses itself "in every form of life" without coming to complete realization though directing this process.⁸ In recognizing such an historical feature,

1. Ibid., p. 83.

2. Ibid., p. 85.

3. Ibid., pp. 90-91.

4. Ibid., p. 92; (Troeltsch, "Historiography," Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 6, p. 718.)

5. Ibid., p. 92.

6. Ibid., p. 96.

7. Ibid., p. 96; (vide, Troeltsch, "Historiography," p. 719).

8. Ibid., p. 98.

"...it may well be that we will have reached the principle of normativeness and universal validity which is both common to all religions and at the same time absolute."¹ However, one must keep in mind the contingency of historical formulations and thus refrain from drawing unwarranted conclusions. The feature of personality represents a direction of movement perceived in human life and thus is coupled with a notion of growth and evolution in existence.² Personality points the direction from a heuristic assumption based on fact. This religious expression of a spiritual evolution presents an upward movement in life which refutes the apparent confusion and disarray of history;³ the same tendencies in the religious realm should issue in the "purest and most profound idea of God."⁴ This idea "...is to be sought...among the positive, historical, religious orientations and revelations."⁵ The inquiry after the absoluteness of faith works within its foundation and expression. It is not a question of imposing values and direction upon history; rather one looks to religion to try to understand what is developing spiritually in one's midst. Therefore, history shows faith to be associated with historical reality.⁶ The present investigation only confirms this while relating faith to the cultural task at

1. Ibid., p. 99.

2. Ibid., p. 100.

3. Ibid., p. 102; (vide, Troeltsch, "Historiography," p.720).

4. Ibid., p. 103.

5. Ibid., p. 103.

6. Ibid., p. 104.

hand.¹ The movement which Troeltsch perceives as a personalistic direction to the development and growth of life finds expression in Christianity. "Among the great religions, Christianity is in actuality the strongest and most concentrated revelation of personalistic religious apprehension."² This is the affirmation towards which Troeltsch has been moving. In a modern world governed by the arbitration of Reason, it is completely out of hand to affirm Christianity's relevance on the basis of a supposed supernatural grounding. This would fail to come to terms with the climate of opinion of the modern world. No, it is possible in this way to argue for faith's absoluteness. It requires the recognition of the historical basis and tendencies discernible and observable in life. The criterion of personality, no doubt, represents a personal valuation on the part of the observer, but even this has some basis in fact. The perspective one takes is a religious conviction which affirms the more profound dimensions and qualities of life to be personally experienced.³ The supernatural falls into disrepute but it is replaced by an evolutionary conception moving towards personal realization.⁴

Troeltsch conceives history as a sphere of movement.⁵ To understand this ground of life, one needs to perceive the connectedness and interrelatedness of life which expresses a

1. Ibid., pp. 104-105.

2. Ibid., pp. 111-112.

3. Ibid., p. 112.

4. Ibid., p. 157.

5. Troeltsch, "Historiography," p. 718a.

similarity and continuity throughout.¹ In history one has to do with a qualitative and valuational dimension which empirical Reason cannot grasp.² In coming to terms with history, one encounters the phenomenon of man and the effects which he produces.³

In the historical sphere nearly everything passes through the medium of consciousness, and in the last resort all turns upon the constant interaction of conscious efforts, into which even the unconscious elements tend to resolve themselves...Here, therefore, it is not permissible to reduce events to non-qualitative⁴ forces, or to explain effects by causal equivalence.

Historical systems represent "mind-affected" realities which bear the stamp of human consciousness. Troeltsch sees this aspect of the objectification of man's psychical existence, for it is there that the motives and values are conceived which are later resolved into actions and phenomena. Therefore, empirical observations utilizing mechanical laws of causation miss the mark in historical explanation. The historian must seek after the human reality and come to terms with him empathetically.

The physical world invites us to understand it by the deduction of general laws; the psychical world by a sympathetic reconstruction of the causal connexions in which the actual facts of history have taken shape ...Historical knowledge selects its materials as it may require...and seeks...to make it as intelligible as if it were part of our own experience.⁵

Grasping the distinction between historical phenomena and mechanical and natural realities brings one to the position

1. MacKintosh, Types, p. 199f.

2. Troeltsch, "Historiography," p. 719b.

3. Reist, Towards a Theology of Involvement, pp. 69-89.

4. Troeltsch, "Historiography," p. 719b.

5. Ibid., p. 720a.

of a sympathetic reconstruction. This process appears to involve the assumption that man throughout the course of time remains a common factor. When one seeks to understand what happened then, it is possible to reconstruct the action or reality assuming that given the same factors it would occur now. Indeed, this whole process of reconstruction, understanding and explanation requires man to make the past alive in the present as a part of his own experience. Historical facts and realities result because of man, and when one understands the factors that stimulated and motivated him to act then one comes to an understanding of the past. Another feature of significance here is the discussion by Troeltsch on the importance of values and ethics in history.¹ For him, a system of this sort allows for the interpretation and evaluation of history from a fixed standard.² But Troeltsch remains aware of the relativity and development³ of history when he points out that all values are ultimately the products of history.⁴ "The circle is not to be evaded, and the difficulty can be solved only by the thinker's own conviction and certainty that amid the facts of history he has really recognized the tendencies that make for ethical ideals, and that he has truly discerned the dynamic movement and progressive tendency of the historical process."⁵ While one cannot

1. Ibid., p. 722a.

2. Ibid., p. 722a.

3. Ibid., p. 720b.

4. Ibid., p. 722a; (vide, MacKintosh, Types, pp. 196-197.)

5. Ibid., p. 722a.

evade this recognition, a solution, in part, is available. The historian must exert his own power of choice and decision. Through this personal activity, he will work as if there are recognized tendencies and discernible movements which characterize life. Troeltsch describes the "as if" quality as insight and imagination.¹ However, he does recognize that this quality, though intuitionist, is nonetheless a "postulate of faith".² On this admission, the intuited standard by which life is interpreted and evaluated will only be seen in approximation.³ While progress and regression may be seen to result, the relative position of all fixed standards must be assumed.⁴ No doubt, such a system relates and connects life and is also a product of psychical powers,⁵ yet the on-goingness and movement of life remain the ultimate and absolute determination. Only by sheer will of personal conviction and certainty can the phenomenon of man harness and control the tide of life which is also the basis of existence.⁶

The line of attack for Troeltsch begins to emerge. The dynamic and on-going ground of life is the basis upon which man finds himself. As he lives, historical life develops and takes shape while always propelled and affected. Man acts and reacts and in the process he creates "mind-

1. Ibid., p. 722a.

2. Ibid., p. 722b.

3. Ibid., p. 722b.

4. Ibid., p. 722a.

5. MacKintosh, p. 198.

6. (vide, Obayashi, "Pannenberg and Troeltsch," Journal of American Academy of Religion, Vol. 38, pp. 401-419.)

affected" realities which enable him to cope with life's power. Christianity is such a reality. It is a system of ethics historically conditioned and determined. In contradistinction to the confusion of life, Christianity offers a point of view for understanding these evolutionary and developmental processes.¹ It is a system of values which heralds the importance of man while accepting the dynamics of life. From the "mind-affected" bulwark of Christianity one can survey the realm of life and perceive a unity and sense value and purpose.² Faith represents an ideal which never realizes anything more than approximation but which nonetheless signifies a teleological dimension to the process of history established upon the life-foundation.³ The position places faith within the historical realm. Here, man discerns the tendencies of religious life and decides that Christianity is the most profound expression of the personal -- a feature manifest in all. Man sees and discovers this by observing and comparing and finally by making a choice. Like Dilthey, Troeltsch perceives the conditioned and determined historicity of human relations and objectifications. His existence grows out of and develops within the relativizing and encompassing category of life. This is the source and bedrock of creativity and man. Amid apparent relativity and confusion, Troeltsch still insists that the psychical powers provide the key to

1. Reist, pp. 174-197.

2. Pauck, pp. 75-85.

3. Troeltsch, "Dogmatics," p. 9.

establishing the grounds of faith as well as its uniqueness. The historical represents the product of consciousness - of man. This is the point of commonality amidst change to which Troeltsch points. And by man, Christianity was conceived and nurtured. Its expression of the personalistic has issued from "positive, historical, religious orientations and revelations." Conceived by man, they can be understood by him since all faith is the product of history. The "religious orientation and revelations" depend upon the person of Jesus Christ. His importance rests upon His insights and valuational choices as well as upon His person.

Christianity's personalistic feature issues in a profound and pure expression of God. The religious man will stand within this faith because he "knows" that here the God of his inner experience comes into view.¹ And Jesus Christ is the man who represents "the most forceful and profound God-centered life" in which the religious man can participate.² Through the energy of His person, faith in God radiates into the world and animates and unites the people who follow Him.³ Troeltsch views Christ in the uncertainties of history and conceives of Him as the "historical mediator and revealer" of God.⁴ The historical approach removes the trappings of metaphysical speculation and focuses upon present day religious experience. Today's experience

1. Troeltsch, Absoluteness, p. 121.

2. Ibid., p. 122.

3. Ibid., p. 123.

4. Troeltsch, "Dogmatics," p. 14.

receives its powers, its vitality and its definiteness, and especially its capacity to take social organization, from the events of history leading us to God; and particularly from the prophets and Jesus. Without these sources of power and centers of concentration, personal piety could be impoverished and crippled, and the religious community would possess no center.¹

Religious experience represents another dimension of man's historical existence. The events and particularly the prophets and Christ function in a special capacity by becoming centres for religious constellations. The originality and power of these sources occupy a central position in the continuance and stimulation of their original insights and conceptions. Present religious experience depends upon the radiant power of these centres for the life-source of its piety. Without these centres, piety would suffer. The essential thing for religious experience is not dogma and idea but community and cultus through which both communion with others and faith in God result.²

Religion is a living and vital phenomenon which cannot depend upon a senseless and lifeless foundation. Communion and fellowship require a personal, motivational source which inspires and stimulates men to unite in faith. Religious life becomes chaotic and insolvent when "[t]here is no dominant rallying-point from which it can nurture its self...."³ It must be based on a real person for myth, no matter how appealing, will not suffice as the organizing point.⁴ Just as God is conceived to be a "heilige Realität",

1. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

2. Troeltsch, Die. p. 25.

3. Ibid., p. 25.

4. Ibid., p. 32.

it is essential that His "Symbol Gottes" also has a grounding in life.¹

It is for him of real significance, that an actual human being lived, fought, believed and conquered, and that from this real life a stream of power and certainty flows that reaches even him. His symbol is a real symbol for him only because there stands behind it the majesty of a transcendent real religious prophet, wherein he not only finds God illustrated, but is able to overcome his own uncertainty and acquire spiritual strength.....²

The symbol of God must be a real man who lived and fought and praised. What is more, a stream of power and certainty must flow from his life to the man of faith. The symbol is real because behind it stands an actual religious prophet in whom man not only finds God presented but also in whom he overcomes his own uncertainty. Troeltsch perceives the importance of a living and breathing person behind the community. In the historical realm, personalities predominate over ideas and values because these are only by-products of men. Christianity is also a product of the times and life of Christ. He illustrates faith in God by being an actual religious prophet whose life sends a current of power and certainty into the present.³ If man today could not recognize the person of Christ or if His historicity is decided negatively, this would mark the beginning of the end for the Christ-symbol.⁴ But the greatness of Christianity rests not in its dogma or moral law but in the centrality of a living and powerful personality whose inner motivations provide the principles for meeting religious

1. Ibid., p. 32.

2. Ibid., p. 32.

3. MacKintosh, p. 207.

4. Troeltsch, Die, p. 34.

tasks.¹ The power of Christ's personality has stimulated other strong persons to create new and old things just as He was generated by the spirit of the prophets of Israel to produce the new.² A continuum of personal spirit and stimulation connects the religious man of today with the God-centred faith of Christ who was inspired by the context of His own time. Believers can participate in the centrality of His person and in the benefits which He creates. Therefore as long as Christianity continues, the central place will belong to Him.³ The power of Christ's person and the ability of man to make this a present personal experience alleviates the problem of historical distance. Man can become certain of the authenticity of faith's claims not through empirical investigation alone but also through personal conviction based on insight and intuition into this personal system of values. A living and feeling relationship develops between Christ and the believer. Indeed, Christian faith presents a view of the world which seeks to fulfil man's need for harmony and stability.⁴ Troeltsch characterizes his conception of Christianity as "...faith in the divine regeneration of man who is alienated from God -- a regeneration effected through a knowledge of God in Christ."⁵ This is the task which he perceives Christ to be fulfilling. Through the mediation of His person, He illustrates a knowledge of God which regenerates man's communion with God.

1. Ibid., p. 43.

2. Ibid., p. 44.

3. Ibid., p. 29.

4. Troeltsch, Absoluteness, p. 137.

5. Troeltsch, "Dogmatics," p. 13.

Christ represents the central rallying-point which historical, religious life may utilize to form a constellation. In this way, the centrality of His person conceives and sustains faith through the course of time. However, one must be wary not to attempt to reduce Christianity to one historical factor or dimension. The content derived from and dependent upon Jesus reveals the particulars of faith. "[T]he essence of Christianity can be understood only as the productive power of the historical Christian religion to create new interpretations and new adaptations -- a power which lies deeper than any historical formulations which it may have produced."¹ Jesus Christ stands undoubtedly as the rallying-point and central personality for faith's conception and continuance. His essentiality in this respect is a "sozial-psychologisches Gesetz".² But hidden beneath the historical adaptations, a deeper power, something beyond demonstration but resulting in objectification, remains active. The "determinative influences of historical conditions" and the "common influences of modern spiritual conditions" affect the manner in which faith formulates itself at any given time.³ Further, it is important to point out that the context of faith represents one influence. The connectedness of history involves it in a set relation which has affected its growth and which it in turn has reacted upon. But just as the ideals and ethics of a system of values only

1. Ibid., p. 12.

2. Troeltsch, Die, p. 27; (vide, MacKintosh, p. 208.)

3. Troeltsch, "Dogmatics," p. 13.

reach approximation in life; so too the productive power of Christianity is only approximated in time. The power to create new interpretations and adaptations remains deeper than any form so far formulated. However, this power is always mediated through the person of Christ, who represents an essential part of faith based upon the lawful workings of man in society.¹

Troeltsch appears to succeed in subjecting faith to the rigours of history in a more radical manner than does Ritschl, Herrmann or Harnack.² He begins with the premise that Christian faith mediated through Christ is of significance to the life-situation. Faith's position is developed upon historical grounds where one looks for tendencies and values. Like his predecessors, he implies the importance of man because he is the dimension which makes history possible. To deal with it brings one into immediate encounter with man and with the world he produces. Undoubtedly there are overtones of Dilthey's position here, especially in regards to man. However, Troeltsch presents Christ and faith as historical phenomena which reflect a connectedness with the past and present in that they mediate and illustrate a perspective which apparently satisfies a recurrent human need. Christ illustrates faith in God, and His person provides the focal point for participation. His place is assured since man demands that his symbol of God be a living

1. Diem, Dogmatics, pp. 6-8.

2. Ibid., p. 9; (vide, Macintosh, "Troeltsch's Theory of Religious Knowledge," American Journal of Theology, Vol. 23, pp. 274-289.)

and breathing person. This personal and subjective element guarantees the certainty of His own convictions and insights.¹ It should be noted that this certainty does not come from historical inquiry but from personal conviction as a postulate of faith. Christianity functions as a shelter to gather into communion men with God. It would seem that like Ritschl et al, Troeltsch conceives faith as a manner of being in the world and as a position which is ultimately beyond empirical proof though relying upon the judgments of value. Further, Troeltsch places stronger emphasis on the historicity of faith and Christ by observing that on the one hand faith as a system of values attempts to circumscribe the whole of reality but on the other hand this same system must be observed as originating in and forming a part of this reality. The tension between absoluteness and historical individualization can never be resolved on the basis of historical evidence and fact. Indeed, the observation of contingency demonstrates the power of life to resist universal positions and principles.² The tension remains real but the individual through choice and decision can effect a temporary truce through knowledge of God in Christ. This peace comes about through the mediation of the factors of historical development and the requirements of the spiritual life. What appears to result is the attempt to portray Christianity and Christ as a means of rationally coming to grips with historical life. Ethical

1. Reist, pp. 197-201.

2. Troeltsch, "Contingency," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 4, pp. 87-89.

and valuational means are required for taming and harnessing the flux of life. Historical observation merely points out the tendency of the spiritual in the direction of a personalistic interpretation. Christianity shows tendencies in the same direction. Here one can possibly find a basis for making value-judgments about life given the correlation between man's spiritual growth and faith's historical development.¹ Yet the bare facts of the matter reveal man's struggle with life.²

Nowhere does there exist an absolute Christian ethic...There is no absolute ethical transformation of material nature or of human nature....This is the cause of that ceaseless tension which drives man onward yet gives him the sense that he can never realize his ethical ideal....Faith is the source of energy in the struggle of life, but life still remains a battle₃ which is continually renewed upon ever new fronts.

The reality of life presents the continuous tension and grasping for ethical valuation. Troeltsch portrays historical existence to be an on-going process where man receives impetus from his faith to do battle with the vagaries of life. In the end, no final outcome is possible for no ethical transformation results.⁴ Absolute values only manifest themselves in historical approximations. Like Dilthey, he perceives the continuousness of the life-process and the ultimate relativity of all systems of interaction and value which would attempt to contain this

1. Troeltsch, The Social Teachings of the Christian Church, p. 1012.

2. Ibid., p. 1013.

3. Ibid., p. 1013.

4. Lübke, "The Theory of Secularized Society," Lutheran World, Vol. 13, pp. 366-376.

power. In a manner again reminiscent of Dilthey, Troeltsch would affirm that history cannot be transcended from within.¹ There are only momentary respites in the struggle for ethical supremacy.² The struggle depends upon man and upon the source of energy available to him.

The task of the damming and controlling of the stream of historical life is thus on all sides complicated. It involves a combination of various fundamental tendencies of the ethical consciousness, and the only evidence which can ever be deduced for the decisive combinations is but a conviction of faith based on conscience and conditioned by individuality.³

This is the point at which the historical inquiry ends for Troeltsch. A conviction of faith decides the distinctiveness of the ethical tendencies of religion. The burden falls upon man and the courage which he can summon now from his own conscience. The process of value-judgments rests upon his person and his choice. The stream of historical life continues but Christ and the faith remain a possible course of attack for the task now at hand. To control and to damm present life requires the absoluteness of faith which only personal conviction can guarantee.⁴ In this view, Troeltsch takes up the position of Ritschl et al., in ascribing to life the conscious need to subjugate it.⁵ Life appears as dull and unfeeling and as forcing man into a

1. Troeltsch, Christian Thought, p. 128.

2. Ibid., p. 129.

3. Ibid., p. 127.

4. Troeltsch, "Dogmatics," p. 16; and Absoluteness, pp. 121-123.

5. Little, "Ernst Troeltsch on History, Decision and Responsibility," Journal of Religion, Vol. 48, pp. 205-234.

struggle. This negative qualification aids in stimulating them to propose a more positive and acceptable view of the world. Here it would seem, they differ with Dilthey in a matter of attitude. His investigation moves man on to an historical consciousness and awareness that will ultimately liberate him from all dogmatic thought and systems. Liberal theology desires to free man from the mechanical and non-personal machinations of the natural order. To do this they distinguish between man and Nature. The former concerns them while the latter is seen to confine. Man's struggle is "to see" himself independent of Nature. Dilthey takes a similar view. But for him, life-experiences include the good and bad, the ugly and beautiful, and the evil and horrible. Historical life is creative, and only when one takes a definite attitude does it become necessary to conjure away or to "fear" some happenings. For Dilthey, every historical experience must be open to man. In this sense, relativity is not the great evil of history, nor is the mechanical-natural view of the world. All reflect the life-experiences of man. Dilthey sees this as the basis for historical freedom and creativity. He envisions a contextualism of life while theology concentrates solely upon a contextualism of man.

E. CONCLUSION: FAITH AND THE SPIDERS' THREAD
OF HISTORY

The actual external details are always a matter of controversy; and in this sense Lessing was perfectly right when he warned us against coupling matters of the highest moment with "accidental truths of history," and hanging the whole weight of eternity on a spider's thread. But the spiritual purport of a whole life,¹ of a personality, is also an historical fact.....

The dictum of Lessing casts a long shadow. Liberal Protestantism followed his lead and admitted the impossibility of finally deciding for or against the actuality of faith's content on the basis of external fact. Attempting to reconstruct the facts of faith's beginning and development will only lead to quibbling and controversy. The probabilistic and accidental truths of history cannot be presumed to establish the "timeless" essentials of faith. Theology portrays the theme of faith to be a recurrent and constant content in the life of man. The world with its natural nexus of cause and effect encapsulates the human phenomenon. Reason tells him that he is a part of the world-machine, but yet he feels and senses himself to be independent of natural processes. Empirical data and observations do not lend credence to this religious view. On an impartial and objective level, man is unquestionably a product of nature and life. But the matter will not rest. Beside the objective evidence is to be found and considered the ability to make value-judgments based on personal conviction. Man "knows" himself to be of worth and value.

1. Harnack, Christianity, p. 61.

These are the qualities which remain beyond the province of impartial observation. Quantitative analysis does not permit qualitative change. However, man does feel meaning to be a real dimension of living. For faith, Jesus Christ announces the worth of all by being the first man to bring this feeling to consciousness and cognition. The greatness of Christ rests upon the conscious explication and living of this insight. Christ's conduct, motives, convictions, all represent visible verification of meaning's power. As a man, He stands in history and makes His mark by the benefits He bestows and by the Power He reveals. He associates the worth of man with the self-end of God. God and man are intended for communion. It is from this association that man "knows" his own value and independence from the world. The natural order becomes the means to express his significance and importance. Christ dies and thereby seals the divine intention of communion with man. The meaning of Christ's message lingers in the context of living and is open for apprehension and appropriation. One begins to appreciate His work on the basis of knowing Him as a factor in history. The empirical evidence supports the veracity of faith. But added to this must be the personal realization and conviction of Christ's inner, personal life. This dimension must be made a personal experience by the believer. As one knows Christ personally, he becomes certain and convinced of the truthfulness of His message and the Power which He illustrates. Knowledge of God in Christ provides the bulwark of the Christian world-view. The

problem of historical distance becomes non-existent in the depths of personal involvement. Christ does not deliver an idea to man which is unrelated to the reality of his life. It would seem to be the case that He verbalizes and materializes an inner, inexplicable feeling in man. The power of His personality and insight transcends the limits of time; because in Him, man recognizes and comes to awareness of something that all men "know". Personality reveals the truth of faith because man can identify and associate himself with what is common to and experienced by him. The facts of history only provide the bedrock upon which the great personalities affect the course of human affairs. Man's continual concern about himself in relation to the external world finds resolution and satisfaction in His personality. The whole weight of eternity is no longer suspended on the spider's thread of external, historical detail. The power of His personality supplements all such facts. In the end, man and his personal realization of His inner life stand as the pivotal point in deciding the truth or falsity of the matter. Faith gives man the perspective of reality which he feels to be true. The knowledge of God in Christ helps to bring to cognition this inner feeling. Man asks and faith answers. But questions and answers are framed anthropocentrically and immanently. Faith satisfies man's needs now, in the present. Dilthey developed an understanding of history which depends upon the continual presence of man. In a similar fashion, theology presents an understanding of faith. The historical world and the religious manifestations represent products of human psychical affectations. The

"mind-affected" world satisfies and creates the needs, directions, values, products and meanings in history. At the end of the day, the final disposition of faith's truth comes before the judgment seat of human volition and value-judging. Dilthey, no less than Ritschl and company, declares the sovereignty of man over the confinement and conditions of life.

The "ugly, broad ditch" over which Lessing could not jump remains. But theology has substituted another means of dealing with Lessing's warning. The "timeless" essentials of faith depend upon the "timeless" constitution of man. Faith answers the "timeless" questions of his relation to life. It accomplishes this by means of the personality of Christ. By identifying with Him and accepting His answer, man realizes and affirms the continuity between Christ's answer and his need. Personality, personal involvement and realization make contemporaneous and real what no amount of facts and figures may hope to secure. Man's present problem finds solution in the knowledge of God in Christ. On theology's behalf, Troeltsch recognizes the limitedness of this solution based upon its adoption by man and its creation in the context of history. The personality-solution must be seen as temporary. Theology may choose to ignore this fact; however, the reality of life persists in creating new obstacles and new tensions for any and all views of the world which claim absoluteness and universality. The uniting of fact and value in the person of Christ must ultimately be seen as (1) resting upon personal conviction and (2) offering only tentative and approximate

evidence in history. The relativity of all such views is the insight of Dilthey. Ritschl, Herrmann and Harnack may desire to postpone the problem, but Troeltsch remains unwavering in his commitment to the historicity of life. Change, relativity and movement are the historical phenomena to which man must adjust. Faith assists in this task but also develops because of it. The task is the constant problem for man, and to date one can only say that faith has been the answer so far.¹

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Liberal Protestant theology attempted to circumvent Lessing's problem. It was in agreement with him when it contended that external, historical facts cannot hope to support the weight of eternity. In essence, theology conceived faith to be a "timeless" content answering man's interrogation of the external world. The valuational dimension of this answer placed it beyond the perview of objectification. For theology Jesus Christ represents the personal and real culmination and fulfilment of fact and value in history. The "accidental truths of history" cannot establish the "timeless" truths of faith. Empirical and objective facts do not have a direct bearing upon the value-judgments made in faith. Lessing and Liberal Protestantism appear to agree on the matter regarding "accidental truths". Personality may provide an alternative route around Lessing's "ugly, broad ditch", but it does not provide a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*.

1. Reist, Chapter 5, and Troeltsch, Protestantism and Progress.

The "ditch" remains as well as the inherent problem of relativity and change. Personality fortified with fact is given the task of upholding the weight of eternity. This emphasis raises the question from a purely historical problem of the truth or falsity of the divinity of Christ to one of His value and meaning for man now in his present struggle with the world. But this solution is conditioned and generated by man. Man and his history are the measures of faith's content. Though personality seems to offer a basis for certainty and veracity, it must be seen as momentary and temporary. The need of man remains while the satisfaction he receives comes from historical products. The psychological slant on faith appears to result from theology's emphasis upon man and upon history's intimate connectedness to his psychical powers. But faith is an historical product also and as such it is qualified by the categories of space and time. The "accidental truths of history" also qualify as "accidental" the characterization of all historical facts and creations. The illusion of faith's absoluteness continues so long as man affirms its universality through personal conviction. Absoluteness attributed to faith derives from man and not from the category of history. The dictum of Lessing remains in force though temporarily aberrated by the introduction of personality.

Theology again finds itself struggling with the problem of Lessing -- how does one come to the certainty of faith's truth? Liberal theology proposed the route of Christ's person. But at the end of this road, it was required to

make a detour. Person of a factual nature came to mean person or personality of a value nature. Facts merely provided the stepping-stone to talk about meaning. But at the end of the road, it was required to see that even this solution rested upon a relative factor -- man and his personal conviction. Historical movement and relativity even blocked the completion of man's journey to establish faith's certainty. Theology may travel an alternative route but it must be wary of further gaps and detours, and it must also allow for the possibility that what Lessing perceived as a "ditch" may really have the dimensions of a chasm. With the threat of this portentous obstacle, the pathfinders of faith continue to risk the dangers of the abyss for the treasures of eternity. As the momentary success of Liberalism dissipates before Lessing's discovery, other theologians with their formulas for fortune brave the dangers of historical relativism and attempt to possess what Liberalism only perceived.

LESSING TO KIERKEGAARD:

A HOP, SKIP, AND A

JUMP

ABBREVIATIONS OF SK'S WORKS IN
FOOTNOTES

CUP = CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT

FT = FEAR AND TREMBLING

PA = THE PRESENT AGE

PF = PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS

TC = TRAINING IN CHRISTIANITY

Nineteenth century Protestant thought had encountered a perplexing situation. It had attempted to grasp firmly the contingencies and temporalities of history in such a way as to contain them within the rational structure of faith and therefore to mould and to control these relativising forces. However, as it became quite clear in the thought of Ernst Troeltsch, the privileged position of Christianity as the faith was to be brought under the influence and power of the same forces which faith had sought to control. The accidental and contingent character of all historical occurrence was eventually applied to the very structure of Christianity itself. Faith claimed to be rooted in the historical happening. But the very nature and consistency of history was marked by the accidental and contingent. Faith's claim to be absolute could be no more than a claim, for history appeared to contain only movement and approximation. Dilthey was quite explicit on this point. History was not to be transcended. All experience was to be founded upon the individual experiences of human beings. There could be no appeal to any transcendent or metaphysical realms. This could just simply not be known, for it was outside man's experiences. The effect of this thinking seemed to undercut the proclamation of faith which ultimately was seen to rest upon the historicity of the Godman, Jesus Christ. Faith could not intelligibly appeal to any realm of reality that might possibly lay outside of experience. Jesus Christ had to be re-interpreted in the light of this "pre-understanding". Much emphasis was put on His humanity and work as an example for man. His divinity

was lost in the non-cognitive sphere of the metaphysical and transcendent. Jesus Christ was unique not in who He was but in what He did. Faith responded to a human need when it pointed to an accidental and contingent occurrence in history. This need itself was viewed as essential and timeless because of its relation to man and as such it did not require doctrinal metaphysics for its proof. The consequence of Christ's personality was the revelation of the worth of every man. This was His insight which gave humanity value and significance in addition to its facticity. This insight assured man that his feeling of independence from the world was indeed real and human and possessing content. The human connection established Christ's importance.

It is at this juncture that the thought of Søren Kierkegaard becomes important both as a point of reaction and attack to the theological development of the late nineteenth century. SK takes up the problem of the eternal and necessary truths of faith as opposed to the accidental and contingent truths of history. His thought appears to present an avenue of hope for the statements of faith made within an historical process of relativity and change. SK moves to re-affirm the positive value and the meaningful qualities of the finitude and temporality of history, as opposed to their negative valuation. It is in the instant and in the moment with all of its change and movement that meaning and significance are contained. The accidental and temporal nature of history is not to be avoided and negativised, but it is to be affirmed and appropriated as the sphere of existence.

Time and history gain their significance and importance because of the descent of God into the realm of existence. God's choosing to reveal Himself in the Godman, Jesus Christ, in the category of time re-makes history and adds a new dimension to it through His in-breaking. Christianity claims to stand upon this divine self-revelation which SK terms the Absolute Paradox. Faith and history are then not essentially disconnected but rather they conjoin and open-up in the revelation of the eternal Deity. They are components of man's existence which, of its very nature, does not permit a logical interconnection or separation between these two. Existence is the realm of man's becoming and acting and is not to be systematized and categorized. Existence does not deal with abstraction but with the particular and the actual as it is individually encountered and experienced. Therefore the historical takes on a positive revelatory and existence-affirming quality. It is not to be avoided, for it is the very place where life is lived.

In this manner SK moves positively in drawing out the implications of the encounter between faith and history. He is able to maintain the historical claims of faith and the self-revelation of God in the particularity and finitude of time without devaluing faith and relegating Jesus Christ to the simple yet complex problem of an historical phenomenon. Christianity does not sink into the mire of relativities and temporalities to be forever speechless and without authority. Rather it achieves its strength and power from the conditions of the moment, which is itself affirmed by the claims of faith. This is precisely the case because the eternal God has revealed

Himself in space and time and has brought the eternal into the present. SK discovers the whole weight of eternity to be found in time -- the place where Lessing also searched but only to leave empty-handed.

A. ETERNAL VERSUS ACCIDENTAL TRUTHS

"Accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason."¹ In this statement by Lessing, one confronts a major problem with which SK attempts to deal.² It is from this basic proposal that the distinction is cast between the "truths of history" and the "truths of reason". Lessing argues that no matter how well an historical truth is substantiated, one is still dealing in the realm of the probable and the approximate.³ Historical argumentation cannot prove or demonstrate the essential truth contained in Christian faith. History represents the sphere of contingency and temporality while religion contains rational truths of a timeless and necessary nature.

[F]rom what Lessing has already said...it follows that there is a difference between historical proof and what can be demonstrated, where demonstration means logically deduced from self-evident premises. So then, Lessing is making another logical distinction, this time between the a posteriori 'proof' which can be adduced in support of an historical assertion,⁴ and the a priori 'demonstration' of 'eternal truths'.

Lessing draws a line of demarcation between these two realms -- that which is historical and that which is eternal.⁵ The

1. Lessing, Lessing's Theological Writing's, p. 53.

2. SK, CUP, p. 86f; (vide, Campbell, "Lessing's Problem and Kierkegaard's Answer," Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 19, p. 35).

3. Ibid., p. 88; (vide, Lessing, pp. 30-31.).

4. Campbell, p. 43.

5. Dorner, History of Protestant Theology, Vol. II, pp. 310-311.

distinction is the "ugly, broad ditch" over which he is unable to jump, for in essence these two classes of truth stand in different qualitative categories - the a posteriori and the a priori.¹ No amount of quantitative proof is able to establish a necessary, eternal truth. Quantitative abundance does not produce qualitative change. This appears to be the point which Lessing endeavours to make. To attempt to argue for the substantiation of the eternal by means of the historical represents the *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*. But it is to be noted straightaway that this distinction marks an assumption on his part -- namely, that theological truths are eternal and timeless.² As long as this assumption remains, an inseparable gulf stands between the historical embodiment of faith and the truth which it transmits.

Reason provides the means by which one is able to demonstrate the necessary truths of the eternal. Such a position implicitly contends that man already possesses a capacity for truth and that he must simply utilize it.³ Through the faculty of consciousness and rationality man holds the available means of progressing along the pathway of truth.⁴ Lessing viewed the road as a continuous and arduous journey not to be dreaded.⁵ The eternal truth categorized

1. Lessing, pp. 53-54; (vide, Sime, Lessing, Vol. II, pp. 210-212.).

2. Lessing, pp. 82 and 83, sec. 2,4.

3. Ibid., p. 101, sec. 22-26.

4. Ibid., p. 94, sec. 70-72.

5. Ibid., p. 43; (vide, Demoor, "The Problem of Revelation in Eighteenth-Century Germany: With Particular Reference to Lessing," Evang. Q., Vol. 39, p. 74; and vide, Dorner, p. 308; and vide, Sime, p. 226.).

as a priori and demonstrable has no need for the occasion or the moment of its transmission. It would appear that history only represents an illustration or an instance of what is necessary and timeless.¹ Man, the thinking creature, contains within himself the possibility for knowing the truth.² In this way the contingent and accidental characteristics of history are merely ancillary and illustrative to the immediate moment of the eternal and rational. Of itself, time is not a fundamental nor essential component in bringing to remembrance what is already implicitly possessed.³ Truth cast in eternal garb becomes a-historical. Man, the possessor of truth, is turned inward onto himself and away from the perception of the temporal. Lessing's dictum consequently draws the "ugly, broad ditch" between the historical as becoming and the eternal as being.⁴ Any point of contact is sent into an infinite digression never to be secured.

Lessing's setting of the problem may be accepted. Then the factuality of the revelatory facts is quite incidental, the real issue being concerned with the reality of the believer. In this case the Moment has ceased to be decisive, we have returned to the Socratic situation, and the fact of revelation is simply part of the mythology postulated by the believer as the mere occasion for the learning of certain eternal truths which really are known implicitly all along.⁵

Lessing does appear to begin his investigation into the truths of theology from the Socratic standpoint. SK presents this

1. Diem, Dogmatics, p. 7.

2. DeMoor, pp. 147-150.

3. Ibid., pp. 140-141.

4. Lessing, p. 31.

5. Campbell, pp. 53-54.

position and an alternative one in his Philosophical Fragments.¹ Lessing presupposes their a priori, demonstrable quality and their implicit being within the individual believer.² Revelation is reduced to an anticipatory process which brings from concealment a timeless possession. Truth does not come from outside of man but is forever inherent in his individual and collective reasoning.³ Time slips into unimportance and God is physically escorted from and taken out of His self-revelation in time.⁴

Beginning from this stance, the revelatory particulars constituting faith's truth are posited as accidental and unnecessary for its propagation. It is in this manner that the Christ of faith is irrevocably separated and wrenched from the Jesus of history -- truth takes precedence over event. The bearer of truth stands as a mere occasion for its being brought to light. Lessing appears to be arguing that the essentials of faith are a human possession which Christ merely more quickly facilitates in His work. "A better instructor must come and tear the exhausted primer from the child's hands -- Christ came."⁵ His act of "revelation" involves the bringing to consciousness of a truth that remains latent and implicit for man in the infancy of rational capability. Christ, the "better instructor," helps man along the path to rational maturity. Indeed, "the development of revealed

1. SK, PF, chapter 1.

2. Lessing, p. 83, sec. 4 and pp. 104-105.

3. Ibid., p. 36.

4. Ibid., p. 32.

5. Ibid., p. 91, sec. 53.

truths of reason, is absolutely necessary....When they were revealed they were certainly not truths of reason, but they were revealed in order to become such."¹ What may have originally been described as a mystery and as beyond comprehension acquires a very rational and intelligible demeanor in the process of time. Lessing points out that this transition from revelation to reason is "absolutely necessary". He might even say that it is inevitable given his belief in the development and maturation of man's intellectual capacity.² What seems to follow from the function of Christ is not a belief in His person but a communion with the truth He "reveals". The "religion of Christ" contradicts the Christian religion. Lessing portrays the former as "that religion which as a man he [Christ] himself recognized and practiced; which every man has in common with him...."³ Christ recognized and practiced a natural religion which acknowledges one God and which seeks to think and to act ideas in accordance with Him.⁴ This is the faith which all men have in common. But the Christian religion "is that religion which accepts it as true that he was more than a man, and makes Christ himself, as such, the object of its worship."⁵ It is this type of belief that holds Christ to be "more than a man" which Lessing wants to see as "so uncertain and ambiguous".⁶ He wants to stress the

1. Ibid., p. 95, sec. 76.

2. Sime, pp. 275-276; (vide, DeMoor, p. 143).

3. Lessing, p. 106.

4. Ibid., pp. 99-100, 104-105; (vide, Bernard, Cambridge Free Thoughts, Letter III, "Axiomata", pp. 18-58.).

5. Lessing, p. 106.

6. Ibid., p. 106.

commonality between Christ and all other men. His preference for the "religion of Christ" suggests his leaning away from the supernatural and transcendent.¹ Lessing's reason rebels against the notion that Christ is of the same essence as God.² Natural religion is so much more natural if it remains on an immanent and rational footing.³ Christ teaches man ideas worthy of God and illustrates the importance of love.⁴ His revelation must become the truth of reason. The consequences of what He says and does predominate over who He is. This situation overshadows and annihilates the bearer and draws exclusive attention onto the truth itself.⁵ Jesus as the Godman is driven into the far country of obscurity because of the contingency and temporality which encompass His existence and which qualifies it as unnecessary and accidental.⁶ The person of Christ is lost in the remembrance of His work. The historicity of revelation becomes transformed into the rational conceptualization of the believer. With the logical distinction drawn between history and the eternal, the moment of revelation, in all of its particularity and historicity, is relegated before the brilliant certainty of the timeless. Existence with its activity and individuality becomes secondary and tangential to the essentially real and universally demonstrable.

1. Ibid., p. 34.

2. Ibid., p. 54.

3. Bernard, Letter I, "The Parable," pp. 2-5.

4. Lessing, pp. 57-61, p. 28; (vide, Lessing, Nathan The Wise, Parable of the Ring, pp. 99-105.

5. SK, PF, p. lii.

6. Fuller, Easter Faith and History, pp. 32-36.

SK was not content with the regimentation and the de-historization of individual and collective existence under the auspices of the a priori and of being. He was in agreement with Lessing on the inability of offering proof for the claims of Christianity. Discovering faith's whatness presumably entails offering its historical, contextual relations in an endeavour to expose its inner essentiality to the light of day. "Supposing that we continue in this manner to prove and seek proof of the truth of Christianity, the remarkable phenomenon would finally emerge, that just when the proof for its truth had become completely realized, it would have ceased to exist as a present fact."¹ To seek and to inquire after the essence of faith places one in the role of an objective observer, where it becomes impossible to decide for or against its claims.² Further SK can also agree with Lessing that the historical, contextual data can never be more than an approximation.

[I]t is more important to have it understood and remembered that even with the most stupendous learning and persistence in research, and even if all the brains of all the critics were concentrated in one, it would still be impossible to obtain anything more than an approximation....³

This being the case, the objective observer who seeks after faith's essence but who can only discover approximations is embarked upon the quest of the impossible dream. He is seeking in objectivity what is foreign to the very nature of faith and contrary to its actuality. He is seeking to prove

1. SK, CUP, p. 32.

2. Diem, Dogmatics, p. 12.

3. SK, CUP, pp. 25-26.

it objectively. In the objective search, the campaign and struggle after its proof tends to obliterate the real and actual existence of faith in its lived and experienced singleness and particularity. The proof also beclouds the existence of the believer in his inner relation to it. Objectivity searches dispassionately without commitment which alone is able to grasp that which is sought.¹ Indeed, objective dispassionateness and approximation can continue indefinitely without final resolution.

It is not without reason that you have been praised, O wonderful objectivity, for you can do all things.... Unless this objective and accommodating temper should perhaps be in the wrong place, so that it is possibly unchristian; in that case it would naturally be a little dubious to have arrived at the truth of Christianity in this manner. Christianity is spirit, spirit is inwardness, inwardness is subjectivity, subjectivity is essentially passion, and in its maximum an infinite, personal passionate interest in one's eternal happiness.²

Christianity does not stand over and against man as merely and simply an objective phenomenon which possesses no personal, passionate and intimate interest for the observer. Rather faith maintains itself within the historical relativities as inwardness, spirit and subjectivity. As well, it is fundamentally and existentially crucial and necessary for one's eternal happiness. Faith is a matter of the utmost importance for man; it is a matter not only of objective but also of subjective, personal concern.³ It permeates the human life-structure and -reality not merely of the thinking but,

1. SK, TC, pp. 37-39.

2. SK, CUP, p. 33.

3. Johnson and Thulstrup (ed.), A Kierkegaard Critique, pp. 217-222.

more importantly, of the existing individual. Christianity is also of subjective interest to man who is not only an observer but also a participator in the truth. "All decisiveness, all essential decisiveness, is rooted in subjectivity."¹ This is the point of departure for SK from Lessing. Christianity is not simply qualified as uncertain and unimportant because of its historical embodiment and claims. Rather precisely because of this, faith is positively affirmed and presented as the decisive factor and commitment in man's existence and for his eternal happiness.² SK's concern is not with proving Christianity but with establishing its relevance for man's life.³

By placing the emphasis upon the contingent, historical and becoming rather than upon the eternal, necessary and being, SK features the truth of faith more in the light of an a posteriori inquiry.⁴ In this way the historical embodiment of Christianity matters for something as integral and component to faith's nature. Man cannot demonstrate its truth a priori, rather he must discover and grasp it within the context of the "accidental truths of history." Therefore, one is able to speak again of the Godman, Jesus Christ, as the self-revelation of God in the context of space and time.⁵ But it is precisely at this point that SK draws the limits of Reason and its objective appropriation. Reason's approach

1. SK, CUP, p. 33.

2. Johnson and Thulstrup, pp. 214-215.

3. SK, CUP, p. 18.

4. Campbell, p. 46.

5. Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom, p. 59.

to God is frustrated and stymied by its attempt to comprehend and to demonstrate the presence and existence of the Deity.¹

"But what is this unknown something with which the Reason collides (when inspired by its paradoxical passion, with the result of unsettling even man's knowledge of himself?). It is the Unknown....Let us call this unknown something: the God."² God is unknown to Reason because He stands in an absolute unlikeness to what Reason is able to conceive. Reason thinks in terms of objectivities: empirical data, facts and necessary connections. It attempts to discern the demonstrable truth of the matter.

When the question of truth is raised in an objective manner, reflection is directed objectively to the truth, as an object to which the knower is related. Reflection is not focused upon the relationship,... but upon the question of whether it is the truth to which the knower is related.³

SK here makes the point that in this mode of thinking one is more concerned with the question of truth than with the relationship to it. In this way, truth becomes an object to be analyzed and subjected to demonstration irrespective of its relationship to the observer. Indeed, this is what occurs when God is perceived as the true object of faith.⁴ By merely observing the historical remembrances of Jesus and even by arranging them into some coherent system, one is still no nearer to the proof of His Godmanhood.

1. Eller, "Faith, Fact, and Foolishness: Kierkegaard and the New Quest," J. Rel., Vol. 48, pp. 56-57.

2. SK, PF, p. 49.

3. SK, CUP, p. 178.

4. Ibid., p. 178f.

As long as I keep my hold on the proof, i.e., continue to demonstrate, the existence does not come out, if for no other reason than that I am engaged in proving it; but when I let go, the existence is there....This act of letting go...is...a contribution of mine. Must not this also be taken into account, this little moment, brief¹ as it may be -- it need not be long, for it is a leap.

The objective attempt to demonstrate the Godman-hood of Jesus is the very act which annihilates and dissolves His existence into a proof which must always remain only approximation. In the "act of letting go," existence is allowed to emerge and to express itself. This is possible because it is not demonstrable but rather it is a given; it is not logically deducible rather it is simply there.² Therefore, SK chooses to approach the matter of God's self-revelation in the mode of an inwardness which is passionately concerned not with rational universality and necessity but with the particularity and individuality of Jesus. In making this approach, SK appeals to the passionate inwardness of human subjectivity -- Christianity communicates life. On this basis, one no longer approaches Jesus as an object, rather the relationship to Him takes precedence.

When the question of truth is raised subjectively, reflection is directed subjectively to the nature of the individuals relationship; if only the mode of this relationship is in truth, the individual is in the truth even if he should happen to be thus related to what is not true. 3

Subjectivity is regarded as another mode of reflection. SK informs us that this reflection clarifies the significance of the essential truth for existence.⁴ Subjectivity reflects

1. SK, PF, p. 53.

2. Ibid., p. 50.

3. SK, CUP, p. 178.

4. Ibid., p. 178 (ftnt.).

upon the truth which affects the contents of living.¹ The What of objectivity is replaced by the How of subjectivity.² To come to life objectively is to attempt to discover its thought-form, to annul its differences and to remain in infinite indecisiveness.³ Subjectivity, on the other hand, seeks to appropriate inwardness, to retain the life-distinctions and to engage in infinite decisiveness.⁴ To be in objectivity is to be in error.⁵ Indeed, it is to decide for the object of truth as opposed to a relationship to it. But the reality of faith is a truth which demands relationship and subjectivity. Jesus Christ represents this truth.

The object of faith is hence the reality of the God-man in the sense of his existence. But existence involves first and foremost particularity, and this is why thought must abstract from existence, because the particular cannot be thought, but only the universal. The object of faith is thus God's reality in existence as a particular individual, the fact⁶ that God has existed as an individual human being.

In the process of "letting go", man dispenses with his attempt to probe and to dissect the historical reality of Jesus, an empirical object. History entails particularity and contingency. This is the place where He is to be found. The object of faith is the existence of the Godman in time, in the depths of history. And more, the objective Reason which can only think the universal can never attain the reality of God who is subject and particular.⁷ There can be no direct

1. Crites, pp. 24-28.

2. SK, CUP, p. 181.

3. Ibid., p. 181.

4. Ibid., p. 181.

5. Ibid., p. 181.

6. Ibid., p. 290.

7. Ibid., p. 178.

relationship between man and God.¹ He is not contained within the totality of the created, objective order.² Rather man's subjectivity represents his inner means to a relationship with Him.³ The non-objectivity and the subjectivity of the Deity demonstrates the futility of all attempts to appropriate Him through Reason. Man must "let go" of his objective attempts. He receives Him only in the person of Christ who has particular existence in the context of history. Here again the emphasis of SK's thought dwells upon existence and becoming in the contextual atomization of its reality. He is interested in the particular life of Jesus Christ as He dwells in the historical-ness of the real world.

Lessing's admiration for the powers of Reason to demonstrate the a priori necessities of eternal truth is played down by SK who turns his attention to the affirmation of the historical and accidental. By asserting the self-revelation of God in time and space, he provides Reason with an insurmountable stumbling-block which prohibits Reason's comprehension and apprehension.⁴ "The Reason has brought the God as near as possible, and yet he is as far away as ever."⁵ In opposition to and yet in correspondence with Reason, SK posits the faculty of faith which subjectively appropriates the sense and meaning of God's self-revelation at the limit and in fulfilment of Reason's power.⁶ Faith is not another

1. Ibid., p. 221.

2. Ibid., p. 220.

3. Ibid., pp. 220-221.

4. SK, TC, pp. 122-123.

5. SK, PF, p. 57.

6. Ibid., p. 76.

avenue to knowledge, rather it is a qualitative leap in time which passionately grasps the Unknown, God, in the Godman, Jesus Christ -- the Absolute Paradox for Reason.¹ The Paradox arises in the fact that God, who is eternal, has broken into time to exist as an individual man in the context of history.² He has come to teach man and this He does by way of a self-giving descent.³ Faith is thus man's approach to the appropriation of the Paradox.⁴ This is necessary because Reason is not able to conceive what is absolute unlikeness to itself.⁵ But yet man is nonetheless confronted with a reality in time that hinders and collides with his own reasoning capabilities.⁶ In the Godman, man is faced with the Paradox of the in-breaking of God. To speak of Him is to speak of Christ in His being-in-the-world.⁷ SK brings to the centre of discussion the centrality of Christ and the individual believer in faith's witness and proclamation. Jesus Christ as the coalescence of the eternal and the temporal, of God and man, of truth and error, stands in the middle of the discussion of Christianity. He is the Paradox which Reason approaches and yet is unable to grasp.

But can such a paradox be conceived? Let us not be overhasty in replying....The Reason will doubtless find it impossible to conceive it, could not of itself

1. Ibid., pp. 58-59.

2. McKinnon, "Believing the Paradoks," Harv. Theo. Re., Vol. 61, p. 633; See Appendix A on Reason and Paradox, p.452ff.

3. SK, PF, p. 39.

4. Crites, p. 64.

5. SK, TC, pp. 28-29.

6. Crites, p. 62.

7. Cruickshank, "Theology and Kierkegaard's 'Postscript'", Church Q., Vol. I, p. 208.

have discovered it, and when it hears it announced will not be able to understand it, sensing merely that its downfall is threatened. In so far the Reason will have much to urge against it; and yet we have on the other hand seen that Reason, in its paradoxical passion, precisely desires its own downfall. But this is what the Paradox also desires, and thus they are at bottom linked in understanding; but this understanding is present only in the moment of passion. 1

The elusiveness of Christ is due to the inability of Reason to conceive Him and thus to abstract Him out of existence.²

Reason is powerless to extract the truth from its encounter with the Paradox. It finds itself helpless and impotent and thus must await communication -- the communication of the truth which is appropriated through faith.³ The evidence of God's approach to man is empirically inconclusive to justify Reason's verdict and judgment of faith's claim. Lessing saw as well that there is no analogy in one's present experience which could count as supporting testimony to the question at hand.⁴ God's coming-into-history is a unique and objectively uncertain occurrence which is a rational ambiguity. Yet a channel of intercommunication exists between these two elements. Reason and the Paradox both desire the downfall of Reason in order to allow for the apprehending of the truth of faith. But it is important to be precise in pointing out that the Paradox in and of itself is not a logical contradiction which confounds and obliterates all coherence and intelligibility.⁵ Rather the Paradox collides with the Reason

1. SK, PF, p. 59.

2. SK, TC, pp. 124-127.

3. Johnson and Thulstrup, p. 167.

4. Campbell, p. 42; (vide, Lessing, pp. 51-56.).

5. McKinnon, "Believing...", pp. 633-636.

as an "essential paradox" which cannot be resolved and decided by an appeal to empirical, observable, objective data.¹ Given the information at hand, Reason is not capable of reaching a definitive resolution of faith's claim. The lack of resolution results from the very nature of history which is strewn with approximations. For SK, the reality and the actuality of the Godman is not a priori and is not demonstrable by the powers of Reason alone. SK restricts himself to the position that

Lessing has concealed everything in the adjective: accidental, but said only a part, so that "accidental" is here not a relatively-distinguishing predicate, but a genus-predicate: historical truths, which as such are accidental....Everything that becomes historical is accidental or contingent; it is precisely through coming into being, and thus becoming historical, that it has its moment of contingency, for contingency is precisely one factor in all becoming. Here again we have the root of the incommensurability that subsists² between an historical truth and an eternal decision.

Historical truths are accidental. History is not the realm of the necessary. Rather "zufallige" characterizes the nature of the historical, and it is within this nature that God comes to man in Christ. In the category of becoming, history is affirmed as contingent. For SK, it is the realm of the coming-into-being.³ Eternal truths as necessary already exist: they have no becoming.⁴ To discuss and reflect upon the eternal's coming into time requires further ado than simple intellectual assent or dissent. The category

1. Eller, p. 56.

2. SK, CUP, p. 90.

3. SK, PF, p. 93.

4. Ibid., "Interlude", p. 91f.

of becoming points to the same incommensurability which the Reason has in confrontation with the Paradox. There can be no fixed and final historical proof for eternal happiness. History as the sphere of existence cannot be systematized or made logical.¹ The process of becoming is antithetical to the necessity which Reason seeks to discover.²

It is to faith that SK points in his explication of the Paradox. Reason stands dumbfounded and stymied, but yet the Paradox allows dialogue and communication. Man comes to it with his Reason which discovers the perplexity of the confrontation and uncovers the absurdity of the claim that God is in Christ.³ But the Paradox is not a logical contradiction, rather it marks the limits of Reason's ability to apprehend.⁴ The Paradox in communication with Reason demands understanding.⁵ And it is in faith, the qualitative leap, that the Paradox is brought into subjective, inward and particular relation to the participant, who seeks the essential truth which provides the basis for his eternal happiness.⁶ Indeed, "the transition by which something historical and the relationship to it becomes decisive for an eternal happiness, is *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος* , a leap, both for a contemporary and for a member of some later generation."⁷ This is what eternal happiness and the How of subjectivity require.

1. SK, CUP, pp. 99f, 107f; (vide, SK, Journals, p. 175, sec. 610.).

2. Ibid., pp. 99-113.

3. SK, TC, p. 139.

4. McKinnon, "Barth's Relation to Kierkegaard: Some Further Light," Can. J. Theo., Vol. 13, p. 33.

5. Ibid., p. 34.

6. SK, Journals, p. 386f., sec. 1084.

7. SK, CUP, p. 90.

There are no easy, short-cut and objective proofs and ways to this decision. No one is in any better situation to understand the truth than anyone else. The decision is just as difficult for all. The way over Lessing's "ditch" requires a leap in confrontation with the Absolute Paradox -- a leap which Lessing could not make. While Reason has functioned in the deciphering of the empirical data and claims, it came to realize its inability to grasp that which it has pursued -- namely, the Godman.¹ The faculty of faith helps to resolve the problem of historical distance. For SK, what is known by the historian is not immediately known simply as an effect or consequence. Rather by an act of inference, an act of resolution characterized as faith, historical apprehension may occur and connection may be made and coherences realized.² Also for SK, faith functions to condition the understanding for the reception of eternal truth. It is also historical and as such demands an act of the will for it is subjective appropriation.³ This appropriation has the existential ramifications of deciding and establishing man's eternal happiness. The eternal as historical is uncertain -- it is the objective uncertainty of the Paradox.⁴ As an act of existential resolution, faith leaps to grasp and to make contemporary the essential truth of this objective uncertainty with passionate commitment and subjective inwardness.⁵ As an

1. Eller, pp. 57-64.

2. Campbell, p. 48.

3. Ibid., p. 51.

4. Crites, p. 90.

5. SK, CUP, p. 182.

act of will, faith involves a leap which is also a risk, for Reason can never of itself determine the certainty of God's self-revelation in Christ and establish contemporaneity with Him. This is the consequence of SK's insistence upon the accidental and contingent nature of history which cannot be systematized. It is always in the process of becoming.

[T]he factuality of the revelatory facts may be insisted upon for SK. In this case ordinary historical questions can be raised about them, and faith in the pre-eminent sense is sundered from the rationalist ideal of eternal truths. It must now be seen as somewhat dependent upon faith in the ordinary sense, which in turn is guided by matters of weight of evidence. Thus faith cannot be sealed off from 'natural inquiry'.¹

SK insists upon the historicity of faith's claims and upon the objectivity of God's presence in Christ. But the uniqueness and the absolute incommensurability of God's act demands more than mere intellectual assent and inquiry, for this is not able to grasp the existing truth present in the Godman. Reason must will its own re-alignment in order that the Paradox of God's historical presence might communicate its truth to man.² Reason thus brings man to the recognition of the Paradox as paradox and in so doing it is re-organized by the content of the truth.³ "[F]aith is not a form of knowledge....No knowledge can have for its object the absurdity that the eternal is historical."⁴ Reason possesses no real possibility of systematizing faith into an object of truth.

1. Campbell, p. 53.

2. Johnson and Thulstrup, pp. 179-184.

3. McKinnon, "Barth's Relation....," p. 34.

4. SK, PF, p. 76.

Life and its essential truth possess the marks of becoming and striving which resist confinement. "The principle that the existing subjective thinker is constantly occupied in striving [means]...he strives infinitely, is constantly in process of becoming."¹ This movement, dynamism and process remain beyond the grasp of objectivity. However Reason can deal quite seriously with the factual, historical questions, for Christianity does point to the eternal in time where time is taken with the utmost seriousness and gravity.² The eternal no longer stands over and against history but is now ever-breaking into the historical process, and thus in decision it can create the moment as an expression of itself.³ Time in its contingency, temporality and finiteness stands out to confront man as essential and significant for his very becoming. It is through an act of the eternal God that history is intersected.⁴ God's coming into existence -- this is the fact which SK seeks to maintain and to protect from the notions of necessity and being, which are a priori and demonstrable. History is the realm of God's self-revelation, and it is positively affirmed as the arena of His creative purpose. Therefore, it witnesses to His presence and opens itself to Reason's scrutiny and faith's subjective appropriation. In this way, SK conditions the eternal with the historical and the historical with the eternal. The appropriation process

1. SK, CUP, p. 84.

2. Bedell, "Kierkegaard's Conception of Time," J. Amer. Aca. Rel., Vol. 137, pp. 266-269.

3. Crites, p. 74.

4. SK, PF, pp. 108-109.

is effected both through Jesus Christ who brings the truth and through man who adopts the truth in subjective inwardness and passionate apprehension.

B. CHRIST AS PATTERN AND TEACHER

SK has positively affirmed the individual moment and instant to be infused with the presence and the power of the eternal. Time becomes essential because it is here that man encounters the truth, the eternal truth, which is the basis of self-understanding.¹ God has come to encounter His people in the person of Jesus Christ. It is He who provides the occasion for the discussion of the eternal in time. He is God's own self-revelation. By asserting the historicity of His presence in time, the position emerges that man is not in the possession of the truth but is rather in the need of its reception. SK parts company with Lessing at this point, for he views the truth to be a God-given commodity which can only be appropriated by faith.²

If a human being is originally in possession of the condition for understanding the Truth, he thinks that God exists in and with his own existence. But if he is in Error he must comprehend this fact in his thinking, and Recollection will not be able to help him further than to think just this. Whether he is to advance beyond this point the moment must decide (although it was already active in giving him an insight into his Error).³

Truth remains something distinct from man. His condition is one of error which entails his inability to grasp the eternal. Rather it is in the moment that man comes to move beyond error

1. SK, CUP, pp. 505-506.

2. Geismar, Lectures on the Religious Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, p. 55.

3. SK, PF, p. 25.

to the hope of appropriating the truth. The decisive moment gives him new life and he is born again.¹ The revelation, possession and maintenance of the truth are functions of God, who is the initiator of the truth-giving process.

God comes as the Teacher. Since man as the learner has not the truth but is in error, it is for the Teacher to bring what man lacks as well as for the condition for its reception.

What the Teacher can give him occasion to remember is, that he is in Error. But in this consciousness the learner is excluded from the Truth even more decisively than before, when he lived in ignorance of his Error....Now if the learner is to acquire the Truth, the Teacher must bring it to him; and not only so, but he must also give²him the condition necessary for understanding it.

Truth and error stand in counter-balanced opposition to each other. They are dialectical poles which help to mark-off the existence of man. These two poles are essential facets of the learner's historical becoming and as well time becomes a decisively significant factor for the revelation of error and the reception of truth. It is in time that the learner experiences the qualitative transition from the one to the other. The moment of transition becomes a matter of utmost significance and existential importance. But it is always the truth of the Teacher which confronts the learner. The moment is always filled with His presence and with His ever-recurring encounter. "[T]he Moment in time must have a decisive significance, so that I will never be able to forget it either in time or eternity; because the Eternal,

1. Ibid., p. 26.

2. Ibid., p. 17.

which hitherto did not exist, came into existence in this moment."¹ The Teacher shines forth in brilliance at the decisive moment when the learner moves from error to truth. But the moment of decision is only partially determined by the learner; it is always the Teacher who extends both the truth and the condition for its reception. Therefore, such a Teacher is more than a teacher. Man who is in error is not able to transform himself into the truth. All is dependent upon the necessary condition which is occasioned by Him. In this He accomplishes more than man is able to do.

All instruction depends upon the presence...of the requisite condition....It is necessary not only to transform the learner, but to recreate him before beginning to teach him. But this is something that no human being can do; if it is to be done, it must be done by God..."²

The teacher who delivers the truth is thus more than man.³ The qualitative transition from error to truth requires an act of God. Such a qualitative change produces a new creature.⁴ Therefore the Teacher must be God Himself who alone possesses the power so to act. But God gives utter and decisive significance to the moment, for in the moment God makes possible the recreation and the reformation of the learner into a qualitatively new becoming. It is a transformation and a metamorphosis that man as the learner will never be able to forget either in time or eternity. "Such a moment has a peculiar character. It is brief and

1. Ibid., p. 16.

2. Ibid., p. 18.

3. SK, TC, pp. 198-205.

4. SK, PF, p. 23.

temporal...; it is transient as all moments are; it is past....And yet it is decisive, and filled with the Eternal... It is the Fullness of Time."¹ God is affirmed to act in time and there to reveal Himself in the brief and temporal instant. It is in the act of self-revelation that time becomes meaningful because it is filled with the eternal; it is filled with God Himself.

God reveals Himself in Christ by an act of divine love. This love is His motive for action. God, the Teacher, instructs man in its meaning. The instruction is a further condition for man's own essential development and eternal happiness.

Moved by love, the God is thus eternally resolved to reveal himself. But as love is the motive so love must also be the end....His love is a love of the learner, and his aim is to win him. For it is only in love that the unequal can be made equal, and it is only in equality...that an understanding can be effected, and without a² perfect understanding the Teacher is not God....

In being moved by love, God also wills to have love returned to Him. He acts in this manner to secure the learner from error for truth. By love God descends to man in order to make him equal and to have communion with him. Equality is a condition which God establishes as a necessary requisite for the transmission and appropriation of the truth. And this moment of equality is in the Godman, Jesus Christ.³

1. Ibid., p. 22.

2. Ibid., pp. 30-31.

3. Reck, "The Christianity of Søren Kierkegaard," Can. J. Theo., Vol. 12, pp. 86-87.

Attention is again drawn to Him as the point of reference for man and for the in-breaking of God.¹ The centrality of love is also expressed in His person. Jesus Christ meets the learner as the Teacher of the truth and imparts God's love through His person and not through the consequences of His work.² He is the moment and the occasion in history for man's faithful striving after God.

SK affirms the actuality of Christ. He was a real and actual man who shared in the vicissitudes of existence.³ He is also the real and actual God who shares in the strivings of living.

In some of Kierkegaard's remarks concerning the Christ as Paradox one senses that his thought has reached a kind of plateau from which movement to new ground can be generated only with great exertion...Kierkegaard does at times seem not only intent to assert that God and man meet in⁴ the Christ, but content to leave the matter at that.

SK does not move in the direction of developing an intellectual system which rationalizes the meeting of God and man.⁵ Rather he points out the encounter and meeting without elaborate and systematic presentation of a doctrine or dogma on the union of the two natures. Such a presentation would attempt to capture objectively what only the faith leap appropriates with subjective inwardness. God is subject and must be known subjectively.⁶ The encounter in Christ, who is the truth,

1. Eller, Kierkegaard and Radical Discipleship, pp. 353-354.

2. SK, TC, pp. 30-37.

3. Sponheim, Kierkegaard on Christ and Coherence, p. 174.

4. Ibid., p. 176.

5. Geismar, p. 43.

6. SK, Journals, p. 186, sec. 620.

delivers to the learner the capacity for love when in the presence of the truth.¹ As a particular, historical person, Jesus reveals to man the ideal which God has for him. In looking at and holding onto Him, the learner comes to know who he is in his own existence.² The truth which Jesus imparts is the truth for man's existence as he is existentially and fundamentally when removed from the bondage of error. He is the pattern for human living and the one who demands imitation, if the learner is to be transformed into the truth.³ Jesus' work coalesces in His existence; He is the Pattern of life by which man is transformed and made qualitatively new.⁴ "This understanding places the work of Christ in continuity with the work God summons man to perform....And while the Christ's death may alter 'everything infinitely', it does not abolish the fact 'that he is at the same time the pattern....'"⁵ Jesus brings to man the truth of God which summons him to a new relationship. The imitatio Christi reveals to the learner the demand which God makes but also the way which He has opened for him to follow. Jesus lives the truth and He approaches man personally and historically. The existence of Christ is indivisible from His work. Reason's attempt to abstract His consequences from His person is in opposition to what it means to be historical -- to be ever in the process of becoming. And

1. Sponheim, p. 177.

2. Ibid., pp. 183-185.

3. Johnson and Thulstrup, p. 168.

4. Geismar, pp. 63-65.

5. Sponheim, p. 196.

in this life-process, He presents the possibility of obedience to the truth of God, for He has already accomplished in Himself what He holds out to man.

Now we see that it is fully as mistaken to divide the Christ's person by reference to the performance of certain function. Kierkegaard suggests that in commenting upon the significance of the Christ as pattern for the Christian: "He believes, that this pattern, if he constantly struggles to resemble it, brings him into kinship with God, a second time and into an ever closer kinship, that he does not merely have God for a creator, as all creatures have, but he has God for a brother." But quite apart from such explicit textual support one faces the fact that for Kierkegaard the Christ is precisely the God-man¹-- that in this one God and man do meet personally.

God approaches in Jesus Christ. In His person the learner is personally brought into relation with God. By means of Christ's existence, man is given the necessary directions for having a God-relationship. Jesus teaches the meaning of life -- He communicates a mode of living which unites historical man with the eternal God.² In the Fullness of time He transforms man into truth and presents him with the condition for faith whereby he holds fast to the transitions by inward appropriation.³ Confronted with the divine initiative, man is called to choose either for or against the truth.⁴ By means of faith, he subjectively takes onto himself the eternal truth and passionately chooses and decides to follow His pattern.

(INTERLUDE)

In contrast to Dilthey's insistence that "History within itself

1. Ibid., pp. 197-198.

2. SK, CUP, p. 219.

3. Croxall, "Facets of Kierkegaard's Christology," Theo. Today, Vol. 8, pp. 331-332.

4. Diem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, pp. 60-62.

cannot be transcended," one comes to the thought of SK who transforms the meaning of the present into an expression of the eternal.¹ The question of a firmly established meaning and value, which so perplexed Troeltsch, is now re-examined in a positive sense with affirmative possibilities. The apparent hopelessness of the "endless movement of the stream of history" is no longer negatively depicted. Troeltsch's search for a unifier in the historical process appears to achieve final completion. "The task of the controlling and damming of the system of historical life" is no longer a task which requires a rational though undemonstrable article of faith. History as the realm of existence and becoming has no room for purely objective controls and damms. It is positive precisely because God has brought it into inter-connection with Himself. By this divine act, man does not exist and become without personal relation to the eternal. Dilthey argued that, "History...must be understood from within. All meaning, all value, all purpose in the historical world, is rooted in the experience of individual human beings who lived at a particular time and in particular circumstances." SK can appreciate this dynamic and human interrelatedness within the context of history. Human existence consubstantially shares in its becoming. This quality depicts history's and man's interconnectedness and interrelation. History relates to individual human beings in all time and circumstances at the point of Christ. As with Dilthey, SK could see that man appropriates and apprehends the essential truth necessary for

1. Bedell, p. 267.

life in this realm. But for SK, the exercise of human subjectivity and passionate inwardness in grasping the object of faith -- an historical existence -- provides the foundation for eternal happiness. In man's act of inwardness, life takes on meaning. Added to the rational content acquired by Reason, human life leaps over the objective uncertainties to essential truth. This basic and existential project requires more than facts and empathy. Therefore, by God's divine and historical act essential truth penetrates history. Meaning, value and purpose remain concomitant with the historical process, but it is always a process which is opened by God's presence. Meaning, value and purpose are commodities which present themselves as conditioned and mediated by the Teacher who is also man's Pattern. History becomes the transitional category and medium where man is brought face to face with essential truth necessary for existence in the decisive moment when choice, decision and commitment become the order of life.¹ It is in this instance that life appropriates meaning in the presence of the eternal. God's descent into history gives each moment a special value, for to live in the moment is to be related to the eternal. The past and the present intersect and open up into the future because of the Fullness of Time.² Time, in a sense, becomes eschatological through the penetration of the divine, for by means of His descent history opens outward and upward to the possibilities He has realized in the temporal process

1. Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard, pp. 117-9.

2. Bedell, pp. 267-268.

through Christ. In the light of SK's beginning point, Troeltsch's rational project dissipates before the historical becoming of God. As the place of living-before-God, history requires no damms or controls to block and to impede its spontaneous and free movement. It always develops and happens in relation to Him who gives the truth. "[H]istorical coming into existence occurs by the operation of a relatively freely effecting cause, which in turn points ultimately to an absolutely freely effecting cause."¹ God, as the "absolutely freely effecting cause," governs the historical through the imputation of meaning realized through the person and pattern of Christ the Teacher. SK's postulation of the "freely effecting cause" is intended to maintain the elusiveness of the coming-into-existence of man. History is the realm of contingency which remains precisely because living happens freely and effectively.

This coming into existence kind of change...is not a change in essence but in being and is a transition from not existing to existing....Everything which comes into existence proves precisely by coming into existence that ²it is not necessary, for only the necessary is.

The "coming into existence kind of change" is the hallmark of the historical.³ Troeltsch was correct in arguing for contingency as that which cannot neatly be fitted into a logical system based on cause and effect and abstracted by the power of Reason. But Troeltsch erred in deducing from this contingent nature that one is thrown into the context

1. SK, PF, p. 94.

2. Ibid., p. 91.

3. Swenson, pp. 148-151.

of the negative forces of relativity. Quite to the contrary, the contingent is the positive sign of becoming which testifies to the "freely effecting cause" in the historical, for contingency allows room for freedom. And further, the contingent is always conditioned by the "absolutely freely effecting cause" which is God. The negative forces which Troeltsch feared are qualified by means of the penetration of the absolute and infinite into the process of becoming. A dialectical tension is set-up between temporal and eternal, the finite and the infinite, error and truth. History is affirmed as positive not simply because it is history but because it is the place of the divine self-revelation and the place of human appropriation and striving. Time receives the eternal and every moment stands out as a point of absolute encounter with God. SK reveals no a priori ban or "pre-understanding" against the transcendent. The immanent world of man stands face to face with the eternity of God. It is this latter world which is affirmed because it is here that God personally meets man. Thus in contrast to Dilthey and Troeltsch, SK perceives and expounds the values of history from the presence of God in it. And in agreement with them, SK rests this valuation upon the subjectivity of man and the use he makes of the moment. The whole weight of eternity is balanced upon the spider's thread of man and his passionate concern. For Dilthey and Troeltsch as for SK, man ultimately forms the bedrock of eternal happiness, and this is so whether through the process of objectivity or subjectivity.

C. INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIALITY

At the divine initiative, Jesus Christ becomes the occasion for human incorporation into the truth which makes possible his qualitative re-making and transformation.¹ Jesus Christ sets the pattern as Teacher for the imitation and appropriation of what it is to be a man before God. It is in God-relationship that man qua man develops and matures. But it is only in this relation that he also inherits the temporal and eternal. Human living and becoming achieves complementarity in the God-relationship. As well human Reason achieves re-alignment and re-organization in complementary relation with faith. Life becomes meaningful and qualitative through its augmentation from the eternal. Human becoming can be seen to strive along the finite-infinite continuum. But without the eternal, man exists as something unreal and unrelated in a world of ceaseless reflection and immobility. When the human dimension of subjectivity falls into limbo, one no longer deliberately acts but now actively deliberates. It is when objectivity and Reason attempt to be the sole arbiters of reality that man relinquishes his inwardness and passion. Reason loses sight of the contingent which is the real.² And in losing sight, Reason also fails to heed the transitional nature of existence which represents the becoming of life.³ To transform the actual as transitional into the actual as necessary belongs to the power of reflection.

1. Geismar, pp. 51-52.

2. Crites, p. 63.

3. Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, pp. 72-85.

But for SK, such a power is not the rebirth of man but his passionless eulogy.

Our age is essentially one of understanding and reflection, without passion, momentarily bursting into enthusiasm, and shrewdly relapsing into repose.... Nowadays not even a suicide kills himself in desperation. Before taking the step he deliberates so long and so carefully that he literally chokes with thought. It is even questionable whether he ought to be called a suicide, since it is really thought which takes his life. He does not die with deliberation but from deliberation. 1

Reason and objective reflection choke and exhaust the creative enthusiasm of man. He is conditioned into a reflective repose which removes the vitality and livelihood. But man is not only effected particularly, the reflective repose infects the entire fabric of the social order. Passion and enthusiasm give way and are replaced by Reason and deliberation. The tensions and dynamics of life which characterize the personal and interpersonal relations and interactions are substituted for a reflective repose which obliterates the qualitative differences.² Qualitative tensions and distances disappear and it is the loss of the subjective and the passionate which places man in untruth and error.³

The established order of things continues to exist but it is its ambiguity which satisfies our reflective and passionless age. No one, for example, wishes to do away with the power of the king, but if little by little it could be transformed into something purely fictitious every one would be quite prepared to cheer him.... People are quite prepared to leave Christian terminology untouched, but are surreptitiously aware that it involves no decisive thought. And so they remain un-⁴repentant, for after all they have destroyed nothing.

1. SK, PA, p. 3.

2. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

3. Ibid., pp. 17-19.

4. Ibid., pp. 20, 21.

The atrophy of the inward and the subjective brings about the reinterpretation of the established order while still maintaining it. The relations continue but not undisturbed and unaffected by man's loss of himself. Ambiguity and fictitiousness mark-off the interrelations, and these elements stand out because the reflective repose thrives on deliberation and not upon decision. Reason reigns but in its reign a paralysis sets in, and man succumbs to immobility and indecisiveness. "Thus our own age is essentially one of understanding, and on the average...more knowledgeable than any former generation, but it is without passion. Everyone knows a great deal, we all know which way we ought to go and all the different ways we can go, but nobody is willing to move."¹ Here is precisely the stigmatism of the reflective repose -- man is not willing to move or to decide. The static and the stationary stance of Reason has replaced the dynamic and the transitional one of real living. Existence as movement and becoming has been lost in the necessary connections and mechanics of objectivity. History as the medium of transition has been rendered impotent and immobile by the a priori and the demonstrable. The spring of life has been sapped of its dynamics -- not by any lack or insufficiency on the part of history but by man's forgetfulness of his own subjectivity in the face of the objective. But SK perceives the hope for a revival and renewal of inwardness and passion. Again, it is in the personal encounter with

1. Ibid., p. 60.

Jesus Christ that man regains his apperception of the eternal in time and of truth in opposition to error.¹

To speak of man is also to speak of Christ as He is revealed in history. His historical objectivity conditions the terms of man's personal encounter with Him.² Encounter occurs in history which is characterized by change. It is the place of the actual and is specified as transitional.³ Because of its movement and change, the historical remains uncertain and confronts man with only the possibility for truth. Life transpires in uncertainty and all human attempts to establish it on a sure and certain basis require more than historical, objective uncertainty. The firm foundation demands a break in the continuity of this approximateness. "This is the essential nature of existence;...all actual transition involves a breach of continuity, a leap."⁴ To appropriate the historical truth is decisively to engage oneself in the process of an inference-leap which seeks to hold fast to the objective uncertainty of Christ.⁵ For SK, this inference-leap is an act of faith with infinite inward passion.⁶ It involves the risk of existence. Man becomes personally and passionately involved in what meets him face to face -- the power of the eternal. But this meeting is not immediately certain or recognizable.

1. Crites, p. 62.

2. Sefler, "Kierkegaard's Religious Thought: The Three Dimensions of Subjectivity," Philosophy of Rel., Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 47-48.

3. Swenson, p. 146.

4. Ibid., p. 146.

5. Diem, p. 16.

6. SK, CUP, pp. 209-210.

[I]t now becomes easy to see that belief is not a form of knowledge, but a free act, an expression of will. It believes the fact of coming into existence, and has thus succeeded in overcoming within itself the uncertainty that corresponds to the nothingness of the antecedent non-being; it believes the "thus" of what has come into existence, and has consequently succeeded in annulling within itself the possible "how". Without denying the possibility of another "thus", this present "thus" is for belief most certain.

In so far as that which through its relation to belief becomes historical and as historical becomes the object of belief...[it] has an immediate existence, and is₁ immediately apprehended, it is not subject to error.

Faith as belief is a wilful and active expression of decision by man to leap over the inherent uncertainties of historical objectivity and to take in subjective certainty the reality of the actual not in its "how" but in its having come into existence.² Existence does not emerge out of the necessary but rather it happens. Belief is man's way of apprehending that which happens in such a manner that the occurrence has immediate presence. It is not a means to pure historical knowledge, rather it is a resolution which seeks to grasp firmly the meaning for man in his personal and existential situation. "The thing is to understand myself, to see what God really wishes me to do; the thing is to find a truth which is true for me, to find the idea for which I can live and die,"³ This truth comes out of the historical in the person of Christ. He is the truth of God and the one in whom the eternal and the

1. SK, PF, p. 103.

2. Geismar, pp. 46f, 57.

3. SK, Journals, p. 15.

temporal intersect. As the Absolute Paradox with which Reason collides, Jesus Christ can nonetheless be apprehended by the historical learner.¹ Reason possesses the capacity to ascertain the facts about Him, but it is never able to resolve His meaning into an understanding.² Rather it is for belief to transcend and to complement Reason and to take hold of His actuality and to see Him as true for me.³ As Teacher and Pattern, He becomes contemporaneous with the learner through passionate inwardness in the face of His objective uncertainty.⁴ Christ delivers the truth and in delivering it He lives the truth which is God's gift and man's fulfilment.⁵ Therefore, Christ reveals its existential function and relevance as opposed to its reflective consideration and indecisiveness. The lived and experienced truth of Christ informs man's life and conditions his becoming.⁶ Although man thinks and is rational, his existing ought not to be simply adjudged in terms of thought and deliberation.⁷

Hence the point is not to think truth but to live in the truth. This means that truth is no longer to be conceived as an objective statement about certain relations of being, but as a form of existence in which such relations are actualized. Hence the truth..."is something related to the knower, who is essentially an existing individual, and that all real insight is essentially related to that which exists and to experience itself." Before the truth...implies a process which is never complete. Man always remains in the position of one who strives.... 8

1. SK, CUP, pp. 512-513.

2. Ibid., p. 206.

3. Diem, Dogmatics, p. 20.

4. Crites, pp. 90-91.

5. Malantschuk, pp. 94-98.

6. SK, Journals, p. 16f.

7. SK, CUP, pp. 312-322.

8. Diem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, p. 38.

Truth for SK stands out not only as objectivity but also as subjectivity. It is personal and existential and actualizes itself in man's very becoming in the process of time. Truth as a mode of becoming before God is man's relation to himself and to all who are involved in the coming-into-existence-kind-of-change. As something lived, it is on-going and ever-striving in time intersected by the eternal. Jesus Christ approaches man as his Pattern for existence and for being in the truth; He is man's way to life.¹

Man's becoming involves him in the free and dynamic acceptance and maintenance of existence in essential inwardness and subjectivity.² Objective uncertainty becomes an element in life which calls into question all finality and absoluteness.³ Existence emerges in all of its elusiveness and precariousness, while conditioned by the temporal and limited by death.⁴ Contingency permits and necessitates the emergence of the particular and of the individual with the breakdown and collapse of all completion. As an individual, man comes out of concealment and is seen to be an actual and real constituent of reality. He becomes meaningful and significant when confronted with the truth and when brought into intercourse with it.⁵ In living it, God and man interact in the moment and man comes forth as a qualitative creature

1. SK, TC, p. 160.

2. Crites, pp. 69-70.

3. SK, CUP, pp. 508-511.

4. Swenson, pp. 129-133.

5. Diem, Dogmatics, p. 20.

who has undergone a transition from error to truth.¹ By faith, man becomes positioned in an ultimate relationship with the eternal God. He is brought into authentic existence when and where he perceives the direction and the goal of his own becoming. In the moment of divine encounter, he is given the potential and the possibility to be what he is intended to become.² The God/man encounter and relationship allow him to embrace the freedom to be himself and in being himself to be for God.³ Man comes into his own by being permitted to accept himself by the power of God. By means of the leap of faith, he takes hold of the eternal and becomes free to accept existence.⁴

Further, man is not a solitary figure. His individuality is not isolated and secluded from the responsibility and decision to deal and to live with others. Ritschl and company also accentuated the importance of fellowship in relation to the apprehension of Jesus Christ as Pattern. For these men, the remembrance and the appropriation of Him is mediated in the community of believers. Individual men in communion with others are presented the possibility of experiencing God's presence. In fellowship, argued Herrmann, moral knowledge will develop and enhance the thought of duty whereby man becomes conscious of who he is.⁵ Jesus Christ represents the model of moral responsibility and He awakens

1. Price, The Narrow Pass, pp. 122-133.

2. Hartt, "Christian Freedom Reconsidered," Harv. Theo. Rev. Vol. 60, pp. 137-140.

3. Roberts, "Faith, and Freedom in Existentialism," Theo. Today, Vol. 8, pp. 473-474.

4. Ibid., p. 475.

5. Herrmann, Communion With God, p. 83.

man to his own moral duty through the consequences of His work. For SK, man comes to be himself in relation to God's presence.

SK sees the transcendence of God...as the eternal point of reference without which there is no love of neighbour, no genuine involvement, but only hatred, bloodshed, and chaos. Unless man reckons with the Absolute,... it has become possible to muddle up the whole of temporal existence. 1

Christ is more than a moral model for SK; He stands at the point of penetration and transcendence of the eternal in time. God's motive for this interaction is the love which He gives and demands. It is only in this relationship that man is completely and passionately capable of handling the demands of existence. Reason must be seen as only one aspect and dimension of man's being-in-the-world. By the power of God, man lives and interacts. His power is His love which descends and makes man an equal and embraces his life in the temporal. Jesus Christ sets the pattern of human relationships.² Man's reckoning with the Absolute initiates him into the demand of love which is an expression of the divine,

"What is the God-relationship of the individuals involved?" On this basis SK interpreted Jesus' requirement that his disciples must be capable of "hating father and mother" to mean that the disciples must love God with such passion, and indeed to love them (which means to help them to stand before God) also with such passion, that to the mother and the father to whom love means exclusive devotion to them on their terms, such passion will appear to be hatred. The ethical task of love is to conform not to the beloved's idea of love, but (precisely for love's sake) to God's. 3

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1. Moore, "Religion as the True Humanism," J. Amer. Aca. Rel., Vol. 37, p. 20.
 2. SK, TC, pp. 231-232.
 3. Moore, p. 21.

God's demands for love condition human relationships. To love the other is to love God with such passionate concern that He ultimately and absolutely informs and mediates the outcome of all interactions. For SK, the interrelation with other men is more than doing one's duty to another in conformity with the consequences of Christ's work. SK opens man's relationships upward and outward to the eternal God who is man's creator and brother. To love as God loves is to become contemporaneous with Him through the person of the Godman.¹ Man loves the other by passionately embracing God.² In this way the relationship is more than between God and man; it also contains the third party -- the neighbour.

In observing Reason to arbitrate and to determine the contents of the real, SK was well aware that the reflective repose though intricate to man's existence also tended toward the dissolution of the connatural abiding of Reason and Revelation.³ By influencing the diminution of the subjective, thought was seen to call into question God's self-revelation as well as history's positive value as the place where man meets man. The eternal as present and individual is discerned by Reason as something ordinary and common.⁴ Surely the eternal and the temporal do not really coalesce in this person. But yet faith makes this claim: that God has actually broken into the conditions of time not only to be in history but also to reveal Himself historically. However,

1. Johnson and Thulstrup, p. 66.

2. Ibid., p. 57.

3. SK, Journals, pp. 367-368, sec. 1044.

4. SK, TC, pp. 69-70.

Reason, in isolation from the subjective, turns outward away from itself and thus becomes unconscious of its own participation in the process of becoming. Therefore, God becomes mythological and beyond experience. Reason is unable to understand Him to be historically contingent and accidental. But in removing His presence, Reason also effects all human relations. According to SK, it can succeed in making life ambiguous and muddled.¹ Man's interactions remain, yet they are hollow and empty because inwardness -- a truly human ingredient -- has ceased, removing passion, and reflection has taken over, leaving only deliberation. Man's existential responsibility has been suspended in the search for conclusions, while in the meantime existence continues ambiguously without decision and without resolution.

Morality is character, character is that which is engraved....but the sand and the sea have no character and neither has abstract intelligence, for character is really inwardness. Immorality as energy, is also character; but to be neither moral nor immoral is merely ambiguous, and enters into life when the qualitative distinctions are weakened by gnawing reflection...The distinction between good and evil is enervated by a superficial, superior and theoretical knowledge of evil, and by a supercilious cleverness which is aware that goodness is neither appreciated nor worth while in this world, that it almost becomes stupidity. 2

For SK as for Ritschl and company, faith emits morality which conditions and influences human behaviour. SK views morality as a function of man's inwardness whereby he is opened-up to the reception of the eternal presence. Inwardness coupled with Reason is man's source for a moral energy which builds

1. SK, CUP, pp. 248-249.

2. SK, PA, pp. 15-16.

and invigorates character. It is inwardness and not just Reason which allows goodness to come forth. Reason suspends judgment on Christ who is the Teacher and Pattern, and in so doing Reason suspends the passionate and human qualities. To cut man off from God is to remove him from the possibility of significant existence and co-existence. Jesus Christ as the foundation of life and the way to its truth must be seen as more than an objective uncertainty.¹ The quality of meaning is a need in life for which history turns out from itself to a God-relationship.² God demands from each man that he should be what he is intended to become -- a learner of the truth. In becoming this, he gives up his error of self-sufficiency and turns to the eternal presence by means of subjectivity.³ In this way, he also readies himself for the encounter with the neighbour. It is in faith and in its subjective appropriation that he truly apprehends the Paradox and is set free to be both for God and man.⁴ Jesus Christ thus plays the pivotal role as mediator. As a pivotal factor in all relationships, He sets out for man the need for contemporaneous decision and action based upon the imitatio Christi.⁵ Man is called again and again to decide and to act for God in concrete and living ways.⁶ Faithful existence like historical happening involves a coming-into-existence-kind-of-change which is always conditioned in turn by the

1. SK, TC, pp. 66-67.

2. Moore, pp. 24-25.

3. Crites, p. 71.

4. Hamilton, "Created Soul -- Eternal Spirit," Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 19, pp. 24-29.

5. Reck, p. 97.

6. Ibid., p. 93.

"absolutely freely effecting cause". The Christian's life can never be a static entity, rather it is an active becoming which moves toward self-realization and toward the neighbour and all of this always in the ultimate grounding of the eternal.¹

The outcome of this finite-infinite encounter is the securing of life in its finitude, contingency and temporality. Man encounters God and his neighbour within the limits of space and time. Because God has entered time, temporality has taken on a new dimension of significance and fullness. The task for man must not be to escape from history but to exist and to decide within its context for eternal happiness.

[T]he aim must not be that man should seek to escape from his temporality and finitude, but that he should seek to regain these in their plenitude of meaning. Finitude must not be left aside, but rather saved and redeemed, for "it is finitude and temporality which are essentially at stake." 2

The historical stands out positively as man's home and as his inheritance. To escape and to run away is to abandon what God has infused with the bountifulness of His presence and the gift of His love. Temporality is the mark of existence and the source of both its uncertainty and meaningfulness before God.³ The Christian infinitely renounces everything to gain all. It is in the moment that he is given a new qualitative existence to be for God and man.⁴ But always he is called upon to choose and to decide in the face of the Paradox either for faith or for Reason. Christianity is

1. Michalson (ed.), Christianity and the Existentialists, pp. 36-41.

2. Diem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, pp. 74-75.

3. SK, FT, pp. 65-69.

4. SK, PF, pp. lxx-lxxii.

lived and acted out and not deliberated upon or thought about without final resolution and faith.¹ This is not to stress any anti-intellectualism,² but it is to point out that faith is more than a matter for the head: one must also deal with the heart. In a sense then, this typifies something of the flavour of SK's divergence from the rational and natural approach to religion found in Lessing.

D. CONCLUSION

SK's position affirms the positive and valuational dimension of history for man. It is a place of becoming and striving. All of life produces the coming-into-existence-kind-of-change. Everything depends upon the simple adjective "zufällige" which characterizes the historical as accidental. There are no timeless and eternal truths which man simply needs to become conscious of. Lessing assumed that this approach was the correct one and consequently dispensed the supernatural and transcendent as quite superfluous and redundant trappings for what is essentially immanent and natural. Historical truths therefore only illustrate and point out what man's rationality can demonstrate and prove. Lessing effectively draws a wedge between events and truth by viewing the former as becoming and the latter as being. The result of this bifurcation leads to the downgrading of the historical embodiment of faith and the ascendancy of its essential truth. This final element Lessing holds to be a

1. SK, CUP, p. 523.

2. Fitzpatrick, "Current Kierkegaard Study," J. Rel., Vol. 50, pp. 88-90.

common possession of all men. It involves the idea of God and human action which is worthy of Him -- love. This is the truth which Christ delivers but which Reason can demonstrate. The importance of Christ thus results from His illustration of a truth which Reason possesses the power to obtain. SK reacts against this formulation. Indeed, Christianity is not a form of knowledge at all. Human rationality can only see as incommensurable any and all claims of the Eternal in time. Objectivity seeks to abstract and to demonstrate the thought-content of life. In its endeavour, objectivity engages in ceaseless indecision and approximation. Reason, no doubt, permeates the entire context of human existence but yet it is not alone capable of providing a firm basis for life. SK emphasizes the accidental and contingent qualification of life in order to point out the insufficiency of Reason. The becoming and striving of man knows no final and rational determination upon which to rest. The accidental characterization of living permeates the entire fabric of history and faith as well as does Reason. To counter the contingency and movement of life, SK proposes a subjective additive to the apprehension of faith's claims. Reason views Jesus Christ as a Paradox beyond comprehension. Objectivity cannot establish enough facts about Him to decide the issue. But SK seeks a point which will be determinative for his life and will provide it with direction and certainty. Subjectivity makes the leap of faith which overcomes and silences the objective uncertainties surrounding Christ, the Paradox. Subjectivity grasps the moment and decides the matter of its eternal happiness. It resolves the issue which objectivity

can only becloud and pursue without final conclusion. The Paradox provides a new paradigm for life which complements objectivity with the certainty of passionate inwardness. Reason remains a dimension of human living but subjectivity augments its indecisiveness and approximation with infinite decision and certainty. Faith is not irrational or non-rational. It is a component of life in history which Reason cannot ultimately affirm or deny. Indeed, subjectivity and inwardness become the cornerstones of Christian faith and life.

SK attempts to resolve Lessing's problem through the medium of man and his subjectivity. Without this latter ingredient, the claims of faith seem absurd and contrary to Reason. But through the exercise of decision, the leap of faith overcomes the apparent absurdity and transforms it into a coherent world-view. Again, the production of this result rests within the capacity and decisiveness of man. In this respect, SK appears to offer another alternative to the solution proffered by Ritschl and company. The unfeeling and dull world requires valuation and worth. Jesus Christ provides the insight in the quest for Liberal Protestantism. He is the first man to bring to consciousness the worth of all men. The significance of His personality reflects this momentous determination. Man comes to approximate Christ's significance as he personally realizes the authenticity of His person. Harnack had warned against hanging the whole weight of eternity upon the spider's thread of historical details and facts. But in theology's endeavour to avoid this peril, the weight of eternity was shifted to the spider's thread of Christ's personality personally experienced and

realized in the life of man. Man comes to the centre of the stage and appropriates for himself the determining position on the disposition of faith. It would appear that SK and Liberal Protestantism both engage in an anthropocentrism which undergirds the truth-claims of faith.

But for this considerable point of agreement, SK differs from Liberal Protestantism as well. For him, faith is not a form of knowledge to be dissected from the rubble of historical facts and impression. It is an all-encompassing and -determining way of life, which resists objective finalizations. The "timeless" elements which Ritschl and company sought to discern appear as a chimera to SK. His radical emphasis upon becoming and striving leaves no room for the "timeless" which they sought to gather into the basket of faith. All of life is permeated by change and absolutely resists the assaults of Reason to encompass it into a universal and necessary system. Life will not be systematized. Troeltsch saw this point almost as clearly as did Dilthey. But yet he sought to find some place amid the relativities where man could stake his claim to certainty and value. But his rational approach could discern no historical points but only social-psychological tendencies and laws. In the end Troeltsch can really find no final absolutes. SK remedies this situation by removing the discernment of eternal happiness from the exclusive province of objectivity to the complementation of the subjective. The essential truths of existence must be grasped existentially -- subjectively through passionate inwardness. The leap of faith leaves behind all of the objective doubts and uncertainties of Reason and

embraces Jesus Christ as the eternal in time. Subjectivity produces a re-organization of existence which objective forms of knowledge cannot effect. And more, SK's position also warrants the re-introduction of the transcendent and eternal in the immanent. Liberal Protestantism laboured under the auspices of Reason which left no room for metaphysical speculation or appeals to the beyond. While subjectivity does not seem to rely explicitly upon metaphysical assumptions, it would appear to be the case that SK's position implicitly depends upon the penetrating and transcending of the finite by the infinite. For this SK presents Christ as the self-revelation of God.

One other point of departure for SK from Liberal Protestantism represents more of an attitude and frame of mind than an outright empirical divergence. The emphasis which Ritschl and company placed on personality placed Christ in the forefront of theological concern and exposition. These men sought to historicize Him and to remove the transcendental wrappings which they assumed to surround His person. Personality became the password for theology. This quality of Christ allowed theologians to speak of Him in a factual and empirical manner without taking leave to the metaphysical. But yet something mysterious and undemonstrable remained about Him. Even after His historicization, Christ retained a dimension of uniqueness and distinction which appeared to outstrip historical discernment. The emphasis fell upon His ability to become personally realized in the experiences of man. His life displayed an inexplicable relation to God which possessed a self-evidencing character. This mysterious

life-source and -power was almost an undemonstrable article of faith which was treated as a given. But it appears that Troeltsch sought to eradicate this last vestige of latent transcendentalism. His unwaivering adherence to the process character of faith moved him to affirm the absolute historicity of Christ. He stands in a line of historical and human spiritual factors which develop and process through the insights of individual men. Christ's personality is important because it satisfies a social-psychological need in man to have a living, breathing personality for his symbol of God. Christ's uniqueness no longer rests in a mysterious life-source but rather in the social-psychological framework of the human mind. In this respect, Christ truly becomes historicized without any explicit or implicit appeal to the mysterious or transcendent. However, the line of succession from Ritschl to Troeltsch never failed to maintain the centrality of His person. Even in Troeltsch's final deathblow to the mysterious trappings, the intent remained to establish Him as a fortification against the gnawing dullness and uncertainty of historical life. From Ritschl to Troeltsch, the theological project becomes the presentation of a world-view which counteracts the erosion and corrosion of the contingency and relativity. Indeed, Troeltsch felt this problem most because of his complete historicization of faith. The climate of opinion appears to be a dread and fear leading to an anxiousness about life. Dilthey had given an explanation of history which preserved its relativity without the anxiousness and fear. He perceived life to be creative and active, and he

saw man as possessing a share in this treasure. Fear and anxiousness are not really adequate expressions of historical consciousness for Dilthey. Rather he appears to view it with its relativity and contingency as positive and creative. Historical awareness liberates man from all of the dogmas and systems which seek to select and to filter experiences as "good" and "bad". Man can be truly free from systematization. But theology seems to have a latent and hidden anxiety about this liberation and freedom which Dilthey makes so complete and final. Jesus Christ provides the instruction and lesson for man's coming to grips with the task of living. From Ritschl to Troeltsch, the aim is to discover the "timeless" elements in Christ which give resolution and relief to man's "timeless" bout with the external world. Indeed, the goal is to find something necessary and self-sufficient among so much contingency and temporality. SK seems to return to the attitude of Dilthey. His radical emphasis upon "zufallige" as the genus-predicate describing history as accidental strikes a heavy blow against all pretenses of necessity and timelessness. The coming-into-existence-kind-of-change is the hallmark of history and of becoming. Life is historical in the most complete and radical manner. Therefore it appears incongruous to him that man should seek to establish his eternal happiness by means of Reason and objectivity. The possession of essential truth can never be a completed act. Movement and change which characterize life also characterize the truth concerning it. This possession must likewise be seen in the dynamics and processes of existence. For SK, subjectivity represents the only possible and existential

prerogative available. It alone allows the means of leaping over the objective uncertainties to be found everywhere. Faith and its leap become man's organs for living in a truly historical manner. There is no need to be anxious or to fear the failure of Reason to reach nothing more than approximations. Life possesses no static and necessary points. But armed with subjectivity, man may gain a new perspective on the situation. From Ritschl to Troeltsch, the attempt was made to approach faith objectively and reasonably. And in the process, anxiousness about history resulted because of the temporary and inconclusive results which were obtained. But SK approaches history subjectively and inwardly and as a result he complements the findings of Reason and grasps certainty and stability in life through Christ. Again, history is seen as what it is -- a realm of becoming and striving. Man has the means at his disposal for a resolution of the ultimate problem relating to his eternal happiness. By a leap of faith, life assumes a different configuration. SK had no need to be anxious or fearful. In contrast to Liberal Protestantism, SK represents a change of view on the question of life. For him, history without faith is blind and faith without history is empty.

But for all of the positive affirmations regarding the person of Christ, the importance of the moment, the significance of life, and the worth of history, SK's position rests upon the spider's thread of subjectivity.¹ This is the

1. Barth, "A Thank You and A Bow: Kierkegaard's Reveille," Can. J. Theo., Vol. 11. pp. 3-7.

possession of man which he has sole authority to exercise at his discretion. For SK, man still remains the pivotal point in the balance of life. His decision and leap decide the issue of faith's content and relevance.¹ In the end, SK provides a variation on Lessing and Liberal Protestantism. Subjectivity augments Reason. Man's passionate inwardness completes the journey which Reason can only begin. Inwardly and heuristically life receives sustenance from the eternal in time. Objectively and empirically, the "accidental truths of history" can never become the cornerstones of eternal happiness. The final disposition lies within the province of human inwardness. This concludes SK's solution to the problem raised by Lessing and partially answered by Liberal Protestantism.

1. SK, Journals, p. 173, sec. 605 and SK, CUP, p. 296.

III

BULTMANN'S INHERITANCE:

JESUS CHRIST'S

MEANING FOR

PERSONAL HISTORY

ABBREVIATIONS TO FOOTNOTES

Bultmann's Works:

- Essays = Essays: Philosophical and Theological
- EF = Existence and Faith
- FU = Faith and Understanding
- HE = History and Eschatology
- "HE in NT" = "History and Eschatology in the New Testament," New Testament Studies, Vol. 1, pp. 5-16.
- JCM = Jesus Christ and Mythology
- JW = Jesus and the Word
- LD = Life and Death
- "M in NT" = "Mysticism in the New Testament," Twentieth Century Theology in the Making, edited by Jaroslav Pelikan and translated by R.A. Wilson, The Fontana Library, William Collins and Sons, London (1970).
- "PCHJK" = "The Primitive Christian Kerygma and the Historical Jesus," found in The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ, edited and translated by Carl Braaten and Roy Harrisville, Abingdon Press, Nashville (1964).
- Prim. Xt. = Primitive Christianity: In Its Contemporary Setting
- "QMH" = "The Quest of Meaning in History," The Listener, September (1955), pp. 329-330.
- "R in NT" = "Revelation in the New Testament," Twentieth Century Theology in the Making, etc.
- TNT, Vol i,ii = The Theology of the New Testament, Volumes I,II (respectively)
- WB = This World and the Beyond (Marburg Sermons)

Other Authors:

- KM i,ii = Kerygma and Myth, Volumes I,II (respectively), edited by Hans-Werner Bartsch.

INTRODUCTION

The work of Søren Kierkegaard on the correlation of history and faith has posed a variant position to that offered by the late nineteenth century Liberals. It appears to be the insight of SK to develop and to elaborate an understanding of history which seeks to maintain the positive thrust of its contingency and relativity as the marks of freedom which provide the basis for transition or becoming. History represents the realm of becoming, of moving-on-the-way, of transition. But yet in this medium, faith finds its reference and grounding. History is most assuredly stamped with temporality and change but yet God has made Himself known in His mysterious and special way in the Godman, Jesus Christ. Because of its transitional nature, the intellectual prowess and capacity of man, with his Reason, is not able to establish the truth of the relation between Jesus and the Christ. The best that it appears to offer is approximation of this past fact. But nonetheless, in this very indeterminate sphere SK seems to maintain and to explicate the interpenetration of God into the creation. For him, Jesus Christ personally represents His point of contact and reference in the historical. SK did not completely follow in the footsteps of Lessing. Rather he upheld the integrity of the accidental truths by viewing history as the place of God's personal action of self-revelation. God does not simply reveal Himself through rational processes but rather involves Himself in the very stuff of history. Through this action, SK argues for the significance and the meaningfulness of this contingent continuum.

It would appear that from this perspective SK is initially basing his position upon the uniqueness and the once-for-allness of God's self-disclosure in Christ. With this initial groundwork laid, SK moves to affirm history's relativities while upholding a fixed point of reference amid them. In this way, history and faith seem to coalesce in His person. He qualifies the temporal with the eternal presence and condescends to become a function in the sphere of approximation.

It is at this particular point that consideration of Rudolf Bultmann may commence. For it appears to be Bultmann's intention and endeavour to sustain the correlation between faith and history, though as he says, paradoxically.¹ The thrust of his work appears to be an attempt to present the Christian faith as an address to man from God which maintains the sovereignty and integrity of faith while opening its meaning and challenge to the light of the modern day. Bultmann confronts the ancient text of the Bible and seeks to enter into a personal dialogue or "life-relation" which permits it to speak out concerning man's existence as a man. The "I" of the investigator and the "Thou" of the text appear to coalesce through the context of understanding. The process of demythologizing is an attempt to open-up the "strange new world of the Bible" in such a way that its thoughts and understandings become contemporaneous and alive. The result of this process is a re-interpretation of man's ontic attitude to the world and to history. History is no longer a concern about the past and about what has happened; rather man is

1. EF, p. 19.

presented with a new self-understanding which frees him from all of this and opens him to the experience of the future with its manifold possibilities. It seems to dissolve into eschatology where every moment is personally experienced as a first and last Now. Bultmann finds the basis for this interpretation from the teachings of Jesus Christ who encounters man as a concrete historical figure in the word of preaching which touches him in the contemporary situation. Jesus Christ is the end of the past and the beginning of the eschaton precisely in the call to decision found in the Word. In His teaching, man meets a challenge-response crisis which demands decision and commitment. One can choose either to fasten hopes to the contingency of the world or to be open to the gift of the future which derives from reliance upon God. Bultmann appears to incorporate within his programme a comprehensive meaning-view of man as a Christian who lives in an alien world. But in this view, Bultmann attempts to maintain the historicity of Christ as an act of God in a world which is something of a closed system of cause-and-effect. The unique combination of cause-and-effect system with the action of God requires Bultmann to effect some type of peaceful co-existence which conserves the uniqueness of the constituent terms. For to affirm one element over the other would appear either to negate any possibility of God's interaction or to deny the cause-and-effect structure of the natural order. These seem to be the two dichotomous forces which Bultmann apparently seeks to preserve in the semblance of a homogeneous relationship of assumed exclusive terms. In his effort to effect this unity, he turns his attention to the Word of God as it comes to man in the scripture.

A. DEMYTHOLOGIZING: INTERPRETATION AS PRIMARY

In every age all forms of theology -- exegesis, dogmatics, preaching -- must certainly undertake this kind of translation. It is an important task...I wish... I knew how to introduce within the framework of Bultmann's concern, something else which seems to me to be even more important....Must we not try to come to grips with him who confronts us there...?....The task of translation is a secondary concern...I am quite sure he (RB) would agree with me about what I have called the primary task. But there he is, still hammering away with unparalleled persistence, at the various historical forms in which the gospel is enshrined. Apparently he already knows what is in the New Testament. (As found in Bartsch, Kerygma and Myth, II, and written by Karl Barth, pp. 87 and 88.)

One port of entry into the thought of Bultmann appears to be found in the interpretive procedure which he utilizes to uncover the meaning of the biblical text. He is keen to point out the need for such procedure. He views the New Testament material as embedded in mythological conceptuality which impedes the contemporary reader of scripture.¹ Today, man does not live within a world bordered by God above and Satan below.² He lives in a world made comprehensible by general laws of science which presuppose a closed world system of cause-and-effect.³ He no longer appears capable of comprehending and finding intelligible religious language which presents the world of God in objectified terms.⁴ God does

1. W. Schmithals, An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, pp. 252-255. For a comprehensive history of New Testament interpretation and analysis, see Werner Georg Kümmel, The New Testament: The History of the Investigation of its Problems (trans. S. McLean Gilmour and Howard C. Kee). SCM Press, London (1973).

2. EF, p. 93.

3. EF, p. 292.

4. Essays, pp. 102-105.

not approach man in any overt, demonstrable and public manner. Rather he remains hidden and mysterious in the ebb and flow of historical life.¹ But yet the New Testament presents a picture of Him and His saving activity in such a way as to objectify Him within the processes of the world system. New Testament myth is a "mode of thought and speech which objectivizes the unworldly so as to make it worldly."² In this way, the real encounter with Him is lost, for He no longer approaches man in His hiddenness and mystery but in empirical terms.³ But it is precisely this ancient garb which must be stripped away since it is no longer acceptable.⁴ "Man's knowledge and mastery of the world have advanced to such an extent through science and technology that it is no longer possible for anyone seriously to hold the New Testament view of the world -- in fact, there is hardly anyone who does."⁵ Nonetheless, beneath the cosmological paraphernalia of the primitive world-view, there lies an encounter with the living God who has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ.⁶ It is to the exposition and elaboration of this encounter to which theology's task must turn. Bultmann maintains that "faith only became possible at a definite point in history in consequence of an event -- viz., the event of Christ. Faith...is only possible when it is faith in Jesus Christ."⁷ He seems to be the only

1. EF, pp. 26-29.

2. Bartsch, KMI, p. 187.

3. Schmithals, pp. 257-258.

4. EF, p. 94.

5. Bartsch, KMI, p. 4.

6. Essays, p. 118.

7. Bartsch, KMI, p. 22.

mediator of man's encounter with God, and if the theologian is to come to grips with this, it will be his responsibility to sift out of the churchly tradition this actual mediating experience. Theology needs to examine the myth of the New Testament in the effort to release the God/man encounter from concealment. "[I]t is a characteristic of original myth that in it empirical reality and existential reality are not distinguished....This is precisely what makes demythologizing necessary."¹ Mythological thought confuses the empirical and the existential realities.² The theologian must seek to separate the two and in so doing to allow man to experience the challenge of God. Therefore, Bultmann elevates the faith-experience over the object of faith.³ As a corollary, existential reality supercedes the empirical.⁴

Demythologizing is the name that Bultmann appoints to this task. Demythologizing moves to dissolve the confusion inherent in mythological thinking by accentuating the anthropological over the cosmological element.⁵ Myth is man's way of objectively understanding himself in the world. But it pursues this explanation in visible analogies which substantiate the powers and forces that are encountered and elevates them to cosmic proportions. "[Man] may account for the present state and order...by speaking of a primeval war

1. Bartsch, KMII, p. 185, fnnt.# 1.

2. Bartsch, KMI, pp. 10-11.

3. TNT, Epilogue, p. 239.

4. Schmithals, pp. 235-7.

5. Bartsch, KMI, p. 10.

between the gods. He speaks of the other in terms of this world, and of gods in terms derived from human life."¹ Thus man inquires after his position in the cosmos by expressing his present experiences in terms of cosmic happenings. In other words, man apparently sees his position as qualified by the powers and forces beyond perceptible control and experience. "Myth is also an expression of man's awareness that he is not lord of his own being. It expresses his sense of dependence... on those forces which hold sway beyond the confines of the known."² It expresses his conviction that life here and now is infused with the influences of powers and forces that he cannot dominate. He is aware that things do not always occur as they were planned and that events seem often to evolve without direct human action.³ Thus myth appears to contain within itself a conceptual system of belief and understanding which endeavours to make sense out of existence. And this is the point at which biblical mythology apparently achieves its importance and significance for theology. One must wonder if Bultmann is not a priori deciding that myth does refer to man as opposed to the realities which it purportedly objectifies. The thought forms of scripture present to the reader an understanding of experience. Bultmann contends that "the real question is whether this understanding...is true. Faith claims that it is, and faith ought not to be

1. Bartsch, KMI, p. 10.

2. Bartsch, KMI, p. 11.

3. HE, p. 2.

tied down to the imagery of...mythology."¹ It is here, then, that the theologian takes his stand in regard to the task at hand.² He must bring to light this understanding of existence which has been garbled in the imagery of an ancient world-view. The problem of interpretation comes to the fore as primary and real and as something to be attacked and apprehended.³ The Christian message must be released from the imagery of the past. The biblical writings are seen as documents of affirmation and proclamation which do require translation in order that they may be understood historically. It is the function of demythologizing to effect this release and to permit the understanding to come forth unencumbered with cosmological speculation.⁴ The bye-product will be to discover "whether the New Testament offers man an understanding of himself which will challenge him to a genuine existential decision."⁵

But demythologizing involves certain presuppositions which guide and direct the translation process. The investigator does not approach the text without implicit and/or explicit self-understandings or questions.⁶ He sees the world as a closed unit. This is to say that it is viewed as a closed nexus of cause-and—effect which apparently precludes

1. Bartsch, KMI, p. 11.

2. EF, pp. 95-96.

3. Bartsch, KMII, p. 184.

4. For an assessment of RB's cosmological presupposition see T.F. Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, p. 48ff.

5. Bartsch, KMI, p. 16.

6. Schmithals, p. 237f.

any outside intervention from the "supernatural".¹ Man's attention is directed to the life-possibilities set within existence.² He cannot appeal to powers beyond this realm, for this would presumably be undemonstrable within the modern framework of cause and effect conceptuality. However, the text is met with the subjectivity of the investigator. The present situation becomes a constituent element within the process of interpretation, for the text is approached with life-questions which take root and mature out of the existential emotion of the investigator.³ He is conditioned by his own individuality which colours and qualifies the initial pre-disposition.⁴ There is a personal involvement on his part and he assumes responsibility for existence by hearing the claim of history within the text.⁵ In this way, a "life-relation" evolves between the text and the investigator which mediates the appropriation and understanding.

[A] specific understanding of the subject matter..., on the basis of a "life-relation" to it, is always presupposed by exegesis....The "life-relation" is a genuine one...only when it is vital, i.e., when the subject₆ matter...also concerns us and is a problem for us.

The text seems to become a part of the investigator's life. It is integral in that it seems to concern him and to present itself as a question (and answer ?) to be contended with. It is this relationship which Bultmann labels as a "pre-

1. EF, p. 291f.

2. FU, pp. 151, 155-7.

3. HE, p. 2.

4. EF, p. 290.

5. C. Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, pp. 133-4.

6. EF, p. 294.

understanding."¹ This is to say that the investigator apparently exists in a specific situation which qualifies and conditions his prior position in relation to the text.² The "pre-understanding" is man's concern about himself. He possesses various thought forms, cultural attitudes and values, and moral beliefs, culminating in a climate of opinion which etches out his place in the world.³ The "life-relation" with the text appears to obtain from the commonality of past and present experience of this climate of opinion.⁴ The "I" of the investigator seems to understand the "Thou" in the text.

In this relation you have a certain understanding of the matter in question, and from this...grow the conceptions of exegesis....[Y]ou will learn and your understanding will be enriched and corrected. Without such a relation and such previous understanding (Vorverständnis) it is impossible to understand....

This is...the basic presupposition for every form of exegesis; that your own relation to the subject-matter prompts the question you bring to the text and elicits the answers you obtain from the text.⁵

The investigator and the text participate in a shared experience. Such a participative sharing creates an atmosphere for enriching and correcting one's approach to life. Thus the purpose and the task of interpretation in general, and of demythologizing in particular, seems to be the elucidation and clarification of man's understanding of himself in the world.

This understanding of existence seems to be re-enforced

1. EF, p. 294.

2. Schmithals, pp. 231-2.

3. HE, pp. 108-111.

4. Essays, pp. 240-243.

5. JCM, pp. 50-1.

by another important "pre-understanding". This complementary dimension of Bultmann's project appears to impute added impetus to the task he engages in. Bultmann is quite specific that one function is the unveiling from mythological concealment the awareness of life.¹ But this consciousness which he has in mind reflects the present climate of opinion. In a word, he takes his stand with the modern scientific attitude which he claims perceives the world as a closed continuum.² The world-view of science seeks to comprehend the occurrences which confront man in a general system of laws which does not appeal to mysterious or supernatural powers. "[F]aith acknowledges that the world-view given by science is a necessary means for doing our work within the world."³ Thus faith does not compete with science in explaining historical, natural happenings.⁴ Rather, Bultmann seems quite explicit that the text must be approached by the investigator with a definite commitment to discover something enriching and corrective.⁵ The scripture does not confront man as an historical document demanding verification and objectification.⁶ Quite to the contrary, the scriptural material converses with the very life-forces of the investigator in order to challenge his present existential commitments

1. Schmithals, p. 259f.

2. A. Malet, The Thought of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 114f.

3. JCM, p. 65.

4. Bartsch, KMI, pp. 3-5.

5. EF, pp. 101-102.

6. FU, pp. 159-170.

and decisions.¹ The text speaks to existence and to being-in-the-world.² The empirical, natural, explainable view of the world which he holds appears to make the personal and existential dimension of the text acquire ascendancy and stature. In today's world, the text challenges anew his understanding and acceptance of who and what he is in the face of existence. "[O]nly those who are stirred by the question of their own existence can hear the claim which the text makes."³ The claim of history -- of becoming -- touches and calls into question man's being, but this claim can only be heard by one who is open to the question. Hearing appears to be the medium through which understanding develops between the text of scripture and the investigator.⁴ The commonality of concern for living generates and excites a vital "life-relation" which facilitates communication and dialogue. To assume that scripture really intended to convey natural and metaphysical information would apparently only confuse and becloud the more fundamental and basic issue of living and finding direction for it. The transmission of understanding concentrates its affective power within this relation.

[I]t is clear that real understanding does not arise from the satisfying contemplation of an alien individuality as such, but basically from the possibilities of human being which are revealed in it, which are also those of the person who understands, who makes himself conscious of them in the very act of comprehension. Real understanding would...be paying heed to

1. Malet, pp. 20-21.

2. EF, p. 296.

3. Essays, p. 256.

4. FU, pp. 280-3.

the question posed in the work which is to be interpreted, to the claim which confronts one in the work, and the 'fulfilment' of one's own individuality would consist in the richer₁ and deeper opening up of one's own possibilities....

The understanding and comprehension effected through the "life-relation" permits the examination of the investigator's own living in the light of what is contained in the text. Man and his personal knowledge become the prime interests of the demythologizing process.² The investigator searches and interrogates the text for the meaning of what is involved in being a man.³ And he looks to scripture because it appears to be the claim of faith that one can find an authentic expression of life there.⁴ Thus he acknowledges the claim of faith and sets about the task of discovering the adequacy or inadequacy of the expression. But demythologizing does not seek after the past references but rather after its present meaning which is pertinent for today.⁵ What is utmost and primary becomes the existential encounter with history, for the real subject of history is man and his action.⁶ Demythologizing brings this past into the present and illuminates the understanding of existence in the text in such a way as to make it a present possibility.⁷ As a possible comparison of method, Bultmann's tendency to

1. Essays, pp. 250-1.

2. Bartsch, KMI, pp. 10-11.

3. I. Henderson, Myth in the New Testament, p. 14.

4. Malet, p. 72.

5. Bartsch, KMI, p. 196.

6. HE, p. 139.

7. HE, pp. 143-6.

accentuate the existential perspective of the task over the possible cosmological or metaphysical additives resembles the "pre-understanding" of Ritschl and company. These men seem to have had an aversion for anything that smacks of speculation about the non-empirical dimensions of existence. Hence, they recorded strong reactions against the mystical and the metaphysical as levels of reality which cannot really be perceived by man in his world. One must, of course, wonder about the extent of the Liberal aversion in respect to Bultmann. Is it at all possible that the "pre-understandings" of his teachers have, in turn, become part and parcel of Bultmann's "pre-understandings" as he approaches the scriptural text? Indeed, does the man who occupies the church pew really share in the theologian's "pre-understandings" regarding the make-up of the world?

Bultmann seems to utilize demythologizing as a means to secure life-possibilities for man.¹ It serves apparently the functional purpose for uncovering and elucidating the possibilities contained in scripture.² Interpretation operates as a means of leaping across the span of time and wresting for the present the insights of the past. In this manner, man becomes the focal point of interest and determination. He becomes the measure by which the past must be understood, for it is man with his present concerns who interrogates the past sources.³ This appears to be the

1. Malet, pp. 151-2.

2. Schmithals, p. 264f.

3. HE, pp. 115, 117-122.

emphasis of Bultmann's "pre-understandings" which guide and direct the task of interpretation. Man is concerned to know about and to understand himself as he is in the present. In looking into the scriptures, the investigator encounters the teaching and preaching of Jesus of Nazareth. Faith makes its claim to possess the means to authentic existence, and it finds its reference in the words of Jesus.¹ Demythologizing directs its attention to the work of this man whose name is attached to this decisive disclosure of understanding contained within the historical limits. Demythologizing operates to extricate from the past the present meaning of the Word of Jesus. It is from this man within history that faith claims to attain its decisive grasp upon an authentic understanding of human existence.

B. JESUS CHRIST AS THE WORD OF GOD

[W]hat God has done in Jesus Christ is not an historical fact which is capable of historical proof. The objectifying historian as such cannot see that an historical person (Jesus of Nazareth) is the eternal Logos, the Word. It is precisely the mythological description of Jesus Christ...which makes it clear that the figure and the work...must be understood in a manner which is beyond the categories by which the objective historian understands world-history, if the figure and the work...are to be understood as the divine work of redemption. That is the real paradox. Jesus is a human, historical person....His work and destiny happened within world-history and as such come under the scrutiny of the historian....Nevertheless, such detached historical inquiry cannot become aware of what God has wrought in Christ, that is, of the eschatological event. 2

1. Schmithals, p. 267f.

2. JCM, p. 80.

Jesus Christ functions as the historical point of reference for the claim of faith to possess an authentic understanding of living. Bultmann appears insistent to present Christian faith as a viable and legitimate avenue of expression for historical possibility. He wants to uncover just that possibility which qualifies and conditions in order to aid man in the realization of his manhood. Historical phenomena reveal him and his actions as the subject matter of research.¹ And it is this research which endeavours to discover the various options open. Bultmann contends that the real essence of man is to be found in his activity.² Genuine life is always before him as a function both of his own existence and of his willing.³ Consequently, it would seem that he is an entity which is constantly being-on-the-way.⁴ His essence is achieved in the grasping of possibilities and in deciding.⁵ And any historical knowledge of past possibilities and decisions relevant for today assist in shaping his present self-knowledge.⁶ Jesus Christ is a past historical figure. His life and His work are covered in the indeterminateness of history and the full recovery of His figure must always remain a project which is like life itself -- perpetually on the way though never complete and final.⁷ This seems to permit

1. HE, pp. 138-9.

2. HE, p. 139.

3. HE, p. 140.

4. HE, p. 46.

5. HE, p. 44.

6. HE, p. 144.

7. Essays, p. 105.

Bultmann to suggest that man can now know little of the life and personality of Him.¹ Yet the investigator has an adequate source of His words which encounter him with the question of how he is to interpret his own existence.² It would seem that this affords a beginning point for an inquiry into Jesus Christ as the Word of God; for while the investigator cannot finally know His person, he can deal intelligibly with His Word and with its present application.³ The investigator is permitted this point of entry apparently because he is able to enter into dialogue with Jesus' Word and to uncover its meaning in so far as it speaks to the problem of human existence.⁴ The question of understanding life appears to be the point of commonality between Jesus of a bye-gone day and the present investigator. Jesus' Word is questioned to reveal how He understood being-on-the-way.⁵ Indeed, the distinction between the historical phenomenon of Jesus as opposed to the self-understanding He occasions seems to be the direction in which Bultmann's thought is moving. For him, there seems to be two approaches to the text:

Either the writings...can be interrogated as the "sources" which the historian interprets in order to reconstruct a picture of primitive Christianity as a phenomenon of the historical past, or the reconstruction stands in the service of the interpretation of the...writings under the presupposition that they have something to say to the present. 6

1. JW, p. 12.

2. JW, p. 11.

3. JW, pp. 8-10.

4. JW, pp. 4-6.

5. "PCKHJ", pp. 27-31.

6. TNT, Epilogue, p. 251.

The pursuit of the former alternative guides one in the direction of asserting the process of reflection and objectivity. The investigator endeavours to discern and to reconstruct, with historical concreteness and accuracy, a replica of the past. Apparently, the emphasis upon the facticity of the text and the objective truth it purportedly conveys disturbs the proper relationship which Bultmann desires to maintain. He is not primarily concerned with presenting the facts of the matter per se. There is a definite part in the interpretation of the text that reconstruction does play, but it is not the prime area of concern. What is apparently "most important" and "basic" is "one's new self-understanding".¹ Bultmann seems to mean "an existential understanding of myself which is at one with and inseparable from my understanding of God and the world."² Faith itself and not the object of faith³ stands at the heart of an investigation into the person of Jesus Christ. Presumably the pursuit of the latter alternative (interpretation) affords the right perspective of the task.⁴ As an amplification and corrective to the "pure" act of reflection, Bultmann wants to add the act of living. Indeed, in the task set before the investigator the act of living must also take precedence. "For they [the texts] can claim to have meaning for the present not as theoretical teachings...but only as the expression of an under-

1. Ibid., p. 239.

2. Ibid., p. 239.

3. Ibid., p. 239.

4. Ibid., p. 251.

standing of human existence which...is a possibility for his [the man of today] understanding of himself...."¹ The thrust of this connection between living and reflecting seems to have ostensible ramifications in regard to Jesus. From the gist of Bultmann's comments, it would appear to be the case that the brute facts of His person are not in themselves overly significant. The "believing self-understanding" lifts faith itself above its object. This would seem to suggest that the message of Jesus (faith, value) takes precedence over His person (the object or fact).² Another way of stating it might be to say that the historical Jesus occasions or illustrates the "believing self-understanding" of the Word. He does not really demonstrate its application or truth though He does appear to function as the vehicle for its transmission.

The Christian faith claims that Jesus Christ is God's point of contact with the historical realm. He is viewed as the objective manifestation of a God who confronts man in the world. He delivers the Word of God which both challenges and demands decision as to how he shall live.³ Faith claims that Christ is the revelation of God and as such He is also God Incarnate. Bultmann is sympathetic to these claims, but he cannot allow its message to be obscured in the mythological language of the first century Christians who attempted to objectify God. For Bultmann, it seems to

1. Ibid., p. 251.

2. Ibid., p. 250.

3. C. Braaten and R. Harrisville (eds.), Kerygma and History, pp. 27-29.

remain a standing proposition that He is both hidden and mysterious even when He is present.¹ In conjunction with this, Bultmann also maintains the closed world which does not avail itself to an observable and objective penetration by God.² However, faith's claims can be approached on the personal level. This encounter would mediate between the claims of faith made about Jesus and the investigator's present existential situation. What would be sought in faith's claims is not the metaphysical possibility of God's in-breaking into history or the ontological description of Jesus as the Godman, for this would be speculation defying the laws of science which seem to know nothing of supernatural intervention. Rather the investigator seeks to illuminate the kernel of existential understanding which is open to him to grasp, to understand and to appropriate. In this way, the person of Christ dissipates into His Word, for the modern man can neither seriously accept nor find palatable any talk which literally expresses God's presence objectively.

It is impossible to use electric lights and the wireless and to avail ourselves of modern medical and surgical discoveries and at the same time to believe in the New Testament world of daemons and spirits. We may think we can manage it in our own lives, but to expect others to do so is to make the Christian faith unintelligible to the modern world. 3

Thus the Word of Jesus is to be laid open in order to glean from it the understanding for human existence contained therein.⁴ This is the stuff of history which modern man

1. EF, p. 16.

2. M. Hoffmann, "Kerygma and History," J. of Bible and Rel., Vol. 33, pp. 26, 27f.

3. Bartsch, KMI, p. 5.

4. EF, pp. 294-6.

can grasp and which is relevant to him in the face of the change and contingency¹ of life. For Bultmann, this represents the proper mode of explicating the faith for today. Demythologizing moves behind the mythically presented picture of Jesus to His message.² In Him, man experiences an encounter with a specific message and it is in confrontation with this reality that one is ultimately placed in making a choice about its truth.³

Bultmann's project discloses itself as a search into Jesus' words to recover His intention and purpose. Bultmann seems to view the result as an expression of an existentially viable concept of human living. Through the process of demythologizing and reconstruction of the past, Jesus Christ is released from the encumbering metaphysical titles and doctrines which have been thrust upon Him by the passage of time and by the wisdom of men. After investigation and interpretation, He meets man as the Revealer of the Word of God.⁴ Christ steps across the span of time as the decisive moment in time when man and God meet in the message proclaimed by the man from Nazareth.⁵ "The event which as a fact in time transforms the world...is the sending of Jesus."⁶ He is the bearer of God's Word which places man in a position requiring a choice to be made -- a position of existential

1. "QMH", p. 329a.

2. EF, p. 292.

3. J.D. Smart, The Divided Mind of Modern Theology, pp. 157-158.

4. EF, pp. 252-254.

5. "PCKHJ", p. 40.

6. FU, p. 174.

crisis. "The crisis is linked...strictly to one particular event, that is, the coming of Jesus....[T]he eternal God is not within the circle of perceivable possibilities; within that circle stands only the incarnate one, whose word is heard...now."¹ By inaugurating the demand for decision, Christ implants within the message an eschatological proclamation which challenges the very core and foundation of man's becoming. Jesus bears God's Word which questions man's life before the Creator. "The now of being addressed at a specific time, this moment, is the eschatological now because in it is the decision between life and death."² The Word of Jesus Christ as the Word of God³ is a repeatable event which occurs in the moment of proclamation and which transforms that specific moment into the urgency of decisive existential significance. Man is placed before the two choices of life and death when he hears the message. He stands before the Word and it is his responsibility to choose, to make a decision.

1. FU, p. 174.

2. FU, p. 175. The investigation of the apocalyptic and the eschatological has been renewed by some of Bultmann's followers. Many seem to differ with him about the proper interpretation of these terms. It would seem that RB's search for the meaning and significance of these terms has been augmented, to some degree, by an attempt to understand the apocalyptic and the eschatological in literal terms. For a discussion of this, see Journal for Theology and the Church, Volume 6 (1969), edited by Robert W. Funk. Of further interest in the area of apocalyptic, D.S. Russell has done an interesting study in the area of Jewish apocalypticism (The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic, Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1964). Russell also appears to disagree with Bultmann's interpretation of this category. He suggests that for the Jews and the early Christians: "The promises made to Israel by his servants the prophets must have meaning and reality and would ultimately be fulfilled" (18).

3. TNT, Volii, p. 62f.

Man's essence manifests itself in action, in his being-on-the-way, which always seeks to place him before new possibilities and alternatives.¹ But in Jesus Christ, he is met with a life-and-death message² which must be considered in all seriousness and responsibility, for it questions the life-core of his essence and being. "Human existence has regained its authenticity in its potentiality to be."³ This is where the decisiveness of Jesus's Word rests -- upon its ability to shake the very foundations of self-understanding and to present a new and real potentiality for becoming. Human essence reveals itself in actualization of possibility. "Man is never satisfied with his present. His desires, his expectations...stretch into the future. That means that the real, the genuine life of man is always before him. Man is always on the way...."⁴ This would seem to be precisely the point where man comes into contact with the Word of Jesus -- at the place of his becoming. The possibility consists of eschatological existence which is lived in the presence of God. "This self-understanding...grows out of the Word.... The believer has passed from death to life...."⁵ Man's old self is replaced by the new which is lived out of the Word. The Word seems to receive ultimate importance in man's encounter with the faith. It is the Word which mediates

1. TNT, Voli, p. 246; Volii, p. 26.

2. TNT, Volii, p. 62.

3. FU, p. 176.

4. "QMH," p. 329b.

5. JCM, p. 81.

the transition from death to life, from the old self to the new, from the world to God.¹ And it is the Word which Bultmann appears to view as the once-for-all-ness of God's revelation in Jesus Christ.

His Word appears to function as a transitional category in Bultmann's theology. Christ delivers it, but it belongs to the Word to effect the shift from death to life.² It appears to be its authorized preaching which transposes life and the world. "God's saving act occurs only as Word and is recognized as saving act only in answer to the Word.... The saving event does not lie behind the Word, but takes place in the Word."³ It remains the prerogative of God to encounter man in this form of address.⁴ Jesus Christ who speaks this Word addresses the man who will listen to God's call. In this way, revelation, as it occurs in and through the message, is a hearing event.⁵ Man is called upon to hear. This proclamation has the function of directly placing him in confrontation with God.⁶ Proclamation demands a faith-response as an answer to the word of challenge. "Faith is directed to the Word and to the authorized proclamation of the Word. Therefore, no other validation can be demanded for the Word and no other basis created for it than the Word itself."⁷ The response to it can be none other than

1. TNT, Volii, pp. 67-8.

2. "R in NT", p. 43.

3. Schmithals, p. 212.

4. EF, p. 166.

5. EF, p. 100.

6. "R in NT", p. 42.

7. FU, p. 138.

faith or unbelief.¹ Its authorized proclamation comes through the transmission of churchly tradition.² To look for validation behind the Word would be to seek after an objective proof which would only invalidate it by making it empirical.³ Man's meeting it apparently requires only a simple "Yes" or "No". The ultimate decision rests within the will of the hearer, but the power of life that brings man out of death resides in the possibility possessed by the Word. It is to the position of faith that the Word of Jesus speaks and endeavours to move man, for it is in faith, which attaches to the Word, that the life of the hearer is opened to the historic possibility of grasping himself.⁴ "Faith has only become a possibility for man because God has sent his Son."⁵ When the Word is proclaimed, man comes face to face with the call of God. The Word possesses the efficacy of creating an eschatological situation which can transform man's life by altering his self-understanding. This efficacy cannot be a possession which can be manipulated and controlled.⁶ Rather it confronts man anew in each experience of preaching and it is here and nowhere else that one finds this encounter.⁷ In the Word's preaching and

1. TNT, Volii, p. 75.

2. JCM, p. 82.

3. FU, p. 122. For further elucidation of Bultmann's use of Jesus Christ as the root fact of faith, see Appendix B (page 460ff) on his similarity to Martin Kähler's "historic, biblical Christ".

4. FU, pp. 139-142.

5. FU, p. 173.

6. EF, p. 169.

7. Bartsch, KMi, p. 41.

proclamation, the contemporary becomes contemporaneous with the eschatological situation found in Christ.¹ Man is given the possibility for authentic existence when he is delivered from himself and this is precisely what Jesus Christ has accomplished.² Man's new self-understanding involves freedom by which God removes man from himself to others.³ It remains the power of the Word to transform man in this manner and thus to make the present moment eschatological. "The eschatological event, which Christ is, is consequently realized...in concreto here and now, where the Word is proclaimed....This proclamation addresses me personally...in the sense that God's having acted is present as an eschatological NOW."⁴ God's personal address requires response. The Word seems to function in such a manner as to present the hearer with the possibility for faith which is itself the potentiality to be a new man. Here resides the power of Jesus' Word: it gives new life by means of a new self-understanding.⁵ "The proclamation does not effect a magical change in our life....It brings nothing into our life as a new entity. It only opens our eyes to ourselves"⁶ It is this "opening our eyes to ourselves" which marks off the special province of the Word. It does not seem to initiate any metaphysical or ontological metamorphosis

1. "R in NT", p. 45.

2. Bartsch, KMi, p. 31.

3. Bartsch, KMi, p. 32.

4. Bartsch, KMi, pp. 208-9.

5. Smart, pp. 158-9.

6. FU, p. 140.

since such a transformation could quite possibly be construed as requiring supernatural intervention.¹ Rather, the change involves an ontic re-evaluation of life-style and -structure which appears to re-order and re-arrange present historic priorities. This apparently being the case, Bultmann announces that the event of preaching constitutes the Now of salvation in which man is brought from himself and the world to others.² Again Bultmann does not appear to be completely novel in the suggestion regarding the ontic change. Herrmann and Harnack have already pointed out that the ideas of the Gospel do not involve a transformation or ontological change in a physical sense. Rather, one is motivated and stimulated to act differently, to act in harmony with the Gospel. Man is thus only ontically affected.

The importance of Jesus Christ rests in His delivering the Word, and in that moment He apparently becomes the revelation of God.³ Christology confronts man as a direct summons of proclamation.⁴ In this way, Jesus Christ becomes the Word which is preached as the word of salvation.⁵ The Now of the Revealer's coming corresponds with the Now of the proclaimed Word.⁶ It would seem that Christ appears to come very close to being identified with the preaching itself.⁷

1. Braaten and Harrisville, Kerygma and History, pp. 217-8.

2. FU, p. 276.

3. "PCKHJ", pp. 41-2.

4. FU, p. 280.

5. "PCKHJ", p. 42.

6. FU, p. 175.

7. Essays, p. 289.

Bultmann has contended that authentic existence is obtained in the acknowledgement and realization of possibility. It is in this that man's essence finds expression, for man is man in deliberate action and not in mere active deliberation.¹ Bultmann approaches the biblical text with this underlying anthropological consideration. And this vastly influences the interpretation of what he finds there. Man himself appears to be a primary focal point for Bultmann's interpretation.² "Since the exegete exists historically and must hear the word of Scripture as spoken..., he will always understand the old word anew. Always anew it will tell him who he, man, is and who God is...."³ Bultmann's concern seems to concentrate on an explication of the phenomenon of man as he exists before God.⁴ In his historical position, man approaches the text. He attempts to sift out who he is in the light of what Jesus Christ has spoken. The investigator cannot anticipate discovering any facts about God who is believed to have spoken⁵ since he apparently assumes a priori that any such talk reflects mythological conceptions. Therefore, his attention moves away from an inquiry into what man can grasp regarding the experience of God as faith claims Him to be in the person of Christ. But within the framework outlined above, the investigator, in order to be comprehensible and intelligible to the modern scientific mind, directs his

1. LD, pp. 60-3.

2. "R in NT", p. 42; and TNT, Vol. I, pp. 326-7.

3. EF, p. 296.

4. Smart, pp. 161-3.

5. Ibid., p. 135.

inquiry into the ontic possibilities for man which faith alleges to be present there. As a result, the facts seem to dissipate into the indeterminateness and obscurity of historical phenomena in general. It may be the case the Bultmann could have some sympathies with Harnack's distinction between facts of external details and the facts of personality. It appears that the person of Jesus is an external detail which no amount of research and scholarship can retrieve from the ambiguities of history. There will always be controversy about the facts of the matter. However, the fact of His reality seen from the sphere of faith allays all doubts and suspicions about the authenticity of His person and His reality as the Christ. With this distinction made, it is possible to see why Jesus becomes ambivalent and ambiguous when investigated as an objective constellation of data.¹ In the opening pages of History and Eschatology as well as in the introduction of Jesus and the Word, Bultmann expresses his concern about finding any sure and certain information. In this way, the person of Jesus, as an objective, historical individual, apparently becomes maintained and established in the transmission of faith.²

We cannot be certain...whether...the earliest layer of tradition disclosed...comes directly from Jesus or whether the oldest community preserved a true picture of him and his message....But actually this need make no difference to us....Whether [our encounter] originated with Jesus or with his church is a secondary consideration.³

1. "PCKHJ", p. 25.

2. Ibid., p. 18.

3. Smart, p. 157.

The infinite qualitative difference which exists between God and man appears central and decisive.¹ It would seem that on the basis of this working hypothesis coupled with the corollary regarding the world-view, Bultmann finds himself restricted in giving any serious consideration to the ontological claims of faith that in Jesus Christ, God is personally present. Bultmann's attention thus draws away from the bearer of the Word and from consideration of who He is. Rather, it would seem to be the case that the Word itself becomes the power which replaces His person who must remain irrevocably caught in the grasp of contingency.² "Therefore, the inner relation between Word and bearer of the Word is irrelevant to the claim of the Word."³ It becomes the province of the Word to mediate the God/man experience which is itself confined to the structures and categories of existence and to the natural laws which govern it. To come to God is not to come to Jesus, the man, but rather to hear in mindful anticipation that which has come down to the present time and which claims to mediate between divine and human.⁴ The Christian faith is a present experience in which the hearer participates.⁵ The eschatological Now rests upon proclamation which comes ever anew in each specific encounter with preaching. In this manner, Jesus Christ is secondarily rescued from the grips of

1. Ibid., p. 154.

2. "PCKHJ", p. 20.

3. FU, p. 131.

4. "PCKHJ", pp. 40-1.

5. J.C. Futrell, "Myth and Message," Cath. Bibl. Q., Vol. 21, pp. 307-9.

obscurity and criticism, for He approaches not in His person but in the historical act of the spoken word.¹ It may be that Bultmann takes his stand with the "Immune-from-Historical-Research School" which contends that the knowledge of events is superceded by the encounter that they mediate and which thus establishes faith on the decision with the encounter rather than with facts.²

Jesus Christ comes in the proclamation which is itself rooted in the historical happening of the cross of the Crucified.³ The content of the Word expresses the meaning that the one who preached God's Word and who demands decision is Jesus of Nazareth crucified.⁴ On this basis, Bultmann can maintain that faith is an historic event which happened in space and time.⁵ The aspect of death, even if on the cross, can apparently be understood within the world-view of Bultmann. The cross which crucified Jesus is also the cross which each man must bear who hears and believes in the spoken word.⁶ In faith, one also participates in the crucifixion in that the believer is both judged and delivered by his act of belief.⁷ In this manner of vicarious suffering and death, the believer accepts the challenge presented in the

1. "PCKHJ", pp. 37-8.

2. H.K. McArthur, "From the Historical Jesus to Christology," Interpretation, Vol. 23, p. 196.

3. LD, p. 93f.

4. FU, p. 114.

5. "PCKHJ", p. 18.

6. Bartsch, KMi, p. 36.

7. Bartsch, KMi, p. 37.

preaching of the Word.¹ It thus initiates a "new and permanent" situation in history because the cross is an historical fact.² Jesus' Word delivers a new possibility while the cross indelibly engraves it into the very fibre and fabric of history itself.³ God has wrought this event which is also eschatological, precisely in that it transmits a new and radical self-understanding. "The Word of God is... a concrete word addressed to men here and now....Its origin is an historical event by which the speaking of this word...is rendered authoritative and legitimate. This event is Jesus Christ."⁴ So the Word of new life is an historically rooted word in the event of Jesus the man as He is preached.⁵ But the foundation appears to give way to the precedence of its existential message -- that man is now a new creation.⁶ The Word of the cross addresses the present. "It gives him freedom from the world and from the sorrow and anxiety which overwhelms him when he forgets the beyond."⁷ The hearer is released from his own self-imposed captivity which has held him in bondage.⁸ His new self-understanding involves a new and dynamic attitude toward the world and men.⁹ "To believe... means to abandon all merely human security and thus to overcome

1. TNT, Voli, p. 292f.

2. Bartsch, KMi, p. 37.

3. D. Fuller, Easter Faith and History, p. 97f.

4. JCM, pp. 79 and 80.

5. LD, pp. 68-70.

6. TNT, Voli, p. 329f.

7. JCM, p. 40.

8. Smart, p. 180.

9. WB, pp. 145-154.

the despair which arises from the attempt to find security"¹ The Word of Jesus challenges man to relinquish his idolatrous graps upon the world and upon his own future. As does Kierkegaard and Tillich, Bultmann appears to be indirectly criticizing any attempts on the part of man to stand aloof from God.² The notion of human self-sufficiency and -assertiveness moves away from the infinite dimension of reality. The finite world and man are not the real possibilities for life. Man's security rests upon the same basis as does the Word -- the presence of God. The cross exemplifies all of the folly and foolishness inherent in all attempts to find security within the world.³ Jesus announces that human existence is from God and that He is the possibility upon which true and genuine life is to be founded. "In contrast to world and death, life is always...a being-in-the-future.... Man...is always being given himself back as his possibility...; he is free...."⁴ This freedom is God's gift and as such it can never be grasped by man of his own accord. Rather, it is the significance of the Word which creates meaning in every moment of preaching. Jesus' Word occurs as an historic happening and it is in understanding history that one comes to achieve the possibility of better understanding himself.⁵ But it remains the claim of faith as announced in the Word that

1. JCM, p. 40.

2. Compare references in Kierkegaard Chapter, p. 128ff. and Tillich Chapter, 262 ff.

3. EF, pp. 174-7.

4. FU, p. 179.

5. JCM, p. 53.

freedom is granted by God's act.¹ The urgency of the Word as well as its finality is impressed upon historic consciousness by the cross which is the road that all men must travel in dying to the security of the world.²

But the Word is also the resurrecting of hope for the future, which arises out of man's past. The cross and resurrection of Christ signify man's vicarious dying to all and rising again upon the basis of God.³ "In accepting the word of preaching as the word of God and the death and resurrection of Christ as the eschatological event, we are given an opportunity of understanding ourselves."⁴ This is where the true future resides -- in understanding and in grasping possibilities.⁵ As Bultmann points out, "the salvation-occurrence" is effected in and through the word of preaching which has as its existential content the death and resurrection of Christ.⁶ As with any speculation about the ontological make-up of Jesus as the Godman, so it must also be in respect to any consideration of the resurrection as a literal event.⁷ "An historical fact which involves a resurrection from the dead is utterly inconceivable!"⁸ It appears that Bultmann's anti-metaphysical presuppositions and his distinction between God and man preclude any serious

1. JCM, p. 53.

2. TNT, Voli, p. 303.

3. Braaten and Harrisville (eds.) Kerygma and History, pp. 35 and 36.

4. Bartsch, KMi, p. 41.

5. J. MacQuarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p. 159.

6. TNT, Voli, pp. 300-2.

7. Fuller, Easter Faith and History, p. 98.

8. Bartsch, KMi, p. 39.

contemplation of the New Testament's claim being taken in an objective sense.¹ What is required is an understanding of what the New Testament is saying to man about himself. The resurrection-event like the Christ-event is geschichtlich unique.² The objective reference gives way to its historic and existential meaning for the believer.³ As with Christ and His cross, so with the resurrection -- they become meaning-events in the fact of preaching.⁴ "I would not call dying and rising again with Christ a subjective experience, for it can occur only through an objective encounter with the proclamation and the act of God which it mediates."⁵ Certainly Bultmann does not want to maintain "subjective" in the sense of a completely illusory experience which takes place only in the sphere of meaning.⁶ Rather, he appears to becloud his meaning in this reference by coupling it with the word "objective". It is entirely possible and conceivable that Bultmann is permitted no other alternative than to demythologize the resurrection given its objective impossibility.⁷ Even if there had been a resurrection it would presumably be incumbent upon faith to view it as nothing other than an explainable phenomenon according to the laws which explain the world. For on Bultmann's pre-suppositions, even a resurrection

1. R. Cushman, "Is the Incarnation a Symbol?", Theology Today, Vol. 15, p. 174.

2. Ibid., p. 178.

3. TNT, Vol. I, pp. 305-6.

4. Malet, The Thought of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 156.

5. Bartsch, KMi, p. 112.

6. Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, pp. 66-7.

7. Hoffmann, "Kerygma and History," J. Bibl. and Rel., Vol. 33, p. 27.

could hardly find its way into faith's understanding as evidence of God's intervention into the course of human affairs. Rather, Bultmann demythologizes the event to mean the rise of the Easter faith in the first disciples.¹ In this way, faith's claims become intelligible to the modern, scientific man, and the confusion which could possibly be seen as occurring in his use of "subjective" and "objective" together subsides in the encounter with preaching and its personal certainty. Indeed, these are the factual dimensions of faith.

From this discussion involving the role of Christ as the Word of God, it appears to emerge that one is not dealing here with merely an historical figure. It seems that Bultmann's understanding of Jesus Christ is somewhat coloured by his basic presuppositions which guide as well as condition the range of his thought on this subject. His metaphysical assumptions considerably contribute to the limitations placed upon finding any sense in the New Testament's talk of God objectively acting in history.² An investigator cannot really attach much credence to the possibility that He has literally revealed Himself. As it relates to Jesus Christ, revelation must be demythologized into categories of comprehensible meaning which make sense to the modern climate of opinion.³ To accomplish this, Bultmann endeavours to ask, "What is the New Testament trying to tell me about my historic

1. Bartsch, KMi, p. 42.

2. MacQuarrie, An Existentialist Theology, pp.166-170.

3. "R in NT", p. 43f.

existence?"¹ No doubt, in this question the point of emphasis shifts from God to man who is still related to God but who appears, nonetheless, to be the reference of primary concern. In this way, Bultmann seems to be perpetuating something of the old dichotomy in reality between the objective and the subjective.² God's acts are not capable of objective, rational conceptuality in this setting, since they remain extra-sensible and thus beyond the realm of perceptual apprehension and experience.³ What is required of the investigator is to speak of man, for he is definitely part of the sensible, perceptual world. Bultmann contends that to speak anthropologically requires reference to the Word of God. But he can only talk about God's Word as he refers to Jesus. This manner of speaking seemingly moves in the direction of playing down the historical data pertinent to Him while emphasizing His importance for the conveyance of present meaning.

First,...the event of Jesus...has its primary significance in the dimension of personal history. Second, Jesus Christ can never be objectively identified as the eschatological event by investigation....Third, Jesus Christ as eschatological event is such only in the present, only as he confronts men in their own situation with the possibility of new self-understanding.⁴

Clearly the emphasis comes to light regarding Bultmann's concern to view Him as a geschichtlich-event while retaining, at a distance, the objective, historical reference upon which

1. JCM, p. 53.

2. Cushman, pp. 178-9.

3. EF, pp. 25-30.

4. N.J. Young, "Bultmann's View of History," Church QR, Vol. 165, p. 424.

this event is founded.¹ In this connection, it appears that he may do some equivocating here.² For he seems to hesitate in his demythologizing project at the point of Jesus Christ. On the one hand, he retains Him as the bearer of God's Word.³ On the other hand, he appears to maintain that there is no objective, material relation between the Word and its bearer.⁴ As a possible comparison, it may be justified to suggest a resemblance between Bultmann's position and that of the Liberals in regard to the personality of Jesus. Bultmann apparently maintains the "Dass" of Jesus in order to ground the Word in the concreteness of history. One can say that Jesus lived and died, but His real importance comes to the fore in the proclamation. In this moment Jesus is the Christ. The believer apparently becomes contemporaneous with Him in the moment of hearing and deciding. While historical-critical research does not seem to be able to demonstrate the material connection between Jesus and the Christ, in "believing self-understanding" the relationship is evidently sealed and made certain in the experience of the believer.⁵ Similarly, the Liberals could speak of "only one fact" which remains beyond question. It is "the appearance of Jesus in history." He "can overcome every doubt of the reality of God." Objective investigation into the reliability

1. H. Diem, Dogmatics, pp. 64 and 65.

2. G.E. Ladd, "The Role of Jesus in Bultmann's Theology," Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 18, pp. 57-68.

3. Bartsch, KMi, p. 41.

4. "PCKHJ", p. 25f.

5. EF, p. 16.

of biblical testimony can only provide controversy and quibbling about the external details of this man. One obviously cannot demonstrate the connection between Jesus, the man, and Jesus, the Christ. However, the New Testament account provides the basis for a personal encounter and experience. For the Liberals, the fact that He lived and died seems to function as an embarkation point into the weightier matter of the Power He communicates. The personal and intimate experience of the believer realizes His "self-evidencing" power. In other words, it seems that the Liberals see Jesus as the Christ in the faithful eventuation of the believer. The fact of His person stands beyond question and doubt in the context of belief. But Troeltsch took opposition to the "self-evidencing" power in that he viewed it as a symptom of latent transcendentalism. Why should this one person possess the ability to prove the authenticity of His person? Indeed, one must wonder if this same question applies to Bultmann. Does his conjoining of the acts of living and thinking provide a more certain basis for relating Jesus to the Christ than the Liberals' "self-evidencing" power? It may not be out of place to suggest that Bultmann is possibly presenting a variation of his predecessors' method, for the experienced reality of Jesus as the Christ takes place in the personal encounter of the believer, both for him and the Liberals. But to return, Bultmann's thought seems a bit confusing in that he appears both to take his stand in the faith and to maintain his allegiance to the modern world.¹ From appearances, he

1. Diem, pp. 76-8.

interconnects Jesus of Nazareth with the Word at the point of proclamation.¹ This would seem to suggest that the historicity of Jesus gives way to His meaning at the moment of proclamation. His subjective and personal importance takes precedence over His objective and empirical grounding. Given the facticity of proclamation and the "Dass" of Jesus, one might possibly inquire, "How does it happen that one part of historical reality eludes objective observation and the other not?"² An alleged disjunction between the objective, empirical and subjective, personal appears to be prompted here. It seems that Bultmann has so construed reality as to make it an either/or proposition, and quite possibly he is one of the first casualties of these apparently mutually exclusive terms.³ One commentator has criticized him on this tendency:

we must protest at the tendency here to exclude the objective-historical element altogether. True, Bultmann is right in refusing to make theology...dependent on historical research. But there is a sense in which the existential-historical implies the objective - historical. To preach the cross as saving event is to propagate an illusion unless the origin of that saving event was an actual happening.... 4

For another perspective of this issue, one can survey the writings of the "Bultmannians" of the New Quest School.⁵ It is a contention of these people that Bultmann has certain "undercurrents" which move in the direction of identifying Jesus with the Word, while Bultmann maintains that the Word

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1. Braaten and Harrisville (eds.), The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ, pp. 142-171.
 2. Ibid., p. 146.
 3. C.W. Kegley, The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, pp. 76-7.
 4. MacQuarrie, p. 178.
 5. See James Robinson's A New Quest of the Historical Jesus.

arises not out of faith in the historical Jesus but from the early Christian community.¹ But all in all, the tendency which appears to manifest itself is that Bultmann tends to maintain the that about Jesus over the how of His relation to the Word.² The answer to the how question would seem to direct attention to the material actuality of the person called the Christ. Paradoxically, it might seem that Jesus Christ both is and is not related to the Word which He speaks.³ And maybe it is incumbent upon Bultmann to decide unequivocally how he will stand on this issue.⁴

C. HISTORY AS ESCHATOLOGY

The Word of Jesus Christ brings an historic possibility which creates a "new and permanent" situation in which man's life-style is ontically re-ordered in relation to the message heard and received.⁵ According to Bultmann the hearer who grasps the Word experiences the reality of history from the perspective of faith. "Christ is...the end of history...."⁶ As a believer, man perceives the historical reality in a new and radical manner which results from the new understanding of existence obtained in faith. As with his understanding of Christ so also with his view of history, Bultmann seems to approach the subject with various "pre-understandings" which condition and qualify his approach. Part of this working hypothesis presumes that an event is historical if it includes

1. J.B. Cobb, "The Post-Bultmannian Trend," J. Bibl. Rel., Vol. 30, pp.3-11. S. Ogden, "Bultmann and the New Quest," J.Bibl. Rel. Vol. 30, pp. 209-218. J. Robinson, "The Recent Debate on the New Quest," J. Bibl.Rel., Vol. 30, pp. 198-208.
2. Ladd, pp. 60,61,63,66.
3. Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, pp. 63-7.
4. Cushman, p. 177.
5. TNT, Volii, pp. 70-3.
6. EF, p. 237.

meaning.¹ But meaning is always related to the investigator who comes to history "excited" by his subject matter and asking questions which relate to his own existential situation. In this way, man encounters history and engages it in dialogue. "We do not stand outside historical forces as neutral observers; we are ourselves moved by them; and only when we are ready to listen to the demand which history makes upon us do we understand at all what history is about."² The dialogue is a necessary part of one's involvement in the questioning, for he is himself a part of the very process which finds itself under scrutiny.³ One views himself as part of the process. This encounter aids man in viewing the demand or claim which calls into question his own subjectivity. "This dialogue is...a real interrogating of history...[in] which the historian puts...[his] subjectivity...in question, and is ready to listen to history as an authority."⁴ Man converses in the anticipation of learning something about himself. History comprises the realm of human existence. "But what we call history is the course of those events which are brought about by human action....Human actions are always caused by purposes and intentions, by the will to attain something."⁵ This characterization appears to tie it very intimately to the actions and reactions of man. Not only does he appear to be the subject, but also he appears to be the primary deter-

1. HE, pp. 118-122.

2. JW, p. 4.

3. "QMH", p. 329b.

4. JW, p. 4.

5. "QMH", p. 329b.

mination of its constitution. What man purposes and intends is the material substance of history. His psychical interaction with Nature seems to provide the dynamism for movements and meaning. One may possibly see strong traces of Dilthey and Troeltsch at this point. No doubt, both of these men approach the subject of history with an anthropological "pre-understanding". Dilthey, Troeltsch and Bultmann do not look at history to discover what, but who man is -- it is to search for personal meaning. As well Bultmann also apparently views history as man's teacher about himself.¹ Therefore he interrogates it and listens to its "demand" as an authority which is to be contended with. "The character of every...situation lies in the fact that within it the problems and the meaning of past and future are enclosed and waiting... to become unveiled by human decision."² But as a Christian theologian, he has special interests for this particular interpretation. He too possesses the interest to engage in dialogue with it, but his interest is attached to a specific event which he views as decisive for interrogating human subjectivity. His attention is directed to the event of Jesus whom faith claims to be the Christ. But we have already seen that no empirical credence can be given these affirmations. Rather the theologian's interest is in demythologizing His person and in placing Him within the instructive sphere of man's realm.

The ideas [of Jesus] are understood in the light of the concrete situation of a man living in time; as his

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1. O'Meara and Weisser (eds.), Rudolf Bultmann in Catholic Thought, p. 172.
 2. "QMH", p. 329b.

interpretation of his own existence in the midst of change, uncertainty, decision; as the expression of a possibility of comprehending this life....When we encounter the words of Jesus...we do not judge them....; they meet us with the question of how we are to interpret our own existence. 1

Ostensibly, Jesus steps out of the historical past in the form of His Word which encounters man today as in every day with an interpretation of existence.² His Word confronts man as the question posed to his own being of how he will live in the world.³ But man's being is not just simply questioned, it is also presented with a "possibility of comprehending this life" and with an attitude of life and mind which sees into the contingencies and necessities of being in the world. Thus the Word confronts the investigator on two levels. First, it removes any sense of security about his own subjectivity. Man encounters a challenge which interrogates him at the very core of life -- his own being. Second, it offers an interpretation that comprehends the situation of man. The Word presents a positive dynamic to man's understanding of himself. His being is both called into question and given new and positive supports. This encounter is an historical one which also presents historic, personal possibilities. Not only does he live and exist in history, but also he can find in it a teacher whose Word can instruct him.

But for Bultmann, the event of Jesus' Word is not

1. JW, p. 11.

2. TNT, Volii, p. 75f.

3. TNT, Volii, p. 75f.

another happening among so many others. Surely, He is just another man who lived and died, but the meaning He delivered comprises something final which prompts him to call Jesus Christ the "end" of history.¹ Something final and once-for-all occurs in the Word.² It is not a final and once-for-allness that radically shifts the ontological structures and abruptly institutes a complete metamorphosis from one age to another.³ There does not appear to be anything of this kind involved; and hardly could there be given the preliminaries to approaching the whole discussion. But while history and the world remain unchangeable, man does change and is affected by what he receives in faith.⁴ No "magical change" takes place. Rather, he is granted a new self-understanding which changes his whole life-style in relation to the world and other men. This new life-outlook can never be at his disposal; it is never his complete possession.⁵ It is the claim of faith that he receives this as a gift from God.⁶ And this gift is effected through the Word which confronts and encounters man. "Christ meets us in the word of preaching and nowhere else.... Jesus represents the intervention of God in history...."⁷ In the event of preaching, Jesus' interpretation of life becomes a real possibility for man. The Word received in preaching seems to validate itself in the message which it

1. Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, p. 166.

2. Schmithals, An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 184.

3. Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, p. 167.

4. HE, p. 153.

5. "R in NT", pp. 45-6.

6. TNT, Vol. I, p. 289f.

7. Futrell, "Myth and Message," Cath. Bibl. Q., Vol. 24, p. 309.

presents. Bultmann appears to make it perfectly clear that one cannot inquire behind the Word, for this would seemingly jeopardize its authenticity and message. To seek behind it would be to seek the objective relationship between God and Jesus, and for Bultmann this can never be verified or established.¹ The Word stands or falls by its own power to convince that in encountering it one encounters an act of God. But to speak this way, one must not look out onto the objective material of history; rather one looks into himself at his own existence. "God as acting does not refer to an event which can be perceived by me without myself being drawn into the event as into God's action....In other words, to speak of God as acting involves the events of personal existence."² To all appearances, the Word acts internally in the man who hears and believes. God cannot be objectively seen nor can His Word find objective moorings in the vicissitudes of history. Consequently, He is seen to act through His Word where only the eye of faith seeks Him. It is to the province of faith to perceive the hidden and mysterious activity of God.

Christian faith can only say, "I trust that God is working here and there, but His action is hidden, for it is not directly identical with the visible event. What it is that He is doing I do not yet know, and perhaps I never shall know it, but faithfully I trust that it is important for my personal existence, and I must ask what it is that God says to me." 3

Surely then, God does act for man even though he cannot perceive this action in the visible events of the every day.

1. Bartsch, KMi, p. 207.

2. JCM, p. 68.

3. JCM, p. 64.

But the effect of the Word creates its own assurance that indeed He is present here in this speaking and that indeed it is God who influences and moulds personal existence. More than this cannot be asserted, for it would endanger the hiddenness and mysteriousness of God by attempting to make Him a possession. Apparently the most that faith can expect and do in Bultmann's world-view is to trust that He is acting here and there through the preaching of His Word. This position occasions another glimpse back to the work of the Liberals. It has been suggested that for them man's Reason overlords Nature as the arbiter of reality. As a consequence, the world appears a self-contained nexus of cause and effect.¹ Yet faith can operate within this context without apparent harrassment and contradiction. The Liberals did not appear to suggest a view of faith that contradicts the experiences of perceptible reality. Rather, it transacts its affairs within the limits set by Reason. As one consequence of this, these theologians put forth the proposition that man of faith can only "see" God in the world for himself. Faith cannot defend itself against the reproach of others that such a "seeing" is illogical. The literal in-breaking and operation of God remains doubtful, if not impossible. In a similar fashion, Bultmann appears to share some sympathies with the Liberals. He points out that one can only "trust that God is working here and there." Ultimately, His activity remains hidden and beyond perception

1. For a discussion of cosmological presupposition in theology, see Torrance, Space, Time and Incarnation, pp. 22-51.

of the objective eye. The man of faith believes inwardly and personally that He is active and present. But again, it is only from the stance of faith that such belief seems possible, for the Liberals as well as for Bultmann.

Man is history and this involves his becoming which occurs through decision.¹ The essence of man does not appear to lie in any immutable quality but rather in his response to the challenge which confronts him. He lives by being-on-the-way. But this is a controlled, guided, and qualified activity which takes its direction from his understanding of existence. Being-on-the-way receives its decisive significance from man's life-style. Presumably it is at this point that the nature of man finds a point of contact with the Word. He lives in possibility which he actualizes in decisions,² and Jesus' Word offers a possibility for life which faith claims to be authentic. In this way, the Word and its hearer seem to occupy a common ground which touches the very core of the hearer's subjectivity. It is a common ground which challenges the hearer's life-style while offering the gift of being a new man.

It is just this that is achieved in Christ and given to man as a gift....He brings history to an end in the sense of ending man's past history, his past understanding of himself, and grants...the possibility for free decision and thus new and authentic existence.... This dimension...Bultmann refers to as eschatological existence, or new life.... 3

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1. Young, "Bultmann's View of History," Church Q.Re., Vol.165, pp. 419-420.
 2. G. Wingren, Theology in Conflict, p. 49; and O'Meara and Weisser, p. 171.
 3. Young, p. 420.

Man is permitted a new life through the ending of his past. Jesus' Word ends the past self-history and opens man to the reception of a "new and permanent" situation which allows for a "new and authentic existence." Bultmann is dealing in the realm of personal and intimate existence where it is a possibility to feel the presence of God acting by trusting in Him. In this way, Jesus Christ is the "end" of history by being the end as well as the beginning of a new and personal becoming.¹ Man's volition becomes the target of proclamation, for in preaching he becomes aware of his own pride and this is what faith in God crushes.² It delivers the opportunity of authentic freedom which can only be his as a gift.³ New life finds the source and well-spring of its power in His power.⁴ The new and personal history finds its basis in a new self-understanding which is grounded in God. As a believer, he lives out of His power confronting man historically in proclamation. His new understanding is the relinquishing of all confidence in human and worldly achievements. It is a turning to God in absolute surrender and trust which sees Him as active and present. "The man who desires to believe in God must know that he has nothing at his own disposal on which to build this faith, that he is, so to speak, in a vacuum....He who gives up, he who loses every security shall find security."⁵ This new awareness awakens

1. Ibid., p. 420.

2. Prim. XT., p. 183.

3. Kegley, The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p. 53.

4. Bartsch, KMi, pp. 43-4.

5. JCM, p. 84.

the impossibility of establishing anything lasting upon the foundation of this world. It is the realm of the contingent, and man is not master here.¹ Rather his authentic hope and possibility is to live out of the power of God. It is He who frees from the entangling alliances with the worldly phenomena and grants true freedom which can only be radical openness for the future. In this way, man moves toward the real grasping of himself. He lives out of divine power and not out of the powers which seem to constitute the world.² The Word of Jesus as the Word of God presents and opens man to the gift of a radical shift in life-style. He lives in the world as though he were not.³ His new consciousness of living views the presence of God as the only security which is real.⁴ Existence becomes conditioned by the presence of the "end" which is inaugurated in the Word and finalized by the power of God. "Jesus Christ is the eschatological event, which means that he is the action of God by which he has sent an end to the old world."⁵ He makes the new beginning; it is new since it is eschatological in that it ends man's past life-style and makes him a new "creation".⁶

[T]he eschatological event has happened within history and happens everywhere in preaching...[E]schatology... is not the future end of history, but history is swallowed up by eschatology....[H]istory must...be understood...as profane....But the dialectic of human

1. WB, pp. 59-64.

2. HE, p. 116.

3. "Prophecy and Fulfilment", p. 74, (see page 202, Ftnt # 5).

4. LD, pp. 58 and 59.

5. "QMH", p. 330a.

6. "Prophecy and Fulfilment", p. 73.

life as historical...is brought to light, and...the history of₁ man as person...is set beyond world-history.

In the light of what has been said, it appears that faith is the answer to any inquiry regarding meaning for life.²

Eschatology no longer deals with a future, objective completion of history but strictly with the believer's personal existence. It ends the old life-style and re-creates him as a believer of the Word. This is accomplished through preaching which mediates the transition.³ Man's place comes into view as a history in and of itself and no longer simply a component of history on a grand or universal scale.⁴ He is now important individually. The emphasis switches from the overall span of history in general to the specific instance of personal history in particular.⁵ Both history and eschatology appear to be removed from cosmic and objective

1. "HE in NT", p. 16.

2. Cushman, "Is the Incarnation a Symbol?", Theology Today, Vol. 15, p. 169.

3. "QMH", p. 330a.

4. Young, p. 420.

5. Ibid., p. 415; Indeed, Bultmann is quite clear in his own mind that the emphasis of the biblical message is directed to the individual. To understand and to interpret this message in any other way moves one in the direction of viewing faith empirically and thus looking for the salvation of a people or community and for an observable end to history. However, Bultmann's conception of the task will only permit an existential or personal interpretation. For this preference in Bultmann, see for instance his articles: "Prophecy and Fulfilment", in Essays on Old Testament Interpretation, edited by Claus Westermann (trans. James Luther Mays), SCM Press, London, 1963; and "The Old Testament and Christian Faith", in The Old Testament and Christian Faith, edited by Bernhard W. Anderson, SCM Press, London, 1964.

proportions and translated into personal terms. Eschatology is thus possible here and now in man who is created anew through decision.¹ "[T]he meaning in history lies always in the present, and when the present is seen by...faith as the eschatological present, the moment of decision, the meaning in history is realized."² History is swallowed up by eschatology, for it too is translated into personal terms affected by the Word.³ God's act becomes personalized in the believer and for this reason history gives way to eschatology since the Word makes life a present possibility.⁴

The need for new life arises from the conditions of being in the world of space and time.⁵ Without God, man stands as nothing without meaning. He participates only in death. But it can only be through the Word that he comes to an awareness of this situation. "[I]n...preaching...the word addresses you, it shows you your nothingness."⁶ Man comes to see that he is at the mercy of the world, for the powers of the cosmos seek to enslave him. "The powers under which man is enslaved are...cosmic powers. They are the element of the world..., the 'dominions, principalities, powers'."⁷ The objective world reveals itself to be an alien counter-point. It cannot be made into a home where security

1. Cushman, p. 176.

2. "QMH", p. 330b.

3. "HE in NT", pp. 12-13

4. Essays, p. 286.

5. TNT, Vol. I, p. 246.

6. EF, p. 169.

7. Prim. XT, p. 190.

and confidence are to be found. It does not apparently present itself as a life-giving possibility. To look to the world of empirical happening is to look into the face of death itself.¹ "In this conception,...he is deprived of authentic life, true existence. Nor can he ever achieve that existence by his own strength."² In this manner, history reveals itself as a hostile force. But the power to overcome it does not rest within his grasp. History appears dominated by cosmic and hostile forces.³ The appearance of Jesus of Nazareth and His Word does not overtly change and rectify the ontological structure of history. However, He infuses the life-process with a "new and permanent" situation which stands out as a voice in the wilderness of unfriendly powers. The Word is an oasis in the vast sphere of insecurity and inauthenticity.⁴ Man confronts the immensity of this realm as a weakling. As well he approaches the Word as a weakling, for in its presence he can only be remoulded and given new life as a recipient. "Only in human weakness is the power of God made known. Once again, this means that the grace of God is never an assured possession. It is always ahead of man, always a future possibility."⁵ His grace touches man in the present through proclamation. It re-directs his attention from the world to the present option of God's futurity which can also become his own. God's grace re-works

1. TNT, Voli, pp. 254-9.

2. Prim. XT, p. 191.

3. TNT, Volii, pp. 76,78.

4. LD, pp. 68-70.

5. Prim. XT, p. 195.

man's awareness of himself by turning him from living solely in the world to living out of the power of God.¹ "Like everything that is created, we are from him....We are encompassed by him, we have our ebbing from him, and we have it for him, we belong to him."² Faith in creation shifts to faith in God. The world and man are no longer seen as self-contained and independent realities in polar relationship. They are viewed in their complete dependence upon the presence of God.³ Therefore, history does not coalesce into a unified and whollistically meaningful pattern because of any inherent potentiality within itself. It is always seen as a medium in relation to man.⁴ World-history is replaced by personal and individual history. The question of meaning in history as a whole falls into unimportance, and now one must inquire after the meaning of personal history as it lies in the present -- in man's present confrontation with God.⁵ The natural order of space and time cannot be grasped as offering any real or authentic options for life. The empirical world, just like man, participates in the nothingness of all created reality. To look to the world for meaning is to look at nothing at all.⁶ Man's only real hope lies in his reliance upon God who creates meaning only in personal, historical existence.⁷

1. TNT, Voli, pp. 288-92.

2. EF, p. 176; and compare Tillich, Chapter, pp. 250-254.

3. EF, p. 176.

4. HE, pp. 138-9.

5. HE, p. 155.

6. LD, pp. 89 and 90.

7. LD, p. 63f.

In his discussion on the part which history plays in man's search for life, Bultmann seems to follow the tendency begun in his demythologizing project. To interpret a text is to ask after its relationship to the investigator. Authentic interpretation always presupposes man's seeking to enrich and to correct his self-understanding. The investigator approaches the text with this same working hypothesis. He desires to know what this text can tell him about himself. As preliminary groundwork, all mythological conceptions are scrutinized to separate the cosmological from the existential presentations. Therefore, the investigator interrogates the text strictly from the perspective of what he can learn about man. But to grasp the full implication of this anthropological concern, he must endeavour to re-enact the Word of Jesus in his own life in order to inquire into its authenticity.¹ The New Testament does speak about man and his situation because these are the "pre-understandings" with which the text is approached and expected to speak. For Bultmann, cosmological speculations must be interpreted to explicate real, existential options.² Man guides and controls the project.³ He is the subject of research and as such he is the medium through which the interpretation must filter. The New Testament relates to man and because of this relationship any talk of the New Testament's understanding of history must also be related to him.⁴ Bultmann sees the Word of Jesus

1. TNT, Voli, p. 307.

2. Young, p. 418.

3. Ibid., p. 419.

4. Bartsch, KMi, p. 16.

as addressed to man in intimate and personal terms. The Word informs me of how I may better understand myself in the world before God. The manifestation of this new life-style and pattern also finds expression in the same personal and individualistic terms as does the Word. Meaning is not to be found in the empirical world as a whole, for this can only be seen in the same manner that man's life is seen before his relation to God -- as nothing. History and man are both creatures and are thus both encompassed by non-possibility.¹ Therefore, Bultmann seems to transform it from the encompassing material realm into personal and human conceptualization. "What...is the meaning in history? The meaning...lies always in the present as far as the present demands decision...and thereby offers possibility to become a self, a personality."² Eschatology is now a real possibility because it too is realized in man's personal life and not in cosmic and universal terms. Eschatology and history coalesce in the human encounter with God -- they are the medium for the realization of his new creatureliness.³ Demythologizing thus seems to humanize and individualize the New Testament and history. Anthropological considerations govern and mediate the interpretative process by which man is re-evaluated as the first principle of concern.⁴ Bultmann's attention is with man and with the meaning for his life that is to be found in Scripture.

1. EF, pp. 176-7.

2. "QMH", p. 330a.

3. HE, p. 152.

4. Diem, Dogmatics, p. 67.

D. CHALLENGE/RESPONSE: MAN'S EITHER/OR

Man's existence as it acquires authentic possibility¹ represents the point of concern for Bultmann's demythologizing project. Man's life comes to be the focal point at which the Christian message is concentrated;² for Jesus of Nazareth has come to deliver a new awareness of his options for living. The Word creates the situation of authentic freedom. The new life is lived in freedom which can be the only condition for the true and authentic actualization of personality. "It is the idea that freedom is irrevocably bound up with being an individual and being one's self -- indeed, that 'being free' and 'being one's self' are identical."³ The realization of personality manifests itself in the dimension of freedom. As man lives for God with an openness for the future, he apparently displays the historicity of his being which permits a freedom from the past as well as a freedom for the present and future. "Freedom belongs to the genuine historicity of man, whose self stands always before him and is to be gained."⁴ However, this category or medium of self-development can never be at man's disposal.⁵ It remains the power of the Word to engender it as a real and living potential. Through His Word, God's grace touches man as the necessary condition for the realization and appropriation of the gift. "Human freedom and

1. O'Meara and Weisser, pp. 179-80.

2. Essays, pp. 83-4.

3. Ibid., p. 306.

4. "QMH", p. 330a.

5. MacQuarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p. 196.

divine grace are...not mutually, exclusive....Indeed we must say that it is only divine grace that is responsible for man's real freedom."¹ Human freedom is always a gift which finds its ground in God. On this basis, His Word becomes the controlling and deciding factor from the divine side which readies man for freedom.² But freedom possesses a definite characteristic which qualifies new relationships and which lies beyond man's power to effect.

For real freedom does not...consist in freedom from the determination of the will by the outward conditions of life...; rather it is in freedom from ourselves -- from ourselves as we are in every "now", as people who come out of their past and are determined by it.³

God's Word works to create a new consciousness of self which has as its content the releasement from past determinations. Freedom qualifies the new self-concept by allowing man to live without bondage to himself.⁴ This type of freedom characterizes itself by being unburdened by past determinations.⁵ Man is extricated from the entangling alliances of his past decisions that were based upon his past reliance upon the world.⁶ His encounter with God's Word delivers the opportunity for a freedom which takes man from himself and brings him to others.⁷ "Freedom...is therefore always essentially 'freedom for' as well...."⁸ God's gift elevates

1. Essays, p. 180.

2. EF, pp. 241-2.

3. Essays, p. 180.

4. Ibid., pp. 180-1.

5. TNT, Voli, p. 330ff.

6. Bartsch, KMi, pp. 19-20.

7. TNT, Volii, p. 78f.

8. Essays, p. 307.

man from simple concern with and about himself and permits him to be responsible for others.¹ The freedom that He brings still challenges man to decision and demands the response of responsibility.²

For here is the point of decision...; he... becomes aware that every safeguard is shattered for him, and... that he must be himself -- that the truth we are inquiring about for our existence is the truth of our existence itself, ... which we constitute as our truth only in actually existing. 3

Man's encounter with God delivers him from enslavement to the hostile cosmic powers that seek to incarcerate him in his past history and in their powers and forces. Through freedom, he becomes aware of the truth of his own existence. This truth is not a static and general quality of definition.⁴ In living from God, man moves in the direction of authenticity and true manhood -- precisely in his acting and in his doing.⁵ In being free, he acts and lives for the future because his past is now past and the future is now God's future.⁶ From this vantage point, he is permitted the privilege of surveying the uncertainty of all knowledge and wisdom which constitutes his past. "The way to freedom leads him in the recognition of the relativity and insignificance of all human activity and all human wisdom."⁷ There can be no real hope of establishing authentic life on these contingent foundations. In

1. TNT, Voli, p. 308f; Volii, p. 218f.

2. EF, pp. 230-1, 239.

3. Essays, pp. 322-3.

4. FU, pp. 64-5, 172.

5. Bartsch, KMi, p. 205.

6. MacQuarrie, pp. 204, 206.

7. Essays, p. 324.

confrontation with the world, man must choose either to stand with God or to remain with the world. With God, he is given the gift of himself free from past determination.¹ Living from the world, he must contend with the realm of relativity and contingency.² Here there can be no absolute or final resting point which offers a fixed and once-for-all reference. Man's decision appears to be limited to two exclusive possibilities.³ "For everything that we do in the worldly realm can be done in two senses: either as a tribute to the worldly powers or, in faith in God the Creator, as a service of love."⁴ In essence, man is obliged to choose which god he will ultimately serve and call his own. Bultmann's attitude toward the natural world seems to possess strands of similarity with the Liberal forefathers. From the above position, it would appear that Bultmann views the created realm as a hostile and alien medium. In this guise, it represents a threat as well as a challenge to the life-processes of man. Taken in and of itself, the world appears as a foreboding wilderness where man may temporarily establish a clearing. But the apparent fickleness and latent hostility of the situation poses an impending threat on creativity which seeks to tame the surroundings. There seems to be the occasion for momentary successes but yet man on his own really does not possess the power to settle himself securely. This is the point where the Word of God stands as a citadel

1. TNT, Vol I, p. 319f.

2. Ibid., pp. 227-69.

3. FU, p. 170.

4. EF, p. 182.

of eternal civilization and learning. Through the onslaught of setbacks and gains, this one point remains unharrassed amid the relativity of life. In his own way, it would appear that Bultmann is affirming without much reservation that man cannot really exist upon finite possibilities. The horizontal dimension of creation must be tempered and qualified by the vertical additive. The infinite dimension, God, His Word, need to contribute and to interact with the medium of the world. In an implicit way, Bultmann seems to agree with Tillich that fulfilment of earthly life requires the dimension of the ultimate. This theme does not seem to be entirely novel or original. Indeed, Ritschl and company also perceived the world as "dull" and "unfeeling". Man knows himself to be a part of the system of Nature and yet he feels an independence from and dominance over this mechanical reality. Ritschl and company seem to depict the theological enterprise not as the great mechanical "gangbuster" which would release man from the confines of the system. The Liberals apparently accepted the scientific climate of opinion of their day and thus allowed Reason to remain the arbiter of reality. As a possible compromise with this "pre-understanding", they sought to free man, at least in spirit, to liberate his feeling, from the mechanism which was assumed to be threatening on all sides. God gifted man with an "organizing centre" "with which the spiritual self-feeling" "receives its permanent and specific satisfaction". In a sense, man becomes personally and inwardly free to experience the elements of the infinite in his life. It may not be unfounded to suggest that with his own "pre-understandings"

about reality, God and freedom, Bultmann re-plays an old tune on a new piano.

In accepting freedom, man accepts responsibility for the decisions which he makes. "Responsibility and freedom belong to historicity."¹ It releases and detaches him from his past and opens him to the present possibilities that remain always ahead. "To be historical means to live for the future."² But this freedom is only possible on one basis. This basis is the "vôuos" in which he:

actually must be and wishes to be as himself, in the unity and constancy of his real being -- by a "vôuos", therefore, by which he is brought to himself and becomes himself. ³

Man's freedom obeys a law that remains a constant factor, though emanating in various actions. This unity of motive in a plurality of behaviour comprehends and upholds itself as a centre for the self. As such it succeeds in the positive and affirmative realization of what man must and ought to be. This centre, this law of being, exerts itself in unity and in concert with his real being. This centre motivates him to become himself. The law apparently expresses itself as a self-actualization principle. This principle seems to release and to condition the inherent possibilities contained in the self. But the activating power behind the self-developmental process appear always to remain in the power of the Word.⁴ It is the Word that must always come to

1. "QMH", p. 330a.

2. Ibid., p. 330a.

3. Essays, p. 307.

4. "M in NT", p. 372.

man as a gift and never as a possession. As a self-actualizing initiative, freedom must be grasped and appropriated on an individual and personal level. Jesus' Word approaches man in a one-to-one encounter, and it is a personal response on a one-to-one level which meets the Word. In this encounter, the dimension of freedom is apparently released.¹ Therefore, man's "way to freedom cannot be made by organization -- it must be found by each man for himself."² The medium of decision is ostensibly the manner and means for the acquisition of freedom.³ "For in the decision of faith, I...make a decision for...a new understanding of myself as made free from myself by the grace of God...."⁴ The Word announces itself in the present moment, in the Now, and thus it requires a "Yes" or "No" as a decisive response. It is in the faith-response that man grasps hold of true life. Again it seems warranted at this point to re-visit the position of Dilthey and to inquire after any possible similarities in Bultmann. It has previously been suggested that Dilthey endeavoured to re-work the historical consciousness. He viewed the arena of history as an on-going flux where man seeks to secure himself against the relativities of life. As a bulwark in his defense, he constructs metaphysical systems which attempt to maintain absolutes while contingencies and insecurities prevail all around. But in this attempt,

1. Essays, p. 180.

2. Ibid., p. 321.

3. Ladd, "The Role of Jesus in Bultmann's Theology," Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 18, pp. 61, 63.

4. "QMH", p. 330a.

man seems to limit his options, depending on which system of interaction in which he lives. That is to say, the various systems limit experiences in that each system contains its own concept of what is intelligible and perceptible and what is "good" and "bad". On the one hand, Dilthey perceives this defensive posture as a concomitant dimension of being-in-the-world. He apparently sees that man contains the will-to-stability. On the other hand, Dilthey seeks to present a view of history which, in part, displays the relativity of all life and systems. In this latter pursuit, Dilthey speaks of the liberation of man from the assumptions which all systems make. He seems to impress upon historical consciousness the finitude of all historical creations. Man's true liberation opens him to all experiences whether "good" or "bad". Bultmann seems to be pressing for a similar type of consciousness which liberates. Again, man apparently strives to secure himself but yet his absolutes are as nothing before the contingency and hostility of the world. Bultmann sees liberation from this situation in the conscious and decisive decision for God as opposed to the world. As man becomes aware of the infinite dimension, he relinquishes his attempts to find security only in finite terms. It is possible to suggest that Bultmann implicitly engages in a value-judgment by conceiving the contingency of reality in negative terms that threaten well-being. No doubt, Dilthey also engaged in judgments. However, the Word of God seems to free man from finite and futile strivings after security in the world. Dilthey does not appear to be as sceptical about life in the world. Of course, it may be

justified to ask, "How does the methodology employed by each man affect the judgment which he makes regarding the possibilities found in history?" Bultmann and Dilthey part company about the possibility for absolutes in history. The former seems quite content to maintain the Word as the one authentic choice to be made. In contrast, the latter would even call this position in question given the finitude of all phenomena. However, both men seem to liberate man -- one from the dullness and hostility of the world and the other from false assumptions which fail to recognize the inherent limitations of life. And as a possible corollary from the perspective of the Word, if one views this as an absolute it could seem to suggest that this position may implicitly rest upon latent transcendentalism. While Bultmann maintains the movement and change in the world, there may be some recourse to the transcendent as eternal and unchanging in order to establish the Word as absolute.

Nonetheless, man's positive response to proclamation manifests itself in total surrender to God.¹ Preaching reveals his nature as related to Him.² He hears His call and it is this that challenges him either to faith or to unbelief. In faith, man obtains a new self that freely realizes itself on the basis of one principle -- to be a personality.³ Through the attitude of faith, he decides both for God and himself.⁴ He acknowledges the insecurity

1. EF, p. 169.

2. TNT, Voli, pp. 288-306.

3. Ibid., p. 324.

4. "QMH", p. 330a.

of earthly and historical life. He is able to affirm his creaturehood and thus his being in finitude.¹ "Faith is the answer to the message of preaching. Faith is the acknowledgement of man's own security and readiness to find security only in the unseen beyond, in God."² He relinquishes all hope of basing existence upon self-sufficiency. There can be no sure basis for authentic life in created reality. Rather, he no longer approaches the world as a closed system. Due to the ontic and internal transformation, the world is now seen to open upward and outward to God. "Hence it is clear that for my existential life,...the world is no longer a closed weft of cause and effect. In faith the closed weft...is transcended."³ Faith allows man to look beyond space and time for the explanation of his new self. He knows that reality is not able to engender real life, for it is only a creature like man. But yet faith acknowledges the working of God where He is apparently not to be seen. "But this is just the paradox of faith, it understands an ascertainable event in its context in nature and history as the act of God."⁴ Therefore, faith seems to abide in paradoxical tension between the acceptance of the scientific world-view and the belief that God acts in history.⁵ It remains to the eye of faith to behold His presence. As a personal commitment and response, it can only claim to "know"

1. Bartsch, KMi, p. 198.

2. JCM, pp. 40-1.

3. Bartsch, KMi, p. 198.

4. Ibid., p. 199.

5. "QMH", p. 330a.

God as He acts pro nobis, and for this reason "it follows that faith is a new understanding of existence, and that the activity of God vouchsafes to us a new understanding of self...."¹ To speak of God requires man always to speak from the context of his own existence. God can only be "known" in what He accomplishes for man.² Man's experience of Him is always mediated in the realm of the personal and not in the objective.³ He never really meets Him in an empirical context but always within the existential, personal and historical;⁴ the changeable can never provide the stage for His authentic self-revelation.⁵

Man can also approach God's Word with the response of unbelief and thus choose to serve the world.⁶ For Bultmann, man denies his real self in this way. The world of space and time reflects the same created nature as does man. In themselves, they are ultimately nothing. "Man's efforts to rely upon himself and to cling to the tangible reality which he can control is doomed from the start, precisely because he is incapable of controlling it."⁷ The desire to control seems to arise out of man's desire to be self-sufficient.⁸ He seeks for somewhere to call his home, but to live out of the world is to live out of the past. Being-on-the-way is

1. Bartsch, KMi, p. 202.

2. WB, pp. 159-163; also, O'Meara and Weisser, p. 169.

3. Essays, pp. 109-118.

4. Fuller, Easter Faith and History, pp. 99-100.

5. Essays, pp. 98-108.

6. WB, pp. 123-128.

7. Futrell, p. 303.

8. Schmithals, p. 93.

man's essence and it can only express itself in action. But man in the world becomes enslaved by its powers.¹ In this state, he is not able to realize himself as he is actually intended to be. The space and time reality poses as the place of security,² but in consequence to man's belief in its claims, he loses himself to the past.³ Liberation is not attained in any other place than in an affirmative and faithful response to the Word of God. Living in unbelief expresses itself as the non-actualization of human nature. Bultmann appears to have bifurcated the options in such a manner as to present them as an either/or proposition -- either faith or unbelief, either life or death, either God or the world. These are the ostensible choices, and it is in choosing for one or the other that one decides either for or against one's self.⁴

E. RECAPITULATION AND RESPONSE

The apparent challenge-response motif in Bultmann's theology accentuates the paradoxical situation of the believer. The man of Reason who is conditioned by the present climate of opinion accepts the closed unity of the world as the place where he must endeavour to live. But in contrast, the man of faith, who may also be the man of Reason, acknowledges his indebtedness to God for working a life-giving experience for him. In this act, he receives a new feeling for life which

1. Prim. XT, p. 193.

2. TNT, Voli, p. 239.

3. TNT, Volii, p. 27.

4. EF, p. 182.

re-organizes and re-aligns the self. By God's power, the believer receives the gift of freedom for the realization and actualization of the self. A new and unitary centre of motivation stimulates action -- it is his acceptance and reliance upon God. In faith, he comes to a new awareness of the real possibilities. The resultant effect seems to be withdrawal from self-sufficiency and -assertiveness based on the world. The gift of freedom prepares the future in a never-ending openness.¹ On this basis, the believer is permitted to find himself by being himself. But here the apparent paradoxical relationship seems to arise at two points. In the first place, man's adherence to the scientific attitude does not allow him to speak or to think in objective terms about God. Man's objective, empirical situation is a priori eliminated from direct contact with Him. This is due to the "pre-understandings" about His infinite qualitative difference with man and about the closed unity of the world. Existence remains self-contained. However, the man of faith believes that God does act and is present. And this belief must always be prefaced by a "nevertheless".² The world is a closed system, "nevertheless" to faith, God is active and present. From this perspective, the self-exclusive propositions seem to be dialectically correlated by the use of a conjunction. In man, the objective and subjective differences seem to form a unity. The conjunction of the acts of thinking and believing may provide the personal resolution to

1. Prim. XT, p. 208.

2. JCM, p. 65.

this paradoxical situation. But in the process of con-
 joining, the application of faith seems to supercede or to
 replace any need or demonstration of faith's object. In
 the second place, the new self-understanding permits man to
 exist as though he were not part of the world. Man seems
 to live between the "already" and the "not yet".¹ Signifi-
 cance and importance are to be found only in the historical
 realm as it is qualified by God's Word. Through His power,
 the believer's horizon is expanded beyond the empirical
 limits. He is opened to the recurring encounter with God
 who remains outside quantitative observation. Man finds
 Him in the effects that He brings. Again, a paradoxical
 relationship results in that God and man interact in a
 personal mode which transpires in a closed system. How is
 this possible? Bultmann attempts to circumvent the apparent
 problem by diminishing the empirical and augmenting the
 existential dimensions of the encounter. God is God for me.
 Consequently, any exposition of Bultmann's position must
 always interpret Christ, Jesus, resurrection, cross, history,
 eschatology, etc., in terms of man and the effects which
 these concepts have on his existence. Nonetheless, the
 apparent circumvention ultimately becomes more of a delaying
 tactic than a solution, since Bultmann must still find it
 incumbent to explicate the "how" of this encounter. Is it
 a viable possibility to argue that it belongs to the Word of
 God to mediate this encounter by granting existential
 sustenance gleaned from a "Dass"? Or does the Word function

1. Bartsch, KMi, p. 21.

as an undemonstrable article of faith which is to be believed though not firmly grounded?

Bultmann most certainly emphasizes the immense importance of proclamation and preaching and their power to transform the self. But again he must tell his reader "how" God is able to affect a regeneration in the believer. What actually is the point of contact between Him and His Word? Bultmann's energetic and enthusiastic endeavour to maintain and to guard the qualitative difference between God and man appears to lead him along the primrose path of mutual exclusion. That is to say, the objective, historical and the existential, historical appear to become bifurcated. His predilection for meaning and significance coupled with his negative-to-neutral results in speaking of Jesus objectively permits him to see as presumably secondary and inconsequential the interrelationship between the bearer of the Word and the Word itself. It would seem that he strives both to relate Jesus to the Word and to play down this relationship. Possibly such a paradoxical tension must exist if Bultmann desires to maintain the Word as an historical reality and as an eternal truth. "Because the reality of history and the historicity of human existence may not be wrenched apart,... we cannot separate historical scholarship and faith as strictly as does Bultmann."¹ To maintain such a dichotomous position is to endanger faith's message. To identify the message of faith and its object is possibly to erect a false stumbling-block by allowing its claims to be misconstrued as

1. H. Zahnrt, The Historical Jesus, p. 94.

illusory based on a priori assumptions.¹ This is not to say that Bultmann accomplishes this identification, but rather that the possibility looms implicit in his thought. As one commentator points out, "We cannot be content with having this...identity between the earthly Jesus and the risen Lord, only in preaching and therefore only in faith. We also wish to discover it."² While it may remain the case that no definitive equation between these two parts can be demonstrated, the need to fasten the Word to something objectively real appears to be required. A danger that must be averted in this search is one exposed by Kierkegaard in his solution to Lessing's dictum. The theologian needs to avoid approaching faith's claim as eternal truth which can find no necessary connections with the accidental surroundings of history. To propound faith in this manner is to confound the interrelationship between faith and history. And this may be a tendency in Bultmann's theology which requires further clarification. How does the correlation between faith and history really stand? Bultmann confronts man with the either/or choice he finds in the New Testament -- either God/or the world. In creating the radical disjunction, he seems to accentuate a position which obscures and relativizes history as well as heralds its negativity. In relying upon the objective world, man in effect surrenders to an alien and hostile power. In contrast, God is expounded as a constancy principle which remains while all else changes. He

1. Bartsch, KMi, pp. 207-211.

2. Zahnrt, p. 94.

can be man's only future for He releases him from the burden of the past. Freedom becomes the category for the achievement of personality. In this way, Bultmann seems to be moving toward the actualization of divine movement in life. Initially, God's Word is taken as absolute and certain, but in the state of existing, the power of this Word partakes of the actualism of human life. In an indirect and circuitous manner, the constancy of God's Word enters the sphere of human movement and history. But again, this entrance must be reserved for the internal dimension of the human factor. God's actualism appears to be directly related to man. Nonetheless, Bultmann seems to affirm, at least implicitly, the disjunction between necessary, eternal truths and accidental, historical ones elaborated by Lessing. Man must turn to God and not to the world if he is to find life and to be free. The "ugly, broad ditch" in its objective proportions appears to have been re-discovered. As with Lessing so with Bultmann, it is a logical distinction which almost defies reconciliation. And further, Bultmann seems to have repeated a preference SK had shown. In uniting the ground of faith (Jesus) with its content (Christ) in the confines of personal existence, Bultmann seems to have subjectified faith by basing it upon man and his decisions. It appears to be the case that faith unfolds according to the presumptuousness of man. His "pre-understandings" look for meaning. And after reviewing Bultmann's theology, man apparently finds that for which he is searching. Man decides and he resolves. Like Dilthey, Ritschl and company and SK, Bultmann also seems implicitly to allow man to decide the content and the disposition of faith.

Subjectively, no gap appears between the facticity of faith and its significance. Objectively, the gap retains its infinite dimensions since the factual demonstration (Jesus' "Dass") can be no more than an illustration of its personal value and intimate meaning. But what valuation of history is involved in this position?

SK went to great pains to elaborate the positive and the affirmative in history. It was his contention that God's self-revelation does in fact take place in the very midst of it. But history is not to be seen as the realm of the eternal and timeless, rather it encompasses the contingent and the becoming. As such, any knowledge of its events and happenings must always be viewed as approximate since they involve a coming-into-existence-kind-of-change. The contingent becomes; the necessary is. Thus to seek the facts and data of objective phenomena is to deal with the approximate. History does not result from necessary causes but from freely effecting causes. They include the potentiality both to be and not to be. Consequently, history is contingent and temporal. In this way, SK seems to have radicalized Lessing's problem by denying the possibility of necessary, eternal truths in historical garb. All truth -- historical or religious -- is contingent. But yet it is in history that God has acted in Jesus Christ. He has affirmed this same temporal realm. From this perspective, history can be open to God and to man because it is the place where both have made their home. In contrast to SK, Bultmann seems to uphold the negative qualities of history which were positive for SK. The contingent and the temporal -- these are all marks of its insecurity and hostility.

At this point, it seems that Bultmann has taken his lead from Ritschl and company rather than from SK. For man to succeed in winning empirical reality would be only a hollow victory, for he would be gaining nothing.¹ God does not objectively and in-and-of Himself penetrate this sphere. This is an absolute impossibility. Rather, God and man meet in the twilight zone of the Word where man comes "to know" of Him through the effects He has upon the believer. Again, Bultmann seems to echo the Liberal forefathers who also place priority on His personal benefits rather than His objective workings. There can be no outside-of-faith point of reference in speaking about Him since the empirical world knows nothing and comprehends nothing of supernatural intervention. History and the world appear to become a never-never land where God and man never meet save in the paradoxically tenuous medium of proclamation. From this perspective, it may be seen why God remains hidden and mysterious. Man is not really offered a way of knowing Him. Man can only act as if He is present. As a consequence, it seems that Bultmann rightly turns his attention to man and to his inner life. While God does not seem to be reasonably and intelligibly present for man, there remains man. By an act of decision he can become a believer and respond in faith to the Word. His decision is decisive because it grasps hold of what he cannot know through the medium of the material world. In essence, Bultmann perpetuates the presumptuous "pre-understanding" canonized by Ritschl and company: Reason is

1. R. Niebuhr, "Faith as the Sense of Meaning in Human Existence," Chr. and Crisis, Vol. 26, p. 130.

separated from its connatural abode with Revelation and it becomes the unwitting arbiter of reality. God is expelled from history, save in the "Dass" of Jesus; any talk about Him interacting with history is nonsense. But Bultmann looks to man's inner sanctum as the bridge for overcoming the alleged bifurcation. Here he can exist both scientifically in a world arbitrated by the powers of Reason and faithfully in a personal encounter with God whom he "knows" through His effects. But again this does not really appear to solve the problem of relating God to history and the world; it only appears to move the discussion to a new level of consideration.

In the early eighteenth century English logic textbooks used to give as an example of a universally true proposition: all swans are white. Then someone with little concern for logical propositions discovered Australia, and, in Australia, birds that were like swans in every respect except that they were black. What could be done? These black swans might have been disregarded as essentially unswanlike because they did not fit the classification, whereas in fact it is recognized¹ that it was the classification that was inadequate.

Today in the twentieth century, the logical proposition that the world in a closed cause-and-effect system is regarded as universally true, so Bultmann. But someone with "little concern for logical propositions" has affirmed God's intervention in history. What can be done? Bultmann answers this question by maintaining Reason's role as the sole arbiter of reality while seeking to demythologize rather than to disregard the biblical report as simply un-God-like. Bultmann does not assume it proper to question the classification. Thus he talks about a new self-understanding and about making

1. Young, p. 423.

man new. But does man really become new?

In personal and individual decision, he takes hold of the Word and responds in faith to it. In so doing, he acquires a new law of motivation. Man's new centre stimulates him to be himself by freeing him from himself. It is important to point out that no "magical change" transpires and that no ontological metamorphosis results. Man changes inwardly and ontically.¹ On this basis he must already contain within himself his essential nature which is only released by the encounter with the Word. And if this is the case, Bultmann is not far removed from Lessing, who did not fear the bifurcation of eternal and historical truth since he was convinced that man already possesses the former truth which makes him free. The new self may possibly be a constant embryonic possession in the state of unbelief, for even in the faith-response no "magical change" or rebirth occurs. This would seem to suggest that man latently possesses the truth while nonetheless ignorant of it. It belongs to the Word to free him for authentic development. It would seem that he really has no need of history or the world, for these only encumber his truth and enslave his possibility. The function of the New Testament in its demythologized form is to present man with the either/or alternatives which Bultmann contends to be the genuine existential choices.² If this is the case, then surely the New Testament and even the Word do not create

1. Braaten and Harrisville, Kerygma and History, pp. 217-228.

2. Bartsch, KMi, p. 16f.

anything ontologically new. They merely occasion a "new and permanent" situation in the life of the believer. After all, Bultmann does seem to look to man as the bridge which somehow relates God to the world. But as a bridge, man cannot be objectively transformed. Therefore, the potential to be a man must already be an inherent possibility within man qua man, or else a "magical change" does in fact really occur. But nonetheless even though the Word does not seem to effect any transformation, it does appear to facilitate the maturation process toward self-realization.

SK does not exactly appear to share a synonymous opinion on this matter. Man's Reason collides with God as the unknown something, and as a result the knowledge of himself is unsettled. The unsettling effect is not simply due to the re-awakening of his true self. More to the point, Reason comes up against an absolute unlikeness which it is not able to dissolve. Reason halts in confrontation with God's self-disclosure in the Absolute Paradox of Jesus Christ. While man's attitude toward existence does indeed change, the effecting factor seems to be something other than man. It embraces him within the historical process and makes Christ contemporaneous. This something identifies itself as the Teacher who is Himself the Truth and not merely its bearer or occasion. The Teacher is not only the Truth but also the condition for its acquisition. In this way, SK can affirm that God can transform and recreate the learner and only as He is a man can this understanding be effected. Bultmann appears to have modified the Kierkegaardian position by curtailing the historicity of the Teacher and amending it

to a mere "Dass". On this basis, the Teacher and the Truth only seem to coalesce at the moment of proclamation. Again, this disassociation is very possibly the result of Bultmann's anti-metaphysical "pre-understanding" which cannot comprehend or attempt to comprehend how a divine Truth can be literally related and conjoined to an historical person. The closed world limits the data to be experienced as well as the interpretation to be given it. It would appear that "[t]he only data within the range of anyone's knowledge are historical data which...have their mode of existence as past in the present of the interpretive act."¹ Man cannot look anywhere else except to the present reality of personal, existential encounter. This appears to limit his knowledge, and any exploration of the past meaning which is intended to be made present can only come by way of the interpretive act. For Dilthey has already made it fairly clear that one must be "open to the possibility that meaning and significance arise only in man and his history." There can be no reliance upon or appeal to supernatural powers and metaphysical speculation. "All meaning, all value, all purpose, in the historical world, is rooted in the experience of individual human beings..."; this is Dilthey's dictum. And in fact Bultmann must share something of a similar view given his own predilections. Therefore, Jesus as the Teacher can, at least, only be related to the Word He delivers in a very nebulous and ethereal manner. Divine words and historical persons do not seem easily to intermix. Rather, "if the question of Jesus' historicity...

1. C. Michalson, "Fifty Years of Theology in Retrospect," J. Bibl. Rel., Vol. 28, p. 221.

is anywhere raised in separation from the question as to what Jesus really means, a truncated historical figure will emerge."¹ As a past mode of existence, Jesus can only become present through the interpretive act which inquires into His present meaning. This act is directed and controlled by the cultural milieu. In this context, it may be possible to suggest that:

for this reason it must once again be emphasized that the objectivity of a particular historical investigation is in no way threatened by the fact that a cultural value serves as the guiding principle in the selection of the data,...for the general acknowledgement of the values that endow the objects under investigation with significance is a fact that the historian can point to. He thereby achieves the highest possible degree of empirical objectivity.²

Where man stands seems to colour his approach to how he will understand Jesus.³ He is never a merely naked fact but always a meaning which is relevant today because of the contemporary cultural value that accompanies any understanding of Him. His significance acquires this qualification through the thought-forms and life-patterns which reflect the particular set of present values. It is this set which guides selection and endows the object "under investigation with significance". The cultural value is a fact that enables any inquiry to attain "the highest possible degree of empirical objectivity." Thus a look into the past historical Jesus and His relation to faith would seem to involve consideration of the present valuational system. The object under scrutiny

1. Ibid., p. 220.

2. H. Rickert, Science and History, p.140.

3. Bartsch, KMi, p. 5; also, HE, pp. 1-2.

is researched precisely because it is "interesting" and "important" to man.¹ A present concern or interest qualifies the event, happening and person of Jesus and His relation to faith as significant for the here and now. But here is precisely where a problem appears to emerge when the consideration of Jesus, such as the one suggested by Bultmann, is strictly confined to a closed world system. As Rickert points out, "there are...as many different historical truths as there are different spheres of culture; and each of these truths...is valid or invalid in the same way."² What appears to develop in an approach like Bultmann's project is the problem of historical relativism which Bultmann appears to have sought to quell in the Word of Jesus.³ It seems to be the case that his demythologizing appropriates a cultural value and holds it up as the solution to understanding the New Testament.⁴ But surely this solution is limited and qualified by the grounds upon which it has matured.⁵ Thus history will also be the realm of valuational changes.⁶ Therefore, Bultmann's "only solution" will, in reality, be only one possible reading, given his concern and interest. In a synonymous way, Dilthey would apparently agree with Rickert, since he also suggests the relativity of all systems and faiths in the historical spectrum. The reflections of

1. Rickert, p. 129.

2. Ibid., p. 137.

3. HE, pp. 1-11.

4. Bartsch, KMi, pp. 15-16.

5. See first chapter section on Dilthey, *pp. 30-34.*

6. "QMH", p. 329a.

Troeltsch may be seen to cast a long shadow, for the task of "controlling and damming...the system of historical life" may be with us once again. Bultmann's demythologizing project appears to reflect a particular valuational system of culture at a certain point in time. As such, Bultmann's project partakes of the same relativity and temporality as does all historical happening. As Troeltsch has already pointed out, "A radical and absolute solution [to historical relativism] does not exist....History within itself cannot be transcended...." And as SK has argued, "Everything which comes into existence [including Bultmann's solution to the question of meaning] proves precisely by coming into existence that it is not necessary, because the necessary is." What can be done? SK had confronted this problem of historical relativism head-on by affirming history's transitional nature and by seeing it as positive because God has chosen to reveal Himself in its midst. SK had also sought to correlate it with faith by protecting its relativity and by attempting to make God's truth partake of the same actualism as history. Unfortunately, God's actualism became over dependent on man's subjectivity. Nonetheless, SK sought to speak of God's activity without resort to the anti-metaphysical tradition of the Liberals. But Bultmann has himself sought to resurrect the ghost of theology past with his "pre-understandings" which appear to re-lead theology back to where history and faith stand in polar tensions. On the one hand, the tension seems alleviated in the personal experiences of the believer who inwardly unites fact and value. But this implies the presumption that man's subjectivity can support the whole weight

of eternity. But can the spider's threat of subjectivity really secure the weight? And on the other hand, fact and value seem as objectively distant as ever. It appears that Bultmann only presents half of a solution to the problem of history's (the contingent Jesus') relation to faith (the necessary Christ).

In conclusion, we are drawn again to the proposition of "all swans are white" and to the discovery of something that looks like a swan but is black. What can be done? Instead of questioning the logical proposition, Bultmann has apparently accepted the classification a priori and endeavours to fit the biblical reports into it. "I am simply making the comment that when Bultmann's approach is followed, that is when certain trends...are selected, emphasized and then made normative...then a (certain) kind of exegesis seems to be inevitable."¹ Bultmann approaches the New Testament with various implicit and explicit "pre-understandings" which question and interrogate it. What may also be required is the questioning and interrogating of the "pre-understandings". In this way, Bultmann may possibly be given genuine freedom from the confines of methodological assumptions. And maybe as a result of this freedom, the claims of faith and the material of history can also find objective correlation on peaceful terms without presuppositions that seem to have re-discovered Lessing's "ugly, broad ditch".

1. Young, p. 423; compare
 (1) Cushman, p. 181;
 (2) Futrell, p. 314.

IV

FAITH, FACTANDSYMBOL:TILLICH'S ANSWER TO LESSING

ABBREVIATIONS TO FOOTNOTESTillich's Works:

BRSUR	= <u>Biblical Religion in the Search for Ultimate Reality</u>
CPT	= <u>Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology</u>
CTB	= <u>The Courage To Be</u>
DF	= <u>The Dynamics of Faith</u>
IH	= <u>The Interpretation of History</u>
"JRS"	= "The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols," found in <u>Religious Experience and Truth</u> , edited by Sidney Hook.
LPJ	= <u>Love, Power and Justice</u>
MB	= <u>Morality and Beyond</u>
NB	= <u>The New Being</u>
PE	= <u>The Protestant Era</u>
"PTSLCED"	= "The Present Theological Situation in the Light of the Continental European Development," <u>Theology Today</u> , Vol. 6, pp. 299-310.
"RDI"	= "A Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of the Incarnation," <u>Church Quarterly Review</u> , Vol. 147-148, pp. 133-148.
RS	= <u>The Religious Situation</u>
SF	= <u>The Shaking of the Foundations</u>
ST i,ii,iii	= <u>Systematic Theology</u> , Volumes I, II, III (respectively)
TC	= <u>Theology of Culture</u>
"VD"	= "Victory in Defeat," <u>Interpretation</u> , Vol. 6, pp. 17-26.

INTRODUCTION

The contingency of history and the absolute certainty of faith remain in abeyance in the thought of Rudolf Bultmann. Meaning and new self-understanding provide the malleable material necessary for interconnecting God, the Creator, and man, the creature. This interconnection is affected by the Word of God which eventuates in the historicity of Jesus of Nazareth. As He speaks this Word, meaning and new self-understanding are imputed into the historical process. History, which of itself is alien and hostile to man, provides the opportunity for the fulfilment of man's possibilities. By speaking the Word of God, the historical event of Jesus Christ addresses man here and now. His event unfolds the central focal point of faith's personal interconnection with history. By means of the Word, man is offered the potential for overcoming the world and its incumbent sorrow and anxiety. He is given the freedom by the power of God's Word. Man is awakened to a real possibility -- to the possibility of his-being-in-the-world. The Word spoken by Christ motivates and activates man's seizure of his authentic possibility for freedom. In hearing and believing, man is given to understand himself and his interrelation to the world. Jesus Christ as the bearer of the Word is also the initiator of freedom. From the perspective of meaning, history becomes eschatological in that the Word opens man to the future. History and eschatology coalesce in this Word which delivers man from the bondage of the here and now and renovates his self-awareness to face the real situation. History as eschatology happens in the Now of preaching and hearing God's Word, and thus it is a personal

and intimate transition which affects man ontically. He becomes inwardly and personally renewed in the self-awareness he receives from Christ. In this way the Word becomes a meaning-event in the life of man. The substantial question of Jesus Christ as the Incarnate Word remains unanswered in Bultmann's demythologizing project. Jesus and His relation to the Word also remains tenuous. This is due in part, no doubt, to the abyss which he creates between God and man. God thus touches His world only through the Word. But how Jesus acquires this Word cannot be adequately handled because of the apparent ontological gap between the finite and the infinite. In the end, Bultmann's attempt to synthesize faith and history through the process of demythologizing retains an outward, objective bifurcation which is inwardly and subjectively mended and bound in the faith experience of man. Man and his predicament in the world remain the pivotal factors in the equation. However, the question remains: "How does God communicate with man?" "What is the point of contact between the content of faith and the material of history?"

It is in the endeavour to relate faith and history that Paul Tillich offers his brand of theology. Tillich surveys the condition of man, the finite creature, within a finite world. He analyzes his awareness of the existential condition in relation to the question of being. This latter question is interconnected with man's understanding of himself. Man's analysis of the finite, the temporal and the contingent propels him to seek after the root and ground of all finite being. He asks questions which, according to Tillich, are answered by the Christian faith. Tillich

examines existence by means of existentialism which is used to interrogate finiteness. By means of this method, Tillich discovers that man is estranged from his essential nature. The predicament of estrangement moves Tillich into offering the message of the Christian faith as the answer to man's quest for essentiality. Tillich discovers in Christianity's picture of Jesus as the Christ the New Being who symbolizes the fulfilment of man's existential quest for what he is essentially. The biblical picture of the Christ is the paradigm of essential unity. In this manner, Christology points to man's coming to know himself and to the realization of the truth of his essential being within the confines of history. Christology reveals itself to be both a dynamic interpretation of history and a symbol for man's essential nature. Man, for his part, achieves the courage to affirm himself even in the face of fragmentariness, temporality, and transitoriness. The symbol of the New Being found in the biblical picture opens man to the acceptance of even himself who is unacceptable. For Paul Tillich, then, the Christian faith answers the questionings regarding the nature of existence in general and of human life in particular. The symbols of faith operate and function to bridge the gap which exists between man's existential and essential natures. From this perspective, faith interacts with history by providing the motivational stimulus which prompts man to move actively in the direction symbolized by the Christ and the Kingdom of God. Through an existential analysis, man "sees" the dilemma of his present predicament, and through the symbols of faith he gains an insight into the direction he must go.

EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS OF MAN

He is the most courageous of all beings because he has to conquer the deepest anxiety. It is hardest for him to affirm the present because he is able to imagine a future which is not yet his own and to remember a past which is no longer his own. He must defend his present against the vision of an infinite past and of an infinite future; he is excluded from both. Man cannot escape the question of the ultimate foundation of his ontological courage.¹

Paul Tillich seeks to investigate the nature of man with the intention of opening him to the symbols of the New Reality expressed by the Christian faith.² But Tillich admits that these symbols are themselves only meaningful to the extent that one has already raised the question "concerning the whole of our existence."³ Christian symbols can only be meaningful to one who has "experienced the shock of transitoriness, the anxiety in which they are aware of their finitude, the threat of nonbeing."⁴ Man's analysis of his situation today is done in existential terms.⁵ It is on this basis that he explicates his awareness of himself as separated from that to which he really belongs. On this analysis man in existence is separated from his essential unity. "A symptom of both the essential unity and the existential separation of finite man from his infinity is his ability to ask about the infinite to which he belongs: the fact that he must ask about it indicates that he is separated from it."⁶ Man thus contains within the existential

1. STi, p. 194.

2. STi, p. 62.

3. STi, p. 61.

4. STi, pp. 61-2.

5. STi, p. 62.

6. STi, p. 61.

realm a notion of belonging-ness to that which is essentially his but is denied him existentially. Existential analysis seeks to explicate this state of affairs.

For Paul Tillich, "man must rise above existence"; he must see himself as separated in his actual state of existing from something which is essentially and potentially a part of him. Man's existence requires him to rise above this state to attempt to regain and to recapture what is really his. "True being is essential being...."¹ In existing, man has lost a part of himself. "In this way man's existence, his standing out of potentiality, is judged as a fall from what he essentially is."² But existence as a falling away is not complete, "for man still stands in his potential or essential being."³ Further, Tillich also affirms that man is neither completely ignorant nor removed from this essential unity because he asks after that to which he really belongs. He remembers and participates in that which is his true unity.⁴ Man lives and moves in a realm of separation where a split manifests itself between existential and essential humanity. For Tillich, existence is a falling away from essential humanity. "Existence is estrangement and not reconciliation; it is dehumanization and not the expression of essential humanity. It is the process in which man becomes a thing and ceases to be a person."⁵ Separation is estrangement from essentiality;

1. STii, p. 22.

2. STii, p. 22.

3. STii, p. 22.

4. STii, p. 22.

5. STii, p. 25.

and further, man's existing qualifies his essentiality and even contains within it the process of dehumanization where he ceases to be a person. Tillich's attitude here is in contradistinction to the great essentialist system worked out by Hegel. According to him, Hegel's system interprets the created realm as the expression of unity between that which is essential and what is existential. As such, Hegel's system overcomes the "separation of existence from essence in finite beings: for him, the finite is infinite both in essence and in its existence."¹ On the basis of this interpretation, man's being-in-the-world expresses his essential nature and this being the case, there is no gap between what man is and that he is. "[Essence] transforms itself into existence. Existence is the being of essence, and therefore existence can be called 'essential being'. Essence is existence...."² Under the guise of this philosophical explanation, the tension between these two realms is assuaged. The state of separation and split are non-existent since "essence is existence". These two are thus reconciled with each other and reality is now a whole.³ And in the face of this reconciliation, estrangement appears to be overcome and man's split with essential being appears to be no more. Hegel's system thus mends the individual and society into a whole where existence is not a separation. According to Tillich:

1. TC, p. 82.

2. TC, p. 82.

3. TC, pp. 82-3.

Non-being has been conquered in the totality of the system; history has come to its end; freedom has become actual; and the paradox of the Christ has lost its paradoxical character. Existence is the logically necessary actuality of essence. There is no gap, no leap, between them....The gap is overcome not only eternally in God but also historically in man. 1

The realization of essence within existence assures man of the possession of his true self. In existence, man is what he is in essence. There is no need for risk or doubt about the incertitude of oneself or of one's relation to God; the gap is overcome. Freedom is actual. There is no need to risk decisions or to question the range of possibilities open. Incertitude and paradox dissipate as essence actualizes itself in existence. "There is no gap, no ultimate incertitude, no risk, and no danger of self-loss when essence actualizes itself in existence."² Striving to be more is no longer necessary, since this same striving is already actualized and already is. However, Tillich opposes this essentialist view of reality, and with it the accompanying development of man's attitude toward himself and his world.³ As such, existentialism is, for Tillich, a protest against "the self-interpretation of man in modern industrial society."⁴ Tillich's analysis is not one of reconciliation but of estrangement. "Reconciliation is...not of reality. The world is not reconciled."⁵ For Tillich, freedom has not become actual and

1. STii, p. 24.

2. STii, p. 24.

3. STii, p. 24.

4. STii, p. 24.

5. STii, p. 25.

history has not come to its end and the paradoxical nature of the Christ has not lost its paradoxical quality. Further, man does experience a gap between that he is and what he is. "The existence of the individual is filled with anxiety and threatened by meaninglessness."¹ Man not only is separated from essence but he is aware of it. Therefore Tillich moves on to explain the transition from essence to existence by means of the symbols of creation and fall.

Tillich has already argued that standing out of potentiality is a falling away from essence (see Ftnt. 2, page 241). Existentialism has given something of an analysis of what it means to be, and in conjunction with this Tillich moves in the direction of answering what and how the transition is in religious, symbolic terms.² Biblical symbols are not to be taken literally, for to do so would lead to absurdity.³ For Tillich, the fall represents a symbol which expresses the human situation universally.⁴ The symbol of the fall, which attempts to explain man's position in the world, expresses his awareness of his existential estrangement.⁵ In so doing, it represents the universal and tragic quality of transition from essence to existence.⁶ The fall points to and participates in the cosmic and universal "transition from essential goodness to existential estrangement."⁷ The Christian symbol captures both the tragic element and the moral impediment accompanying participation in this transition.⁸ As Tillich

1. STii, p. 25.

2. STii, p. 25.

3. TC, p. 63.

4. STii, p. 29.

5. STii, p. 31.

6. STii, p. 38.

7. STii, p. 39.

8. STii, p. 39.

maintains, it is man who is held responsible for the fall.¹ Thus for Tillich, it is only through man that the transition is seen to occur.² Since the fall is not to be taken literally,³ it is also pointed out that it did not just happen once upon a time. Consequently there was no time when created goodness actually occurred.⁴ This being the case, the fall as well as creation are viewed as co-temporally co-inciding "in so far as there is no point in time and space in which created goodness was actualized and had existence."⁵ From this it would seem to follow that all reality, in so far as it is actual and has existence, remains in a state of estrangement which marks its separation from essential goodness. The coming-into-existence-kind-of-change includes both elements of fall and creation as Tillich symbolically expresses them. Such a change has the quality of a leap and as such "existence cannot be derived from essence."⁶ Man as he exists participates fully within the tragic universality of an estranged state. "Man as he exists is not what he essentially is and ought to be. He is estranged from his true being."⁷ By not being what he essentially is and ought to be, he shoulders the responsibility for the estranged state.⁸ The essential goodness to which he really belongs acquires a distorted quality

1. STii, p. 39.

2. STii, p. 39.

3. A.J. McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 149.

4. STii, p. 44.

5. STii, p. 44.

6. STii, p. 44.

7. STii, p. 45.

8. McKelway, p. 150.

in the state of existence. The essential goodness remains at a distance from man's existential condition even though he is not completely separated.¹ His standing out estranges him "from the ground of his being, from other beings, and from himself."² Subsequently, man's part in the transition separates him not only from essence but also from the ground of life where he encounters other lives. Tillich portrays man as both responsible for and suffering from this transition. Man's entire existence finds itself tattered and fragmented as a result of his standing out. But for him to be ultimately responsible, Tillich predisposes the quality of freedom to man.³ Man's existence is his standing out of and upon the ground to which he really belongs. To exist is to move to actualize what one really is.

But man's being is not only hidden in the creative ground of the divine life; it also is manifest to itself and to other life within the whole of reality. Man does exist and his existence is different from his essence. Man and the rest of reality are not only "inside" the process of the divine life but also "outside" it. Man is grounded in it, but he is not kept within the ground. Man has left the ground in order to "stand upon" himself, to actualize what he essentially is, in order to be finite freedom. 4

For him to stand out of the potential is for him to stand upon "the creative ground of the divine life." What he essentially is lies hidden within this life. But nonetheless man has the freedom to actualize this potential in existence and to participate in this actualization requires

1. STii, p. 45.

2. STii, p. 44.

3. McKelway, pp. 147-148.

4. STi, p. 255.

him to be both "inside" and "outside" of it. In leaving the state of potentiality, he does not stand upon himself. Rather he rests upon the ground to which he belongs. Indeed while existence is different from essence and while the former cannot be derived from the latter but can only be viewed as a leap,¹ man nonetheless finds his basis of living in possibility.

This is the point at which the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of the fall join....Fully developed creatureliness is fallen creatureliness. The creature has actualized its freedom in so far as it is outside the creative ground of the divine life....To be outside the divine life means to stand in actualized freedom in an existence which is no longer united with essence. 2

The overlapping and coinciding of fall and creation are expressed by Tillich. To be created and to exist are already to participate in the fall, for Tillich has already pointed out that there is no point in time and space where essential goodness has had existence. To be a developed creature is to participate in fallen creatureliness. As a creature, man stands outside of the divine ground and so he is "no longer united with essence." He is separated from it while nonetheless founded upon it.³ As he lives in this actualized state, there is a gap between that man is and what man really is. He is not what he essentially is and ought to be. He remains light years away from the "ought"; this is expressed by the symbol of creation.⁴ But even in this state where he

1. D.J. Keefe, Thomism and the Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich, pp. 297, 315.

2. STi, p. 255.

3. Keefe, p. 217.

4. BRSUR, p. 35.

experiences the gap, he still retains an awareness of and a participation in this ground upon which he stands. Indeed, Tillich affirms that man's very questioning indicates his consciousness that he is separated from essentiality. In the present predicament, man experiences finitude and the threat of non-being and becomes pointedly aware that essence and existence are not reconciled. However, he does possess the quality of finite freedom as a result of the transition. This allows him a limited capacity to work out his real nature. Such freedom provides the basis for the "ought" and the "must" which Tillich posits. Man is responsible for the tragic and universal predicament of the human condition. In the possession of freedom he accepts responsibility for reality. Creation gives this potential which is always tempered with the strains of destiny. Destiny is that part of man formed by previous decisions, human nature, the world, history.¹ Therefore freedom and destiny form, for Tillich, a polar relationship which makes self-realization a possibility on a limited scale. "Creation is fulfilled in the creaturely self-realization which simultaneously is freedom and destiny."² Man who is responsible for creation is qualified by freedom which is, in turn, tempered by destiny. Creation "is fulfilled through separation from the creative ground through a break between existence and essence....God creates man; he gives man the power of transforming himself and his world."³

1. STi, p. 185.

2. STi, p. 256.

3. STi, p. 256.

By means of the creative act man is given the power in freedom to accept responsibility for creation. Though freedom is conditioned by the given-ness of existence,¹ man nonetheless retains a propensity to transform himself and his world. The bestowing of such power makes it incumbent upon him to maintain and to fulfil existence, for Tillich affirms "that man is the telos of creation."² In the created and estranged state he possesses "the possibility and necessity of actualizing himself and of becoming independent by his self-actualization...."³ Man becomes the dynamic element which provides the given-ness and the conditioned-ness for self-realization as a finite creature determined by the polar dynamics of freedom and destiny. As the telos he fulfils both creation as well as himself when he actualizes freedom within existence. He occupies the focal and central position because of his analogous relationship to God. As the image of God, man's logos is similar to that of the divine ground.⁴ This being the case, the divine logos manifests itself in the fallen creatureliness of humanity.⁵ While man stands out of and upon the divine, he participates in it and is dependent upon it. In the actual and created state, he lives by the power of God, for the infinite remains present in all that stands upon it.⁶ Man is the telos by sharing

1. Keefe, pp. 302-304.

2. STi, p. 258.

3. STi, p. 259.

4. Keefe, p. 216.

5. STi, p. 259.

6. STi, pp. 261-263.

analogously in the divine logos and as such he purposes and fulfils creation to the extent that he actualizes and realizes his own potentialities.¹

From the Christian symbols of creation and fall, Tillich achieves quite a bit of explicative mileage in analyzing the existential situation. Tillich utilizes these terms in a co-incidental fashion which allows him to present a state of creative falling where man both stands upon that to which he really belongs and also remains in intimate co-relation to it. Even though existence involves transitoriness, finitude and estrangement, man remains in freedom in order to live within the possibilities and potentialities given to him. A concomitant aspect is the quality of this freedom which dialectically holds man in dependence upon and independence of the divine ground. Tillich tells us that man is both "inside" and "outside" the divine life. And what is more, his freedom makes him responsible since he contains "the possibility and the necessity" of self-actualization. As a creature, he encompasses this "possibility and necessity" by the intimate and participative relation and interconnection analogously remaining between the divine and human logos. Therefore, man's existential separation from God in no way precludes his ultimate responsibility to Him. In the created state, man still participates and shares in an awareness of essential oneness and unity in the divine. He retains the potential within himself to recognize that he is not what he really is

1. STi, p. 263.

and what he "ought" to be. Existence becomes a matter of decision and responsibility because he must choose either for or against God.¹ It provides the medium for possible and potential fulfilment but it is man, with his freedom, who has the power to make the potential actual. And further, it is man who inherently shares in the logos of being and therefore shares in an awareness of the telos of creation which is his responsibility.² From this perspective, it becomes somewhat more perceptible to grasp Tillich's alignment with the existentialists in opposition to Hegel.³ Existence and essence cannot be reconciled within the created realm, for such a stance would relieve man of the impetus to strive and to become. History would end in that man would no longer be required to choose and to make decisions, and there would be no possibility for him to experience a self-loss. Further, the appearance of the Christ would not be a paradox since the essential would have already manifest itself in all things. Tillich, however, is not willing to move in synonymous thoughts with Hegel, as he understands him. Rather man's existing reveals itself to be a process of creative falling which separates him from his essence, which allows him participation in the divine life, and which grants him the potential capacity for freedom. By means of the Christian symbols of creation and fall, Tillich symbolically expresses the actualization of freedom which rests upon participation

1. BRSUR, pp. 44-46.

2. STi, p. 264.

3. TC, Chapter 7.

in the divine ground.¹ Man in and of himself is not a self-sufficient creature.² His awareness of the transition shows him to be more than a merely self-contained life. In freedom, he is given the option to act, to decide, to change, and to respond, to his real being which is contained within the divine life.³ Man, the creature, moves forward by actualizing what he is in essence. Man qua man experiences a call to move beyond himself to what he "ought" to be.

He experiences a demand which frees him from being simply bound to that which he finds existing and forces him to add to the question, "Whence?" the question, "Wherefore?" With this question the circle is broken in principle and man is raised above the sphere of the merely living thing, for the demand asks something that is not yet here, that should be, that should come to fulfilment. 4

The "ought" is a demand to move beyond the simple given-ness of creation and to transform the already given into the new. A quotation from George Bernard Shaw hints at Tillich's possible meaning here: "Some people see things as they are and ask why. I dream dreams that never were and ask why not." Man's purposing and transforming are determining factors which produce and promote something qualitatively new.⁵ Man does more than manipulate the given; he possesses the power in freedom to change, to decide, to act and to respond, to the demand of the "ought" which propels him in the direction of transcending himself and the given.⁶ He possesses the

1. DF, p. 52.

2. DF, p. 76.

3. STi, p. 254.

4. IH, p. 207.

5. STiii, pp. 302-303.

6. STii, pp. 31-32.

power to open himself to the call of the unconditioned which is the ground from which he comes and upon which he stands. He can direct his power to a creative use when he responds to the "Wherefore?" of existence. In so doing man transcends simple concern about origin and now seeks to inquire after and to share in the real purpose and intent of the created realm.¹ This demand stimulates him to devise and to create something that has not been before but that should be. The "ought" thus returns to lead man beyond himself to the qualitatively new.² The "demand seeks the fulfilment of the true origin."³ Man moves, changes, acts, decides and responds in relation to his receiving and heeding the demand, the "ought", of his real nature.⁴ To the extent that he participates in this way, he remains within his existential finitude.⁵ In the existential state, he participates in the creative falling of being actual, of being created. He is cognizant and aware of the split between essence and existence. But in the anxiety and threat of meaninglessness and non-being, man experiences freedom which allows him to decide either for or against his real state and therefore either for or against God.⁶ Existence is the realm of decision and response to the demand and to the "ought" which calls man to his real and true nature. While participating in this divine life as well

1. IH, pp. 206-207.

2. STi, pp. 181-182.

3. STi, p. 209.

4. MB, p. 20.

5. STii, p. 67.

6. STi, p. 235.

as in creation, he is also responsible for the latter and for himself. Since man analogously shares in and communes with the divine logos, he becomes the telos in that existence serves the purpose of providing the environment for self-actualization. Tillich perceives man to be striving and struggling -- to be a man who is not self-sufficient and -contained but who must look beyond himself to the source of being-itself. The fall is, for Tillich, a break between being and becoming. History does not contain the possibility to fulfil itself as Hegel maintained.¹ Man and the world must open themselves to that which transcends but yet penetrates life with its source of being. Man needs to face the question of his ontological source while relinquishing self-sufficiency in the presence of the eternal. He does this because he is aware that the past, present and future are not permanent possessions but are conditioned by finitude and temporality. Thus Tillich appears to create something of a gap between what man is and that he is. And yet even though this gap remains, man is conscious of and participates in what he really is. On this basis Tillich appears to have created a conceptual dialectic which depicts the creative fallen-ness of man who senses what he "ought" to be but yet possesses the power to contradict himself. And further, Tillich appears to follow Kierkegaard in accepting an infinite qualitative distinction between man and God. This arises in Tillich's distinction between existence and essence.

1. STii, pp. 29-30.

As a striving creature who experiences the "ought" of the really real,¹ man requires definite direction and motivation in the accomplishment and fulfilment in this drive.² After all, Tillich believes that existentialism can only provide an explication of man's situation and that answers to these questions of being can only be answered religiously.³ Tillich develops his theology as an answer to the questions raised by man who on his own cannot answer them.⁴ For Tillich, Christian theology provides the symbolic resolution to the human questions.⁵ He tells us that "man has asked and is asking in his very existence and in every one of his spiritual creations questions which Christianity answers."⁶ As he did with the fall and creation, Tillich also draws upon other Christian symbols to explicate and to ameliorate the existential position. He directs answers to the questions asked and also provides content and guidance for fallen creaturlieness. Tillich's aim appears to be the creation of a sacred-secular synthesis which is able to open man and his society to the reality of God and to the foolishness of self-sufficiency.⁷ For him, existence stands upon more than man. For man to cut himself

1. Keefe, pp. 301, 314, 315-316.

2. G.H. Tavad, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message, pp. 140-162.

3. STi, pp. 59-66.

4. K. Hamilton, "Tillich's 'Method of Correlation'," Can. J. Theo., Vol. 5, pp. 87-91.

5. Ibid., pp. 91-94.

6. STi, p. 65; (vide, STii, pp. 27-28).

7. "PTS", pp. 305-309.

off from the eternal is to remain within the limits of finitude. True being moves him in the direction of actualizing, to a temporary degree, essential humanity, but this is only possible when he remains open to and shares in the power of the divine. Tillich stands within the Christian heritage and therefore draws upon this tradition to answer the existential questionings. In so doing, Tillich focuses attention upon the biblical picture of the Christ who represents the New Being. This picture provides the clue to true existence. But Tillich does not accept the picture without some re-interpretation. The Christ functions as a symbol for man and as such He helps to bridge the infinite gap between existence and essence. The symbol of the Christ attempts to concretize and to motivate the human quest for essential being. It is this symbol which gives content to the demand and the "ought", and it is by the power of this symbol that life becomes historically correlated to the being of the divine.

RELIGIOUS SYMBOLICS

Christianity relates man to the ground of being by the use of Christian symbols.¹ It is in the power of religion to bridge the gap which man experiences in the core of living, and thus religion grows and matures as man becomes aware of his predicament.² Religion's power to overcome the gap created by the transition rests in the power of the symbol.³

1. DF, p. 45.

2. TC, pp. 40-41.

3. Keefe, p. 225f.

This gap requires Tillich to develop and to expound his theory of symbols, for it is on this basis that the communication between the finite and infinite transpires.¹ Tillich's symbolics function as a dialectical language between man and God. In this communication, man receives content and direction for his self-realization and for the actualization of creation.

Tillich begins his discussion by stating that (1) symbols and signs reflect a similarity in use in that they both "point beyond themselves to something else."² But only symbols (2) alone participate in that to which they point.³ For instance, the sign "flag" can be replaced by the flag of a particular nation, such as Chile or Canada. As well, the sign "book" can be replaced by specific titles such as Uncle Tom's Cabin or The New Being. But symbols appear to operate quite differently. Like man they appear to stand both "inside" and "outside" of that to which they point and in which they participate. Tillich suggests that symbols functioning religiously have both a transcendent and an immanent level of meaning.⁴ As such, a symbol has a representative function. "The symbol represents something which is not itself, for which it stands and in the power and meaning of which it participates."⁵ Symbols stand in the place for something which one does not have. In this respect it shares

1. DF, p. 45.

2. TC, p. 54.

3. TC, p. 54.

4. TC, p. 61.

5. TC, p. 56.

in the "power and meaning" of that to which it points. On this basis (3) symbols possess the "power and meaning" necessary for bringing from concealment "levels of reality which otherwise are hidden and cannot be grasped in any other way."¹ This function appears to reveal and to transmit the "power and meaning" of the reality to which it points. Symbols appear to function both cognitively by communicating "meaning" and emotively by transmitting "power".² In grasping this "reality which is otherwise hidden" man comes to "know" something about the reality. Further, this "knowing" of the otherwise hidden may provide a stimulus to move and to act differently. In addition, Tillich goes on to state that (4) symbols are "two-edged. It opens up reality and it opens up the soul."³ In order for the reality revealed by the symbol to be grasped, man himself must also be receptive in order that he may appreciate and apprehend what is conveyed. The "two-edged" function seems to mediate between the unlocked dimensions of reality and the soul by creating a mood or an avenue of communication where man has the ability to participate in what is beyond him and within him simultaneously.⁴ Thus a symbol appears to be able to bridge the gap between essence and existence. But symbols (5) cannot be produced intentionally.⁵ They are born and they die.⁶ They grow and are

1. TC, p. 56.

2. SF, pp. 52-63.

3. TC, p. 57.

4. DF, pp. 42-43.

5. DF, p. 43.

6. TC, p. 58.

not made.¹ As such they arise out of a situation which itself reveals that which it participates in and expresses.² For instance, Tillich relates the symbol of the Holy Virgin who no longer has symbolic power for Protestants because of the changed situation in relation to God brought about by the Reformation.³ A symbol thus reflects a social aspect which connects it with the community who responds to it.⁴ It is the situation of the group which maintains the vitality of the symbol. And finally (6) a symbol can function either to integrate or to disintegrate both groups and individuals.⁵ This aspect refers to the "power and meaning" of a symbol to function cognitively and emotively in human existence as a rallying-point which spurs man to action. As a rallying-point, it contains both the possibility of creation and destruction in man's life. On the basis of Tillich's remarks, it seems to be the case that a religious symbol functions transparently in the realm of existence. For the reader is told that "everything can become a bearer of the holy. Nothing is prevented from becoming a sacred thing. Only historical contingencies prevent it."⁶ A symbol grows out of situations in which the divine manifests itself in the finite. It does not refer one to the finite reality but acts as a vehicle in the expression of the infinite. The former notion would require

1. IH, p. 239.

2. STi, p. 129, see fnt. #6.

3. TC, p. 65.

4. "JRS", p. 4.

5. "JRS", p. 5.

6. "JRS", p. 8.

one to position the symbol in the place of that to which it points and this would lead one into idolatry.¹ Symbols which are taken literally become an absurdity.² For Tillich, reality is more than the given. To elevate the symbol to the position of the ultimate is to shield oneself from the divine and therefore to remain isolated within the confines of the finite.³ Man lives in the finite realm but only by the power contained within the infinite ground.⁴ Religious symbols perform the task of drawing man's attention away from himself to the infinite.⁵ God is apprehended in the language of symbolics.⁶ He represents man's infinite ground, and symbols are always present as a means of conversing about the finite/infinite relation.⁷

The "power and meaning" of the symbol arises out of that which the symbols points to and participates in. It remains transparent and expressive of something beyond itself and as such it reveals its grasping, shaking and transforming capacity. To participate in the "power and meaning" of the symbol, man must be grasped by the infinite and must be aware of his own potential infinity.⁸ He experiences the symbols by sharing in them and by living them. "Man is able to under-

1. DF, p. 52.

2. TC, p. 63.

3. DF, p. 14.

4. STi, pp. 261-3.

5. DF, p. 45.

6. DF, pp. 45-6.

7. DF, pp. 49-50.

8. DF, p. 76.

stand in an immediate personal and central act the meaning of the ultimate, the unconditional, the absolute, the infinite."¹ Symbols relate him to the ground of being and expose him to the influence of it and to the awareness of his part in it. Such exposure and consciousness involve man in the act of participation which is itself a category of relation between man, his world and the infinite.² It is through the symbol that man's horizons are broadened. They function as picture windows to the ultimate. They open man to dimensions of reality which he otherwise would not have the tools to experience, and further they open him in order that he may also participate in these hidden dimensions brought from concealment. By existing in the "power and meaning" of the symbol, he achieves a cognitive and emotive insight into the essential ground of being.³ Through sharing, man involves himself in symbolic communication with the divine. He opens himself to the experience of the ultimate and to the recognition of what it is he "ought" to be.⁴ Tillich does, of course, hold a variant view on the relation of symbol and myth to Christianity than that of Bultmann. The latter is very anxious to demythologize the symbols in such a manner that they reveal a new self-understanding within the world. Bultmann views the Christian symbols as inundated in the cosmology of the primitive Christian community and therefore as foreign to the present time and situation. Given the advent

1. DF, p. 9.

2. STi, pp.176-7.

3. J.Y. Fenton, "Being-Itself and Religious Symbolism," J. of Rel., Vol. 45, p. 73.

4. R.F. Aldwinckle, "Tillich's Theory of Religious Symbolism," Can. J. Theo., Vol. 10, p. 11.

of existentialism, he enlists the services of these categories in order to move behind the Christian symbols to their application for today. In exegeting a text, one employs the tools accepted by the modern climate of opinion to release the meaning of the symbol from the symbol itself. Tillich views this approach as an attempt to disrupt the myth and thus to substitute one meaning for another.¹ The attempt to recover the meaning from the symbol saps it of its power and thus deprives it of its truth. For as Tillich maintains, they are born and die and cannot be created intentionally. Thus he preserves their function against the assaults of demythologizing. He accomplishes this by understanding Christian symbolics within his own frame of thought which itself expresses his own intentions.² These intentions begin to manifest themselves as one follows him in the use he makes of the Christ who directs attention to the presence and reality of the New Being.³

THE BIBLICAL PICTURE OF JESUS AS THE CHRIST

We are to speak of the situation of this period in its relation to eternity. Therein we shall see the real religious situation of the present....The total movement with which we are concerned is the slowly developing defeat of the spiritual temper of the nineteenth century. The self-sufficient this-worldliness of capitalist culture and religion is being disturbed. Questions and doubts are arising on all sides; they point toward something beyond time and threaten the security of a present which has cut itself loose from the eternal. Doubt is cast on the complete rationality of the three great powers, science, technique, and

1. DF, pp. 50-1.

2. T.A. O'Meara and C.D. Weisser, Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought, p. 131.

3. Keefe, p. 185f.

capitalist economy; abysses are opening on all sides and everywhere the souls of men are struggling for fulfilment which must arise out of the deeper strata of life. 1

In the above several sentences Paul Tillich sets out his introductory analysis of the present cultural predicament of the human situation.² Tillich appears to be casting an unequivocal "NO" to man's endeavour to remain in an attitude of self-sufficiency and this worldliness.³ Man's true being rests within the essential humanity from which he is estranged.⁴ The existential situation is one of separation and split establishing an infinite gap between him and true reality. Essence and existence are not reconciled and man in his present condition is not what he should be. Self-sufficiency and this-worldliness imprison him within the confines of finitude.⁵ But the present situation is also one of questioning and doubting of the supposed sanctity of these institutions and assumptions. Questions and doubts are driving beyond the present, and in so doing they threaten the very structure of the here and now which has cut itself off from the eternal. Man's interrogation and incertitude are moving and searching for a fulfilment which involves a more primary and fundamental level than man and his own abilities and creations. "The decisive event which underlies the

1. RS, pp. 51-2.

2. Compare: M. Azkoul, "Prolegomena to a Critique of Western Culture," Gr. Orth. Theo. Rev., Vol. 4, pp. 151-160.

3. Compare: Chapter on Kierkegaard, p. 128ff.

4. SF, pp. 1-11.

5. RS, p. 137.

search for meaning and the despair of it in the 20th century is the loss of God in the 19th century."¹ In his effort to be self-assertive, man eliminates the experience of the ultimate. His place in creation becomes tenuous and ambivalent since he is conditioned only by the qualities of existence which also include his own non-being.² No act in the historical is itself capable of overcoming the conditions of estrangement which are the experiences of man.³ With this as background, Tillich reviews "the present theological situation in the light of the continental European development."⁴ Here he relates the theological systems of the Liberal school of Ritschl, Harnack and Troeltsch, and pronounces this movement as dead.⁵ Tillich contends that the Liberal school moved in the direction of avoiding metaphysics and speculation and in its stead spoke of the religious-ethical man.⁶ Theology shifted its emphasis from the ontological to the moral.⁷ It endeavoured to retrieve the Jesus of Nazareth from the Hellenizing dogma of Christianity.⁸ And it attempted to relate the faith to the racial and economic institutions and assumptions of European civilization, and in so doing to establish the absoluteness and certainty of the faith.⁹ The

1. CTB, p. 142.

2. STi, p. 210.

3. STii, p. 79.

4. "PTSLCED", p. 299.

5. "PTSLCED", p. 299.

6. "PTSLCED", p. 300.

7. CPT, p. 218.

8. CPT, pp. 219-223.

9. "PTSLCED", p. 301.

questions and doubts of the once self-sufficient man have shaken the theology of Liberalism and are now seeking for something more than the religious-ethical man, the historical Jesus, or the establishment of faith upon immanent world-views.¹

[T]he symbols of the Church have become strengthless. The 'word' no longer sounds through its speech. Society no longer understands it. And vice versa the work of society has become empty, and into its vacuum powers of the anti-divine, of the untrue and unjust, have forced² their way, the very powers which it wanted to escape.

The attempts to locate and to position man as self-contained and -assertive have failed. For the attempt of Protestant theology to capture and to extinguish the questions and doubts have failed.³ The search for meaning is a result of the loss of God. And with this loss, man and his community are suffering from an invasion "of the anti-divine, of the untrue and unjust." The cultural life of today is one of breakdown in harmony and as such reflects the personal, existential condition.⁴ Culture today experiences "fear", "uncertainty", "loneliness" and "meaninglessness".⁵ Disintegration becomes the bye-product and result of this self-assertiveness. "We come out of a time which no longer possessed any symbols by which it could point beyond itself."⁶ Thus a present crisis arises which demands a new approach and a re-awakening of our concern for the ultimate.⁷ Tillich is certain that "people

1. BRSUR, p. 57.

2. IH, pp. 238-9.

3. RS, pp. 57-9.

4. PE, p. 244.

5. PE, pp. 245-6.

6. RS, p. 50.

7. PE, p. 224f.

want to have a principle which transcends their whole dis-integrated existence in individual and social life."¹ Man searches for a way out of the present predicament which has begun with the loss of God and has continued in the disintegration of culture and the breakdown of the religious situation.²

At this point it appears that the interests and concerns of Tillich reach a step beyond those of Bultmann. Indeed, Tillich is expressing a concern not only for the individual man but also for the culture and the society in which he lives. Tillich is not only involved in attempting to recover the meaning of man individually, but also he endeavours to see man collectively as a correlative to the dynamics of society. Tillich appears to direct his attention to the present historical setting. "In this situation in which most of the traditional values and forms of life are disintegrating, he [the man of today] often is driven to the abyss of complete meaninglessness...."³ He views the present age as one of cultural disintegration and re-organization where the self-assertive and -sufficient tendencies are being shaken to the foundation. Man and society have lost the ultimate and now the time requires a new attempt to synthesize the finite and infinite in order to reverse the dehumanizing process⁴ involved in the loss of God. "We are convinced that today a kairos, an epochal moment of history, is visible."⁵ Tillich looks

1. PE, p. 227f.

2. CPT, chapter 4.

3. PE, p. 202.

4. E. Cell, Language, Existence and God, pp. 361, 363.

5. PE, p. 48.

to the symbols of the faith to move man out of the abyss of meaninglessness and into the symbolic relationship with the ultimately significant.¹ In this symbolic relationship faith and society stand in dialectical tension which neither fuses nor confuses the two identities but which recognizes the interplay of content and form.² "And that means nothing other than that the whole life of society in every direction is destined to be strongly symbolic of God. Church and society are destined to become one."³ The movement towards unity, towards the infinite, is expressed in the symbolics of the Christian faith which opens man to the ultimate dimension by means of finite realities.⁴ Thus Tillich looks to them to provide a new perspective on man, society and his relation to God.⁵ This is, of course, a more comprehensive view of the Christian faith than the one developed by Bultmann which seeks to incorporate into man a new self-understanding. Bultmann's emphasis falls upon the individual and his freedom from bondage to the present. It is an emphasis which man experiences internally in opposition to the apparent absurdity of existing. However, Tillich moves beyond the circle of individual concerns to the society and to the history in which he lives. And in so moving, Tillich seeks to create a new understanding of self and world which takes into consideration the presence of the ultimate.⁶

1. PE, p. 43f.

2. J. Dillenberger, "Paul Tillich: Theologian of Culture" Rel. in Life, Vol. 35, p. 692.

3. IH, p. 238.

4. RS, pp. 11-16.

5. C.W. Kegley and R.W. Bretall, The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 65.

6. RS, pp. 21-2.

Tillich has made it clear that existence ultimately stands out of and upon true being which is also the source of true humanity. Man remains aware of his relation to this ultimate source as he has a sense of participation and belonging-ness to that which gives life. Indeed, Tillich wonders how it is at all possible for one to come to understand Christianity or any religion "without finding a point in the structure of man as man in which the finite and the infinite meet or are within each other."¹ Tillich seems to assume a point of identity between man and God which allows man to move in the direction of finding the ultimate. His creative falling assures that he "is never cut off from the ground of being...."² Even in the existential condition, man remains fundamentally in relation to the infinite, to the eternal. His essence remains separated from existence, but he nonetheless possesses an intimation of what it is he "ought" to be. The search for himself and for the meaning of life in contrast to the questions, doubts and abyss about him can be answered only from a religious basis. "Man cannot solve any of his great problems if he does not see them in the light of his own being and of being-itself."³ He is permitted to quest after the source of the really real and of meaning-itself as he becomes conscious of the threat of non-being and the anxiety of meaninglessness. The search can begin with his own life, but he is required to move beyond existence

1. CPT, p. 231.

2. STii, p. 78.

3. LPJ, p. 125.

to the source of all becoming. This brings him face to face with God. "Fulfilment is bound to eternity...."¹ In himself and in the confines of history, man possesses no hope of transcending the boundaries of finitude.² The search for fulfilment leads along the road to an encounter with the unconditioned, the absolute, the infinite -- with God. The self-actualization of man, the creature, rests upon the power of God who creates, sustains and directs all along the path to accomplishment and fulfilment. But man experiences a gap in his relation to the infinite. Between man and God, there remains an unbreechable chasm which cannot be transcended by mere finite capacities.³ Rather God manifests Himself within the confines of the created order and thus "reveals" Himself.⁴ But His revelation must not be seen as a literal transportation into the structures of reality. The language of the faith is the language of symbols. The divine reality becomes transparent in the symbol which illuminates man's awareness of his participation in the absolute. A symbol opens up new dimensions both within man and his world. That which a symbol points to and participates in comes out of concealment and becomes an immediate experience. He appropriates its truth by participating in it. Participation becomes a mode and means of relation between finite and infinite reality. Being involved in the power of the symbol, man receives its cognitive and emotive content. The symbol begins to function

1. LPJ, p. 124.

2. McKelway, p. 222.

3. McKelway, p. 155f.

4. STi, pp. 132-7.

as a sign-post pointing to the really real and thus directing him "to see" possible ways of realizing his potential.

Fulfilment is possible only as it is related to the infinite and it is through sharing in the symbol that man moves along the path to self-actualization. Indeed, he is the telos of creation. By means of the symbol he "sees" where essence resides and he begins "to know" the direction in which he must move. The symbol expresses its content in personal terms. "Man cannot be ultimately concerned about anything that is less than personal...."¹ The "power and meaning" of a symbol becomes expressed in a personal life.² Christianity symbolically directs attention to the presence of the ultimate in the person of Jesus as the Christ. "The term 'the Christ' points by marked contrast to man's existential situation. For the Christ, the Messiah, is he who is supposed to bring the 'new eon', the universal regeneration, the new reality."³ He comes symbolically as a person directing attention beyond the present to a confrontation with the ultimate, which guides his fulfilment in creation.⁴ Jesus as the Christ, as the new reality, responds to the question of being which arises in living. Tillich's existential analysis of the predicament of estrangement reveals man's "old eon".⁵ As the "new eon", Jesus points out the way to fulfilment and to the really real.

1. STi, p. 244.

2. STi, p. 229.

3. STii, p. 27.

4. STii, p. 120.

5. STii, p. 27.

Faith is the sphere of life where man receives the victor over the powers of estrangement.¹ Jesus as the Christ comes from the concealment of history to answer the question of being. "The quest of the New Being presupposes the presence of the New Being...."² And the quest is itself a universal quest because of the universal character of estrangement.³ All men by nature of becoming remain separated from the really real. Faith directs man, who seeks after the really real, to the biblical picture of the Christ.

It is interesting to note that at least two features of Tillich's position are not completely new. Tillich maintains that the theological position of Liberalism is no longer viable. This is the case since man seeks answers to life which require him to look beyond himself and this world. Symbolically speaking, man needs to think ontologically in terms of the finite and infinite. This will not involve direct metaphysical speculation and discussion. Rather one will be required to discourse symbolically. It will be remembered that Herrmann and Harnack prefigured, in part, this approach. Liberalism's anti-metaphysical "pre-understanding" directed theology's concern to the here and now, as Tillich has already indicated. Man's present situation demands amelioration and guidance. However, with the removal of the transcendent from direct perception, Christian categories could be utilized as paradigms and models for present

1. STii, p. 80.

2. STii, p. 80.

3. STii, p. 86.

action and behaviour. To become a believer did not involve an ontological metamorphosis; instead man received new stimulation and motivation for his being-in-the-world. Herrmann and Harnack perceived the pregnant ideas of the Gospel as the means to this end. In a sense, the idea or the symbol of the Christ contained the power and meaning to stimulate man though not to transform him. As long as the finite and the infinite remain at bay, Liberalism could conceive the notion of a re-birth or transformation of the believer in time as highly unlikely. After all, in point of fact for them, Reason has objectively and empirically determined man to be a part of the natural-mechanical world. Faith thus becomes a personal and rational process of value-judging. On a second front, Martin Kähler also prefigured Tillich's position.¹ Tillich apparently takes great pains to speak of Jesus as the Christ. The amplification of His person is communicated in the biblical narrative. It is here that Jesus comes forward as the Christ and it is here that the present believer must receive information and testimony about Him. The life of Jesus drawn in the New Testament provided Kähler's point of attention. This is the fact with which one must deal. The biblical picture is the root-fact of Jesus' existence and the community's acceptance of Him. Tillich also begins here, though he re-interprets and fortifies the content of this picture. Nonetheless, Kähler had apparently set the stage for the later concentration on Jesus in the New Testament as compared with the Jesus behind it -- the latter

1. (See Appendix B, p.460ff)

position followed by Liberalism. Therefore, in what follows, Tillich attempts to deal with the picture of Jesus as the Christ as the determinative affirmation for faith.

Tillich has affirmed that fulfilment for man and creation is only possible as it is related to the eternal, to the infinite. Tillich also affirms that the faith possesses the symbol for man's fulfilment in the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ.¹ Man's quest for direction and meaning comes to an end in the encounter with Him. Here one symbolically meets a personal life which has overcome the power of estrangement in life.² Tillich's analysis of existence has demonstrated the transitory, fragmentary and temporal character of existing. What is more, Tillich has reviewed the present cultural and religious dearth as symptomatic of the need to look beyond man to the eternal, where some direction toward fulfilment may be found. At this juncture, he positions the biblical picture of the Christ as the answer to man's individual and collective quest for meaning in the present period. Tillich is somewhat emphatic when he presents the Christ as a fact which has happened.³ "Only if existence is conquered in one point -- a personal life, representing as a whole -- is it conquered in principle"⁴ To be the Christ, there must be a concrete person who fulfils the actual fact of what it means to be Him. Man's estrangement occurs within the confines of finitude and it is

1. B. Martin, Tillich's Doctrine of Man, p. 162f.

2. STi, p. 239.

3. "RDI", p. 133.

4. STii, p. 98.

to these confines that the conqueror of finitude must be subjected.¹ One aspect of Jesus as the Christ, then, is His character as a brute fact. Jesus of Nazareth becomes the Christ because He is believed to be so.² Through the reception of His followers, He receives this appointment. "If Jesus had not impressed himself as the Christ on his disciples and through them upon all following generations, the man who is called Jesus of Nazareth would...be remembered as a historically and religiously important person."³ The fact of Christhood must also be tempered by its reception. Jesus becomes the Christ because He is received as such by the disciples and followers.⁴ Thus a reciprocal relation arises.⁵ It is the power of God to give and it is the freedom of man to receive.⁶ When the giving and receiving form a unity, God and man are conjoined symbolically.

The Incarnation has happened and has been received. But now Tillich goes on to explicate the meaning of it for man today in relation to the ontological and societal predicament. Existence is conditioned by finitude and temporality. The transition from essence to existence has the quality of a leap which does not permit one to derive the occurrence from necessity. Rather it exemplifies a contingent happening for

1. J.C. Livingston, "Tillich's Christology and Historical Research," Rel. in Life, Vol. 35, p. 700.

2. "RDI", p. 144.

3. STii, p. 99.

4. STii, p. 99.

5. McKelway, pp. 157 and 158.

6. BRSUR, p. 29.

which there is no apparent reason. But nonetheless man does exist. And what is more, existing has the quality of a creative falling. Tillich explains that human existence reflects the possibility and potentiality to realize some degree of essentiality. But such actualization is always tinted by the nature of the transition itself. Actualization and realization remain contingent and determined by the characterization of finitude which is one of the marks of existence. However, this mark does not circumvent the being of man in his actual state. He participates in and retains the awareness of the really real from which and upon which he stands. He is never completely nor fully extricated from this ground. In the actualized state of becoming, he lives out of the source of creative fallen-ness. But in existence, man is possessed with the dimension of freedom which also provides the dynamic for movement. Freedom remains finite in that it is encompassed by the reciprocal polarity of destiny.¹ Destiny describes the limits and boundaries in which freedom operates. In part then, destiny contains the given of existence as a partial conditioner upon freedom. All in all, man may exercise his freedom to actualize, in a finite way, what it is he really is. Participating in the contingent, he also questions and seeks after the dimension of being from which he feels separated. However, God communicates symbolically. At this juncture, man enters into dialogue with the divine. Through symbolic reference and participation, he begins to know the "power and meaning" of that to which the

1. STi, p. 182f.

symbol points. Finite experiences are opened to the infinite. Man comes "to know" symbolically the interpenetration of the infinite into the finite as well as the really real. In this manner, he also receives content and form for the "ought" which positions and motivates him in the direction he should move. Man strives and becomes by communicating and receiving content and meaning from beyond. Collectively, man also experiences a societal necessity which directs his attention beyond the present situation. Tillich calls this a time of religious crisis and cultural disintegration. It is a time where the present is emerging from the shackles of finite confinement and pressing beyond itself to the infinite. The recovery from the loss of God in the 19th century characterizes itself as a painful process that elicits a feeling of meaninglessness and anxiety. Tillich diagnoses this ailment as due to man and as a result of the self-assertiveness and -sufficiency he displays. But these are societal attitudes which are correlated to the individual. Tillich looks beyond this ontological split to the infinite and he looks beyond the societal dilemma to the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ. In Him, man perceives a sign-post of the really real. In Him, man comes to a symbolic awareness of himself within the confines of existence. Tillich does not mean to assert that the infinite has become incarnate in space and time, for this would be a superstition.¹ The Incarnation directs attention to the relation of the finite to the infinite in that essential

1. "RDI", p. 134.

God-manhood has come into existence.¹ To come to grips with the Incarnation, it is imperative to reflect upon its soteriological significance.² Indeed, it must be remembered that fulfilment is related to the infinite. Under the feature of finitude, the Incarnation reveals essential God-manhood without disruption and antagonism with existence.³ It reveals Jesus as the Christ as over and against essence and existence.

It is New Being over against essence, because it has actual reality; it is a fact, while essential being as such is merely potential and not actual. The description of the gap between essence and existence must not suggest that essential being has existed at some time in the past or somewhere in the world, since it is potential and not actual. 4

Jesus as the New Being is more than essence because as symbolizing essential God-manhood He stands within existence. But He is also more than existence since He is the New Being. Jesus as the New Being brings essence into existence.⁵ In a way, His symbolic being as the Christ bridges the gap between these two by standing over and against the two while participating in both. As the New Being, He appears to represent a "system of symbols which gives the individual the courage to accept himself in spite of his awareness that he is unacceptable...."⁶ Tillich has already pointed out that "essential man or essential being" has not existed in space and time. Therefore to speak of the Incarnation as the infinite becoming

1. "RDI", p. 138.

2. "RDI", p. 139; (vide, STii, p. 130).

3. "RDI", p. 141.

4. "RDI", p. 142.

5. NB, pp. 15-24.

6. STii, p. 173.

incarnate is superstition. The presence of essential God-manhood in existence points beyond the actualization of essence. More to the point, one is dealing with God-manhood as it involves existence symbolically.¹ It does not itself become actual in a person's ontological structure. It participates in existence only symbolically.

To essential man belongs the unity of his finiteness with his infinity, and it is precisely this unity which I call Godmanhood, because it is an expression of the dialectical interdependence of finiteness and infinity. Man is the only being who possesses a genuine finiteness because he is the only being who possesses a potential infinity; for finiteness has meaning only in correlation with infinity and vice versa. 2

The event of the Incarnation does not disrupt Tillich's infinite abyss. Essentiality is never really an actuality at any point within space and time. The Incarnation symbolizes the reality and the essentiality of the unity between man's finite and infinite qualifications. It represents the dimension of interdependence between the two. And this interdependence finds appreciation and significance in man alone; for he is the only participant in existence who shares both in finiteness and infinity. But more, the Incarnation becomes indispensable because man's multi-dimensional involvement produces meaning only as the finite and the infinite are viewed as correlatives. As the Christ who is the New Being, Jesus symbolizes this interdependence to man. The Incarnation of Him who incorporates God-manhood into existence "indicates that divine self-objectification and

1. Kegley and Bretall, p. 242f.

2. "RDI", p. 143.

essential manhood belong together, because man is essentially the divine image, and anthropomorphism contains an indestructible element of truth."¹ The gap produced by the transition from essence to existence appears to be overcome in Him. The New Being functions as a symbolic bridge both utilizing a finite reality and participating in something more than the finite. In this manner, He interrelates finite man with the ground of being.² The Incarnation symbolizes a point of unity within life.³ At a point in space and time, the cleavage between essence and existence is bridged. This point is the identification of Jesus of Nazareth with the Christ. The Christ as the "New Being...represents the essential unity between finiteness and infinity....It represents the essential unity between individuality and universality....It represents the essential unity between contingency and creativity."⁴ The picture of the Christ functions to show man what he can be.⁵ Participating in His symbolized reality, one finds assurance of His truth.⁶ The category of sharing relates man to the Christ. "And it can be shown that...it was this picture which created both the church and the Christian...."⁷ Thus the picture possesses "power and meaning" which can transform and create changes and situations for the individual and for history.⁸ And what is more, the biblical picture leads one to

1. "RDI", p. 143.

2. McKelway, p. 171f.

3. "RDI", p. 144.

4. "RDI", p. 144.

5. STii, p. 93.

6. STii, p. 114.

7. STii, p. 115.

8. STii, pp. 114-5; (vide, "RDI", p. 146).

the point of the eschatological.¹ Jesus as the Christ correlates finiteness with infinity and therefore produces meaning for him who shares in this symbol of correlation. He saves man by healing his existential wounds.² He provides the possibility for salvation which means "reuniting that which is estranged, giving a centre to what is split, overcoming the split between God and man, man and his world, man and himself."³ By possessing this salvific power, Jesus as the Christ directs attention to the end for which man and creation were intended.⁴ The New Being demonstrates to man what he is really "has appeared in existence" and in appearing gives not only man but also history meaning by serving as a "command and expectation".⁵ Tillich affirms that the New Being has come in the reality of Jesus as the Christ.⁶ Man and history are given meaning because the Incarnation produces it in that it correlates the finite and the infinite.⁷ For Tillich, Jesus as the Christ answers man's ontological quest for meaning.⁸ And further, He answers the societal dilemma brought about by the loss of God. He provides a symbol which communicates "power and meaning" and "command and expectation" capable of healing the split between man and his world.⁹

1. "RDI", p. 147.

2. STii, p. 166.

3. STii, p. 166.

4. STii, p. 167.

5. "RDI", p. 147.

6. J.N. Williams, "The Christology of Paul Tillich," Encounter, Vol. 21, p. 429.

7. SF, pp. 173-186.

8. O'Meara and Weisser, p. 227f.

9. NB, pp. 34-45.

It is of interest to note that Tillich is not concerned with Jesus Christ as an historical entity per se but with Jesus Christ as He comes through the Bible.¹ Tillich deals with His picture.² This is where the Christian faith finds its foundation,³ its root-fact. For Tillich, faith cannot rest upon the unsure ground surrounding historical criticism.⁴ "Faith cannot rest on such unsure ground."⁵ Man is sure of faith's foundation by participating in the creative power of the Christ.⁶ This power is inherent in the biblical picture.⁷ Christ is the centre of history since He makes a universal and absolute claim to meaning.⁸ Again absolutism cannot be achieved on the basis of historical criticism.⁹ Rather Tillich accepts the picture of Christ that is found in the Bible to be invulnerable to criticism while yet portraying the victory over estrangement.¹⁰ It becomes the real event for faith.¹¹ This emphasis appears to lead Tillich into a position of abandoning the historical quality of the picture itself, for indeed Tillich suggests that "there is no point in attempting to go beyond it, and to ask for a photographic picture in addition to the religious picture...."¹² The

1. Kegley and Bretall, p. 230f. (see Appendix B, p. 460ff)

2. McKelway, p. 159.

3. STii, p. 114.

4. DF, p. 89.

5. STii, p. 113.

6. Kegley and Bretall, p. 244.

7. STii, p. 115.

8. IH, p. 251.

9. B. Cameron, "The Historical Problem in Paul Tillich's Theology," Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 18, p. 266.

10. T.M. Dicken, "The Biblical Picture of Jesus as the Christ in Tillich's Theology," J. Rel. Thought, Vol. 25, No.1, p. 31.

11. Ibid., p. 38f.

12. "RDI", p. 145.

historical quality of the narrative falls into ambivalence as its religious function is offered as an answer to man's existential questions. The New Being is actual but one cannot absolutely know in whom it occurred.¹ Nonetheless, faith's response continues to assure His certainty. However, it does appear from Tillich's discussion of the Incarnation that Jesus as the Christ does not become a literal but a symbolic representation of Godmanhood and therefore the Christ becomes less of a man and more of a symbol.² Tillich is very precise in stating that the New Being should not suggest that essential man or essential being has become actual. Thus one is apparently left with a symbol and with an interpretation which seems to move Tillich out of the realm of historical criticism and the relativities incumbent with it.³ The Christ as a symbol loses its concrete historicity.⁴ But nonetheless Tillich affirms that unless existence is overcome concretely it is not overcome at all. It would seem that if the biblical picture arises from an actual life, then its interpretation is also conditioned by the historical claims.⁵ Tillich cannot sever the biblical picture from its historical moorings without transforming Christianity from a historical to a non-historical religion.⁶ What appears to

1. STii, p. 114.

2. M.F. Sulzbach, "Christology in Contemporary Protestantism," Rel. in Life, Vol. 23, p. 213.

3. R.C. Johnson, "Jesus of History and Christian Faith," Theology Today, Vol. 10, p. 175.

4. O'Meara and Weisser, p. 190.

5. Livingston, p. 704.

6. J.Y. Fenton, "Faith and Facts," J. Rel. Thought, Vol. 45, p. 112f.

develop from his attempt to insulate the foundation of faith from criticism is a variant reading of the dictum developed by Lessing. Tillich appears to be inferring that the absolute claims of faith cannot be dependent upon the unsure grounds of external details. Indeed it may be the case that he prefers to deal with two realms of truth -- those of history and those of faith, the objective, empirical and the subjective, personal.¹ This leads one commentator to assert that

Tillich has drawn an illicit deduction from a truism. The truism is that historical statements are by definition contingent and probable, but this does not imply that historical knowledge can never be described as certain knowledge -- unless, that is, Tillich equates² certainty and truth with the necessary truths of logic.

Doubtless, Tillich does draw a sharp distinction between the historical Jesus and the biblical picture. He relates the thesis presented during 1911 when he raised and attempted to answer what the faith could say if the non-existence of the historical Jesus were to be demonstrated.³ Indeed, Tillich affirms, "The foundation of Christian belief is not the historical Jesus, but the biblical picture of Christ. The criterion of human thought and action is not the constantly changing and artificial product of historical research, but the picture of Christ...."⁴ In this passage, Tillich appears to make it quite clear that the historicity of Jesus of Nazareth has no direct effect upon the foundation of faith.⁵ Rather faith appears to be grounded in a picture which is itself a constituent of history without having direct ties to

1. J.H. Thomas, Paul Tillich: An Appraisal, p. 86.

2. Livingston, p. 700.

3. IH, p. 33.

4. IH, p. 34.

5. Cameron, p. 272.

the historical context which gave it birth. The relation of Jesus of Nazareth to the Christ is not a completely clear matter in Tillich. He does point out that the picture becomes united with the reality of the New Being. "In an ecstatic experience the concrete picture of Jesus of Nazareth became indissolubly united with the reality of the New Being. He is present wherever the New Being is present."¹ Here one seems to discover that the union is effected in "an ecstatic experience". But what is the nature of it? Further, it is the "concrete picture of Jesus of Nazareth" that one is dealing with and the person of the resurrected Christ.² The concrete picture achieves importance apparently because Jesus was able to leave an indelible impression on His disciples through the power of His being.³ At this point, one may be justified in querying Tillich. Troeltsch had pursued a more radical approach to the faith. This made great strides in eradicating the implicit transcendentalism which he saw lingering in the Liberalism from Ritschl to Harnack. These men heralded the personality of Christ. This historical fact possessed the power to impress itself upon the believer. Along with His historicity, an added quality -- His self-evidencing power -- seemed to accompany His historical appropriation. Troeltsch's stand on the complete historicity of faith seemed to counter-act this hidden dimension. But the question now arises, "Does Tillich's 'ecstatic experience' re-introduce this hidden dimension through the back-door?" Indeed,

1. STii, p. 157.

2. Dicken, p. 36.

3. STii, p. 157.

it may not be too problematic to suggest that Tillich may have done just this. No doubt, Jesus of Nazareth had been put to death. However, it appears to be essential that the New Being conquers the transitoriness of existence.¹ Consequently the "concrete picture of Jesus of Nazareth" becomes associated with the salvific determination of the New Being. On the basis of this, He and the New Being become synonymous through the experience of the disciples. This effects Tillich's understanding of the resurrection which has nothing to do with a physical event but which is characterized as a "spiritual presence".² In part, it is the symbol of the resurrection which Tillich utilizes to confer upon Jesus the distinction of being the New Being.³ It is a symbol grounded in the fact of the disciples' "ecstatic experience" and in the interpreted reception by them of the unity between Jesus and the New Being.⁴ "They called this experienced event the 'Resurrection of the Christ', and it was a combination of event and symbol,"⁵ Surely the concrete picture "finds its basis in an actual person", but the nature of the origin and development of "the reality of the New Being" must also be queried. One needs to know where and how the disciples came into the possession of this "reality" which they amalgamated

1. STii, p. 157.

2. STii, p. 157.

3. McKelway, p. 169f.

4. J.W.D. Smith, "The Resurrection of Christ: Myth or History?" Expository Times, Vol. 72, p. 373.

5. STii, p. 154.

with the concrete picture of the man from Nazareth.¹ It seems to be the case that Tillich has built his theology of the New Being upon a reality which exists in history but whose history is beyond question and possibly even a/historical.² The gap between the picture of Jesus and that of the Christ appears to be as infinite as the one Tillich has proposed between essence and existence.³ Thus one may ask Tillich the same question put to Barth by Harnack: "If the person of Jesus Christ stands at the centre of the gospel, how else can the basis for reliable and communal knowledge of this person be gained but through critical-historical study so that an imagined Christ is not put in place of the real one?"⁴ Whether one speaks of the person or the picture of Christ, the possibility of historical claims and grounded-ness cannot be denied.⁵ If Tillich is not to create "an imagined Christ", he must allow His biblical picture to be itself a product of objective, empirical history and thus open to investigation. Otherwise, Tillich may be dealing with two separate realms of truth -- those of history and those of faith. And on this basis he is required to expound on the interpenetration of the one with the other. But the opinion appears to emerge that Tillich's biblical picture is and consequently is necessary. Therefore, it is

1. H. Kraemer, Religion and the Christian Faith, p. 427f.

2. McKelway, pp. 177-180.

3. Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. 161f.

4. H.M. Rumscheidt, Revelation and Theology, p. 31.

5. Fenton, "Faith and Facts," p. 113f.

exempted from the coming-into-existence-kind-of-change which Søren Kierkegaard described as the mark of all existing things. Tillich seems to grasp after something that resists movement and contingency. For him, historical inquiry is not required, for the picture apparently forms the root-fact of faith behind which it is impossible to go. Nonetheless, the question must remain, "Is Tillich's picture of Christ an imagined one put in the place of the real one?" "Do the pictures of Jesus and the Christ form the ground level of faith?" "And even if this is the case, can the pictures of Jesus and the Christ form an undisturbed continuum?" "Or does not the same abyss really exist between necessary and accidental truths, even if presented in picture form?" The infinite abyss that separates the finite from the infinite does not allow Tillich to speak literally of Jesus as the Incarnate One. Just as for Bultmann so also for Tillich, the ontological gap between essence and existence does not permit one to speak of a literal bridging of the abyss. One is permitted to speak only symbolically, for it is superstition to hold that God has really become man. Therefore, God as Being-Itself does not directly impinge upon the created order. The divine comes in the "power and meaning" of the symbol which presents the ultimate. For Bultmann, the Word of God Jesus preached bridged the gulf between the finite and the infinite. In this Word, man comes to a new self-understanding. But in all of this, God does not directly penetrate man. Similarly for Tillich, the biblical picture represents the concrete actualization of the infinite in the finite. However,

it is pointed out that this does not suggest that essential being has actually existed. Rather, the New Being symbolizes the interdependent relation between the finite and the infinite in man. Again, the ontological gap is not broken, for essence and existence continue to remain unequivocally separated. But by participation in the "power and meaning" of the symbol, one shares in that to which the symbol points. Therefore inquiry can have no particular bearing on the picture of the Christ since the picture itself appears to form the bed-rock of faith. Tillich's theology of the New Being appears to succumb to the bifurcation between the finite and the infinite, and as a result God remains infinitely separated from creation. Historical objectivity and facticity do not really produce a foundation upon which one is able to establish meaning and intelligibility. The historical is the contingent and the probable. But the historical also contains subjectivity and the personal. Man and his affirmations appear to provide another dimension to history which makes the picture of Christ real and actual. In a manner reminiscent of Harnack's distinction between facts and facts, Tillich apparently holds the beliefs and affirmations of man to be another class of historical facticity. Jesus as the Christ is real and factual because He answers a real and factual need within the life-struggles of man. The Christ represents the way man has discovered and affirmed to be the resolution to his existential copings and questionings. Even if His objective facticity proves to be non-existent, His subjective reality remains alive and intact in the confession of the man who believes that He is truly the Christ, the New

Being. One must wonder if Jesus of Nazareth had not received this distinction, would man have need to find another? The notion of essential Godmanhood remains indifferent to the external details and contingencies of history. Again in this regard, Tillich echoes the position of Liberalism which turned its attention from the controversy of external details to the certainty of personality. What appears to be essential is the absolute and universal claim of the New Being to heal the existential split in man and his world. The symbol remains more certain than the external fact that Jesus of Nazareth is Himself this New Being. Man's awareness of the "ought" and of the what he should be receives "command and expectation" as well as "power and meaning" in this symbol. Man finds courage to accept himself in participation with it. Therefore, man in conjunction with the biblical picture of the Christ achieves the courage of self-affirmation.¹ Christology ceases to be a matter of ontological speculation regarding His two natures since essentiality is never actualized in space and time. Rather Christology leads one in another direction. It directs one to an interpretation of history.² History, the here and now of man's interactions, becomes the outgrowth of a Christology which helps man "to know" what he "ought" to be and which enables him to change and to transform his life-situations. In substance then, Christology informs man about himself in history.³

1. NB, pp. 50-59.

2. IH, p. 242.

3. Tavard, pp. 163-174.

THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY
(IN THE SHADOW OF THE CHRIST)

To develop Christology means to describe the concrete point at which something absolute appears in history and provides it with meaning and purpose; and this indeed is the central problem in the philosophy of history. This problem can be obscured by leaving that concrete point in history unnamed or rendering it invisible....But the problem cannot be escaped, for history becomes history only through its relation₁ to such a concrete point by which it gains meaning.

Tillich seems to be quite clear that Christology does not involve one in a discussion about the two natures of Christ. Rather, one is directed to the reality of history itself which demands interpretation. This interpretation becomes possible on the basis of a concrete point which is also absolute. Indeed, the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ appears to satisfy this double demand for Tillich.² The Incarnation symbolizes the interdependence between the finite and the infinite which is responsible for the production of meaning. The biblical picture provides history with its centre and with its absolute point for meaning and purpose. This picture is not an abstract point. Rather it represents in symbol and event a point of healing in space and time which delivers the "command and expectation" of what man should be. In relation to it, history becomes history because it is here that meaning is to be found.³ Its conditioned and contingent possibilities receive meaning and power and are open to the otherwise hidden dimensions of the ultimate. In correlation

1. IH, p. 243.

2. Tillich et al., The Kingdom of God and History, pp.103-142.

3. Tavard, pp. 82-112.

with the biblical picture, history partakes of the creating and the transforming power implicit in this symbol. The concrete and absolute point of Christ opens history to the ultimate which is the ground and the source of all being. Man responds as a man only in relation to the infinite which is the source of his essence and therefore his "ought". He becomes a man when he seeks after the "Wherefore?" of his being. The quest elevates him above the merely existing and aids him in asking what he should be. The demand finds its content and realization in the biblical picture, for this point of concrete existence shows God to man and what He wants man to be. Existence therefore becomes an ethical mode of becoming in the presence of the ultimate. Man in his existing state is given the quality of finite freedom to move toward essential goodness. In freedom he must decide for or against God in confrontation with the meaning realized in the biblical picture. And to the degree that man finds fulfilment through the "power and meaning" of this picture, so also do all dimensions of creation participate in his actualization. "Qualitatively speaking, nothing happens in man that does not have a bearing on the elements which constitute the universe."¹ Man in himself represents all levels and realms of life. Moreover, in the present cultural situation where man today is pushed toward the abyss of meaninglessness, historical existence is threatened in that the loss of God has impaired communication with the ultimate.² Tillich

1. STii, p. 121.

2. "VD", p. 18.

points out that this is due to the weakening of the symbols which societal man utilizes to communicate with the infinite.¹ The present dearth results from the nineteenth century's attempt to be self-assertive and -sufficient. But this has achieved a state of cultural disintegration and religious crisis in that man is temporarily severed from the ground of being.² This in turn has resulted in a depletion of meaning in the present epoch. For Tillich, meaningful historical activity is to be found in action which receives meaning and power from the centre of history.³ To speak of meaningful activity requires one to speak of Christology, for this is the point in space and time where meaning and purpose are expressed in a concrete and absolute existence. Christianity makes the claim that in the personal existence of Jesus as the Christ the fundamental meaninglessness of living has found a centre of unconditioned meaning and fulfilment.⁴ He satisfies and fulfills man's personal quest for significance by His undisturbed relation to God.⁵ In Christ, the foundation of ultimate meaning is laid down, and the event of salvation takes place within the confines of history.⁶ This manifestation of ultimate meaning and therefore of salvation and fulfilment occurs in a group of believers who herald Jesus as the Christ to future generations by a decision of faith.⁷

1. IH, p. 238f.

2. NB, pp. 115-124.

3. Kegley and Bretall, p. 295.

4. IH, p. 259.

5. IH, pp. 259-260.

6. IH, p. 260.

7. IH, p. 260.

"Only for faith, Christ is the centre of history, and only through this centre is faith possible."¹ Faith brings one into participation with Him and with the power of existence that expresses itself in meaning and salvation.² Faith as such is a religious act which "opens the depth of reality and gives...intuition access to the character of the depth of reality and enables us to express it in definite terms."³ Faith provides an intuitive insight into the deeper dimension of reality which is not always visible to the objective and undiscerning eye. In faithful participation with Him, one shares in and is grasped by that which both penetrates and transcends the present reality encompassed in the symbol.⁴ The ultimate both "stands" in and beyond the present experience and there "is the transcendent meaning implied in history...."⁵ Faithful participation in the Christ is faithful sharing in the ultimate which is immanently though symbolically transcendent to existence. Participation involves the basis of meaning. Therefore Tillich asserts:

The old christological struggle has been transformed into a struggle about a Christian or a half pagan interpretation of history: whether the Kingdom of God or a national kingdom is the centre of history and principle of meaning for every historical activity, and what the relationship should be between divine⁶ and human activity with respect to the Kingdom of God.

To engage in Christological discussion entails speaking about the final meaning of history that is found in faith. One is

1. IH, p. 260.

2. IH, pp. 262-3.

3. IH, p. 268.

4. IH, p. 269.

5. IH, p. 270.

6. IH, p. 261, ftnt, #1.

able to speak meaningfully about the relationship of divine and human activity. But one must stand and participate in the bounds of faith where the centre is believed to have made itself manifest in space and time. To speak from the standpoint and the belief of faith allows one "to see" intuitively the true nature of existence as estrangement from God.¹

Existence is estrangement and not reconciliation. Therefore, man and his self-sufficiency "have no power to overcome arbitrariness, that goddess and demon of history, because history itself cannot overcome itself and its supporting powers."² Man must choose between the Kingdom of God which signifies absolute meaning and a national kingdom which can only express conditioned fulfilment. The man of faith "sees" the choices clearly and discerns the real choice from the bogus, for the choice made will colour one's view of history.

There are several characteristics which Tillich presents as qualifying and characterizing the historical. In the first place, it involves the union of the objective and the subjective, of fact and interpretation.³ History recognizes not only that something occurred but also that this something is meaningful and relevant.⁴ In this way, events become remembered events which signify that a decision has been made at some point by the reception and acceptance of a happening.⁵

1. Cell, pp. 367-8.

2. IH, pp. 260-1.

3. STiii, p. 302.

4. Kegley and Bretall, p. 303.

5. Kegley and Bretall, p. 303.

Second, while not being the only factor, man and his purposes become decisive in the historical.¹ Tillich has already pointed out in his ontological survey that man is the telos of creation. In history, he pursues purposes and decisions which in themselves express meaning.² "Processes in which no purpose is intended are not historical."³ Third, purposing depends upon the finite freedom resulting from creative fallenness. Freedom allows man to pursue goals and alternatives which are not yet present. It permits the capacity for self-transcendence that contains the possibility "to produce something qualitatively new."⁴ Within the limits of destiny, man possesses the freedom to create something that has not existed previously. He has the power to produce something qualitatively new. Tillich asserts the "for our purpose it suffices to describe freedom as the faculty of producing the new and of realizing meaning."⁵ Not only does freedom possess this potential, it also expresses itself by creating meaning. The human product which results possesses meaning and relevance. "In realizing its [freedom's] own meaning it is within itself and beyond itself....The new that is produced by freedom is meaningful reality."⁶ It is not an event or a

1. STiii, p. 302.

2. L.T. Howe, "Is History a Theological Problem?", J. Rel. Thought, Vol. 23, No. 3, p. 88.

3. STiii, p. 303.

4. STiii, p. 303.

5. IH, p. 252.

6. IH, p. 253.

natural thing that is new, rather the new is meaning itself.¹ Man's purposeful pursuits transcend the given limits of existence by resulting in the creation of the qualitatively new meanings which are more than any fact or event or natural thing. As an aside, it is interesting to note that Tillich seems to be pursuing a similar approach to an understanding of history as the one previously encountered in Dilthey and Troeltsch. The similarity comes in Tillich's emphasis upon the phenomenon of man and his conscious purposing. Events and things filter through his psychical medium where they become correlated to him and to his needs and pursuits. It would appear that as things and events satisfy and fulfil human intentions, goals and purposes they become historical. Indeed, Dilthey and Troeltsch took a similar view in their approaches to man and his relation to the world. For them, man's consciousness and awareness of events and things gave them meaning and significance. For all three men, it seems that the "more than" quality of history -- the more than events, things or facts -- is man and his value-giving pursuits and purposes. To return, as a fourth point, the new possesses its meaning in a unique and novel way which sets it apart from all other new-ness.² By being unique, a historical creation is non-repeatable and non-recurring.³ But there are occasions when the uniqueness becomes significant. Significance represents "a human potentiality in a unique, incomparable way."⁴

1. IH, p. 253.

2. STiii, p.304.

3. "VD", p. 19.

4. STiii, p. 304.

These potentialities of life attain historical status by occurring within existence and finding representation as a uniquely significant event.¹ In this manner the uniquely significant participates both within and beyond history. Significance attaches to events as "they represent essential human potentialities, they show these potentialities actualized in a unique way, and they represent moments in the development toward the aim of history...."² On this basis these events are universal, particular and teleological. With these marks, Tillich sets the tone for his interpretation of history. To engage in it is to encounter both fact and interpretation. These are related to the phenomenon of man as he pursues purposes and goals. His power of action expresses itself in the dynamics of finite freedom which is part of the given of creative falling. This power of action can create both the new and the meaningful. The product of freedom possesses a unique quality since it is non-repeatable. The new and the meaningful happen once and for all. But more to the point, this uniqueness can also be of significance for the entire life process. It can represent human potentialities under the conditions of existence and thereby point to the aim of history. Such a uniquely significant event confronts man in the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ. This picture represents the universal potentialities of life inherent in all men. He portrays the particular and concrete existence of one whose power of being has expressed itself as

1. STiii, p. 304.

2. STiii, p. 305.

the reality of the New Being. And He directs man's attention teleologically to the "ought" of essential nature and therefore to the telos of creation. The biblical picture represents the purposes and decisions of the disciples in the creation of a new and meaningful event and reality which is itself significantly unique.¹

Moreover, the free decision of the disciples also reflects the communal quality of Jesus' life and the disciples' faith. Man's finite existence actualizes itself in community with person-to-person encounters.² The previous decisions of freely purposing men become the events of meaning today as one re-affirms these past decisions now in the present.

Tillich sees "the" meaning of history to be that which is portrayed in the Bible as the history of salvation, which for him is a history of the decisions of a people that certain events were and are the locus of their own authenticity. To find meaning in history...we must be able to affirm those same decisions. 3

The biblical picture finds affirmation in the Church which is the community of faith. This is the place where Jesus is proclaimed to be the Christ and the centre of history. "The appearance of the Christ in an individual person presupposes the community out of which he came and the community which he creates."⁴ One receives the key to the interpretation of history as one participates in this community where history is said to have found its concrete and absolute centre.⁵ From

1. Thomas, p. 154f.

2. STiii, p. 308.

3. Howe, p. 84.

4. STii, p. 136.

5. Kegley and Bretall, p. 295.

the vantage point of the community there arises the affirmation of the biblical picture and the view that history is the history of salvation.¹ One lives this perspective through the faculty of faith which affirms Him.² In addition, as a man shares in the religious symbol, he appreciates and experiences the existence of the Christ.³ In this manner, the faithful perceive history to be "constituted by the appearance of an unconditioned meaning not as a demand but as existent, not as an idea but as the temporal and paradoxical anticipation of the ultimate perfection."⁴ Jesus as the Christ bestows a teleological perspective upon the realm of man's existence. He anticipates the "ultimate perfection" in the temporal realm. He signifies what man can and "ought" to become. The significantly unique event of the Christ points to the meaning contained within history though grounded beyond it. On the basis of his Christology, Tillich suggests that an interpretation of history includes both a prophetic and a sacramental element. In Christ, the ultimate has come in an anticipatory way. "Those who participate in him participate in the New Being...only fragmentarily and by anticipation."⁵ Though participating on a limited basis in His power, one experiences Him as the qualitative "finish" or "aim" of history even though it continues quantitatively.⁶ The biblical picture points to the aim that has come and to the end that is to come. The

1. IH, p. 256.

2. Thomas, p. 161f.

3. IH, p. 262f.

4. IH, p. 262.

5. STii, p. 118.

6. STii, p. 120.

faithful man stands between the first and second coming.¹ He shares in an existence that is qualitatively ended but quantitatively active. "So the Christian interpretation of history stands between 'already' ['Christ, the centre of history, has come'] and 'not yet' ['Christ, the end of history, is coming']; the explanation of this 'intermediate situation' is the main problem of Christian theology today."² The man of faith "sees" his being-in-the-world as an "intermediate situation" where existence participates in the "already" and anticipates the "not yet". Historical existence vibrates between these two dialectical points as man freely though fragmentarily transforms and expresses the new in relation to the ultimate meaning that has come and is coming. For his part, the believer lives out of the qualitative end and fulfilment of history and thus perceives that "the realization of meaning could be understood as the essential content of history...."³ Participating in the biblical picture and freely creating the new, man realizes meaning within the process of becoming and shares in it.

In a fashion apparently synonymous with Dilthey, Tillich seems to be elevating the personal and human element in his understanding of Christ and history. The fact of Christ shares reciprocity with His reception. He is called the New Being because man believes Him to fulfil this role.⁴ Through personal conviction and faith, he "sees" Jesus as the

1. STii, p. 118f.

2. IH, p. 264.

3. IH, p. 254.

4. Keefe, p. 190.

Christ. The human element in the equation of fact and reception points to the pivotal position of man. He decides and purposes the final outcome of faith's claim. On the basis of this he finds himself armed with the necessary handles for gripping the process of becoming and shapes it into an intelligible and meaningful pattern. It would appear to be the case that man finds fact (Jesus of Nazareth) and value (the Christ) united and real at a particular point in space and time. Man creates the new and the meaningful because he is in relation to Him. Dilthey, of course, perceived history as meaningful because it results from the psychical processes of man. But Tillich like Troeltsch adds the extra factor of the Christ who once and for all conjoins fact and value. The mechanism of history still receives meaning and purpose. Dilthey understood this as resulting in different productions qualified and determined by different values at different times. Tillich perceives history to result in varied products at different points in the time-continuum. But the over-riding and all-encompassing source of value radiates from the Christ. No doubt, He is a product of history in that He arises in the affirmations of the disciples who were influenced by the brute facts of the matter. In contradistinction to Dilthey, Tillich suggests one point to be meaning-giving for all others instead of several points giving meaning to several others. Tillich and Dilthey do seem to agree that history results from the influence and intervention of man. For both, man appears to retain the initiative and centrality in the space-time

continuum. For both, it would appear that history reflects the "mind-affected" creations of man. But much unlike Dilthey, Tillich sees the Christ as a basic and primary ingredient to living. Dilthey concentrated upon immanent relations. Indeed, as man becomes historically conscious and aware of this immanentism he obtains liberation from dogmas and faiths. In a word, man becomes free to experience the relativities of existing. Tillich has an "about face" on the subject of liberation. It appears to be the case that fulfilment is only possible in intimate relation to the infinite. The cultural and religious dearth of the present situation results from man's loss of God. No doubt, Tillich wants to speak symbolically about Him and about man's relation to Him. But yet, he wants to identify this loss as being the root of evil for man today. Consequently, Tillich directs attention away from the immanentism that Dilthey proclaimed and heralds the presence of the New Being as the centre of history. It would appear that meaning and pattern are imputed in living through the symbolic presence of God in Jesus as the Christ. Thus while Tillich and Dilthey may see history as working out man's humanity, collectively and individually, the former sees its ultimate basis in the infinite and the latter looks no further than the present.

To continue, even though the biblical picture of the Christ functions teleologically pointing out the direction of history and the "ought" of man, Tillich is immediate to suggest that nothing within the confines of the historical has any claim to the absolute and the ultimate.¹ Existence in

1. PE, p. 42.

the presence of the ultimate still continues to bear the marks of transitoriness, fragmentation and contingency. While man works for the realization of his essential state, his attempts must always be conditioned by these features. "The unconditioned appears as that which does not admit any conditioned fulfilment of its commandments...."¹ His strivings and workings collectively and individually are always qualified by the features of finitude. What is essential is never actualized under the conditions of estrangement. The Word of the Cross is to be heard, for it is a protest against any and all claims of finite realities to be absolute.² The character of existence is estrangement and this places all finite realities under the sentence of finitude.³

Nonetheless, historical time is measured qualitatively in that events are unique and free creations which are non-repeatable.⁴ History progresses in a forward movement. Time comes from and rises up to the eternal. "I would suggest a curve which comes from above, moves down as well as ahead, reaches the deepest point which is the nunc existential, the 'existential now', and returns in an analogous way to that from which it came, going ahead as well as going up."⁵ In this suggestion, Tillich seems to point to the presence of the eternal in the temporal. This is the really real toward which faith's symbols direct man. It impinges upon the

1. IH, p. 224.

2. IH, p. 234.

3. PE, p. 38.

4. Kegley and Bretall, p. 304.

5. STiii, p. 420.

structures of history.¹ Symbolically speaking, the "existential now" receives its content from the eternal which comes from above, shadows the present, and rises up again to the eternal.² The eternal goes ahead of the "existential now" and points to the future which transcends the present.³

The question about time or about history, which has a definite direction and a meaningful end, therefore coincides with the question about a concrete reality in which the contradictions of meaning are regarded as overcome, in which the possibility of final senselessness is removed. Therewith, however, the decision about history has become⁴ part of the decision of the Christological question.

To speak meaningfully of time or of history requires one to have committed himself on the Christological question. One is required to decide, "Yes" or "No" about the biblical picture. The decision also decides the question about time and history.⁵ The believer experiences its meaningful interpretation by actively participating in the community where the centre is affirmed.⁶ Time attains the quality of a leap where freedom transcends the given and creates meaning in the new.⁷ The capacity to create reveals the revolutionary and transforming character of time in individual and collective life.⁸ History demonstrates its power of transcendence by its leap to the qualitatively new. Time symbolizes the

1. PE, p. 73.

2. SF, pp. 34-37.

3. "VD", p. 20.

4. IH, p. 248.

5. McKelway, p. 237f.

6. "VD", p. 22.

7. IH, p. 273.

8. IH, p. 275.

correlation between the eternal and the finite as well as represents the shadow of the eternal in the present. Therefore, every part of history participates "in the transcendent meaning of History."¹ The ultimate stands out as fulfilment and decision. "Fulfilment here means that the meaning of history has overcome ambiguity and meaninglessness."² Fulfilment finds its expression in the biblical picture which opens history to meaning. "Decision means that the realization of meaning in history is possible only by freedom."³ Creative falling produces the ability to respond in the mode of freedom which permits the responsibility of decision. As a purposing creature, man finds it incumbent upon himself to decide. In history, "[t]he ultimate is that which is fulfilled, which is decided."⁴ This finds expression in decisions which can produce the qualitatively new. Man freely purposes, decides and establishes something new which has the dimension of a leap. Through fulfilment and decision, the ultimate remains equally near to and distant from all moments.⁵ As well, fulfilment and decision express the content of the ultimate.⁶ Belief allows one "to see" it as symbolically present. "Everyone who recognizes a meaning of history, recognizes salvation through history....Fulfilment implies salvation, consequently, decision is decision for or against salvation."⁷ Religiously speaking, Tillich points to the

1. IH, p. 274.

2. IH, p. 278.

3. IH, p. 279.

4. IH, p. 280.

5. IH, p. 280.

6. IH, p. 282.

7. IH, p. 283.

Kingdom of God as the expression of fulfilment expected.¹ The Kingdom of God symbolizes the completion of the historical realm.² As such, it has political, social, individual and universal connotations.³ "It is a kingdom not only of men; it involves the fulfilment of life under all dimensions."⁴ In this symbol, the ultimate finds its most comprehensive representation for salvation.⁵ It is both present and active in history while directing attention to eternal completion beyond the here and now.⁶ The Kingdom of God is the aim of history.⁷ Therefore it encompasses all aspects of becoming by symbolizing the content of the ultimate fulfilment for the entire historical spectrum.⁸ The symbolic picture of Jesus as the Christ remains the centre of history infusing it with meaning and demanding decision. As well, the biblical picture directs attention to final salvation encompassed and expressed in the symbol of the Kingdom of God.

By means of these two symbols, Tillich delineates between the present and the future, between what is and what can be. In this way, man is given rallying points which possess cognitive as well as emotive "power and meaning". Through the utilization of these symbols he is able to give content and impetus to change and to transform the present

1. IH, p. 280.

2. STiii, p. 356f.

3. STiii, p. 356f.

4. STiii, p. 359.

5. McKelway, p. 235f.

6. "VD", p. 24.

7. "VD", p. 26.

8. Kegley and Bretall, p. 307.

in the light of the eternal. The biblical picture of the Christ symbolizes man's personal salvation and fulfilment under the conditions of existence. Man realizes his personal end by participation in the community where Jesus is affirmed and believed to be the Christ. By the power of this symbol he achieves revolutionary energy to alter the situations in which he exists.¹ This moves man "to see" the salvation of all dimensions of life. On Tillich's presuppositions, the fulfilment of one dimension also includes the fulfilment of all others.² Therefore, he proposes the symbol of the Kingdom of God as encompassing the entire spectrum of life. However, these symbols are never really actualized within the historical realm. Rather they point the direction man can and should travel in order to attempt to actualize himself and creation. Thus these symbols become rallying points which provide the impetus and courage to face the struggles of existing and "to see" them within the meaningful context of salvation.³ Tillich's symbols arise out of an old tradition where concepts no longer expressed "the paradox of the ultimate and the depth of religion."⁴ He sees the need and the necessity to revitalize the symbols of Christianity "in order to make visible the concrete and living meaning of religious symbols."⁵ He admits that his method is unusual and that he does not employ empirical or

1. LPJ, pp. 107-124.

2. STiii, p. 359.

3. IH, p. 282f.

4. IH, p. 284.

5. IH, p. 284.

psychological sciences to develop a position, but he feels this necessary in order to confront the impasse of the present with which theology has not dealt.¹ Tillich's concern over the present cultural and religious situation apparently has given him the daring to attempt a new interpretation of faith in order to approach existence with an "activistic interpretation" that opens man to the dimension of the ultimate.² He is convinced that this is the only way out of the present dearth which no longer experiences the infinite and is therefore segregated from salvation. But the symbols of the Christ and the Kingdom have been employed to move beyond the present impasse to the ultimate confrontation. In the face-to-face encounter with faith, man is required to decide whether the Kingdom of God or a national kingdom shall infuse history with meaning. These are the choices which Tillich presents. It is now man's decision for or against faith, the Christ, the Kingdom, ultimate meaning and salvation.

CONCLUSION

Paul Tillich has travelled quite a distance from his initial existential analysis into the conditions of the human situation. There he labelled existence as a state of estrangement from the order of essential goodness. The fact that man exists demonstrates the fact that he is separated from what he really is. On this basis, Tillich perceives a gap between

1. IH, p. 284; (see also discussion on "Protestantism" in RS, pp. 191-219, and Chapter 15 in PE.)

2. IH, pp. 260-2; and ftnt. #1 on p. 262.

what man is and what he should be. It is a gap which does not allow for the essential to become objectively actual. Indeed, essential goodness never actualizes itself under the conditions of existence. The gap remains an infinite abyss. In this way Tillich demonstrates a predilection similar to Bultmann in that his methodological presuppositions do not permit the transcendent to break the bounds of the external, closed cause-and-effect world. The state of essence and the state of existence remain separated. In a fashion similar to Kierkegaard, Tillich also appears to view existence as a leap which has all the marks of contingency. It cannot be seen to be derived from essence. It remains unexplainable in that it reveals no necessity. On this basis, Tillich can join with Kierkegaard in disclaiming the great synthesis achieved by the great system-builder, Hegel, who attempted to conjoin and to reconcile essence and existence. For Tillich as for Kierkegaard, the latter demonstrates a leap-quality which both defies systematization and reveals its contingent character. Now faced with an abyss, Tillich proposes symbolics as a means of bridging the gap. It would appear that symbols allow man to participate, to share and to be involved in the transcendent realm. This is possible because symbols themselves participate in the reality to which they point. By experiencing their "power and meaning", man also shares in the "power and meaning" of the ultimate. Therefore he can live in the finite without being totally excluded from the infinite. In order to experience the ultimate, one must share in the symbol which opens this dimension.

Consequently Tillich turns his attention to Jesus as the Christ. But he is careful to point out that one is here dealing with the biblical picture of the Christ and not with God become man. For Jesus as the Christ to be the Incarnate Word, essential goodness would need to have realized itself within and under the conditions of existence. Tillich manoeuvres around this position by arguing that Jesus of Nazareth and the reality of the New Being form the irreducible composite of Jesus as the Christ. This occurs when the disciples experience His resurrection as a spiritual presence. This experience results in an ecstasy which indissolubly unites His picture with that of the New Being. However, Tillich does not really inform the reader from where this latter reality has come. One possible explanation may be to suggest that Tillich, like Liberalism, distinguishes between external and personal facts. The root fact for faith is the biblical picture. No doubt, this represents the personal conviction and affirmation of the disciples who believed Jesus to be the Christ. Working on the level of personal fact, Tillich may speak of the infinite in time. It becomes an intimate experience of the believer who has faith that the biblical picture is certain and authentic. Indeed, one may still inquire into the relation of the New Being to the import of the biblical context. Tillich talks about the New Being as essential Godmanhood under the conditions of existence. By essential Godmanhood, he means the interdependence of the finite and the infinite. The latter marks the realm of fulfilment. Tillich does not appear to suggest that the in-breaking of God into the realm of the finite is an external fact.

Rather by apparently placing priority on the personal facts, the New Being really points to man in his essential humanity where existential man really lives. It appears that the contingent person of Jesus of Nazareth is only ancillary to the in-breaking of this realization and awareness that man belongs to the infinite.¹ One commentator tells us that Tillich has severed the historical from faith and has attempted to personify an idea.² Indeed, this may appear to be the impact of Tillich's manoeuvring, for he tells us that the New Being has become actual in existence and this is the case even if he is not called by the name Jesus. Historical inquiry can investigate Him but it certainly cannot undermine the foundation of faith which remains the biblical picture. Again it is possible to suggest that Tillich begins his discussion with the external facts of the matter. However, it must be remembered that even if one agrees that this forms the root fact of faith, the biblical picture is still a product of personal conviction and belief. If one allows Tillich to begin the discussion in this manner, Tillich appears to be somewhat justified in shifting the emphasis from external to personal facticity. But one may still want Tillich to tell us how he knows that the Christ of his theology is the Jesus Christ of the Gospels and not possibly some undigested morsel of beef. If the Christian is dealing solely with the picture which is an expression of personal reception and interpretation,

1. H.R. MacDonald, "The Symbolic Theology of Paul Tillich," Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 17, pp. 414-429.

2. Sulzbach, pp. 211-213.

His meaning becomes more important than the fact. Besides, the meaning will also presumably include the fact at some level.¹

Thus "Jesus" is in Tillich's systematic thought merely "the fact"...the sheer existence of which validates the interpretation....It is no longer the historical manifestation but the "Biblical picture of the Christ" which is the basis of all. Jesus plays no functional part whatsoever in the² belief of the believer or the faith of the faithful.

Historical inquiry can investigate the figure of Jesus, but this investigation can never dislodge the faith of the disciples. It is this faith which believes Him to be the Christ and places more importance upon Him than the historical Jesus. This is not to say that Tillich denies His historicity but rather he does not find it necessary to deal with this problem at any great length. Thus Tillich is essentially dealing with a meaning, an interpretation, a personal conviction. These apparently hold precedence over fact.

One must conclude,,.that while fact and interpretation should not be identified, the truth of interpretation depends upon its factual basis....Through his complete separation of fact as interpretive faith, Tillich undeniably shifts the centre³ of revelation from history to a non-historical realm.

Tillich does appear to shift the discussion from interpreted fact to interpretive faith. But he has also accomplished something more. The non-historical characteristic of the interpretive faith seems now to give the sure foundation which he could not seem to find in the labours of historical

1. J.L. Adams, Paul Tillich's Philosophy of Culture, Science and Religion, p. 187f.

2. W.D. Johnson, "Tillich's Religious Symbolism," p. 175.

3. Cameron, p. 272.

inquiry. The meaning, the significance and interpretation of the picture towers above the uncertainty of the external, historical facts. After all, these are always open to controversy and quibbling. No doubt, the historical Jesus is important for Tillich. His importance rests upon His being a fact which has been interpreted. The picture of Jesus of Nazareth as an external fact becomes indissolubly allied with the interpretation that this picture represents the New Being. At this point, one might even assert that Tillich echoes the past assertion of Herrmann who said that:

All Christian faith is thus really a confidence in an event which has taken place in the Christian's own life....Now the event whose occurrence in our life is fraught with such importance, is the fact that the portrait of Christ is brought before us by the New Testament and expounded to by life in Christian fellowship....The proof of the historical reality of Jesus... rests always on the significance which the story of Jesus has gained for his life. (Herrmann, Communion With God, pp. 176 and 7).

It would appear that faith for Tillich as for Herrmann becomes a reaffirmation of the Christ's significance and meaning for man in his encounter with a world seemingly deprived of meaning and sense. Faith becomes a confidence which re-establishes the personal unity of the faithful's life. To speak of Him requires one to stand within the context of the community and to come face to face with "the portrait of Christ" found in the New Testament. In communal participation, one comes to affirm Him and thereby achieves an integrative principle resting upon personal importance and faith. The event of the picture incorporates both the external fact and its intimate connections. Historical uncertainty dissipates like the morning dew before the certainty inherent in the act

of belief. In faith, Jesus as the Christ opens the dimension of ultimate meaning and this permits the believer to experience the power of God. With this synthesis of fact and interpretation, Tillich begins to work with an entirely new creation which is something qualitatively new.¹ The synthesis results in the interpretive faith of the disciples' decision to represent Him as the Christ. At this point then, one is dealing with a personal faith which has transcended its ambiguous beginnings.² History now appears to give way to interpretation that is meaningful, certain and absolute. The act of faith rests upon this latter presupposition. Again one perceives undertones of Dilthey. The fact fades into unimportance as the significance arising from it comes into view. It is man who purposes, decides and creates the qualitatively new. Man qua man becomes the barrier against change and relativities. Purposes and values are all "rooted in the experience of individual human beings...." While the experiences change, man himself remains a constant factor which permits the picture to flow from one generation to the next. Man qua man remains constant and on-going. Dilthey tells us that "meaning and significance arise only in man and his history." And Tillich informs us that man, through the power of his finite freedom, can produce the "qualitatively new" which can also be uniquely significant for representing all human potentialities. The unique event of Jesus happens

1. Kegley and Bretall, pp. 297-301.

2. K. Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. 172.

within "the experience of individual human beings". Through an act of faith, man shares in the "meaning and significance" of the portrait of Christ. It can only happen in man and it can only be transmitted by him. He remains the common denominator throughout the changes in history.¹ Therefore, man armed with an undemonstrable article of faith -- the symbolic possession of ultimate meaning -- takes up the gauntlet and engages in battle with the fragmentation and temporality of life.²

Nonetheless it would appear that Tillich has not really succeeded in presenting a point within and of history that is absolute and certain. He begins with Jesus as a contingent fact, but his attention soon shifts from this particularity to the certainty of the interpreted fact.³ It would seem that in a sense Tillich attempts to transcend history by the infusion of something absolute but also non-historical -- the interpretation. The biblical picture presents itself as the cornerstone of history. This is the point where history's centre is seen to rest. Indeed, this is the centre not in a quantitative but in a qualitative sense.⁴ The biblical picture allows existence to become a Gestalt. The meaninglessness and senselessness constantly threatening the non-believer subsides with faithful participation in His "power

1. Cell, pp. 339-46, 348, 353, 355, 372, and 373.

2. Compare: K. Hamilton, "Tillich's 'Method of Correlation'," Can. J. Theo., Vol. 5, p. 94f.

3. Hamilton, The System and the Gospel, p. 170.

4. Adams, pp. 36-41.

and meaning". History finds concrete and absolute this point which is also teleological. The Christ-symbol not only signifies who and what man is but also what he can and should be. Christ's absolute significance apparently derives from the union of fact and value. In Him, he receives an "ought" which is absolute. The ambiguities are broken, for He represents the final meaning both "inside" and "outside" the confines of life.¹ The aim of history is expressed in the New Being who reveals what God wants man to be. The Christ becomes a rallying point which seems to motivate man to create the new and to change the present. But man is also central in this endeavour. And in a fashion similar to Liberalism, Tillich might also agree that:

Personal conviction of the Christian view of the world... depends on faith in the Divine worth of Christ. For His historical appearance denotes not only the organizing centre of the world-whole...but also the absolutely sufficient ground of knowledge by which we make that view of the world our own.
(Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation, pp. 592-3)

The Christ symbol functions as a sign-post both giving man "knowledge" of his situation and directing him along the path he must travel. Its power rests, in part, upon the personal conviction of the believer, and, in part, upon faith's participation in the "power and meaning" of the picture. The demand, that man experiences, finds its content in the concept of Justice. "The general content of the demand therefore is that dignity equal to that of the 'I' be accorded the 'You',

1. N.F.S. Ferre, "Three Critical Issues in Tillich's Philosophical Theology," Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 10, pp. 236f.

the dignity of the true origin of human essence."¹ Jesus as the Christ reveals this "general content". He directs man beyond the now to what "ought" to be. In terms of the demand for Justice, the New Being symbolizes "fulfilment within the unity of universal fulfilment."² Christ becomes the criterion of authenticity under the conditions of becoming. In Him, man becomes "knowledgeable" about his destiny -- he discovers the way he must sojourn.

It would appear that Tillich, in part follows the lead set by Kierkegaard around Lessing's ditch. Decision, resolution and action become the tools at man's disposal for forging a way across the "ugly, broad ditch" which Lessing perceived. The accidental truths of history remain accidental. But by sheer human power and resolve an interpretive and personal path around the "ditch" emerges. The symbols point out what essentially belongs to him. They enable man to share in infinite value and worth. In deciding for faith and its symbols, the problem of objective historical distance is transformed into the personal certainty and immediateness of contemporaneity. Accidental historical facts seem to disappear in the brilliance of meaning and significance. History provides the vehicle for value in the biblical picture. Man's resolve to appropriate it apparently seems to negotiate the distance between faith's Christ and history's approximateness. In this leap, man is seen to be the pivotal point. His decision erases the enigma between the uncertainty of history

1. IH, p. 210.

2. LPJ, p. 65.

and the meaningfulness of faith. History illustrates what its facts cannot demonstrate. The effect of his decision places him in contact with the infinite. It illustrates Christ to be the final demonstration of meaning. But it is important to remember that faith's decision opts for personal value over external fact. For Tillich, both dimensions -- personal and external -- are seen to be historical. It is on the existential level that Christ stands as a concrete and teleological point of reference and meaning. The coming-into-existence-kind-of-change affects all historical realities save Him. However, Dilthey's dictum must be heard again. "All meaning, all value, all purpose, in the historical world, is rooted in the experience of individual human beings...." The picture is a meaning, value and purpose expressed in the "ecstatic experience" of the disciples and the participative experience of the community. Man's re-affirmation brings to explicit awareness his essential belonging-ness to something of infinitely more value than the present here and now. Man's decision opens him to the presence of the eternal which is an essential ingredient for living.

Tillich's opting to view the transcendent in personal and existential terms appears to be a decision for meaning over fact. "The key to Tillich's view of the transcendent is that there is no transcendent realm, only transcendent meaning."¹ The infinite as infinite is not an expression of being as being but of being as value and meaning; the infinite

1. N.F.S. Ferre, "Tillich and the Nature of Transcendence," Rel. in Life, Vol. 35, No. 5, p. 665; vide, Tillich et al., The Kingdom of God and History, p. 114f.

qualifies existence.¹ Therefore the symbols of the Christ and the Kingdom function to qualify history and life by making it human, meaningful and coherent. Existence achieves meaning, coherency and humanization to the degree that man actively participates in the "power and meaning" of the Christian symbols. In participation, his existence becomes aware of its essential foundation. Potentiality qualitatively differs from actuality, but yet man shares in potentiality when he shares in the "power and meaning" of the New Being. Subjectively, fact and value are conjoined symbolically in the portrait of the Christ. But objectively and externally, history does not appear to provide the quantitative evidence required to bring about qualitative change. Subjectively, Lessing's "ditch" appears closed. Objectively, it seems to be as wide as ever. It would appear that Kierkegaard might be justified in reminding Tillich that, "Everything that has come into existence is eo ipso historical. For even if it accepts no further historical predicate, it nevertheless accepts one decisive historical predicate: it has come into existence" (Philosophical Fragments, p. 93). For the reality of the New Being to remain a reality within history, it too must be historical and contingent and consequently conditioned by a coming-into-existence-kind-of-change. For it to remain aloof from this contingency, the New Being must be necessary and completely resistant to change. "Everything which comes into existence proves precisely by coming into existence that it is not necessary, for the only thing which cannot come into existence is the necessary, because the necessary is. (Ibid., p. 91).

1. Adams, pp. 46-49.

The is-ness of the New Being suggests its reticence to change and its quality to be necessary. "Nothing whatever exists because it is necessary....The actual is no more necessary than the possible, for the necessary is absolutely different from both."¹ The New Being as absolute and necessary objectively contradicts the realm of history which Liberalism, Kierkegaard and even Tillich perceived as relative. Whatever exists is actual and therefore it cannot be necessary for the necessary simply is. "But if the event of Jesus is, as Tillich has claimed, both fact and reception, then the risk of faith is not only existential but is also historical."² Faith's basis involves not only an interpretive faith but also fact. It is this fact, at least, which seems to establish faith in the changing tides of history. Tillich has implicitly followed Lessing's dictum by not allowing the historical to effect the truths of religion. But he has apparently shifted the discussion to the realm of meaning. This would seem to suggest that indeed history in external terms can only be approximate.³ Therefore history and faith remain objectively separated. Tillich's attempt to bridge the gap moves his inquiry from the historical to the non-historical.⁴ In a sense, Tillich, like Bultmann and Ritschl and company, is not completely able to jump Lessing's "ugly,

1. SK, Philosophical Fragments, p. 92.

2. Livingston, p. 702.

3. Ibid., p. 700.

4. J.Y. Fenton, "Being-Itself and Religious Symbolism," J. of Re., Vol. 45, pp. 73-86. The author raises the question if it is the case that phenomena are well-founded "when they are absolutely founded?" He deals with this question in relation to Tillich's solution offered in terms of Being-Itself.

broad ditch". The whole weight of eternity cannot be suspended on the spider's thread of external, historical details. The absolute truths which faith is assumed to require and the probabilistic truths of history remain severed and unreconciled. The symbol of the New Being stands as something non-historical within the particularity of space and time. It does not really appear to afford a way to a "radical and absolute solution" for "the system of historical life". To be historical involves change and precludes any thought or notion of the absolute and completely certain. History remains the realm of the contingent and the particular. Indeed, "History within itself cannot be transcended...." Change remains the order of the day. In the end, it would seem that Tillich like the Liberals before him appears to offer a subjective and personal path around a dilemma that is equally objective and external.

V

THE STRANGENEW WORLDOFKARL BARTH

ABBREVIATIONS TO FOOTNOTES:Barth's Works:

A	= <u>Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum</u>
G/A	= <u>God in Action</u>
H/G	= <u>The Humanity of God</u>
N/H	= "The New Humanism and the Humanism of God," (trans. Friedrich L. Herzog), <u>Theology Today</u> , Vol. 8 (1951-2), pp. 157-166.
T/C	= <u>Theology and Church</u>
W/G	= <u>The Word of God and the Word of Man</u>
Xmas	= <u>Christmas</u>
Ii, Iii, etc.	= Appropriate volumes of <u>The Church Dogmatics</u>
E/R	= <u>The Epistle to the Romans</u>

Other Authors:

D/M	= James D. Smart, <u>The Divided Mind of Modern Theology</u>
E/KB	= Robert E. Willis, <u>The Ethics of Karl Barth</u>
H/B	= Hans Urs von Balthasar, <u>The Theology of Karl Barth</u>
Q/G	= Heinz Zahrnt, <u>The Question of God</u>
R/T	= H. Martin Rumscheidt, <u>Revelation and Theology: An Analysis of the Barth-Harnack Correspondence of 1923</u>
TFT	= T.F. Torrance, <u>Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology, 1910-1931.</u>

The strange new world of Karl Barth opens out and upward into new vistas and insights which unfold new dimensions and perspectives hitherto glossed or ignored. Barth comes forward as a strange new voice bringing into perceptibility an alternative interpretation of the contents of faith. In the preceding exposition on Bultmann and Tillich, one was confronted with explications of the faith which sought to clothe its contents within the wrappings of immanence. Both Bultmann and Tillich share a similar ontological presupposition and "preunderstandings". Both theologians seek to come to grips with the contents of faith from the starting-point of the world in general and of man in particular. In essence, for both men it can never be a question of discoursing about God in Himself or about God acting in history. Such talk not only offends but also contradicts their initial assumption regarding the world in which they live. Bultmann quite simply points out that one of his basic operating propositions contends that God does not literally interact with the world of space and time. Rather he is given to emphasize the Word of God as it is transmitted to man by Jesus Christ. But this same Jesus Christ is not understood as the Incarnate Word who meets man as vere homo et vere Deus. On the contrary, Jesus approaches man as a special moment in space and time. It is a moment which has brought to awareness the comprehension that the world is more than a closed nexus of cause and effect. Jesus illuminates the presence of a God who, while not directly interacting with man, can nonetheless present to him a feeling and a sense of freedom from an otherwise closed world. Even though he is existentially free from the

confines of this world, man still does not come to any knowledge or encounter with God. He is released from bondage by the Word of God which illumines his awareness of the world. However this awareness bespeaks to man not an understanding of God but of himself. Man in essence falls back upon the immanence of this world. One might say that God becomes a regulative principle of our awareness even though man is not able to experience or to know God. A similar development occurs within the thought of Paul Tillich. In his theology, Tillich is quite precise when he points out that there is never a time when essential goodness has become actualized. Like Bultmann, Tillich operates with a world that remains contained within itself. Tillich, like Bultmann, attempts to describe and to explain the world religiously. In order to do this he develops his symbolics which allow him to speak about God. But it is important to point out that Tillich does not acknowledge God's direct interaction with the world. This becomes clear in his exposition of Jesus "as the Christ". Here one is not dealing with the Incarnate Word but rather with the picture of Jesus who becomes indissolubly united with the picture of the Christ by means of an ecstatic experience. Jesus becomes the Christ by an act of the disciples. Jesus remains the Christ for man today as he re-affirms this act of the disciples. This Jesus as the Christ comes to symbolize the New Being of all men. The symbol signifies man's essential goodness which has been lost to him in his existential state. But the symbol of the New Being reminds man of his essential goodness and of what he should be. Jesus concretizes this symbol by being the occasion for its introduction into man's

world. But the symbol itself hovers between the here and the beyond. It functions as a signpost directing man's movement and energy to what he should be. However, this "should be" is never a component part of the existential realm. The infinite, to which the symbol points, remains man's threshold into the mystery of God. To speak of Him one must speak symbolically. Indeed, the only non-symbolic statement Tillich will grant in relation to the divine is to assert that God is Being-Itself. Taking into consideration the gap which irrevocably remains between the finite and the infinite, one finds that he can only speak symbolically of God's being since He does not really interact within the cause and effect world. God does not give Himself to be known in His action; even in Jesus who is called the Christ, God does not directly interact. He remains immediately unknowable. One must ask if it is not legitimate to say that Being-Itself is God for Tillich. Certainly in his theology immanence remains the order of the day. Tillich is not really able to have the finite and the infinite interact in any other way than symbolically. The insurmountable chasm continues between these two realms. Man finds himself again thrown back upon the world which exists according to the laws of cause and effect.

Into a theological world which unceasingly attempts to ford Lessing's "ugly broad ditch", Karl Barth presents his theological portrait. Theology does an about-face with Barth. The attempts to base the world upon itself and to explain it by means of immanent causes and solutions have fallen upon bad times. Barth recognizes the "ugly broad ditch"

which so baffled Lessing and those who have followed after him. However, Barth fails to accept the presuppositions upon which the "ditch" has been dug. The validity of Lessing's problem looms ominously over any theological exposition which radically separates the finite and the infinite. Bultmann attempted to hurdle this gap by means of the Word of God. Tillich sought to erect a bridge with his symbols. But in the end the accidental truths of history are not momentous enough to storm the necessary and eternal truths of religion. Immanence and transcendence continue unconnected, and in the end immanence falls back upon itself. But at this point Barth attempts his explication of the faith. However, it is not a this-worldly assault upon the gates of heaven. Rather Barth takes another avenue of approach. He permits the transcendent God to reveal Himself where and when He so wills it. In taking this approach Barth ignores Lessing's "ditch" as a non-existent ontological reality. For him, it is a question of the reality of God first in His being and act and then the reality of the world. Barth refuses to allow any world-view to pontificate over the truth and the reality of God's presence. Rather he becomes the charter and map-maker of a new exploration into the mystery of the eternal presence, in space and time. Barth attempts to approach the biblical witness without the usual assortment of ontological preconditions, presuppositions, and "pre-understandings" moulded by a this-worldly attitude and governing and controlling what is to be called real. On the contrary, these preceding notions are seen to be controlled by God's self-revelation. He who is the Truth controls the ratio of truth. God does not

remain at man's disposal that he might domesticate Him. Rather God freely gives Himself to man's cognition. He creates and imparts the revelation of His truth. Jesus Christ stands in history as God's personal self-revelation. In Him, God freely enters into the space and time continuum of man's creatureliness to share in man's life and to determine man for Himself. Barth does not shrink away from speaking of God as presenting Himself within the limits of this world. And moreover, Barth speaks of God's interaction in objective and literal terms which testify to the earthly presence of the eternal in time. For Karl Barth, to speak of Jesus Christ is to speak of God Himself. This is the strange new world of Karl Barth. It is a world which expounds the divine in real terms and in so doing denies the reality of Lessing's "ugly, broad ditch" which neither Bultmann nor Tillich has successfully crossed. But here one comes up against a different approach which acknowledges God's presence here in the world. God gives Himself to be known and it becomes the task of the theologian to inquire into what God has already said in the person of Jesus Christ.

A. KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

And so it stands: whatever exists apart from thee, the Only One, can be conceived as not existing. Thou alone of all living beings hast really true existence -- and therefore thou alone of all beings hast perfect existence. For anything other than thee does not possess this manner of existence and therefore possesses but imperfect existence. 1

Jesus Christ comes to the Christian as the self-

1. A, p. 154.

impartation of God Himself.¹ God comes into the sphere of space and time to communicate knowledge of Himself to man where he lives.² God steps into the realm of creation as creature but without ceasing to be the One He is. Barth attempts to handle this revelation of God in Jesus Christ with absolute seriousness. But in order to do so Barth must appropriate a cognitive apparatus which will facilitate the exposition of this revelation. Therefore he turns to the work of Anselm in order to acquire an epistemological basis for bringing to understanding the revelation of God. In Anselm, Barth admits that he was "working with a vital key, if not the key" to which formed the base for a faithful understanding of the divine.³ Indeed, the exercise of thought which Anselm's method transmitted to Barth was a process of reflection whereby intelligere issues in probare.⁴ In discoursing about God, one stands within the tradition of faith. Theology searches for an understanding of its subject matter; it does not attempt "to lead men to faith, nor to confirm them in the faith, nor even to deliver their faith from doubt."⁵ Rather theology searches for intelligere on the basis and foundation of faith. One does not begin with ignorance but with a knowledge that seeks and desires to become clearer.⁶ Therefore to speak of faith is to speak of a summons to knowledge which

1. IVii, p. 101.

2. Ii, p. 155.

3. A, p. 11.

4. A, p. 14.

5. A, p. 17.

6. TFT, p. 184.

is inherent in the nature of faith itself.¹ God delivers Himself to man in an intelligible and cognitive manner which the ratio of man is capable of assimilating and of knowing. The faithful man is in search of a clarification of what he already believes to be true. To expound the reality of God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ, the believer turns toward and stands within the context of Christianity.² It is here that one comes to know God. "We know it [God's existence] because it is how God has revealed himself and because we believe him as he has revealed himself."³ God controls and determines human inquiry. He accomplishes this control in the event of His revelation. Faith believes that God does reveal Himself in Jesus Christ and that He gives Himself to be known. Man's inquiry, then, does not need to establish the reality and the presence of God a priori. Quite to the contrary, the inquiry arises out of the fact of God's act in itself. It is solely on the basis of God's initiative that man receives knowledge which itself seeks to become clearer. Therefore a definitive relationship between God and man is already posited in faith before it seeks for a clearer understanding of itself. "But this act of knowing can be explained: we know it because on the basis of revelation and faith, standing before God, we know that we do not stand as anyone being before any other being, but as a creature before his Creator."⁴ Revelation and faith become the

1. A, p. 18.

2. A, p. 16.

3. A, p. 152.

4. A, p. 152.

determining factors in the quest for clearer knowledge. Man comes to know a definite object which has given itself to be known and which controls the mode of this process of thought. God in Himself, God in the person of Jesus Christ, condescends to communicate with man.¹ God, the Creator, confronts man, the creature, and bestows upon him knowledge. God and man meet and communicate and have dialogue at the behest of the divine.² Man does not come by any ability inherent or innate within himself.³ Rather faith like revelation is dependent upon the activity of God. "In as much as faith in God, and therefore really faith in what is right, it is the proper action of the will due to God, enjoined by God and bound with saving 'experience'."⁴ God stands as the author and the sustainer of man's belief. But man is not simply a passive recipient of this divine initiative. His faith also resembles God in that it is an action of the will. Man's faith which searches for understanding expresses itself in the proper action of the will. Proper action becomes a decision of the will which freely chooses to give obedience owed to God.⁵ In a sense, it may be legitimate to suggest that as an absolutely freely effecting cause God allows man the option of freely choosing Him. Man chooses to respond to Him and to acknowledge His revelation.⁶ Man's choice is not inadvertent nor is it

1. Iii, pp. 132-133.

2. Iii, p. 188.

3. Iii, p. 135.

4. A, p. 22.

5. A, p. 19.

6. Ii, p. 233.

accidental. His acknowledgement and response follow upon the event of hearing which comes about through preaching.¹ Faith experiences the "Word of Christ" which confirms man's experience of the divine.² Human speech about Him possesses the possibility of becoming His Word about Himself.³ This Word can be "legitimately represented by particular human words."⁴ But these "particular human words" are found within the context of the Church. Man's words are not random dissertations or discourses. Rather they reflect a definite content which arises from a particular point of reference. This point of reference finds expression in the belief of the Church -- the Church Credo. The "subjective credo has an objective Credo of the Church as its unimpeachable point of reference...."⁵ Therefore one is not discussing how man in general comes to know God, but how the Christian who already believes moves from knowledge to clearer knowledge of his faith.⁶ In order to discourse about God one does not begin with something other than faith. He begins within faith itself. "[F]aith is assent to what is preached as the Truth, assent for the sake of Christ who is its real and ultimate Author and himself the Truth, can proclaim only the Truth."⁷ What is preached summons the hearer to obedience.⁸ It is

1. A, p. 22.

2. A, p. 22.

3. Ii, p. 57.

4. A, p. 22.

5. A, p. 24.

6. Ii, p. 224.

7. A, p. 25.

8. Ii, p. 104.

something which requires assent and acknowledgement from the hearer.¹ What is preached is seen and heard in its divine essentiality.² Jesus Christ is the truth of God made flesh.³ As the truth, Jesus Christ proclaims what is true about Himself and consequently what is true about God.⁴ God in Christ acts and reveals Himself within the context of this world. "God...is certainly a reality within our world. For our knowledge must be knowledge of a world-reality if it is really going to be our knowledge."⁵ One of the conditions for apprehending God in this world is that He be present here where man lives. God accomplishes this requirement in the person of Jesus Christ. He is the Word made flesh.⁶ Man's act of cognition has the objective act of God as its basis for reflection.⁷ God speaks and man listens. Thus what is preached has its foundation in the act of God, in this person who is Himself the Author of Truth. Faith begins with this point of reference as it is transmitted to man who stands within the tradition of faith.⁸ This tradition bears witness now to God's act then.⁹ Faith assents to the belief and testimony of the Church where what is preached is heard as the truth. God remains in complete

1. Ii, p. 101.

2. Ii, p. 105.

3. Iii, p. 156.

4. IVii, p. 125.

5. Iii, p. 207.

6. Iii, p. 132f.

7. Iii, p. 165.

8. Ii, pp. 98-140.

9. G/A, pp. 3-4.

control of revelation and of man's assent and acknowledgement of it. God who is the object of faith's search for understanding determines and limits the acquisition of truth. As the object of knowledge, He reveals Himself within the context of the Christian tradition. Here is the beginning point where theology seeks for a clearer elucidation of its content. The gap between man's assent to faith and his awareness of the Truth forms the basis of theology's endeavour to move from credere to intelligere.

Faithful man comes before God who is the summa veritatis as well as the causa veritatis.¹ God stands as the Creator. Human existence, for Barth, takes place within the comprehension of the eternal. There is no independent existence as such.² Man lives, moves, and has his being within the nexus of a created reality that is dependent upon God Himself. "And so it stands: whatever exists apart from thee, the Only One, can be conceived as not existing." The reality of God forms the umbrella over the reality of the created realm. "God is the prius of all cognition and of everything known...."³ He becomes the precedent of faith because God is its object. And God is this object because He so wills to be. Therefore the truth-quality of faith's understanding does not reside in any quality of the Christian. Rather God the summa veritatis is the causa veritatis. He possesses the basis of faith's truth within Himself.⁴ Faith commences with the

1. A, p. 18.

2. Ili, pp. 165, 168, 169.

3. Ili, p. 197.

4. Ii, p. 223.

certainty which God has already bestowed within His revelation. "And for the very reason that this thing, the Word of God, is not a thing, but the living, personal, and free God."¹ Jesus Christ as the Word of God become flesh assures man that his statements about and his reflection upon this object of faith resemble and correspond to the truth of God.² On the basis of faith, on the basis of the Word of God, and on the basis God's revelation in Jesus Christ, man wills to apprehend the object of his faith. God becomes the pre-supposition for faith's knowledge. "Thus the knowledge that is sought cannot be anything but an extension and explanation of that acceptance of the Credo of the Church, which faith itself already implied."³ The Christian's search for understanding moves between his assent to faith and his awareness of its truth. There can never be any question of denying or doubting faith's foundation. On the contrary, Credo determines the basis of intelligere. On this pre-supposition or "pre-understanding" man moves forward to extend the limits of faith's initial basis. But it is an extension and an expansion that is never ignorant of its background and tradition. This extension of the Credo is always positive and hopeful because it involves God's grace.⁴ Therefore theology does not question and doubt faith's basis but rather it proclaims the truth of the Credo which is guaranteed by God.

1. Ii, p. 226.

2. TFT, p. 187.

3. A, pp. 26-7.

4. H/G, p. 59.

However this proclamation cannot establish a conception of God since only He can know Himself.¹ In dealing with God, theology and faith are confronted with an event. It is the very nature of God to be contained within His act.

We are dealing with the being of God; but with regard to the being of God, the word "event" or "act" is final, and cannot be surpassed or compromised. To its very deepest depths God's Godhead consists in the fact that it is an event -- not any event, not event in general, but the event of His₂ action, in which we have a share of God's revelation.²

In Jesus Christ, God comes to man and delivers knowledge of His being in His act of revelation. God does not confront one as a static entity or as an eternal truth. God encounters man in His act in Jesus Christ. God comes to meet man where he resides. God shares man's time. His action in Jesus Christ reveals His being. This action provides the basis for knowledge. God's truth like His being shares in this active characterization. "The definition that we must use as a starting-point is that God's being is life."³ One is here dealing with a dynamic entity whose truth is life itself and whose life is truth itself. While man cannot know God in Himself directly, the Christian confession of faith provides a mediate basis of knowledge. "[R]evelation is originally and immediately, what the Bible and Church proclamation are derivatively and mediately, God's Word."⁴ Thus knowledge of the eternal is never without a witness or a testimony. His presence remains in the Credo of faith

1. Iii, p. 179.

2. Iii, p. 263.

3. Iii, p. 263.

4. Ii, p. 131.

where God so wills to make Himself known. Man's knowledge and his language are appropriated in His gracious act of revelation. God as the causa veritatis gives to human language and cognition participation in His summa veritatis. In this act God does not affect and determine what is alien and foreign to Himself. Rather He is the basis of all created reality. In approaching man, God comes unto His own. There is certainly no question of the divine performing a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*.¹ God interacts with what has been created by Him. But in the event of God's coming to appropriate the creature's language and cognition, He comes to what is other than Himself.²

By the Word and Spirit of God we are told that God is and who He is, what He wills and does and will do, and what this means for us. We have now to tell ourselves what is told to us, and we have also to tell it to others. 3

God informs man about Himself. In this communication the realities of God and man remain distinct and intact. Yet He communicates who He is and what He intends. It is for man to reflect upon this conversation, for he now needs to come to an understanding of what God's meaning means for him. Faith experiences and encounters God's truth not as God knows and comprehends the truth about Himself but as man in the created realm comes to a creaturely appreciation of the knowledge of God. In faith man, the creature, stands before God, the Creator. His truth is not man's truth, although God

1. IIi, p. 228.

2. IIi, p. 228.

3. IIi, p. 211.

creates the possibility of the human ratio corresponding to and resembling the divine veritatis. On this basis, then, theology is a creaturely pursuit of the Creator which has been initiated and authorized by the will of God. In this pursuit, faith speaks positively of God's activity in the event of His revelation. But because God's very nature is activity and event, human truth is subsequent, secondary, dependent, and improper.¹ Faith's search for understanding can only acquire an imprecise knowledge which is in need of constant correction. "It belongs to the nature of this knowing that it consists only in 'approximations'. It cannot...be perfected. It stands in need of correction at every point."² His knowing in faith cannot hope to be anything more than an approximation of the certainty of faith. It may be the case that Barth is acknowledging the transitional nature of life. Kierkegaard has already pointed out that the movement and contingency of existence qualifies the certainty and definiteness which the Reason seeks to attain. Quite possibly, Barth is reflecting this same motif in his acceptance of approximation as the limiting condition of even faith knowledge. Consequently, man's language and cognition of God must always transpire in the creaturely realm which is other than God and which is in the constant state of becoming. Therefore faith can only attain to a scientific or probablistic certainty. This is to say, the Christian must act as one who does not possess absolute certainty about

1. IIIi, p. 228.

2. IIIi, p. 202.

his object, who will experiment with his conceptions, and who is in need of correction from others.¹ The knowledge of faith becomes relative in that this intelligere is always dependent upon and reflective of the activity of God who in His being is freely willing life and activity.² Faith's coming to knowledge must reflect God's nature if it is to be true knowledge and right action of the will. The understanding after which faith seeks depends entirely upon its object.

Since man's knowledge can only be mediate cognition and since the object of faith is not just any creature or thing but the Creator, the entire credibility and comprehensibility of faith's undertaking depends solely and entirely upon the incomparable and the incomprehensible -- namely upon the fact that God gives Himself to man's apprehension. "Everything depends not only on the fact that God grants him grace to think correctly about him, but also on the fact that God himself comes within his system as the object of this thinking...."³ In God's decision to be the object of man's faith and thus of his understanding, God takes the initiative to approach creation and to appropriate what is His own. But this is always God's decision because it is always God's act.⁴ Knowledge, then, occurs as it is instituted by the decisive action of God.⁵ It is His confrontation with man in the person of

1. A, p. 30.

2. A, p. 37.

3. A, p. 39.

4. Ii, p. 178.

5. IViii, p. 219.

Jesus Christ that provides the focal point for Christian experience.¹ And this experience is never contemplated nor grasped by pure intellectual capabilities. Christian knowledge requires that one, in his totality, is grasped and determined by the very object of thought.² It is always God who retains the initiative and it is He who grasps man in all of his possibilities.³ As such he shares in this knowledge by participation which is always presented to him.⁴ Participation inaugurated and sanctified by divine action in Jesus Christ becomes a mode of relation between God and man in the realm of cognition.

And the presupposition of this participation is that the ground of being of this One penetrates and transcends of itself the limits of the sphere of what we can see and interpret and know, that it discloses and declares and attests and reveals itself in this sphere. 5

God offers Himself to human cognition. And this is effected within the realm of man's world. God both penetrates and transcends the limits of what is knowable. He interacts and communicates with the creature in the place where he makes his home. God "discloses and declares and attests and reveals" Himself where man lives in order that His creation may come to knowledge of the Creator. Participation is an act of God in His self-revelation. It is His coming into the limits of space and time. It is God's act in Jesus Christ.

1. IViii, pp. 267-274.

2. IViii, p. 220.

3. IViii, p. 220.

4. IViii, p. 220.

5. IVii, p. 39.

On this basis of participation one "can see and interpret and know" that God is with him because God acts where it is possible for man to come to an understanding.

The essence of the knowledge of this One is that the divine act of majesty in and by and from which the man Jesus has His being should be reflected and respected in the human seeing and interpreting which is awakened and controlled by Him and therefore corresponds to Him. 1

Again everything depends upon Him. Faith's search for understanding can only repeat and reflect what the "divine act of majesty" has effected in Christ. Human seeing and interpreting reflect upon God's act in such a way that man is both awakened and determined by Him in this experience. Because God acts and because He participates within the sphere of creation, man comes to knowledge. And this knowledge receives its credibility and truth because God awakens and controls it within him. He personally guarantees and assures the certainty and the truthfulness of human cognition and its correspondence to Him. "The veracity of the revelation of God verifies itself by verily laying claim to the thinking and speaking of man."² Man's thinking and his speaking are put into the service of God. In this way human thought and speech receive their truth-quality in relation to divine communication. Indeed, God becomes the first and the last word that is spoken about Him by man. It would seem to be that Barth may again be reflecting a Kierkegaardian motif. It has been suggested (see Appendix A) that SK understood

1. IVii, p. 39.

2. IIIi, p. 211.

Jesus Christ as the Absolute Paradox. He is nonetheless intelligible and comprehensible in His reality. In confrontation with the Reason, SK contends that Christ appears as the absurd and the incommensurable. In and of itself, the Reason cannot understand Him, but through the passion of faith man can overcome his rational doubts and limitations and embrace the reality of the Eternal in time. In matters of faith, the Reason is hard pressed to explain rationally the content of faith. It does not seem to be the case that SK is advocating the suspension of the Reason. Rather he seems to be marking the point of its competence. Similarly, Barth implicitly appears to be arguing for the same limitation when attempts are made which strive to explain the faith rationally. Faith presumably provides its own comprehensibility which is beyond the competence of the Reason.

Faith and the understanding which accompanies it are always reflecting upon the revelation and act of God in Jesus Christ. This faith and the corresponding knowledge share in the reality of Christ then and there, here and now. The truth-quality of this original ratio becomes contemporaneous in the present act of intelligere by the ratio fidei. Then and there becomes here and now -- a present reality.¹ Man is distinguished from the animals in that he shares in the vestigium trinitatis.² Man possesses this possibility which comes to actualization within the reality of faith. This vestigium trinitatis empowers man: (a) to remember God,

1. Ii, pp. 168-170.

2. A, p. 20.

(b) to recognize Him, (c) to love Him.¹ This potentiality resides within the limits of faith. Barth is not arguing for anything that may smack of a natural theology or a natural capacity within man to come to God unaided. He is rather contending that the knowledge of faith can become contemporaneous on the conditions immanent in faith itself. The vestigium trinitatis relies upon a "biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic presupposition".² Knowledge of God is attained on something which exists externally to man and which must be given to him to understand. He can recognize, remember, and love God always and only within the prospectus of faith. Man "recollects the revelation of God on the basis of the "biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic presupposition".³ Here it is given to man to move to the ratio fidei where Christ's reality becomes present.⁴ Man's noetic ratio comes into correspondence with the ontic ratio of the object of faith.⁵ And this ontic ratio is identical with the summa veritatis and the ratio veritatis of God.⁶ In the position of faith, the noetic ratio of the believer is determined and appropriated by the ontic ratio of the object.⁷ God who is this object becomes known and contemporaneous with man's act of cognition as the ratio fidei moves to intelligere.⁸ And moreover, this event of cognition also incorporates its

1. A, p. 20.

2. A, p. 58.

3. Ii, p. 136.

4. TFT, p. 192.

5. A, p. 45.

6. A, p. 45.

7. A, p. 46.

8. TFT, p. 189f.

own veracity. God is contemporaneously the truth, the content, and the object of faith in the event of cognition. The ratio fidei becomes identical with the truth of God and this identity lies hidden within the "biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic presupposition" of faith.¹ This identity comes to emergence and into the ratio fidei always on the initiative of God.

Fundamentally, the ratio either as ontic or noetic is never higher than the truth but truth is itself the master of all rationes...deciding for itself, now here, now there, what is vera ratio: in so far as the ratio of the object of faith and the use which man makes of his capacity to think and judge conform to Truth...its true rationality is determined and the intellectus that is sought occurs. 2

Here again one meets the assertion that God who is the Author of Truth is also its master. He affects the relationship that results between the ontic and noetic rationalities. When man's rationality conforms to the rationality of the object of faith, the possibility is present for true rationality to result and for knowledge to occur.³ When true rationality obtains man can truly remember, recognize, and love God as the Author, Guarantor, and subject of the Truth and the object of his faith. God's act in Jesus Christ who is the object of faith and God's self-revelation becomes contemporaneous in this acquisition of genuine rationality and intelligibility. The mediate knowledge transmitted by bible-church-dogma provides the foundation for God's past act in Jesus Christ becoming present. This act of revelation

1. R/T, pp. 182-7.

2. A, p. 47.

3. T/C, p. 45f.

then and there becomes a renewed here and now in God's decision to make the ratio fidei correspond to the ratio of the object of faith. Two points of interest seem to emerge. First, the "biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic presupposition" of faith's knowledge may possibly reflect the influence of Kähler (see Appendix B). He had vigorously proposed that the biblical document presents the uniqueness of the biblical, historic Christ. Within the context of the faith tradition and given the faith of the believer, the Bible provides an integral and irreducible component for the foundation and preservation of faith. These various integrated and essential ingredients represent the fundamental building-blocks. In his own way, Barth appears to concur with Kähler on this initial point of reference. On a second front, it is important to point out that Barth's emphasis on the "here and now" in the ratio fidei does not simply appear to suggest his opting for an existential reading of faith's content. Barth's position seems to be an alternative to the way proposed by Bultmann and Tillich. These latter men appear to seize upon the moment as the point of revelation and faith. For both men, the emphasis seems to fall upon the decision for faith in the now. The supra-temporality of God becomes real and alive in the eschatological moment of decision. The past and the future do not really seem to be of great significance for RB and PT. What is important is the here and now which manifests itself in commitment to and re-affirmation of the faith and decision of the disciples and the Church to confess Jesus as the Christ. Indeed, the Barth of the Romans had also expounded a similar point.¹ Barth speaks of the Moment

1. G.C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth, "Theology of Crisis?", p. 23ff.

and of its standing beyond the temporal.¹ Time gains significance as man manifests his action in love. "[K]nowing that the eternal 'Moment' does not, has not, and will not, enter in, we should then become aware of the dignity and importance of each single concrete temporal moment, and apprehend its qualification and its ethical demand".² God's "time" and His eternity seem to stand above man's time and historicity, Yet man lives in hope and consequently he waits and lives "as though" he sees and knows what is invisible.³ This type of exposition reflects the similarity of RB and PT. The moment, the here and now, is recognized as eternal and qualified by its ethical demand of love.⁴ And it was this similarity which RB and PT grasped as representing Barth's standing with them.⁵ However, Barth has pointed out that for all of his "art and eloquence", he had missed the distinctive feature of Rm. 13.11f: "the teleology which it ascribes to time as it moves toward a real end".⁶ The supra-temporality of God as well as His pre- and post-temporality must be recognized as integral to a proper exposition of the reality of God.⁷ Bultmann and Tillich appear to hold God's reality at a distance beyond the real and the known. Barth accepts the temporality of God as a past, present and future correlate to the historicity of man. As a complementation to his

1. E/R, p. 497.

2. E/R, p. 501.

3. E/R, pp. 313-315.

4. IIi, p. 635.

5. IIi, p. 635.

6. IIi, p. 635.

7. IIi, p. 608ff.

exposition of Rm. 13.11f, Barth views the End as more than an existential qualification standing beyond each moment. The End is real as is the supra-temporality of God. For Barth, man lives in the constant presence of the real and eternal God. It is no longer enough merely to challenge and to repudiate all human attempts to approach God.¹ And it is not enough to cling to the moment with the intense and inward anticipation of a revelation from Him. The moment no longer swallows up both the past and the future. God's pre- and post-temporality stand at the beginning and end of man's journey through life. God's supra-temporality conditions and qualifies man's present by leading him from the "no longer" to the "not yet". In a word, Barth in contradistinction to Bultmann and Tillich appears to combat the modern dislike of the divine supra-temporality by taking seriously the reality and presence of God "who is also pre-temporal and post-temporal, bound to no time, and therefore the Lord of all times."

From the epistemological foundation which Barth has established, several points emerge. Essentially Barth is writing a theology, an explanation of faith, from within the confines of faith. Like Anselm, Barth does not hold up to questioning the "biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic presupposition" of his thought. He begins with faith and therefore with a particular object which is something new and unique and which requires a new and different mode of apprehension.² But

1. E/R, pp. 240-270.

2. IVii, p. 38.

this is not something that man can achieve by his own ability and prowess. Because of the uniqueness and the incomparableness of this object, man is given to know about God. He receives the ability to know by the grace of God Himself. Man knows when he is able to recognize that in Jesus Christ God is present.¹ Here is the incomparably new event within the context of the creatures' world. It is the in-breaking of the infinite into the finite. This becomes a necessary act since God has decided that man should know Him. A limit to man's knowledge is inherent in the very creatureliness of his being. Man can only come to know what transpires and occurs within the limits of his reality. God moves toward man by participating in his space and time. He transcends and penetrates this sphere in the being and act of Jesus Christ. In the objectiveness of this person God accomplishes His self-revelation within the world. In order to do this, God does not disturb what is alien and foreign to Him. On the contrary, He moves into a closer and more intimate relationship with what is essentially His own. All things are seen as residing and existing within the province of His activity and being. Nonetheless the distinctiveness of both God and man remains. He is the prius of all cognition and the basis of all knowing. God lives as the Author of Truth. Therefore His work in Jesus Christ is really the truth of His own being. Jesus Christ delivers the truth of God because He approaches and encounters man as a reality within the perspective of the world. But the uniqueness of this reality demands and requires God's

1. IVii, p. 38.

intervention in the process of human reflection. Man simply does not possess the tools to handle this incomprehensible reality without assistance.¹ Barth maintains that God as the Author of Truth and as the Subject of truth in Jesus Christ permits human cognition. God permits man to know Him by recognizing Him in the event of Christ. The faith of the Church repeats and reflects this revelation. But this faith is only mediate knowledge and recollection of what is immediate in revelation. Faith can never hold or encapsulate God whose very nature is activity, event, and life. Thus God imparts Himself through the vehicle of the faith of the Church. God initiates and effects the cognition which occurs in man. To explain this process of thought, Barth follows the lead of Anselm. God in Jesus Christ speaks truthfully about Himself because He is the truth. Cognition has as its object the testimony of faith regarding the fact of revelation. The Word of Christ can become identical with the words of those who preach Him. God's Word can be represented by particular human words and thoughts. Faith reflects upon these words in the expectation that God's Word will become manifest in them. This is accomplished as the ratio of the believer corresponds to and resembles the ratio of the object of faith. The essence of Christian knowledge is the repeating and reflection upon God's act in Jesus Christ.² But this

1. IVii, p. 58.

2. Q/G, pp. 113-121. In these pages, Zahrnt attempts to do battle with Barth over the application of his understanding of faith and history upon the present day situation of man. Because of the apparent divine decision before time to create time and man, Zahrnt feels it necessary to challenge the effects of this eternal decision upon the real world. He contends that the historical can do no more than disappear into the eternity of God. This, of course, also
(Contd.)

repetition and reflection is always controlled and awakened by the Truth who masters all rationes. Therefore human words and thoughts about God are not simply propositions which are debated and dismissed on the assumption that their truth value lies inherently within the words themselves. More to the point, the proposition of human speech acquires its truth because God makes it true. He guarantees that man's words correspond to His Word. From this, Barth will contend that knowledge of God remains limited both to the confines of faith and to the continuance of God's grace. Knowledge of God reveals itself to be Christian knowledge based upon "biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic" presuppositions. And again, these presuppositions are not reducible, but

Contd.) allows Zahrnt to maintain the non-historicity of Barth's theology. On a second front, Zahrnt attacks Barth's lack of concrete reference to man's existential life. Indeed, this existential interpretation of faith is primary for man. (For Zahrnt's historical and existential viewpoint, see especially pages 205-207.) On the first count, Zahrnt does not appear to appreciate the vitality and dynamism with which Barth comes to an understanding of God. God is not an eternal and unmoveable First Cause but rather active and eventful in His being. God's being and act seems to correspond to the event-character of history itself. The conjunction of "timeless event" in relation to God's activity hardly appears to be consistent if "timeless" is taken to mean static and stationary. This simply does not depict Barth's narration of God. Rather God's decision is an event in eternity which itself reflects an historical nature. Barth's system does not appear to infringe on the freedom of man nor on that of God. Turning to the second point, one of the basic thrusts of Barth's exposition is to move beyond a simple recounting of faith's benefits for man. To see only this is to miss completely the vertical dimension of God's in-breaking into history. An existential slant can distort the ontological reference of faith's words which Barth sees in God Himself. And further, existential questions may receive faithful answers but can these answers be assumed to be intended strictly for existential purposes? Or does the text answer questions which are not always related to man and his existence?

themselves establish the foundation for faithful enquiry.¹

B. A MOMENT TO PAUSE

Very distinct avenues of approach begin to emerge as one considers Barth's epistemological structure in relation to what has already been reviewed. Barth asks a very pertinent ontological question which underlines the new direction of development inherent in his thinking. "Could the Christian message and the Christian faith be a subject for debate while the validity of a general world view was presupposed?"² It would appear that Barth is reviewing Liberal Protestant theology at a very basic and crucial point. From an epistemological perspective, for instance, how can one possibly contend for the ontic ratio in the object of faith if in point of fact one is not really dealing with the truth of God in Jesus Christ? How does one grapple with the "biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic" presuppositions of the faith if their truth is not contained in that to which they refer but in that which they say in themselves? Without this ontological referent as underlying the truth of faith's presuppositions, must not faith be viewed as anthropocentrism, nominalism, symbolism, or myth? Indeed Barth admits that Liberal Protestantism cannot be denied entirely, because it still speaks even today.³ It is essential to be clear that

1. A, p. 60f.

2. H/G, p. 23.

3. H/G, pp. 32-3.

Liberal theology has alerted Barth to the danger of conditioning faith by implicitly assuming the truth of one world-view. This is pointed out in his question. Barth contends that Liberalism was too entrenched in fixing the contemporary world as decisive and primary.¹ By attentively focusing upon the world, the prevalent ideas of the time became normative.² Essentially man began to take himself too seriously.³ Christianity appeared as another historical phenomenon which had to be related to the experiences of man. However, 19th Century Liberalism never viewed Christianity as anything more than historical.⁴ Indeed Barth was aware of Overbeck's position of the non-historicity of Christianity.⁵ This allowed him to view the historical as well as the non-historical dimension of reality which opens outward beyond man's perception to God.⁶ Because the 19th Century could not view Christianity as something more than historical, theology became enwrapped in the inner experiences of the Christian in relation to the notion of God.⁷ And more, theology sought to acquire this God by methods and means at its own disposal -- God's truth was seen as inherent within the experiences of the believer.⁸ Man became the centre of importance as God's dealings with Him slipped into the background.⁹ The reality

1. H/G, p. 19.

2. H/G, p. 19.

3. H/G, p. 20.

4. H/G, p. 29.

5. T/C, p. 61f.

6. R/T, pp. 134-8; D/M, pp. 100-4.

7. H/G, pp. 26-7.

8. T/C, Chapter 6.

9. H/G, p. 25.

of God became estranged from the phenomenon of Christianity. God was not seen as literally interacting with the space and time world.¹ The contemporary scene of man and his world blotted out the immediate presence and living reality of the divine because the picture of that world had been elevated to the dignity of a world-view. On this basis Christianity could be no more than something historical. Lessing's "ugly, broad ditch" provided the gap between God and the Christian. The static being of eternal truth could not be established by the elusive and dynamic becoming of historical data. Historical approximation and becoming is not synonymous with the logical coherency and explicit necessity of eternal truth. As SK has pointed out, the necessary is and therefore it does not undergo the coming-into-existence-kind-of-change which is consubstantial with the historical. Rather the truth of faith's claims could be seen as logical, propositional truth without explicit historical referents. The ontological basis of faith's claims could thus be extradited to the outer limits of human experience. But Barth viewed a different world from most theologians when he looked into the context of Scripture. He encountered something of a new world created by God.² A new beginning and a new direction in theology seemed necessary because the Bible testified to God's speaking to man.³ The Bible witnessed to the activity of God which is cognisable by man.⁴ For Barth

1. R/T, pp. 177-181.

2. W/G, p. 40.

3. W/G, p. 44f.

4. W/G, p. 48f.

this world does not represent the beginning and the end of our wisdom and knowledge. "We would truly find release in the...fact, that our human existence is neither self-sufficient nor a law unto itself, that the visible world can be neither without God nor with a powerless, invisible God 'in heaven' as its opposite."¹ The present world does not stand by its own initiative nor by its own wisdom. But God Himself maintains creation by a presence that is neither powerless nor fictitious. The world of man enjoys both a horizontal relationship with other creatures as well as a vertical relationship with God the Creator.² Here then is where Barth challenges and abandons a world-view that had an assumed validity. He relinquishes the presupposition that the world is self-sufficient and that its God must either be powerless or non-existent. Barth's approach appears to move him around the dilemma of Lessing who was unable to establish the eternal truths of religion by means of the accidental truths of history. Lessing's "ugly, broad ditch" is no longer obstructing Barth's theology. It can no longer be a question of confining faith's truth to some eternal land where logical necessity and coherent immovability establish the nature of God. Barth transcribes this static immovability into an event-character conception of the divine.³ God is not only eternal truth in Himself but He is also the truth involved in event and act. S. Kierkegaard's understanding of history as

1. Xmas, p. 62.

2. IViii, p. 248.

3. IIi, p. 263; E/KB, p. 121.

becoming begins to be interpolated into Barth's conception of the divine. God and man as distinct realities¹ eventuate themselves in the act of becoming. God and man are thus historical, each in its own distinct mode. Lessing's obstacle takes up a position behind Barth because he has seen it as something that is avoidable and not absolute. Essentially, Barth gives credence to the biblical message that God has acted and is active in the affairs of man. This position manifests itself in Barth's epistemological framework where he actively attempts to make intelligible this reality of God. It is a theological stance which gives seriousness to the ontological referent of faith's claims. Barth seems to have learned from the predecessors of the 19th Century Protestant Liberalism. He has discovered the alternative route of taking God as well as man seriously within the shared context of created reality. From this perspective then, the reality of Jesus Christ provides the means of knowing both God and man in the particular and personal existence of the vere deus et vere homo.

C. THE REALITY OF JESUS CHRIST

It is precisely God's deity which...includes his

humanity....How do we come to know that?... It is a Christological statement...in Him we encounter the history, the dialogue, in which God and man meet together and are together....Jesus Christ is in His one Person, as true God, man's loyal partner, and as true man, God's. ²

1. IIIi, p. 46; IIIi, p. 580.

2. H/G, p. 46.

Barth's epistemological foundation has been laid to make intelligible God's interaction with the world as it has come to man in the testimony of the "biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic" presuppositions of the faith. It has been established that faith is capable of cognition and understanding. Moreover, this process of thought functions upon the impetus and initiative of its object. At this point the person of Jesus Christ looms into the foreground of faith's encounter with God. He approaches faith's quest for understanding as the object of its cognition as well as the initiator of this process. Jesus Christ encounters man as the reality of God's deity and the fullness of man's humanity. He allows man the possibility to come to know. He approaches as man's partner in dialogue along the way of faith's search for a fuller cognition of its object. In a word, the epistemologico-ontological referent of the knowledge and being of faith's reality drives one into immediate and certain encounter with Jesus Christ. In this way, Barth's "biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic" presupposition appears similar to the position of Kähler. Kähler encountered the Christ through the mediation of God, the faith tradition, and the confession of man. The historic, biblical Christ stands revealed and hidden in the complex of these determinations. Barth seems to progress along a similar path. He is interested in the Jesus Christ of faith as He is mediated through tradition, scripture, confession and God's grace. As a result of His uniqueness, one is driven to explore the reality of this person from several vantage points. God certainly enables man to know who Jesus Christ is. But man must always recount to himself

what God means to say. Human knowledge can only attain to scientific certainty. As such, his statements and conceptions of God in Jesus Christ require constant correction and demand continuous experimentation. God's truth can never be fully grasped; it can only be approximated in faithful human endeavour for understanding.¹ This is the nature of faith's knowledge and as such this imposes limitations and shortcomings on any one formula or sign expressing the dynamic actuality of God's being and act in Jesus Christ.

When one is propelled to inquire after the "Who?" of Jesus Christ, one receives the answer: "He is the Word made flesh."² Jesus Christ stands before man in history as having been in the beginning with God.³ The Word announces itself as a free and sovereign reality within the structure of history, because the Word is always Subject.⁴ Therefore one has not to do with any reality that arises from some necessity inherent in the contingency of history.⁵ One must make reference to an entirely new creation -- something unique that has not been before.⁶ Nonetheless, this Word becomes flesh within the realm of space and time without ceasing to be free and sovereign in this very act.⁷ The Word becomes flesh; God enters the context of man's historical existence.⁸

1. H/B, p. 184.

2. Iii, p. 132.

3. Iii, p. 133.

4. Iii, p. 134.

5. E/KB, pp. 141-3.

6. Iii, p. 134; IVii, p. 37.

7. Iii, p. 136.

8. Iii, p. 147.

That God enters the realm of space and time indicates that He has become a man Himself.

If we ask what the Word became when in His incarnation, without ceasing to be the Word, He nevertheless ceased to be the only Word, and if we allow ourselves to say that He became flesh, we must note that..."flesh" does not imply a man, but human essence and existence, human kind and nature, humanity humanitas, that which makes a man man as opposed to God, angel or animal. 1

The Word not only became a man in the flesh who eats, sleeps, talks, but also the Word became what is essential to man. The Word appropriated and became "human essence and existence, human kind and nature". In becoming man, the Word attached itself to the possibilities and potentialities implicit in humanitas.³ And moreover, this act of God was accomplished without His ever ceasing to be God. "Jesus Christ very God and very man does not mean that in Jesus Christ God and man were really side by side, but it means that Jesus Christ, Himself true God, is also a true Man."⁴ The Word becoming flesh, a man, does not result (1) in a God who appears to be a man, (2) in a man who is thought to be a god, or (3) in a third reality between God and man.⁵ The being and activity of Jesus Christ adopts and assumes humanitas in such a manner that it is always determined, preserved, and actualized by the reality of God.⁶ In this real and objective person, God penetrates and transcends the limits of created

1. Iii, p. 149; compare IVii, p. 25.

2. E/KB, pp. 144-6.

3. Iii, p. 150.

4. Iii, p. 161.

5. Iii, p. 151.

reality. He lives as a man equal to us in what we are as men.¹ By this act, God does not interfere with what is strange to Him; He comes unto His own.² On Barth's epistemological premises, it is essential that Jesus Christ comes to man as a reality which is discernible within the context of the human mode of apprehension. Man's faithful knowledge of God requires its basis within the concrete objective structures of experiential world-realities.³ If there is really going to be human knowledge, it must be apprehended as something that is possible and real here in space and time. Jesus Christ comes into the world-historical situation as a real man. He does not appear in docetic or ebionite wrapping or as some third between-God-and-man reality. Jesus Christ steps into the soil of history as a real, living, breathing man. However, Jesus Christ presents Himself as determined solely and exclusively by the activity and presence of God.

As a man, then, Jesus Christ enters the world of time and space, flesh and blood. The commencement of His entry is marked off by the event of incarnation -- God becoming a man.

God's revelation in its objective reality is the person of Jesus Christ....[I]t becomes the object of our knowledge; it finds a way of becoming the content of our experience and our thought; it gives itself to be apprehended by our contemplation and our categories. 4

The incarnation reveals itself to be an act of God's self-

1. Iii, p. 151.

2. Iii, p. 151.

3. Page **333**.

4. Iii, p. 172.

revelation in the person of Jesus Christ. It is an objective reality that contains the possibility of becoming the object of human knowledge. This reality possesses the revelation of God. Here the importance of the incarnation comes to the fore. It is the beginning in time of God's self-impartation to man. The incarnation marks the commencement of God objectively revealing Himself in the person of Jesus Christ. Man's knowledge and faith requires the apprehension of this mystery of revelation.¹ By contrast, Bultmann does not appear to be overly congenial to this position. The importance of Jesus Christ is not to be found in His person but in His message -- the Word of God. It seems that Bultmann is not concerned to deal seriously with the God incarnate. Rather, he is content to elaborate and interpret the Church's confession that Jesus is the Christ. In a word, Bultmann seems to place more credence on confession than on the person confessed. To explicate the person of this mystery, Barth offers a discussion of the Virgin Birth. In this way, Barth sees an avenue opening into discourse about this act of God. "Born of the Virgin Mary" signifies that one has here to do with a real son born to a real mother.² One is not simply discussing a mythological or symbolical figure who is seen to represent something else. Here Barth is talking about a real historical person. Therefore man becomes central in this act of revelation.³ He finds himself affected. By the

1. Iii, p. 184.

2. Iii, p. 185.

3. Iii, p. 186.

Word's becoming flesh, God becomes man and thus undergoes the limitations inherent in humanitas.¹ In becoming a man, God limits Himself to the structures of flesh retained within the bounds of space and time. But to be "born of a virgin" signifies even more to Barth. It indicates that humanitas in and of itself has come under God's judgement.² In and of itself, humanitas requires the intervention of God in order to bring about the incarnation of the Word. But what does this indicate in regards to man's nature?

[Man] has lost his pure creatureliness, and with it the capacity for God, because as a creature and in the totality of his creatureliness he became disobedient to his Creator....It is with this disobedient creature that God has to do in His revelation. 3

A new light enters into the discussion. Jesus Christ is not simply an academic exercise by God to test the usefulness of the lines of communication between Himself and man. One discovers something more profound and basic. God interacts with man in the Incarnate Word because the creature has lost or relinquished his capacity for the Creator. Man has lost contact with God. He possesses no facilities or capacities for re-establishing the divine-human dialogue. In the face of man's plight⁴ God acts in the event of His revelation to attack this loss of capacity and to give back to man what belongs to him in his creatureliness. God's act in Jesus

1. Iii, p. 187.

2. Iii, p. 188.

3. Iii, p. 188.

4. A, p. 38.

Christ is the working out of this mystery for man. "And this mystery must consist in [man] receiving the capacity for God which [he] does not possess."¹ Humanitas becomes the recipient of a lost capacity and ability. The incarnation of God creates a new potentiality of divine-human dialogue. In this mode of expression God reconciles the disobedience of the creature. "The mystery of revelation and reconciliation consists in the fact that in His freedom, mercy, and omnipotence, God became man, and as such acts upon man. By this action of God sin is excluded and nullified."² Revelation becomes the manner of reconciliation. Incarnation as revelation reconciles man to God. It occurs at the behest of divine, "freedom, mercy, and omnipotence". The result manifests itself in God becoming man and bestowing the capacity for communication. God appropriates and moulds humanitas in order to give back to it the full expression of its creatureliness. God imparts a capacity for Himself. Therefore to be "born of a virgin" indicates the incapacity of man on his own behalf to provide a basis of communication and dialogue with God. As such, this indication discloses the negative dimension of God's act in Jesus Christ.

But there is more than the negative. The sign of the Virgin Birth also possesses a positive quality which cannot be properly lost sight of. Jesus Christ was conceived by the Holy Spirit. Barth views this conception as providing the ground and the content displayed in the event of the

1. Iii, p. 189.

2. Iii, p. 191.

incarnation.¹ To be conceived by the Holy Spirit demonstrates that truly one is dealing with something new and unique which cannot be encompassed within what has gone before.² The act of conception reveals itself to be strictly an act of God -- it is a pure divine beginning.³ This creative activity fulfilled in the incarnation of Jesus Christ expresses a divine intention. It points out "that God Himself creates a possibility, a power, a capacity, and assigns it to man, where otherwise there would be sheer impossibility."⁴ God acts in the Holy Spirit and in Jesus Christ to convey what is otherwise impossible for man. God acts positively in the self-impartation of this power, capacity, possibility, when He appropriates and grasps the "human essence and existence, human nature and kind". He pursues that with a positive end in view. But more, this positive pursuit of man points out the correlation involved in the event of man's reconciliation and the existence of Jesus Christ.⁵ "For it is on this ground that the same work, the same preparation of man for God by God Himself, can happen to us also, in the form of grace, the grace manifested in Jesus Christ...."⁶ A connection comes into view between the existence of this real man Jesus Christ and man himself. It is the interconnection of human reconciliation and the existence of this real man. On the basis of the existence of Jesus Christ, man is made

1. Iii, p. 196.

2. Iii, p. 198.

3. Iii, p. 197.

4. Iii, p. 199.

5. Iii, p. 200.

6. Iii, p. 200.

available for God by His preparation.¹ Humanitas receives the preparation and the power to share in this revelation of reconciliation. But this participation resides always in the good-pleasure and grace of God manifested in Christ. The positive dimension of the Virgin Birth directs attention to the activity and event of God Himself.² The ontic rationality preserved by the formula "born of the Virgin Mary" and "conceived by the Holy Spirit" possesses a truth which relies on the act of God.³ It assumes a noetic rationality as man is given to recognize and acknowledge the event of God in this sign. "[B]ecause He is thus conceived and born, He has to be recognized and acknowledged as the One He is and in the mystery in which He is the One He is."⁴ Because God comes to man as He does, human cognition can only acknowledge this activity which remains a mystery in the event of revelation. Because it is incomprehensible in itself, one can only recognize that this is God who is conceived and born. Ontic and noetic rationality merge at the point where acknowledgement and recognition are made possible by the grace of God who is master of all rationes. In another vein, Tillich endeavours to affiliate the human reality with essential meaning through the power of the symbol. For him, Jesus as the Christ is the New Being who points the way to man's overcoming the forces of estrangement. As a symbolic importation of essential meaning, Jesus as the

1. N/H, p. 160.

2. Iii, p. 201.

3. H/B, pp. 100-2.

4. Iii, p. 202; compare IV, p. 208.

Christ symbolizes man's essential goodness. In contra-distinction, Barth affirms that Jesus Christ is indeed the real and living presence of God Himself. Man does not need to speak symbolically since God has come to His own.

But what is Barth really attempting to say here? A clue into his intention may perhaps prevail as one reconsiders the epistemological prologue. Quite definitely, faith presents the possibility for rationality and therefore for understanding. As well, in order to be a possibility it must be an experiential world-reality. Jesus Christ fulfils this condition. He enters the arena of history as a real man of flesh and blood. Barth unequivocally maintains the utter realness and full-ness of His humanity. But Barth sees more to be involved than the simple historical apprehension of a past historical entity. Here he embarks upon an exposition of the meaning of the incarnation as it is expressed in the sign of natus ex virgine and conceptus de Spiritu sancto. A new dimension looms over the horizon of the discussion. Barth is attempting to point to a "more than" quality and characterization prevalent here.¹ Yes, Jesus Christ is a world-historical phenomenon. And yes, He is "more than" this. The mystery of the incarnation, of the Word become flesh, highlights this otherness, this strangeness, this incomprehensibility. Because Christ is "more than" a flesh and blood historical entity, and more precisely because He is the activity of God Himself in the

1. H/B, p. 193.

flesh, man's rationality is confronted with a strange, new, incomprehensible, paradoxical, phenomenon.¹ There are no analogies to point to and to find correlations with. Yet here in man's midst something real and unique demands to be heard and to be understood. But what is the point of entry into the rationality of the person of Jesus Christ? Barth maintains that the paradoxical can only be acknowledged and recognized as God Himself by the grace of God. The whole circumstance of His becoming in Jesus Christ appears a mystery. By his own rational capacities, man stands dumb-founded before this reality. Yet Barth does not want simply to write-off this entity as unintelligible and therefore as unreal. It is real and it is intelligible. Jesus Christ becomes these things on the initiative of God. Here is where man can begin to apprehend the truth of what had previously seemed incomprehensible.² Man comes to know Him through the invitation of God. The ratio of this object of faith is available for human cognition, but the availability is always determined by God. Why is this? Barth contends that this one particular and real event in the historical world received its definition, determination, and actualization from divine prerogatives -- conceptus de Spiritu sancto. It stands as an absolutely new and unique beginning completely dependent upon God. God acts in order to deliver something that man's creatureliness has lost -- a capacity for the divine. Through His work in the person of Jesus Christ, man again may

1. T.F. Torrance, Space, Time, and Incarnation, p. 52ff.

2. R/T, p. 141.

participate in dialogue with God. His work is a preparation of man for divine contact and interaction. Thus Jesus Christ in the uniqueness of His person is seen to fulfil "more than" an ancillary role in the self-revelation of God. His importance looms overwhelming if one considers that to know Him is to know God.

By way of an aside, one can begin to see a few parallel developments here between Barth and SK. If one considers that for SK history is marked exclusively as the realm of becoming and change and that because of this fact Reason is unable of itself to come to grips with the paradox of faith; something a bit similar is seen in Barth. He too seems to assume implicitly the coming-into-existence-kind-of-change which SK so vividly portrayed. History is not a static realm of necessary truths and logical connections. Rather one has to do with flux and change and becoming. But what is one to do in the face of the Christian claim that the divine is in time? SK maintains the rationality of the Paradox even though it appears incommensurable with the integrity of knowledge gleaned by Reason. He upholds the integrity of faith's object as well. Barth, for his part, pursues a similar course. Jesus Christ comes to the judgment seat of Reason as something incomprehensible, indeed as paradoxical. However, Barth opts to maintain the intelligible integrity of the faith and its object. Certainly one has to deal with what seems unintelligible and paradoxical. However, God provides the basis and the ground for any and all rationality that man requires in order to come to an understanding. There is rationality and intelligibility to

be had in faith. And what appears to be unreal and impossible to the perview of Reason is nonetheless more real and more true because God Himself sanctions the authenticity of this event which occurs in space and time.

But to return, Barth maintains that the conceptus de Spiritu sancto provides the ground and the content of this mystery of revelation. One discovers that this has a positive quality which impresses the presence of God upon man. This capacity for the divine rightfully belongs to the very nature of creatureliness. The full dimensions of this ground and content of revelation blossom as one inquires more deeply into the person of Christ. In meeting Him, man perceives his existence as an open entity which stands in direct relationship to God in Jesus Christ. "With Christ: never at all apart from Him, never at all independent of Him, never at all in and for itself. Man never exists in himself."¹ A new dimension of reality opens which has heretofore remained closed by disobedience -- lack of capacity for the divine. Man apprehends that his existence as a man is not simply a closed reality actualizing itself along a horizontal plane. In encounter with Christ, a new level of existence becomes manifest to the creature. "Man exists in Jesus Christ and in Him alone; and he also finds God in Jesus Christ and in Him alone."² Man can no longer be viewed as the independent bearer of his own existence. Rather, he is seen in intimate relationship with Jesus Christ. The horizontal

1. IIIi, p. 149.

2. IIIi, p. 149.

dimension of existence is penetrated and transcended by a vertical element which in and of itself grasps the existence of man where he is. In this person, man comes before the knowability of God on his side.¹ "He is God who is man. This is Jesus Christ. In Him we do not stand outside but inside; we participate....In Him the fact that God is knowable is true not only for God Himself,...but for man, for us."² The new vertical dimension to creaturely existence is seen to possess content and form. The vertical does not approach as a vague and meaningless openness or feeling. Man stands in the presence of God Himself as he encounters the person of Christ. He reveals Himself as the vertical element which renders God knowable on this side of creation. It is a revelation which requires a change in focus, a shift in attention. To recall a point, it is possible to expand an apparent point of similarity between Kierkegaard and Barth. For SK, the Absolute Paradox confronts man in its total unlikeness. Man with his Reason can only view the Paradox as something absurd and incomprehensible. Nonetheless, the Paradox persists in its claim to be decisive for every moment. Its decisiveness depends upon God, the Eternal, in time. The Reason cannot explain this actuality within the realm of possibility. Yet the Paradox persists and demands its recognition. In confrontation with this paradoxical incommensurability, the Reason can only yield, for the Paradox must bestow its content and give itself to the understanding. On

1. IIi, p. 150.

2. IIi, p. 151.

its own, the Reason cannot cope with the reality of God's presence in a particular man. In His absolute freedom, God has become a man in time. But because God is so essentially unlike man, He remains the Absolute Paradox for man's rational capabilities. In faith and in passionate commitment, man can come to appreciate the Paradox even though he cannot explain it. In the passion of faith, man attains new insights and vistas into the dimension of existence. For Barth, something similar appears to be happening. As the self-revelation of God, Jesus Christ in His historic, biblical person confronts man in His unlikeness to him. On his own, man cannot comprehend His person. Nonetheless, His reality continues to confront man and to challenge his self-contained position. In Jesus Christ, God reveals His presence in space and time. Man cannot explain this actuality, but he can come to an understanding of Him within the context of faith given the "biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic presupposition". In His otherness, God becomes historic while remaining God. In faith occasioned by God's free grace, man can freely come to a faithful understanding of God and himself. In faith, a re-organization of life-perspective and -attitude takes place. For Barth as for SK, Jesus Christ is the truth of God. As a result, man finds himself confronted by the truth. "What happens in the truth, what is indeed the truth, is what happens before God, by God, in our place. And it has happened before God, by God, in our place that our enmity against His grace has been expiated and abandoned."¹ The content of the person of Christ becomes

1. IIIi, p. 152.

yet clearer. The truth happens by God and before God in our place. This happening expresses God's act on man's behalf. Jesus Christ as the happening of truth relieves man of his enmity, his disobedience, before Him. He accomplishes that act of expiation on man's behalf before God by an act of God. Jesus Christ fulfils what man cannot do. He performs an act of expiation which produces a capacity in humanitas for God.¹ By means of this labouring, man no longer remains outside of the eternal, but now he stands inside of Him. It becomes apparent that God is not against but for man.² In essence, God decides to be for man. However, this "God for us" does not remain a distant fact that is unrelated to human existence. Man has a share in the work and accomplishment of Jesus Christ. In Him, he participates in the inside of God -- in His grace. "Thus everything that is to be said about our participation in the person and work of Jesus Christ...can properly consist in this: It lies in the nature of what happens there in God, in eternal continuation of the reconciliation and revelation accomplished in time, that in full reality it happens here also to and in us...."³ The work and person of Jesus Christ do not become a quiet remnant of past history that contains no relevance for the present. The vertical dimension determining, penetrating, and transcending the reality of His existence will not permit then and there to remain then and there. God acts in such a

1. Ili, p. 153; E/KB., pp. 126-9; Ili, p. 156.

2. Ili, p. 157.

3. Ili, p. 157.

manner as to allow for the possibility of human cognition.¹ And this act possesses the potential of becoming here and now of full contemporaneousness. In this way, God's there and then becomes real here and now, because God so wills. What becomes present and pertinent is the reconciliation and revelation effected in the work and person of Jesus Christ. Man can thus share in what happened in truth once and for all. But this participation and sharing brings man's thought back to the realization that his existence is not self-sufficient. Man does not stand upon himself.² He can no longer stand outside of God, for he has now received the means of coming inside into the graciousness of God. As another aside and in terms of Lessing's problem, the reality of truth itself

1. See D.M. Baillie, God Was In Christ, p. 34f. It is interesting to note Baillie's reaction to Barth's early writings on Christology. He apparently feels hostile to Barth's suggestion that the historical Jesus per se demonstrates no revelation of God. Baillie points out that Barth restricts revelation to "the miracles, the Resurrection, and the forty days." This restriction seems to reveal Barth's scepticism about the historical. It should be noted that Barth's position on the historical Jesus seems to be intent on preserving the uniqueness of Christ without destroying the objective reality. Barth appears to maintain that the historical Jesus is a bifurcation of His historic-suprahistoric reality. To divide His person is to compromise and consequently to miss His reality. Further, Barth does not limit the revelatory activity of Christ to the elements Baillie mentions. Revelation commences with the miracle of the Incarnation and ends with the mystery of the resurrection/ascension. In the total complex of His activity, the distinctiveness and uniqueness of Christ remains beyond the explanation of the Reason.

2. Ili, p. 159.

has been transformed from the immanent to the transcendent. God is the Author of Truth. As He acts to reveal Himself in Jesus Christ, He imparts His truth in His being and act. Thus in the being and activity of Christ there does not exist any gap between static and becoming truths, since God's very nature reveals itself to be action and event. The immanent remains immanent and the transcendent remains transcendent; however the two dimensions of reality converge in the person of Christ who brings man to God and God to man. This person participates both in the becoming of history and in the event-character of God's very nature. In this way the static and necessary notions of eternal truths dissipate before the activity of God Himself.

Barth has examined this world-historical reality as the Word become flesh. To do this he has pursued the formula natus ex virgine and conceptus de Spiritu sancto. Again Jesus Christ has been reviewed as the vertical dimension of man's existence while participating fully in the horizontal plane. In this He has been perceived to be standing inside the reality of God opening and readying man for mutual participation in this inside. But now Karl Barth reviews Jesus Christ from yet another perspective. One now begins to see another reflection of the telos involved in the work and being of this person. Something was done to man:

and the meaning for him of the divine word of atonement and therefore of the grace of God, is that as God condescends and humbles Himself to man and becomes man, man himself is exalted,...being placed at His side, not in identity, but in true fellowship with Him, and becoming a new man in this exaltation and fellowship.¹

1. IVii, p. 6.

Another characterization opens up. In Jesus Christ one still has to do with the activity of God. This involves Him condescending to be a man within the context of history. In this condescension, God effects the exaltation of humanitas, not by making him God, but by encountering him in true fellowship. The result of this action is the creation of a new man standing inside divine fellowship. God accomplishes this result in Jesus Christ not simply as a man, but as the man, true man.¹ What He is as vere homo cannot be exhausted by His likeness to man in general. The distinctiveness of this true man resides in His determination by God.² Because He shares in man's humanitas, God does not leave this unaffected. Rather, man's existence and essence, human kind and nature, are exalted.³ Exaltation "means the history of the placing of the humanity common to Him and us on a higher level, on which it becomes and is completely unlike ours even in its complete likeness...."⁴ Jesus Christ stands among men in likeness and unlikeness to them. One is here dealing with an unlikeness that exhibits a qualitative difference. Humanitas is set into motion; man experiences a movement from below to above.⁵ However, this motion always refers to the exaltation of this true man -- of Jesus Christ.⁶ Man in general does not receive improvement or change.⁷ Exaltation

1. IVii, p. 27.

2. E/KB, pp. 142-4.

3. IVii, p. 28.

4. IVii, p. 28.

5. IVii, p. 29.

6. IVii, p. 29.

7. IVii, p. 28.

of humanitas occurs in this one true man.¹ The entrance of His person into the world-historical situation is a unique phenomenon. His life initiates an entirely new sequence which remains dependent upon God.² What transpires involves the true God becoming true man not because of any necessity impinging on Him, but rather because of His good-pleasure.³ The act of incarnation must not be seen as having no relation or relevance for man, however. God's becoming flesh "signifies the promise of the basic alteration and determination of what we all are as men."⁴ The divine in-breaking into the space and time sphere of creatureliness signals the new, unique, the divine in history. Man does not find himself alone. God confronts him and encounters him in the event of Jesus Christ.⁵

The human speaking and acting and suffering and triumphing of this one man directly concerns us all, and as His history is our history of salvation which changes the whole human situation, just because God Himself is its human subject in His Son, just because God Himself came into this world in His Son, and as one of us "a guest this world of ours He trod." 6

The incarnation as history reveals another history which has relevance for all men. The history of Jesus Christ in His speaking, acting, suffering, triumphing, fulfils the history of man's salvation.⁷ This man in His person effects a change in the whole human situation and He succeeds in this because He is God Himself as a man among men.⁸ He is the

1. IVii, p. 176.

2. IVii, p. 37.

3. IVii, p. 41; IViii, p. 227.

4. IVii, p. 49.

5. E/KB, p. 145.

6. IVii, p. 51.

7. IViii, p. 216; IVi, pp. 197-200.

8. IViii, pp. 183-191.

Subject of man's salvation history.¹ As such, Jesus Christ remains the author of salvation, the initiator of man's dialogue with God, the guarantor of human capacity for the divine.² Salvation stands or falls with this person.³ It is His history which accomplishes the dialogue between the finite and the infinite.⁴ The divine and human essences assure the vertical and horizontal realities of this event.⁵ It is a history open outward to man and upward to God. Within the reality of Jesus Christ one has to do with the humanity of God in all of its real-ness and truth.⁶ God does not change or alter humanitas in His downward movement in becoming a man. He determines human essence by divine essence.⁷ But man in general has a part in this work of God. He is not excluded from participation. Man comes to know the history of salvation as he recognizes the particularity of Christ.⁸ His history is salvation history. Participation occurs as one recognizes and acknowledges Him as the One He is. "To recognize Him is to see and know Him...as the One who He, Jesus of Nazareth, really is. It is not a matter of interpreting an appearance but Himself, His existence, beside which He has no other....It is a matter of interpreting Him

1. IVii, p. 60.

2. IVii, pp. 65-6; IViii, p. 215.

3. IViii, p. 212.

4. IVii, p. 69.

5. IVii, p. 71.

6. IVii, p. 72; N/H, pp. 158-9.

7. IVii, pp. 60-1, 84, 87, 88.

8. IVii, p. 89.

as the One He is."¹ To interpret, know, see, and recognize Jesus of Nazareth as the One He is directs attention to His humanity.² One is not dealing with an appearance fabrication, or imagination, but with a real man -- Jesus of Nazareth.³ There is no other "beside" or "behind" to this man.⁴ As one inquires after Him, the discovery of His existence leads to the recognition of His truth. This truth, based on the good-pleasure of divine grace, displays the determination of divine essence upon human essence and the actualizing of obedience in the humanity of Christ.⁵ Humanitas receives its truth in the measure of obedience manifested. This is not a random obedience but a participation in the inside of God. Obedience expresses true human freedom for God who is for man.⁶ This is the creaturely quality which was lost but has now been restored by the exaltation of humanitas in Christ.⁷ As such, man now exists in self-contradiction and ignorance.⁸ Jesus Christ demonstrates who and what man is to be.⁹ Therefore Jesus Christ brings man the truth and the genuineness about himself. "Our life is hidden -- not yet revealed -- with Him."¹⁰ He is the basis upon

1. IVii, p. 91.

2. IViii, p. 214.

3. IViii, p. 195.

4. D/M, p. 191; R/T, pp. 44-5.

5. IVii, p. 92.

6. IVii, p. 93.

7. IVi, p. 89.

8. IViii, p. 197.

9. IVii, p. 93.

10. IVii, p. 103.

which human life must be established.¹ There can be no sharing in this obedience and no knowing of God which attempts to side-step His humanity.² The humanity reveals itself solely in the person of Jesus Christ.³ Here is where one must look. It is not a static point nor an eternal idea.⁴ There remains nothing static about Him.⁵ The phenomenology of this divine event is a history, happening within the historical sphere.⁶ And moreover, even though God Himself has acted in a definite time once and for all, Jesus Christ lives today here and now as He did there and then.⁷ The existential dimension of participation in faith which Bultmann and Tillich emphasize also has a place in Barth. Man's present moment is qualified and determined by the supra-temporality of God. But Barth views this supra-temporality in real and present terms through God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ. God's saving act contains this forward reference which allows it the freedom to become contemporaneous.⁸ But it becomes this only when God so wills. "He, then, is the law controlling what we think and say."⁹ God limits and controls man's apprehension of the truth.¹⁰ The being and act of God in Jesus Christ forms the ground of cognition about

1. IVii, p. 117.

2. IVii, p. 101.

3. IVii, p. 105.

4. IViii, p. 216.

5. IVii, p. 106.

6. IVii, p. 106; IVi, p. 128.

7. IVii, p. 107; IViii, p. 223f.

8. IViii, p. 182.

9. IVii, p. 108.

10. IVii, p. 122.

Him.¹ The act of knowledge depends solely upon divine initiative presented in the act of self-revelation.² Because Jesus Christ is event, man's knowledge must likewise be event.³ The static truth of this One dissipates as man confronts the dynamic reality which is not controlled by human abilities and powers. The mystery of revelation demands dynamic participation which can only be given by God. The truth and the cognition of the history of Jesus Christ and of the history of man's salvation remain concealed within the dynamic reality of God.⁴ It is His to give and to control.⁵

The elusiveness and the dynamism inherent in this history of Christ is pointedly demonstrated in the mystery of the resurrection. This event portrays the meaning and the significance of this man.⁶ "The resurrection and ascension of Jesus Christ are the event of His self-declaration."⁷ This self-revelation brings from concealment the "who" of this person. It possesses the power to communicate and to proclaim itself.⁸ The resurrection forms an integral component of the Christ-event.⁹ On the basis of it, Jesus Christ then and there becomes here and now.

The eternal action of Jesus Christ grounded in His resurrection is itself the true and direct bridge from once to always, from Himself in His time to

1. IVii, pp. 122-3; IViii, pp. 267-8.

2. IVii, p. 123; IViii, p. 219.

3. IVii, p. 124.

4. IVii, pp. 125-130.

5. IViii, p. 231.

6. IVii, p. 132.

7. IVii, p. 133.

8. IVii, p. 134.

9. IVii, p. 134.

us in our time. Because as crucified and dead He is risen and lives, the fact of His death on the cross can never be past, it can never cease to be His action, the decision which God makes hic et nunc....¹

Again in speaking of the resurrection one does not come up against a past fact which is simply past. The death and resurrection of this man remains part and parcel of a past time that meets man as a completed event. But even so, this event transcends the limits of this past time and penetrates into present realities.² The resurrection bridges the historical distance from once to always. This bridging effect reveals the full-ness and comprehensiveness of the work and being of Jesus Christ. The resurrection forms the turning point in the mystery of revelation. The Easter-story marks the before and after of this revelation.³ A distinction arises at this point: "...the step from the relative concealment of the being of Jesus Christ to its absolute manifestation: the historicity...in which His being is revealed before no less than after, but after differently than before."⁴ The Easter-narrative relates the degree of concealment contained in the before and after of the resurrection. One has to do with the same Jesus Christ. He forms the point of continuity between these two points. The distinction which arises and which places central importance on this event is the absolute quality of revelation that is made apparent. The resurrection signals the completion, fulfilment, and fruition of the work of this person and

1. IVi, p. 315.

2. H/B, pp. 120-1.

3. IVii, p. 139.

4. IVii, p. 140.

therefore of His revelation.¹ As such this event is once and for all and all-sufficient as a basis for knowledge.² The veracity of this event as a basis for cognition remains inherently interrelated to the being and activity of Jesus Christ.³ A clearer perspective may possibly be achieved if one again considers the position of Kähler. The historic, biblical Christ provides the root fact for faith. The biblical narrative presents the recollection/confession complex which testifies to the reality of one who stands beyond the grasp of factuality. The crucifixion/resurrection event signifies the two-fold work of Christ. But the suprahistoric dimension of His reality eludes historical research. Pre-supposing the recollection/confession complex, Kähler perceived revelation and salvation. In a similar fashion, Barth portrays the person of Jesus Christ. The crucifixion and resurrection events mark the culmination of revelation and salvation. Nonetheless, the uniqueness and unlikeness of Christ elusively denies man access to an explanation of His person. The suprahistoric dimension must be contended with, for it is the work of God which preserves and initiates His life-giving and life-determining self-disclosure in Jesus Christ. Consequently, an explanation by the Reason of His revelation is not possible even though it can be understood in the context of faith.

1. IVii, pp. 140-1.

2. IVii, p. 142.

3. IVii, p. 142.

Here one is dealing with an event that transpires within the world of space and time.¹ As such it is a concrete and real event imbedded within the fibre of history. But its history does not involve it as a public event.² However, this in no way detracts from its realness. Again, the resurrection points up the quality of self-manifestation which (a) relies completely on the initiative of God and (b) declares the risen Christ to be in essential continuity with the pre-Easter person.³ Therefore, the resurrection maintains itself as an event of revelation, because it is intrinsically interconnected with the reality of Jesus Christ who is Himself an event of revelation.⁴ Like Jesus Christ, the resurrection possesses the quality of incomprehensibility simply because it is inherently and innately a part of His own incomprehensibility.⁵ But even so, the paradoxical strangeness and uniqueness of this event must be comprehended. "By its sacred incomprehensibility we mean its necessary and essential distinctive newness and difference and strangeness as the event of revelation of the hidden presence and action

1. IVii, p. 143.

2. IVii, p. 143; W/G, p. 90. The "non-historical" dimension of the resurrection becomes clearer in the discussion of "saga" and its relation to the "non-historical" historical level of reality. The non-public is seen in relation to the vertical in-breaking of God.

3. IVii, p. 144.

4. IVii, p. 146.

5. IVii, p. 146.

of God in the flesh...."¹ There can be no parallels or analogies by which to capture the rationality of this event.² Rather the apprehension of the resurrection depends upon the self-declaration and self-impartation of God Himself. It possesses a miraculous character which defies naked human comprehension. Its newness, strangeness, and difference demands that Christ kindles the recognition and acknowledgement required on the part of man.³ Jesus Christ is and remains the personal inroad into the human apprehension of the mystery of revelation.⁴ It is not possible to get "behind" this reality and the mystery by some sifting through historical knowledge and recollection. Man is confronted with the documents of faith which testify to the reality of Christ. Historical knowledge cannot legitimately dissect these documents and thus capture the truth of their statements.

It must be a consideration of what the texts say (and do not say) in their attestation of this event, without measuring them by an imported picture of the world and history, without reading them through these alien spectacles, without prejudice as to what is possible or impossible, good or less good, without prescribing what they have to say and what they cannot say, without imposing questions which they themselves do not ask, but entering into their own questions and remaining open to their own replies which, if our thinking is to be genuinely "historical", must have precedence over our own attitude (which we naturally reserve). 5

The texts must be allowed to witness and to testify to their ontological reference point.⁶ The texts of faith attest to

1. IVii, p. 146.

2. IVii, p. 147.

3. IVii, p. 148.

4. IVii, p. 149.

5. IVii, p. 150.

6. J.A. Wharton, "Karl Barth as Exegete and His Influence on Biblical Interpretation", Union Seminary Theological Review; Vol. 28, No. 1, 1972, pp. 6-9.

the mystery of revelation in Jesus Christ. But this attestation can only be distorted and retranslated when one enters into dialogue with them on the basis of pre-conceived notions and "pre-understandings". The texts must be allowed the freedom to reply to the questions which they themselves seek to ask and to answer.¹ The inquirer must himself remain open if his thinking is to be genuinely "historical". His "pre-understandings" must be held in abeyance in confrontation with what purports to be the truth of God. If man refuses to encounter the truth of faith on these terms, then of necessity his quest after historical knowledge can only lead away from the truth and from the knowledge of this event.² Even though Jesus Christ and His resurrection receive testimony in the documents of the faith, this does not permit man to handle and to control the truth within these records. The truth is never dependent upon the documents in and of themselves. Like Jesus Christ and His resurrection, they are historical realities contained within space and time. Nonetheless their truth-character is self-transcending in that they rely upon the self-giving of God Himself who is the object of knowledge. The newness and difference of the divine presence among men places Him inside and beyond the capabilities of man's ability to learn and to know. And what is more, it is man himself in his plight and disobedience who has lost his power and possibility for God.³ Knowledge and truth there-

1. W/G, "The Strange New World in the Bible".

2. IVii, p. 150.

3. N/H, p. 161f.

fore rest solely upon the good-pleasure of His self-revelation. In contrast, it could be said that Bultmann and Tillich both appear to establish the possibility for God on man's faith in Him. By existential participation in the belief of the Church, man may live as if God is real and active in his life. Through faith, the believer embraces the meaning and significance of God for his life. Pregnant with possibilities, the present moment confronts man and demands decision from him. Bultmann and Tillich both strongly suggest that through the power of faith, man can find life in death and he can move toward goodness while surrounded by the demonic.

But there is yet another angle from which one may approach the reality of revelation inherent in the resurrection. Barth tackles this perspective from the problem of historical distance -- how can the past become present?¹ The implications of this problem lead into a consideration of relevance, recognition, and recollection. In a sense, the epistemological presuppositions display another dimension of reality as one takes a second look. This is what Barth does. However, he does appear to stumble or to hesitate in reformulating his answer to the problem of relevance. Barth simply again maintains: "The only answer which it seems we can give is the profoundly ambiguous and unsettling one that it [the resurrection] can do so only as we accept it from others, from the tradition of the Church and ultimately from the biblical witness...."² Indeed Barth is correct to label his

1. IVi, p. 287.

2. IVi, p. 287.

answer to the question as "profoundly ambiguous and unsettling." For he goes on to affirm that today it is necessary to turn to the testimony of others, to ecclesiastical tradition, and finally to the word of scripture. Acceptance of the truth of these attestations and testimonies establish the foundation upon which "'Jesus Christ for us' is valid today." This alone must be the port of entry into any discussion of relevance which takes seriously both the fact of historical distance and the fact of Jesus Christ. With this said, Barth again maintains the concrete reality of the resurrection. It is an event in space and time. Therefore, a connection can be established between the past and the present.¹ And this connection must be in the form of recollection where historical, mediate knowledge and indirect report, tradition, and proclamation form the second-hand basis for knowing.² Indeed, this may seem distressing, but yet Barth maintains that one cannot simply halt here in a vacuum of uncertainty.³ The problem of historical distance must not provide an insurmountable obstacle for coming to grips with what has certainly taken place. The ghost of Lessing's chasm ought not to dissuade man from the pursuit of this event.⁴ To hesitate indefinitely before the problem of historical distance would be to avoid entirely the reality of the divine relation.⁵ The problem is indeed a genuine one

1. IVi, p. 288.

2. IVi, p. 288.

3. IVi, p. 288.

4. IVi, pp. 287, 290.

5. IVi, p. 291.

and ought to be considered, but it is not overwhelming. In other words, this problem does not have the last word. Barth discerns that more appears to be involved in man's hesitation than Lessing's "ugly, broad ditch".

We need the consciousness of historical distance, the neutralizing historical consideration, the remembrance of the 1900 years, the thought of the message and tradition and proclamation of others which binds but also separates the there and here, the question of authenticity and credibility, the feeling of the uncertainty of the mediation, the unsettlement which it involves for us, we need all this because it seems to create a delay. 1

The consciousness of historical distance demonstrates a need on the part of man. All this talk about 1900 years ago, the question of credibility and authenticity, the excuse of uncertainty regarding transmission, all this creates a neutralizing effect which does no more than delay serious consideration of a historical reality. Barth would seem to be proposing a psychological diversion pretending to ontological status created by man to divert his attention in another direction. The problem of historical distance seems to be an escape mechanism to channel man's creative abilities in a direction away from the truth. It is as if Lessing's "ditch" acts as a displacement exercise. This seems to be something of the intent on Barth's part.

The genuineness of Lessing's question cannot be disputed in that it springs from a very genuine need: the need to hide ourselves...from Jesus Christ as He makes Himself present and mediates Himself to us;... the need to safeguard ourselves as far as this movement of flight allows against the directness in which He does in fact confront us.... 2

1. IVi, p. 292.

2. IVi, p. 292.

The delaying tactics involved with Lessing's question are truly real and genuine. Barth does not deny this. Man's need engages him in an almost subconscious flight and withdrawal from the direct immediateness and spontaneity of the reality of Christ. Human reaction to this directness involves a genuine drawing back which seeks to avoid dealing with the immediate reality. A similar flight occurs as man steadies himself along the path of natural theology.¹ Here man is seen to engage in a domestication of the Gospel which re-moulds it into the image of man's knowledge about himself. The similarity involved here is the escape, withdrawal, and flight from Jesus Christ who gives Himself immediately and directly. This, however, does not impugn the genuineness of man's withdrawal; it nonetheless demonstrates it to be unnecessary.² In each instance, Barth comes back to the immediateness of the perception which makes counter-arguments against these positions unnecessary as well.³ The real solution to the problem of historical distance has been resolved in the resurrection itself.⁴ In His dying and rising

1. IIi, p. 163f; IIIi, pp. 134-9.

2. IIi, p. 172; IVi, p. 293.

3. IIi, p. 171; IVi, p. 293.

4. IVi, pp. 293, 351f; compare G. O'Collins, "Karl Barth on Christ's Resurrection", Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 26, No. 1, 1973, pp. 85-98.

Fr. O'Collins questions the heavy Barthian emphasis upon the objective appearance of the risen Christ (pp. 90-2). Indeed, he thinks that such an approach can be fatal if it relies too heavily on objective data (92). However, it would seem important at this point, by way of clarification, to make two points. (1) Barth asserts that man can only come to know what he can experience as a world-historical phenomenon. The risen Christ is a knowable reality as a continuation of God's revelation in the Incarnation. On Barth's epistemology, the risen Christ cannot be simply an inner experience or a spiritual appearance. To be known,
(Contd.)

again, man then and now has died and has been risen with Him.¹ The old man of flight and withdrawal has received his final notice.² In the death of Christ, man also finds his end and his judgment for this flight from God.³ But beyond this judgment, there lies the positive aspect which controls and determines the judgment and death preceding resurrection.⁴ The "beyond" in question, the positive aspect inherent in the death of Christ, manifests itself in the event of resurrection.⁵ As such it is a (a) new act of God, (b) confirming the event of His death, (c) altering man's situation, (d) happening to the same Jesus Christ, and (e) occurring once and for all. Just as God created a new sequence within the world through the event of the incarnation, (a) He is also responsible for the act of the

Contd.) He must be objective and real. And (2) for Barth to fail to acknowledge the objective reality of the risen Christ would possibly have placed something of a limitation upon the actuality of God's historical self-revelation. In addition, to know the risen Christ in anything but an objective manner would require the positing of another epistemological system. Even in speaking of the creation, Barth maintains the continuity of God's self-revelation in its historicity in order to make it an object for man's cognition. Therefore in dealing with the resurrection Barth also deals with the objectiveness of the risen Christ.

1. IVi, p. 295; IVi, p. 351f.
2. IVi, p. 294.
3. IVi, p. 296.
4. IVi, p. 297.
5. IVi, pp. 297-99.

resurrection.¹ The uniqueness and newness of this occurrence places it beyond human possibility and effort. Again, (b) the resurrection follows in sequence upon the death of Jesus Christ. He was dead and buried and then He was resurrected.² In this way, there is no disruption of the temporal order of events which receive their conditioning by the space and time continuum. Jesus Christ, even in the event of revelation, confines Himself to the limits of this reality. More importantly (c) the resurrection points to an alteration of man's very existence.³ As an alteration based on the experiences of this man, it also is relevant now.⁴ Christians attest to this fact as they recognize and acknowledge Christ as alive.⁵ Nonetheless, the Christian lives in expectation and anticipation in his act of recognition. The alteration effected by Him is "not yet".⁶ Man lives between the times of the resurrection and the ascension and His coming again.⁷ Faith in Him moves one into an eschatological position where one anticipates the future of the final and definitive and proper manifestation of the prophetic alteration effected by Him.⁸ Something new, unique, and different approaches and encounters man from outside of

1. IVi, p. 300.

2. IVi, p. 305.

3. IVi, pp. 310, 316.

4. IVi, pp. 313-5; IViii, pp. 239-251.

5. IVi, p. 317.

6. IVi, pp. 319-323.

7. IVi, pp. 324, 327; IViii, p. 262.

8. IVi, pp. 327-329.

himself and in this exchange man receives and participates in history.¹ This something from outside begins in the incarnation and proleptically manifests itself in the resurrection -- one is confronted with God among men.² This demonstrates (d) the resurrection to be an experience in space and time.³ Though it is unique and of a different historical sense, it is nonetheless an event which can be known.⁴ And finally (e) the death and resurrection of Christ are once and for all because of their temporal and historical character.⁵ But the purpose of this event is to give man time to stand before God and to hear His positive Word.⁶ The death and resurrection mark the end and the beginning of man in relation to God.⁷ Bultmann is not prepared to follow Barth in his bold declarations regarding the resurrection. Instead, he accentuates the meaning and significance of the event for the believer. The resurrection marks the beginning point of the Easter faith when the disciples came to realize the existential implications of Christ's message. Bultmann's lack of concern for the supra-temporality of God appears to shift his point of concern toward man and the relevance of faith's message for him.

From these perspectives, the person of Jesus Christ has been presented not in His totality and fullness and complete

1. R/T, pp. 9-12.

2. IIIii, pp. 623-625.

3. IVi, p. 333.

4. IVi, pp. 335-7.

5. IVi, p. 343f.

6. IVi, p. 353; compare IVi, p. 253.

7. IIIii, pp. 637-8; IVi, p. 355f; and see W/G, "Biblical Questions, Insights, and Vistas".

clarity, but in approximation and anticipation which is always in need of constant correction. However, several things appear to be justified to say about this person on the basis of Barth's exposition and faithful search for understanding. One here has to do with an historical phenomenon in the particularity of the person of Jesus of Nazareth. He is a man among men. But there is something unique, new, and strange about this man. His humanitas stands completely determined, penetrated, and transcended by the reality of God. While humanitas exhibits His essence, God determines His existence. His human life and being receive exaltation by the activity of God. Barth confirms that here one meets true man and true God. A vertical and horizontal interrelationship displays itself. God and man communicate in this one person. As such, the incommensurable and paradoxical mystery of revelation marked off between the times of incarnation and ascension dwells among men. In this way Jesus Christ comes to His creation and imparts Himself. But He always does this within the limits and with respect for the structures of space and time. Jesus Christ does not disrupt history. On the contrary, He fulfils and accomplishes, now proleptically and later absolutely, these limits and structures of history. The first sign of this action becomes apparent in the self-declaration of the resurrection. Here God acts and reveals. Barth sees this action and revelation as the working out of the divine plan of reconciliation, atonement, and salvation which makes man ready for God by giving him a capacity and power for the divine.¹ This is done where man

1. O'Collins, "Karl Barth on Christs Resurrection," Scot. J. Theo. Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 94-8, 1973.

lives and as he lives in the person of Christ. He is not an abstraction, an appearance, or an eternal idea; He is a flesh and blood man.¹ This is important for Barth, since man can only know what occurs as a part of his experience within the world. But even though He appears as a world-historical phenomenon, the truth, cognition, and apprehension of His person always relies upon the good-pleasure of God. Jesus Christ can be viewed simply as Jesus of Nazareth in His horizontal dimension without reference to His vertical determination. But this is to miss entirely His reality and truth. Jesus Christ is the being and activity of God among men. The absolute uniqueness and newness of this reality does not correspond to anything past or present within the structures of human existence. At this point, Barth's thought describes a correspondence theory of knowledge which relies upon "analogies", "similarities", and "correspondences" between objects of cognition and the process of thought which grasps the relationship involved and all of this in order to explain the act of coming to knowledge. On this basis he can assert that Jesus Christ as the One He is in Himself cannot be known by man. This would be a consequence of the infinite qualitative difference between human and divine.² There can be no knowledge or cognition where there exists no similarity or analogy. What Barth appears to be saying is that man has no inherent or innate relationship with God on which he can

1. O'Collins, pp. 87-91.

2. R/T, p. 10; IIIi, p. 189f; H/G, p. 52.

establish his own knowledge and cognition of this object.¹
 But a correspondence and a relationship does indeed occur when and where God gives Himself to be known. He is the master of all rationality and truth because He is the Author of Truth. Therefore man's claim to stand before an insurmountable gap where accidental truths of history can never possibly establish the truths of faith falls before Barth's

1. The question of analogy is important in the theology of Barth when one considers the vast amount of epistemology contained within the structure of his thought. It is on the basis of this ability to know that Barth is able to speak meaningfully about the historical reality of God's revelation then and there becoming present here and now. Since this "unprecedented event" possesses no analogy within our own structures of knowing, the power to come to know must be given to man. Barth has a discussion on the use of analogy in III, pp. 224-243. In the context of this paper, analogy is seen to be a dynamic relationship inaugurated by God. The possibility for coming to know rests on His side when He allows for man's thought to have a correspondence with His truth. At this point, the position of Jung Young Lee's article, "Karl Barth's use of analogy in His Church Dogmatics," (Scot. J. Theo. Vol. 22, pp. 129-151) has been seen as guiding the inquiry in this paper.

By way of amplification of the discussion on the topic, the following readings are listed:

- 1) John McIntyre. "Analogy," Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 12, pp. 1-20.
- 2) T.F. Torrance. "Karl Barth," Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 22, pp. 2-3.
- 3) J.G. Gibbs. "A Secondary Point of Reference in Barth's Anthropology," Scot. J. Theo., Vol. 16, pp. 132-135.
- 4) B.M.G. Reardon. "Reason and Revelation: Is Barth Consistent?", Church Quarterly Review, Vol. 145, pp. 144-155.
- 5) H.G. Wells. "Karl Barth's Doctrine of Analogy," Can. J. Theo., Vol. 15, pp. 203-213.
- 6) Hans. Urs von Balthasar. The Theology of Karl Barth. see section "Analogy in Full Bloom", p. 100ff.
- 7) H. Martin Rumscheidt. Revelation and Theology. sections: "Possibility of Knowledge of God," p. 143f; "How is Man to Speak of the Reality of the Testimony?", p. 149f; and "Dialectical Relation between Revelation and Man's Speech," p. 155f.
- 8) Donald Evans. "Barth on Talk about God," Can. J. Theo., Vol. 16, pp. 175-192.
- 9) G.C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth, pp. 181-195.

epistemology. When dealing with Jesus Christ and thus with God, man experiences the solution to all problems of cognition and understanding because God controls and masters and imparts what man sees and hears and thinks and says about Him. When this happens a genuine and an authentic correspondence, analogy, and similarity arises which remains approximate, determined, penetrated, and transcended by the activity of God. This divine-human relationship must always be initiated by God and must always be correlated because of the very nature of the divine life. Correspondence, analogy, similarity, relationship, must all reflect the dynamism and actualism of God. For this reason also, Jesus Christ does not remain past and old but penetrates and transcends the present and the now. The incarnation marks the beginning of God's act of revelation in Jesus Christ. And the resurrection and ascension mark the historically proleptic conclusion and divine continuation of this mystery of revelation which becomes a once within the limits of space and time but an always within the being and activity of God. Therefore Jesus Christ, as God Himself, possesses the initiative to make the mediate and indirect and second-hand attestations about Him the medium for immediate, direct, and contemporary knowledge. Certainly one deals with witnesses and proclamation, historical distance and credibility of texts, when one takes hold of the Credo of faith. But these "biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic" presuppositions do not contain the truth and reality of this person in themselves. Their truth as a correspondence and as a relationship to His truth are always dependent, controlled, determined, conditioned, and authenticated by Him in His act

of revelation in the testimony of the Holy Spirit.¹ Man recollects the Jesus Christ of then and there in faith's tradition and by God's act man here and now participates in the reality and mystery of His truth and being. The Jesus Christ man comes to know is the same person of the biblical witness and the Church's faith.

What takes place in real Christian knowledge is rather...that the whole man...is grasped by the object which takes and retains the initiative in relation to him....For its theme, basis, and content, is the reconciliation between God and man effected in Jesus Christ and also revealing itself in Jesus Christ. As a human action it takes place in participation in His action. 2

Here is the one and only basis for man's knowledge of God. Jesus Christ is the theme and content of this cognition of the divine activity of reconciliation. By participating in His action, man shares in His act and this becomes contemporaneous with and shared by man. Divine knowledge imparts human correspondence and analogy which lead to this participation in the divine reconciling activity. Here, then, the resurrection bridges the historical gap between once and always by a self-revelation of God's intent and purpose for His creature. But it is an intent and purpose prefigured and expressed in history though not yet absolutely manifested. Consequently, the resurrection points to an eschatological dimension of man's life where he exists between the resurrection and ascension and His coming again.³ In this way,

1. IVii, pp. 125-132; compare Iii, pp. 203-279.

2. IViii, p. 220.

3. D/M, p. 61.

something is seen to lie beyond the event of the resurrection and yet be dependent upon God. The time between the times belongs to man in the presence of the eschatological dimension of existence which points by way of Jesus Christ outwardly and vertically to the presence of God.

D. THE TIME BETWEEN THE TIMES

The concept of history in its true sense...is introduced and achieved when something happens to a being in a certain state, i.e., when something new and other than its own nature befalls it. History... does not occur when the being is involved in changes or different modes of behaviour intrinsic to itself but when something takes place upon and to the being as it is. The history of a being begins, continues and is completed when something other approaches it and determines its being in the nature proper to it, so that it is compelled and enabled to transcend itself in response and in relation to this new factor. The history of a being occurs when it is caught up in this movement, change and relation, when its circular movement is broken from without by a movement towards it and the corresponding movement from it, when it is transcended from without, so that it must and can transcend itself outwards.¹

Barth communicates the person of Christ as always determined by the being and activity of God. He is God Himself within the framework of history performing a once and for all act of self-revelation. As a historical event and reality, He respects the limits of space and time. God's self-impartation respects the sequential nature of creation while always maintaining His being and activity in continuity through time. In this way Jesus Christ does not disrupt time but is Himself a once and for all historical event. Because of His determination by God, He stands in history as

1. IIIii, p. 158; compare Tillich, The Interpretation of History, pp. 203-210.

a new and unique occurrence which has no foundation or necessity in the past. His being and activity are totally and absolutely different. In history God thus creates a new series and sequence of events which confront and encounter man. And because God acts and creates, the situation of Jesus Christ alters man's situation in the world. He offers the possibility of true history. History becomes real and true when something happens which is new and other than himself. It is not the case that man changes inherently within himself by a process or movement of something in him. Man encounters something which transcends the limits and possibilities of his being and existence. Something from outside of man has an effect upon him. A new factor confronts and determines him by compelling and enabling him to transcend himself by responding to this sequence and series of events. As this occurs, man engages in true history which breaks the bounds of circular creaturely movement and permits him to transcend himself in response and in correspondence to this new factor. When man is so determined, his movement and activity relate, respond and correlate to the movement and activity of what comes from the outside. In true history, man becomes enmeshed and enwrapped in the movement of God in Jesus Christ. He is the new factor, the something from outside, who opens man outward to the reality of God. He breaks man's circular creaturely movement and allows him to transcend himself. Here one meets Jesus Christ as the initiator and enabler of true historical existence.¹ Jesus Christ meets

1. IIIii, p. 159f.

man within the framework of space and time as the God become man without ceasing to be God. Indeed He is not an appearance or a symbol. He is rather a real man like all other men yet unlike all other men even in His likeness. This, of course, differs in degree from the interpretation of history presented by Tillich. While the basic contents of the interpretation remain similar between the two men, it is nonetheless apparent that Barth speaks of an objective factor which breaks the circular movement of the creature while Tillich speaks more in terms of a symbolic representation of what the creature "ought" to be as symbolized in the New Being. The basic distinction, then, rests in the implications underlying the two different approaches to reaching an "understanding" of the human situation. For Tillich, it is never the case that the infinite is actualized or materialized within the structures of reality. The creative fallen-ness of man indicates the gap that irrevocably remains between the finite world and infinite meaning. The symbols function in such a way that they "open" new vistas and windows to what transcends but does not literally interact with time and space. The medium of this interaction always remains at the disposal of man's "seeing" the truth intrinsic in the symbol's pointing. However, Barth approaches history with the implication that there is a vertical dimension directly impinging upon creation while maintaining its integrity. This, no doubt, preserves the relativity and contingency of history as well as the reality and objectivity of Jesus Christ. He no longer confronts man as a symbol but as a real man. And by His action a new series of events within the events of

history are made possible. The objectiveness of this person allays all need for referring to symbols and appearances. One now has to deal historically with a person as He is transmitted and made known through the documents of faith. Even so, a coming to knowledge of this man who allows all men to transcend their circular movement remains dependent -- one may say, contingent -- upon the object of cognition. The very nature of what is involved focuses attention from the merely empirical phenomena to something just as immediate but yet inscrutable for the empirical abilities of man. The vertical dimension of reality remains real and active in the human pursuit of knowledge. Here Barth and Tillich agree. However, for Barth it is strictly within the province of the vertical to give itself and thus to grasp man in this process of giving. Indeed, even the framework of history relies upon the creative and determinative powers of the divine. Christ as well as space and time stand in direct and non-empirical relation to God. In Barth's explanation of the event of creation, this vertical dimension receives explanation. In his discussion, Barth displays the cognitive tools available to man for making this realm real and intelligible for human experience and cognition.

Jesus Christ approaches man from within the structures of history. He reveals the reality of God. Barth maintains that God is also responsible for the realm of history by His act of creation.¹ Here God sets the stage for the history of salvation which comes about in the person of Christ. "The

1. IIII, p. 59.

history of salvation is the history, the true history which encloses all other history and to which in some way all other history belongs to the extent that it reflects and illustrates the history of salvation...."¹ This becomes the theme of all history. Salvation in time is the content of creation, and this is what is meant when one discusses history. All history belongs to this act of salvation. God actualizes the possibility of reconciliation as He creates the world and man.² Creation and the history standing upon it are the first works of God.³ Man comes to an appreciation and understanding of this relation as he comes to view himself and his historical being as concrete divine acts.⁴ Faith attests to God's work of creation and Barth, for his part, attempts to explain and to understand what this means in terms of faithful knowledge. The biblical witness to this act is straight-away affirmed as presenting the history of creation.⁵ Barth does not want it to be interpreted as a philosophy of existence which would entail another epistemological approach.⁶ It is seen as an act in continuity with God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ.⁷ Like this action, God works in particular events in a once and for all manner.⁸ By

1. IIIi, p. 60.

2. IIIi, pp. 43-6.

3. IIIi, p. 60.

4. IIIi, p. 61.

5. IIIi, p. 63.

6. IIIi, p. 61f.

7. IIIi, p. 64.

8. IIIi, p. 65.

His action in creation, He fashions a place where man can participate with Him.¹ He creates a place where man can participate in history. God accomplishes this by the historical act of creation which takes place within time.² The temporal element marks off the creaturely qualification of man as distinct from God.³ This element involves a one way sequence of events which characterize both the creature and the act of creation.⁴ Time and creation come into their own simultaneously. The temporal realm becomes the sphere where God is able to communicate His eternity historically.⁵ The time given in this way is always from God and always dependent upon Him.⁶ The fact of man's time rests upon the genuinely prior act of God's creating it.⁷ This temporal element finds itself conditioned, qualified and determined by the reality of Jesus Christ who is.⁸ As this One, He is "now" even as He is "once" and "not yet". In Him, time is constituted in its full contemporaneity.⁹ He sets the norm and the standard for the valuation and meaning of real time.¹⁰ "Really to have time is to be in Him and with Him, in virtue of our participation in His present, on the road from this past into this future."¹¹ God Himself stands as the guarantor

1. IIIi, p. 67.

2. IIIi, p. 67.

3. IIIi, p. 67.

4. IIIi, p. 68.

5. IIIi, p. 69.

6. IIIi, p. 72.

7. IIIi, p. 73.

8. IIIi, p. 74.

9. IIIi, p. 74.

10. IIIi, p. 74.

11. IIIi, p. 74.

of this real time in that He makes time to be fulfilled in this person.¹ Time as a sequence characterizing the existence of the creature does not form an independent series of events distinct from the reality of Jesus Christ. Rather in His act of salvation and reconciliation, He determines and qualifies the meaning of time before time. "It was in correspondence with this real time, and as the necessary and adequate form of this event, that time was originally created."² With this said, Barth begins to bring into full view something of the scope and comprehensiveness of God's act in Jesus Christ. The reality of time and of creation correspond and relate to this divine self-revelation. God's act of reconciliation determines and precedes His act of creation. The temporal and sequential ordering of creation stand in direct immediacy to Him.³ From the person of Christ, one attains a vantage point which unlocks the qualitative significance of all time. Thus to speak of Him requires man to appreciate and to understand the comprehensiveness of faith's object. The similarities with Tillich's existential interpretation of history cannot be overlooked. Barth and Tillich appear to agree that the input of the Christian message into the life of the believer provides the possibility for a teleological perspective upon existence. Tillich suggests that this perspective is keynoted in the symbol of the New Being. As the believer re-affirms and participates within

1. IIIi, p. 75.

2. IIIi, p. 76.

3. IIIi, p. 77.

the uniquely significant decision of the disciples and the faith tradition, he acquires the symbolic handles by which to grasp and to perceive the potentialities and possibilities latent in existence. It would seem to be the case that the believer is given direction and guidance for living. In a sense, the New Being functions as a touchstone by which life's possibilities may be evaluated and judged in terms of meaning and significance. Jesus as the Christ represents the New Being, but it is important to point out that the cohesiveness and legitimacy of this association of Jesus and the Christ appears to be a matter of faithful decision by man. In a word, the recognition depends upon the affirmation and sustained passion of the believer. Indeed, Tillich suggests that there could be a time when "Jesus as the Christ is the centre" comes to an end, and presumably this would involve a break in continuity with the historical tradition surrounding Him.¹ He functions as the beginning, centre and end of the present relation to Him, but this relation is understood in existential and personal terms. Jesus as the Christ is the beginning, centre and end of existential meaning and worth. Barth appears to demonstrate a limited sympathy for this "Christ for us" interpretation. Jesus Christ apparently signifies the vertical interpenetration into man's horizontal continuum of time. Jesus Christ infuses meaning and direction into time by helping man to see and to know his dependence on God. But yet, Barth seems to place the emphasis for this situation upon God's grace rather than upon man's faith. In this way, God's supra-temporality represents more than a concept of

1. Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, "History and the Christ".

eternal meaning and worth. God penetrates and transcends existence with meaning as well as with His personal presence. Consequently, Barth sees God's pre-temporality and post-temporality as limiting points which entail more than the category of meaning. For Barth, God really limits the beginning, centre and end of man's existential and historical becoming.

However, Barth does not limit his exposition to the correspondence of creation to the act of reconciliation. In the same manner used to explicate the historicity of the Christ-event, Barth moves to exposit something of the historical character of creation. He has found the key to this understanding in the person of Christ when he sees Him as qualifying the totality of existence. But creation like the resurrection is not a public event. Nonetheless, Barth is seen to uphold its historical-ness. In order to do this he turns his attention to the vertical dimension of reality. He asserts that creation cannot be interpreted in terms of a purely perceptible and visibly objective event.¹ What is required here is consideration of the "non-historical" level of this event. "For this reason it is a 'non-historical' history, and it can be the subject only of a 'non-historical' history."² This does not make it any more or less real; it simply places creation in a sequence of events which are not immediately perceptible by man but are nonetheless of a similar historical nature. What Barth appears to be maintaining is the equal

1. IIII, p. 78.

2. IIII, p. 78.

status to cognitive reality of this "non-historical" dimension of existence. He points out that, "...this is true of all history to the extent that God's creation continues in it and in all its movements, relationships and forms there is an element in which it is immediate to God and immediately posited by Him."¹ Similar to his discussion on the resurrection and indeed pertaining to it, Barth is insistent to maintain the vertical slant with and in correlation to the horizontal. For God's creation continues in all history and it is therefore in immediate relationship to Him. God's positing of the created realm establishes a relationship between the finite and the infinite.² Barth can confidently confirm, "Not all history is 'historical'."³ There remains this definite and real connection between God and history. And in regards to creation in particular, this allows him to treat this event strictly and solely in its "non-historical" immediacy to God.⁴ Indeed, Barth's continuation of this exposition leads him to conclude that history is really only genuine and true in so far as the "historical" and "non-historical" dimensions accompany each other.⁵ If man continues to deny this latter level he engages in "a highly unreal history...in the poor light of which the historical... can only seem to be an ocean of tedious inconsequence and therefore demonic chaos."⁶ Barth, for one, will not be

1. IIIi, p. 78.

2. IIIi, p. 49.

3. IIIi, p. 80.

4. IIIi, p. 80.

5. IIIi, p. 81.

6. IIIi, p. 81.

driven to this dichotomous approach to reality. The real and the genuine must continue in their relationship to the divine. What appears to be implied from this and above statements is the imposition of purpose and meaning into history by divine interaction. History stands as the arena in which God executes the divine plan of reconciliation. This is the intent and purpose for which it has been made the medium. However, Barth must still provide some cognitive tool for the apprehension of this "non-historical" dimension which remains beyond the grasp of simple "historical" objectivity. The "non-historical" element requires depiction and narrative.¹ To meet this requirement Barth turns to a discussion on saga.² Saga depicts and defines this vertical dimension. This becomes his manner of speaking about "an intuitive and poetic picture of a pre-historical reality of history which is enacted once and for all within the confines of time and space."³ Saga seeks to interpolate the immediacy of God within the "confines" of history. This immediacy is not objectively grasped by saga; it is seen intuitively, insightfully, imaginatively. Moreover, saga does not present itself in objectified prose; it utilizes poetic language which narrates figuratively and therefore approximately. This language does not appear to encapsulate its ontological referent; it only highlights and illumines its presence. Saga, then, is the human exposition of the immediacy of the

1. IIIi, p. 80.

2. IIIi, p. 81.

3. IIIi, p. 80.

divine within history. At times, the biblical witness is forced to speak in this form because of the very nature of its object, i.e., the resurrection. Historical and objectifiable language cannot grasp this transcendent dimension involved in the make-up of genuine history. "On the contrary, we have to recognize that...the Bible is forced to speak also in the form of saga precisely because its object and origin are what they are, i.e., not just 'historical' but also frankly 'non-historical'."¹ Saga represents a necessary means of communication. The object, which controls and conditions the truth of the statements made about it, will not permit itself to be simply grasped and managed by objectifiable and quantitative language. The reality of God penetrates and transcends history. He cannot be managed and quantified. This would ignore and destroy the dynamism and actualism of God's being and activity and life. To speak of God in the non-public aspect of His interaction, the biblical witness employs something of a dynamic language which at least approximates the object of its narration. Biblical narrative speaks in terms of saga which is non-objectifiable and non-quantitative. This is the path that must be pursued when one depicts the event of creation. Here one is engaged in pure saga.² What is required at this most basic of "non-historical" levels is the implementation of "the divinatory and poetical saga."³ "Divination means the

1. IIIi, p. 82.

2. IIIi, p. 82.

3. IIIi, p. 82.

vision of the historical emergence which precedes 'historical' events and which can be guessed from that which has emerged and in which 'historical' history takes place."¹ This element of pure saga appears to involve an intuitive imagining. In this case, it is a process which results in a vision or mental conceptualization of the beginning of the historical process. Moreover, it seems to be a deductive process based upon experiential data and governed by this as well. All in all, Barth seeks to describe an intuitive-deductive process of thought by which one produces something similar to a cognitive grasp of historical emergence.² "And poetry means the articulated form of this divinising vision and therefore of the historical emergence seen in this way."³ Poetry verbally expresses the intuition and insight of the divinatory process. It speaks figuratively of that which is not perceptible in an objective reality but is derived and imagined on the basis of the given. As such, poetical narrative speaks about something which remains beyond the grasp of perception but within the eye of the mind. Barth utilizes this divinatory and poetical saga to envision the basic structures implicit in historical phenomena, to grasp at the origin and roots of history, and to express figuratively the hidden depth of genuine time in existing time.⁴ Therefore divinatory and poetical saga performs an important role in the apprehension of reality. The saga moves into relationship

1. IIIi, p. 83.

2. Compare A. Einstein, The World As I See It, pp. 124-126.

3. IIIi, p. 83.

4. IIIi, p. 83.

with divine immediacy which, by its very nature, outstrips man's objectifiable perception. Saga allows him to intuit and to feel and to sense the divine presence not in abstraction from but in relation to and dependence upon the known quantities of the world. Saga, then, relies for its partial verification upon its consistency and continuity and agreement with other biblical witnesses.¹ This conceptual apparatus for perceiving the "non-historical" comes a bit sharper into view when Barth contrasts it with myth. Barth draws the distinction regarding myth that its object and content are of a general nature.² The particularity of saga is transformed into the timeless, inclusive and narrow imagining of reality peculiar to myth.³ It does not concretize its intuition nor does it seek to uncover the depth of its insight. Rather myth's intuition pertains to a timeless and abstract view of its eternal truth.⁴ This method, of course, is immediately unsuited for the task of speaking about God whose very nature is not a static truth but an historical manifestation of His reality. But because of its abstract nature of depiction, the distinctiveness of the elements involved become blurred to the point of creating a monism.⁵ And what is more it fails to achieve a depth beyond man and his own world.⁶ This is again inappropriate to the intercourse between man and God. In Barth's view, these two

1. Compare A. Einstein, The World As I See It, pp. 173-4.

2. IIIi, p. 84.

3. IIIi, p. 84.

4. IIIi, p. 85.

5. IIIi, p. 85.

6. IIIi, p. 85.

elements are distinct and particular in their own right. Thus the timelessness, the predominance of man and his world, and the lack of real depth, mark myth off as a non-historical and abstract divinatory and poetical understanding.¹ Barth quickly contrasts saga as retaining the essential distinctiveness of Creator and creature, as depicting the particularity of the interaction, as grasping the hidden depth behind the creature's existence, and as narrating exactly what it intends to say.² All of these dissimilarities lead Barth to the conclusion that saga and myth are opposites.³ The historical and particularized nature of the biblical witness requires one to speak of saga. Barth maintains the historicity of creation as well as God's active distinctiveness from man. Further, he does not view the biblical witness as a presentation of a timeless and eternal truth related exclusively to man's understanding of himself. Here Barth would find contention with Bultmann and his occupation with myth. No doubt, Bultmann does present an understanding of the biblical witness which seeks to get "behind" the myth-character of this witness in order to bring from concealment the true intention of the text. One must ask if Barth is not supplying his reader with a means of interpreting the true purpose of Bultmann's demythologizing task. Surely implicit within Bultmann's project is the assumption that somewhere in the biblical witness one can certainly etch out a hidden

1. IIIi, p. 86.

2. IIIi, p. 86.

3. IIIi, p. 87.

truth or idea about reality that is relevant and pertinent today. And behold, the Word of God as it is transmitted through Jesus Christ seems to give one something to retain amid the change and relativity of the world. Bultmann dismantles the particularity of the message of the witness in order to make it pertinent now. He appears to abstract some eternal and static truth out of the testimony of faith. But Barth does not view this as the proper category for understanding the manner of biblical speaking. Instead of myth, one has to do with saga. This is the proper way to inspect the conceptualization of this witness. One is not dealing with a timelessness and an abstraction but with a particular entity -- God and man interacting while retaining their distinctiveness and identity. Behind man at a more basic dimension of reality stands the divine immediacy which requires witness but which lies beyond the perceptible grasp of man. Here one employs the divinatory and poetical saga as the conceptual apparatus for forming cognitions of this dimension and for preserving the integrity of God. Therefore myth is regarded as totally inappropriate for the depiction of this vertical level and for narrating the historical interaction between the horizontal and the vertical. Two interesting parallels between Barth and Kierkegaard seem to be reflected here. First, Barth speaks of saga as grasping and intuiting the "non-historical" history of creation. What is revealing is Barth's persistence in avoiding any suggestion that saga explains the creation in an objectifiable manner. He appears to be intimating the position that the

Reason's sphere of competence does not allow it to dissect and to analyze in a detached and quantifiable manner the content of this "non-historical" history. It would seem that the Reason has achieved the limit of its capacity in confrontation with God's activity. Similarly, Kierkegaard appears to have drawn the limits of Reason in explaining the Absolute Paradox. The latter is no less real because of this. Barth and SK, in their own ways, may be seen to agree that the activity of the Reason breaks down when it attempts to explain the historic-supra-historic reality of the Eternal in time. Second, Barth and SK appear to agree that a qualitative distinction remains between God and man. For Barth, saga assists in maintaining this distinction. Yet saga provides a faithful inroad into the intelligibility of God's historic-suprahistoric activity. In this way, Barth can possibly appreciate Bultmann's interest in discerning the meaning and significance of God's activity for man. However, Barth augments this meaning and significance with the reality of God's presence.

Barth now returns to the presentation of creation as pure saga. It is now apparent that his exposition avoids the claim of being an "historical" history which presents only the public and perceptible facts of the matter. As well, it is also clear that Barth is not speaking mythologically about timeless and abstract human phenomena. Creation as pure saga seeks to explicate the "non-historical" dimension of "historical" reality in its concreteness and particularity. "The question always and everywhere, is that of the actuality

of the historical self-revelation of God. This has also a 'historical' aspect, and to that extent its witnesses must observe and think and speak 'historically'.¹ Saga accomplishes this task by preserving the historical integrity of God's actualism and dynamism in interrelationship with man and his world. Because God presents Himself in this manner, human cognition must assimilate itself to this object of thought. God gives Himself historically; therefore man must observe and think and speak historically as well. God in His historical self-revelation determines, governs and controls man's apperception and cognition of Him. It must always be the case that man adjusts and attunes his thinking and speaking and observing to the reality of God who is the prius of all cognition. Thus, Barth wants more than perception and comprehension.² "Imagination, too, belongs no less legitimately in its way to the human possibility of knowing. A man without imagination is more of an invalid than one who lacks a leg."³ Perception and comprehension encompass man's knowing on the objective and empirical level of being. But this is not the limit or the extent of what "to know" circumscribes. Knowing also involves imagination, insight, and intuition. This type of knowing does not appear to be mere speculation, given Barth's previous statements. Imagination is always governed by the given phenomena of empirical reality. And in the case of faith, imagination

1. IIIi, p. 90.

2. IIIj, p. 91.

3. IIIi, p. 91.

is governed by other biblical witnesses which condition and qualify any imaginative intuition. Man requires this avenue to cognition if he is to participate in the truth statements of faith. For again, the "non-historical" dimension of divine immediacy lies beyond the quantifiable comprehension of man. Imagination, insight, intuition, provide the inroad into this level of reality. And more, imagination provides a common denominator among men. It is a shared phenomenon allowing for communicability and commonality of intuited insights of the divine immediacy. "In principle each of us can be open to the actualities of pre- and post-history; each of us can produce saga and prophecy or at least perceive them when they come from others."¹ Man does not exist without the inherent cognitive apparatus necessary for divine perception. But it is an apparatus that is always initiated and controlled by the divine object. What one encounters in the creation narrative in particular and the biblical witness in general is human attestations and human mediation of the divine self-witness.² God provides the content, credibility, determination, and the limitation of this human medium.³ He maintains and conditions the truth-quality of man's statements by giving both their content and their veracity. What comes to the fore in this process of imaginative cognition is the object of faith attested in human, poetic language. This is the limit and the determination of the biblical witness in general and of the creation

1. IIIi, p. 91.

2. IIIi, p. 93.

3. IIIi, p. 93.

in particular -- God in His historical self-revelation.¹

What begins to emerge from all of this is a very strange new world. Barth takes with utter seriousness the historicity of the biblical witness in its testimony to the activity of God. The subject matter of this testimony governs the giving and the comprehensibility of the message. Barth has made this point clear with his insistence upon the actuality of the revelation of God. This becomes the guiding light in any human effort to move toward understanding. Man is not left unaided and alone in this endeavour. The vestigium trinitatis -- the "biblical-ecclesiastical-dogmatic pre-supposition" of faith -- and the human power of imagination provide the basic tools for faith's quest for understanding. This testimony and ability at human disposal provide the bridge which God determines, controls, and initiates. What opens into view is the "non-historical" reality of God's immediacy before the "historical" realities of objective history. God remains actual and present within its context. He makes Himself known by allowing human cognition an insightful and intuitive inroad into the divine "non-historical" and historical reporting of the divine historicity in Jesus Christ. Man experiences God in the actuality of the historical self-revelation, and to express and to depict this depth-dimension man employs both divinatory and poetical saga as well as historical testimony. By means of the saga, man comes to know the non-historical reality of God in a conceptual though non-objectifiable manner. God determines the vision

1. IIIi, p. 94.

and the poetic expression of man but yet He always appears to remain other than man's imaginative picture of Him. The truth-quality of saga is always between the truth of who God is in Himself and what man experiences this truth to be. Theology works in this gap between Truth-Itself and man's assent to it.¹ In other words man does not directly speak about the reality of God. This respects both the infinite qualitative difference between God and man and the integrity and intelligibility of man's faithful cognition of the object of faith. As seen from the perspective of salvation, history becomes the place where and the material which God employs for the working out of His plan of reconciliation. History appears in a broad spectrum which affirms the actuality of man and God. There is a purpose in all of this and this purpose dissolves the apparent and demonic chaos which would otherwise be assumed. God creates time out of His good-pleasure and He fulfils it in the person of Jesus Christ. Here one encounters the genuineness of real time in its full contemporaneity. Jesus Christ who is "now" meets man as "once" and "always". He provides the unique clue for coming to an understanding of God in history. In the person of Jesus Christ, God approaches man and comes into His own. History is real in so far as it stands in relation with and in correspondence to the reality of God.² He is the dimension of completeness which stands behind everyday existence and which provides the

1. A, p. 25; R/T, p. 182.

2. IIIii, p. 46.

depth and roots of creation. God is true existence in Himself and everything outside of Him can be conceived as not existing.¹ The actualism and the dynamism of God establish the once and for all-ness of history which even God Himself respects in the person of Christ. There exists, then, this vertical dimension which is once and always active in the horizontal and sequential continuity of "historical" history.

RECAPITULATION

Barth seeks to protect the historical dimension of the dynamism and actualism of God. He seeks to preserve the historical integrity of God's act in Jesus Christ. In order to achieve this end, Barth conceives history as a two-dimensional sphere. A type of complementarity transpires here in that God creates the historical for the purpose of man's reconciliation while man requires the medium of the historical in order to come to know the reality of God. The two dimensions intersect each other at the point of Jesus Christ who is the God become man. And more, Barth presents the saga as a means of penetrating the "non-historical" historical dimension of divine immediacy. Saga provides the tool of moving into this level of being which remains beyond the perceiving and comprehending of man. Imagination and poetry delimit the content of saga which itself attempts to preserve the historical individuality of God's actions in space and time -- actions which stay beyond the empirical grasp. But

1. H/B, p. 135.

this entire schema resides upon the more inclusive conception of history as the reality where God fulfils His eternal plan of reconciliation. From an epistemological standpoint, Barth provides the conceptual apparatus for conveying cognitive data. And from an ontological perspective, the inclusiveness and comprehensiveness of God's being and activity direct Barth into conceiving the whole of the historical sphere as the place of God's action. However, the eternal decision of God does not destroy the human freedom of man. He still possesses the genuine option of retreating from Him, i.e., Lessing's problem. God's act in Jesus Christ proleptically fulfils what God has decided from eternity. But yet man lives between the time of the resurrection and ascension and His coming again. The purpose and intent of history is determined and conditioned by God, but man can use this time between the times to come to God or to turn away.¹ No doubt, the correlation of human and divine freedom within the sphere of history must remain open for discussion.² But as Barth has pointed out to Harnack,³ "I explicitly deny the possibility of positing anything relative as absolute, somehow and somewhere, be it in history or in ourselves...."⁴ This is consistent with his position throughout, that as one approaches the object of faith one is only allowed to speak with scientific certainty. What

1. IVi, p. 323.

2. H/B, pp. 123-4, p. 194f.

3. For a fine treatment of the Barth-Harnack correspondence (1923), see H. Martin Rumscheidt, Revelation and Theology.

4. R/T, p. 48.

man between the times can and will say about God is always approximate and relative. God's being and activity move on toward the future. God's movement requires man to move in his thought and in his faith. Man's faith in search of understanding needs constant correction and support. This quality marks off man's relationship to God. It is a relationship involved in a movement between the times. As such, it takes place in history where God and man meet in the person of Jesus Christ whose "once" becomes "always" in the Christian act of understanding.

I thank thee, good Lord, I thank thee, that what
I at first believed because of thy gift, I now
know because of thine illumining in such a way
that even if I did not want to believe thine
Existence, yet I could not but know it. 1

The conclusion of Barth's exposition of God in history brings him back again, full circle, to the point of his beginning. Faithful man's search for understanding involves him in the circulus veritatis Dei where he repeats what God has effected and made known.² For Barth, God is the beginning and the end of faith's knowledge. In every aspect and in every dimension of this quest, man is confronted, encountered, determined, and conditioned by Him. He is the ontological reference of truth and He is the way to and the content of this truth. Therefore, at the end of the day man can only say, "I thank thee, good Lord, I thank thee." Gratitude and thanksgiving mark a positive quality of theology which brings to clearer knowledge God's "Yes" to man.

1. A, p. 170.

2. Iii, p. 250.

POSTSCRIPT

I. A GLANCE BACK

The thought of Kierkegaard has been pointed out earlier as a reaction to 19th Century Protestant immanentism. SK attempted to affirm the relativity, contingency and temporality of history as the sphere in which man comes to faith. He dampens any notion of faith being related to an eternal apprehension. Indeed, Reason cannot successfully cope with the dynamic possibility of faith within the historical continuum. Reason collides headlong into the unknown reality of faith. Here the Reason, which must be viewed in its objective and empirical garb, encounters God. This encounter is mediated within the confines and limits of time and space where contingency and temporality are the order of the day. Nonetheless, Reason experiences something real that will not be dissolved and controlled by Reason's analyses or circumspections. Because in history one can only deal with the unnecessary and with the contingent, Reason can never demonstrate and prove this unknown reality with which it collides. Approximations can only result. But this is simply not good enough. Faith admits to mediating in time the experience of the eternal in the God-man Jesus Christ. To Reason in the full bloom of objectivity and empiricism sprinkled with a notion of immanentism, this declaration of faith can be no more than an absurdity. However, the persistence of the claim continues and Reason's attempts to demonstrate the complete absurdity of faith's content cannot resolve the matter. SK develops the classification made by Lessing regarding reason's eternal truth and history's accidental truth

to an extreme. Indeed, history has no element of staticness and rest. The very historical nature of all reality, if it is to be truly historical, demands a coming-into-existence-kind-of-change. History, then, involves becoming. Most surely on these grounds, Reason can hope for no more than approximation. Nonetheless, faith continues to make the claim that the eternal is in time in the person of Jesus Christ. He is the Absolute Paradox which faith relies upon and Reason cannot dissolve. Here again the incommensurability between historical truth and eternal action manifests itself most distinctly. The Absolute Paradox approaches Reason as totally incomprehensible and absurd. Yet SK maintains the integrity and intelligibility inherent in this Paradox. In other words, to accept the Paradox involves one in an integrative re-organization of the logical structure of being.¹ The Paradox provides another approach and dimension to integrative and coherent living which Reason in itself cannot obtain. SK refers to the downfall of Reason as its paradoxical passion links Reason and Paradox together in understanding during this moment of passion. Paradox is assimilated into the human structure of "knowing" and being by the activity of the leap of faith which resolves to make inward and subjective the objective uncertainty and absurdity of the eternal in time. The leap of faith grasps in the moment of passion and subjectivity what Reason can only view as incommensurable. This leads SK to make the claim that, "Faith is not a form of knowledge; for all knowledge is

1. A. McKinnon, "Barth's Relation to Kierkegaard: Some Further Light," Can. J. Theo., Vol. 13, pp. 33-4.

either a knowledge of the Eternal, excluding the temporal and historical as indifferent, or it is pure historical knowledge. No knowledge can have for its object the absurdity that the Eternal is historical."¹ SK appears to be influenced to no mean degree by the distinctions of Lessing. Indeed, it almost seems to be the case that SK works within the limits set by Lessing. This observation relies upon SK's claim that "Faith is not a form of knowledge." To have knowledge is to know either the Eternal in and of itself or the historical in and of itself. These are the two approaches open to the realm of knowledge. But faith makes something of a synthetical claim by offering the eternal in time. Knowledge cannot be attained from the temporalization of eternity since this lies beyond the spectrum of the grasp of knowledge. Reason appears to be able to contemplate eternal ideas in their static and logical interconnectedness. As well, Reason can consider the approximations of accidental historical truths. But the necessity of eternity revealed in the contingency of history provides a unique and unbelievable situation. This situation can only be categorized by the machinations of Reason as incommensurable. SK therefore maintains the non-knowledge condition of faith. However, faith does have a consistency and coherence of its own even though no form of knowledge as defined above results. "But the disciple is in Faith so related to the Teacher as to be eternally concerned with his historical existence."² For SK,

1. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 76.

2. Ibid., p. 76.

faith establishes something of a heuristic grasp of the individual act of becoming in history. One involved in this heuristic coherency has laid aside the attempt to demonstrate what always remains beyond Reason's ability to demonstrate. Faith involves one in the concern for and resolution of historical living. It is an act and movement of becoming conditioned and qualified by the Teacher, the eternal in time, Jesus Christ. The strict historicity of the dimension of existing removes the full blossoming of faith from the objective into the inward and subjective passionateness of the believer. This does not appear to negate nor to dismiss the historical reality of Jesus Christ. What appears to be happening is the very definite change of direction and switching of emphasis. The rationality and integrity of faith finds its establishment upon an inward and subjective basis. Faith functions as a mode of passionate inwardness in the face of an objective uncertainty. Thus faith appears to be encapsulated within the inner experiences of the believer. This appears to follow upon the heels of SK's stringent emphasis upon the contingency and becoming of realities within time and space. Faith remains coherent and consistent but it is not knowledge as defined by SK. SK, then, offers a way of reacting to 19th Century Liberal Protestantism from within the accepted limits and structures set by Lessing. The believer is able to affirm within himself what Reason cannot establish from historical data. Man in faith comes "to know" God in Jesus Christ by a subjective act of will. Indeed one must inquire if SK has not in effect created another anthropocentric system.¹ This is the question

1. K. Barth, "A Thank You and a Bow: Kierkegaard's Reveille," (trans. H. Martin Rumscheidt), Can. J. Theo., Vol. 11, p. 6.

Barth asks. One may ask differently, "Is it possible to react constructively against Lessing without being freed from the limitations of his problem?" SK develops this limitation to a maximum point as he views all of history and the knowledge deriving from it as involved in becoming. Faith offers more stability within time because it deals with an eternal reality in history. Faith ultimately grasps this reality by an act of passionate inwardness making faith's truth immanently and directly subjective. One must begin to question the objectivity of faith, its realness in space and time, if it must withdraw into the inner recesses of the passionate soul.

Barth thinks not. In his own way, SK affirmed the historical reality of Christianity. Reason does meet and engage the incommensurable Paradox within history. But finally faith resolves to appropriate this historical encounter inwardly, thus removing it from the contingency and temporality of time. History maintains its radical state of becoming and faith achieves the truth and certainty of the eternal. However the bifurcation of existence lingers as history continues objectively and faith moves underground into the indirect experience of subjectivity. From the perspective of Barth's exposition on faith, this continuous dichotomous situation fails to do justice to the reality and actuality of God's self-revelation. Barth's little but important book on Anselm appears to engage the ontological problem epistemologically. This writer is not convinced that Barth is so much painting a picture of the world as he is informing his reader about the inherent possibility for

knowledge that does exist in faith. No doubt, a metaphysical construction may arise by way of implication; however this does not appear to be the primary thrust or interest. Man in the midst of faith can know God. Certainly there would be some line of agreement between SK and Barth on the statement that "Faith is not a form of knowledge." It is not a form of knowledge to be gleaned by the processes of Reason. However the reality and actuality of God in time is open to cognition on the basis of Credo and the working of God himself. In this way, history retains the radical nature of becoming which SK perceived. It is a constant realm of coming-into-existence-kind-of-changes. But Barth wants to place a much weightier and heavier emphasis upon the objectiveness of Jesus Christ. He does not appear to be satisfied with this person being absorbed into the subjectivity of man. Jesus Christ possesses an objective reality distinct from and knowable by the man of faith. Indeed the historicity of Christ seems to be taken in utter seriousness. Yet for Barth as for SK, Reason cannot decipher the incomprehensibility of this "unprecedented event". However Barth does not simply view the problem from this side of reality as does SK. He rather assumes that the possibility of knowledge resides with God. Therefore if one asks "How do we/I come to know this person?" Barth does not respond that knowledge of Jesus Christ as the One He is is impossible or not really knowledge at all. Rather one must approach the Credo of faith and be given to know Christ as the One He is by the good-pleasure of God. In this way the solution to "how can accidental truths of history be seen as the eternal truths of

reason?" is given by God Himself in Jesus Christ who is the same one that Reason can never know unaided. Lessing's problem is thus transposed from the realm of epistemology to that of psychology. His problem does not agree with the actual reality of the subject matter. God is known and is knowable in the person of Jesus Christ. Christ encounters man as an historical reality and as the object of faith who is knowable. Reality, by implication from Barth's epistemological framework, includes both a vertical and a horizontal dimension. God does not remain exiled beyond the limits set by Lessing's problem. SK dealt with God as He was experienced inwardly in man. This vertical dimension remains prominent: (1) history is strictly the realm of becoming; (2) "Faith is not a form of knowledge"; (3) Faith's leap appropriates the historical and objective uncertainty subjectively within man. However the viewing of God from the perspective of becoming similar to history places God and history on similar dynamic and movement-oriented levels. Barth preserves the actuality of God's historical self-revelation as well as the contingency and becoming which characterize history. Dynamism and activity qualify the interrelation and interaction between God and man in history. The bifurcation between eternal and historical truth becomes antiquated in the dynamics of the relationship. Nothing static and abstract remains of God who must be interpreted as eventful. Therefore Barth's exposition of the faith seeks to displace and dissolve as unreal and illusionary Lessing's problem. By doing this on epistemological grounds beginning from God and going to man, Barth seeks to invert the man/God relationship which SK moved

to a deeper level of human subjectivity. With Barth, Lessing's limits and strictures are removed from the realm of theological consideration and from faith's search for understanding.

II. A GLANCE TO EITHER SIDE

a) Bultmann: "Faith is not a form of Knowledge"

It has been pointed out that SK had labelled faith as not being a form knowledge: (1) because it does not deal strictly with the Eternal exclusive of the historical and (2) because it does not deal strictly with the historical exclusive of the Eternal, but (3) faith deals with the Eternal in time. It has been suggested that SK works within the bounds of Lessing's problem while accentuating the meaning of accidental to be an all-inclusive classification of the historical. And further, SK transposes the realm of faith from the objective arena of becoming into the subjective sphere of man's inwardness and passion. In doing this he does not degrade the historical, but rather he arranges the limits of the historical in such a manner as to display the futility of Reason's attempt to grasp what can only be incommensurable. Therefore the battle for the certainty and applicability of faith goes into the subjective inwardness of man's being where the rationality of objective Reason exhausts itself and the coherency of faith intercedes. One may ponder the alternative presented by Bultmann.

Taking Bultmann within the context of his exposition of history, one approaches something resembling the subjectivity

of SK. It would almost appear that faith is not really a form of knowledge. But what tends toward this assumption? Bultmann has a purpose in mind as he dialogues with the Jesus Christ of Christian faith. Dialogue is an important exegetical tool in that it retrieves something of the commonality inherent between then and there and here and now. Bultmann's conversation with Jesus Christ discovers an existential awareness that contains relevance and importance now. In a world that seems alien and appears hostile to man, there can hardly be any security or readily available material for man to construct a foundation upon which to build his life. History for Bultmann can only objectively be perceived as contingent and temporary. This is hardly a conducive atmosphere for man to achieve stability. What Bultmann appears to be saying is that the world is in a state of constant flux and of becoming. With this view, history itself cannot be a sure basis for human security. Rather man must look into the becomings and past becomings of history for some possible means to alleviate the tension and anxiety produced by the constancy of change and flux. In the preaching of the Word of God as instituted by Jesus Christ and heard today, a new self-understanding can be found. The Word delivered by Jesus Christ attacks the false foundations of security man would find in history. As well, the Word demonstrates the insecurity and the vulnerability of man in the face of history. But in this demonstration, the Word also delivers a new self-awareness. It would appear that Bultmann maintains that man receives something of a heuristic principle which produces an ontic change within the inner man. The anxiety and fear arising from the

insecurity of history dissipates as one discovers a new source of hope in the power of God. This power is not perceived, however, and man can only act as if God were in control. Though the world rages on, man acts as if meaning and value are inherent in reality. The self-awareness contained in the Word becomes a present reality. The then and there becomes here and now in the subjective inwardness of man where the constant becoming of history subsides and dissipates. The "now" becomes important not because of any objective and empirical knowledge delivered by Jesus in the Word. The "now" is important because man possesses a self-awareness which allows him to proceed in the world as if the ontic change had really been ontological. Thus it does not appear that the man in faith is dealing with knowledge as SK defined it but rather he goes forward on the basis of a self-assured awareness. No direct relation between SK and Bultmann is suggested here, rather the possibility of a co-incidence and similarity.

On the basis of Bultmann's approach to the relationship between faith as subjective inwardness and history as objective becoming, his cosmological "pre-understanding" remains intact. Jesus Christ does not communicate knowledge about the eternal or about history but about a way of standing in history. It is a way of standing based inwardly upon man's subjectiveness. Again in counter-reference to this Bultmannian position, Barth affirms that there is no *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος* between the world and God.¹ God does not need to jump an

1. IIIi, p. 60.

"ugly, broad ditch" to approach His creation. Bultmann's myth is replaced by Barth's saga. Timelessness and abstraction are replaced by the historicity and particularity of Jesus Christ. Barth does not assert this on the basis of any cosmological grounds -- "How does one know this?" His epistemology seems to permit God the initiative of acting, and then the initiative of bringing this act to cognition. In this way, Barth's approach does not circumscribe God's activity and man's apprehension of Him. What Barth discovers from the openness of his approach is the openness of history to the actuality of God. Again, faith does not need to retreat into the inner depths of man's being because faith can perceive the hidden depth in history as the vertical dimension of God. The becoming of history contains the becoming of God in history which can be no private act on man's part but is open to public scrutiny on the initiative of God. In Barth, faith's content moves out-of-doors and allows for the possibility of knowledge about the eternal in time.

- b) Tillich: "The Symbols of faith form the basis for historical action".

SK had taken the content of faith into the inner recesses of human subjectivity. The objective data of history concerning the content of faith are not irrelevant and dismissed. Rather Reason is not able to move behind the data to comprehend the reality. The issue of faith's content must be decided on other than objective grounds. It must be determined by man's subjectivity which appropriates the

truth of faith for the realignment and reconstitution of the believer's existence. On the groundwork laid by this truth, man receives an example by which he may express his existence. The subjective appropriation of faith's truth finally moves outward again in the concrete expression of a life-style forged out of the content of this truth.

Action and life-style are also important ingredients in the thought of Tillich. Concentrating upon his understanding of history, the centrality of the Christ comes into view. For Tillich, Christ establishes the concrete point of reference for man's qualitative appreciation of history. The biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ simulates the New Being of man within the structure of space and time. This is not to argue that Tillich's gap between essentiality and existential existence has been closed. The New Being expressed symbolically in Jesus as the Christ points to the direction man must travel and the path he must tread in order for him to assimilate the symbol of the Christ. For this symbol demonstrates the interdependence between the finite and the infinite. Man's essential reality lies beyond his existential being; however the Christ-symbol points out the qualitative possibilities available in history when one conditions his existence in the light of the infinite. The dimension of the infinite provides the ideal toward which man "ought" to strive. Tillich maintains that fulfilment lies in the infinite, in the "Wherefore" of man. The symbol of the Christ provides the window into the infinite dimensions of man's existence. Christ participates within the concrete while pointing out beyond Himself to the infinite. The symbol of

the Christ allows man "to see" the way he must go since the symbol allows man "to know" heuristically the true dimensions of existential reality. In this way Christ and the Kingdom of God function as rallying points and battle cries for man's action, concern and determination. The content of historical activity which is meaningful and relevant and pertinent to the essentiality of man in his "Wherefore" derives from the religious symbols. Man appropriates these symbols subjectively and thus reorganizes his existence around the Gestalt which they impart. Faith imparts itself in the form of the symbol which transmits to the believer an internal awareness, perception, "knowledge" of the course to be pursued. Again faith's content does not appear to be knowledge as SK defined it, rather it seems to be a heuristic perception as Bultmann concluded. However Tillich appears to attach the societal and communal relevancy to this perception which brings it outside of man and into the context of historical action and activity. Indeed the symbolic content of faith appears also to be consistent with Tillich's assertion that essentiality has never really existed in created reality. Therefore man can only "know" in symbolic and figurative terms the content of faith. And on the basis of the necessity for Tillich's symbolics, one must also wonder if he is not indeed operating within the limits of the problem set by Lessing and defined by SK. The secret to historical action appears to be in ontic, subjective transformation whereby man, the believer, is given the eyes "to see" reality as it "ought" to be. Meaning penetrates history from beyond via man. He is the instrumentality of change and value. Man affected by the

infinite dimension shining through the symbol conditions and shapes the created realm. Man performs this task by re-affirming the disciples' decision regarding Jesus of Nazareth. It was the decision to identify him as the Christ. The reality of the Christ-symbol thus becomes loosely affixed to the concreteness of history. But in the final analysis the concreteness of history becomes secondary and functional to the purposes of the symbol. At this point, one must reconsider the vitality of Lessing's problem.

However, Barth lifts the content of faith out of the subjectivity of man and sees it rooted within the structures of becoming and history. History is meaningful not because of man's subjectivity but because of God's objectivity in Jesus Christ. The reality of His person is not dependent upon some ecstatic experience of the disciples. His reality like all reality is determined by God. Jesus Christ does not need to hide within the safety of man's subjectivity. God has revealed who He is in the context of history. In the turbulence, contingency, temporality and becoming of history, man can come to know the eternal in time. He is an objective reality and as such a world-historical phenomenon. There is no need for symbols to bridge the gap between the finite and the infinite because this gap is an illusion. God Himself acts within history. History is meaningful because (1) God created it and (2) it is the place where He encounters man. "How does one know this?" On the basis of faith's Credo and by the testimony of the God Himself. That man knows God by His act influences what man knows about the reality of the creation.

The objective and horizontal dimension of history stands in relationship to the qualitative and vertical dimension of God. Man no longer needs to explain God; God explains Himself, man and creation.

CONCLUSION: LESSING'S END?

The vestiges of the past have been found in the present. In particular, the figure of Lessing can be seen to cast a rather long shadow. In many respects, his endeavours have become a constituent component of present theological enterprise. For Lessing, "accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason." His definition of the propositions has created the "ugly, broad ditch" over which he was unable to leap. In faith's terms, his problem involved the relationship between the ground and content of faith -- "How is the historicity of Jesus Christ connected to His message?" To Lessing, the problem did not appear overly burdensome or terribly significant. Fortunately, he was already across the pitfall. However, those who were to follow were nonetheless confronted with the "ditch" from the other side. The ground and content of faith apparently required an engineering feat in order again to connect the two. The theologian lives in the realm of the accidental yet he began looking for a way to make available the necessary truth of faith. The bridging process concentrated upon the Christological question and the interpretation of His person. The answer to this question also entailed a decision about the characterization of history. In the main, Lessing had separated history and faith by inserting a logical wedge between faith's ground and content. Later men approached this situation with the hope of alleviating and ameliorating the resulting tendency either to objectify Christ and thus idealize faith, or to subjectify Him and thus relativize His message.

Again, history remains the realm of the contingent and faith continues as the sphere of the necessary and eternal. Yet from Ritschl onwards, theology has sought to interpret and to understand these two dimensions. Experientially, the interconnection seems unquestioned and sound. Epistemologically, theology appears hard pressed to explain the basis of the interrelation. To a large extent, the Liberals proposed a possible way of resolving the problem. On the one hand, history is contingent and objective in its natural determination. Consequently, the external and material details about Christ are a matter of controversy and uncertainty. On the other hand, history is also seen to include the personal dimension of man. This entails the values and purposes he lives and pursues. From this perspective, Christ is a sure and certain reality in that man apparently may empathize and experience His "inner life" as a present, personal reality. In this way, the Liberals seem to manage to tolerate the disjunction. Yet, they also appear to relieve some of the pressure by drawing out the consequences of their distinction between external and personal facts. The former category retains the accidental qualification while the latter possesses some undemonstrable, sure and certain basis for faith. Christ's personality provides the personal experience which both confirms His authenticity and protects His contemporaneity. The objective, historical world appears undisturbed by His presence, but yet man receives the gifts of value and purpose for life. Unfortunately, Troeltsch soon revealed that even this optimistic solution was really a delaying tactic. Jesus Christ is part of the objective, historical world, and therefore He also shares the uncertainty

and probability of this realm. There can be no undemonstrable quality inherent in His "inner life". The Liberal attempt to bridge Lessing's "ditch" began to collapse. Troeltsch did not see a sure and certain basis for faith in history. Rather, he thought it more expeditious to speak of Him as satisfying a social-psychological need. This replaces His undemonstrable power with something a bit more substantial and open to investigation. Apparently, Troeltsch did not assume that history can really transcend itself. His fidelity to the accidental character of history appears to re-admit the problem of finding another bridge. Christ's "inner life" did not really seem to be able to bear the whole weight of eternity. SK would presumably agree with Troeltsch's depiction of history as transitional and with the inability of facts to establish Christ's reality once and for all. It appears to be his insight which radicalizes Lessing's terms. He argued for the contingency of all historical reality including the truth of faith. Everything that is, is historical. The objective, empirical world is no longer neutral to man's well-being. On the contrary, God has become incarnate in space and time. The Absolute Paradox, Jesus Christ, lives and dwells in this same transitional sphere where man also lives and dwells. He confronts Reason in His total unlikeness and thus aids Reason in breaking out of its finite shell and in re-organizing life in terms of a finite/infinite correlation. The truth of God appears to become free and dynamic. SK does not seem to formulate it as a necessary truth which is constant and immoveable. The necessary in these terms cannot be historical, since the

necessary simply is. But SK continued to co-ordinate the realization of God's truth in the Absolute Paradox with the subjectivity of the believer. Faith becomes a personal affirmation and conviction. God's reality as well as Christ's becomes indissolubly co-temporaneous with the subjectivity of man. In a fashion similar to the Liberals, SK's position involves the risk of relativism for history and for faith. Indeed, relativism becomes extremely perilous for SK since he accentuates the transitional nature of life and seeks to take it with the subjectivity of the believer. Bultmann and Tillich appear to retain elements of this same subjectivity. However, they give it an existential content. In a manner similar to the Liberals, Bultmann and Tillich reiterate that the objective, empirical world is dull and unfeeling. And moreover, it is also fraught with the accidental and contingent. It would seem to follow that the external facts of Christ's reality are again not a matter of primary concern for faith. Bultmann and Tillich do not seem eager to re-open the "Life of Jesus" approach. They rather refer to His picture or portrait as the root fact. The historical-critical inquiry is not permitted to move behind the texts in order to discover a "so-called" historical Jesus. He is in unity and oneness with the Christ in the biblical narrative as well as in the preached word. Jesus is the Christ in that the disciples and later followers affirm this relationship in their living and believing. The human aspect imputes historical concreteness and realness to Him. He becomes inextricably bound to the reality of man. The objective, historical world plods along, yet man affirms and believes

Christ in existential, historical terms. In this way, Bultmann and Tillich apparently opt for the existential experience of Christ which begins with the initial yielding of His empirical facticity. Yet they go on to elaborate His importance and significance for life. At least, the initial admission seems to permit a secondary factual basis which is, of course, greatly amplified in personal terms of meaning. For Bultmann, meaning is understood in personal, individual terms of authenticity. For Tillich, it is perceived in individual and social terms of fulfilment. The objective, historical world receives the taming hand of man. Through faith, God's reality is affirmed, but both men speak of Him as if He is present. God cannot be demonstrated in reality, but His personal effects can be understood as illustrations of His presence. Bultmann and Tillich both appear to offer a personal and subjective solution to Lessing's problem. They attempt to establish a subjective bridge over a logical "ditch" which seems also to have an objective side. They both seem to think that it is quite sufficient to contend that either the "Dass" of His living and dying or the portrait of Jesus of Nazareth will do. One must ask if the tenuousness of their answer can adequately sustain the reality of God, the contingency of history, and the faith of man. Ultimately, neither man appears to succeed in really re-defining Lessing's terms. Faith's content remains necessary and simply is. But its ground remains uncertain and probable. No explanatory foundation appears to be forthcoming which adequately gives any credence to God's reality as distinct from man. It

seems to be KB's epistemological break-through which grants the conceptual possibility for understanding God as separate from man. SK had emphasized the human side of the relation without apparently establishing the epistemological tools for adequately speaking of God. For KB, His reality becomes an important concern. As one understands His relation to the world, one can also grasp the reality of Christ in the world. KB presents God as the central reality upon which all other realities are dependent. He is an absolutely freely effecting cause. In these terms, the world cannot be understood apart from Him. His life is lived in conjunction with historical reality. The transcendent and the immanent are interrelated in complementary though polar dynamics. God's actualism correlates with that of the world. His reality is separate from though in correlation with that of man. But KB does not want to move in the direction of an intellectualization of faith which merely augments the faculty of Reason. Faith is real and sovereign. The reality of Jesus Christ marks the point of contact at which God and man meet in their unlikeness. This occurs in the medium of history which is not hostile or alien to His presence. God remains real and distinct as does man in this encounter. However, through His grace and man's faith, a communication commences which protects both man and God. The objective person of Christ and the subjective faith of man moderate and correlate at the moment when God so wills to reveal Himself and man receives the will for faith. God's eternity reveals itself to be actual and real from Christ's actualism in history. Jesus Christ is the Godman. His position remains protected by faith,

church tradition, God's will and preaching. He cannot be manipulated through the exercise of Reason. Nor can He be subjectivized since He is distinct and independent of man. In this way, Barth accepts Lessing's proposition about history as modified through SK. But consequently, he rejects Lessing's definition of faith as necessary. It appears that for KB the necessary is and this opposes the vitality of history. Therefore the necessary is not historical. But faith seeks to understand how God is just this. To place Jesus Christ in the actualism of history also implies that His truth is actual and thus transitional. Indeed, His truth is alive and present in each moment of faith and grace. In this way, KB does not bridge Lessing's "ditch", rather he provides an interpretation which suggests the artificiality of the problem. Lessing's proposition of accidental and necessary truths seems to have created an epistemological gap. On his definitions, the content and ground of faith appear to be separated. In this manner, the disjunction continues to manifest itself on a logical level. In many ways, KB's understanding seems to be proposing a definitional counter-argument using Lessing's terms. The subjectivity of the believer and the objectivity of God seem to be placed in polar equilibrium. Man cannot be convinced of faith through rational arguments. As well, God cannot be defined in necessary, static terms, since He freely wills His presence in Christ. The absolutely freely effecting cause (God) and the freely effecting cause (man) seem to coalesce and to communicate in the co-temporaneous moment of grace and faith. However, KB does not really appear to be suggesting a

cosmological answer to Lessing's problem. Rather, he seems to approach it with a similar interpretive intent. If this is really the case, is the definitional reformulation of Lessing's terms sufficient? It may well be that KB's answer also requires a reformulation of the climate of opinion which made Lessing's problem possible. This would presumably entail a cosmological as well as an epistemological re-evaluation of reality.

Another dimension of Lessing's problem is the increased importance of man in matters of faith. His ascendancy seems to be closely correlated with the rise of Reason. As a rational creature, he functions as Reason's medium for understanding. This involves judgment and interpretation. Again, man appropriates the power of arbitrating the content and meaning of faith. Lessing's definitions coupled with Reason's anti-metaphysical bias appears to have severed the alleged tie between the ground and content of faith. But since man is a rational creature, he can presumably also understand what faith's content really is. In a sense, a presumptuousness on the part of man seems to develop which is carried through by the Liberals. They interpret faith in terms of value and purpose while conceding that man is a valuing and purposing creature. Consequently, he retains the right of disposition over faith's content. One can only know God through the effects He produces in the believers. His reality is beyond empirical observation and conception. Nonetheless, man feels His presence and he interprets the meaning which it has. For SK, faith's content is not a

necessary, static entity. His severe emphasis upon the transitional nature of history precludes any type of necessity. Faith becomes a human organ which makes the Absolute Paradox a present function of life. God is apparently present in history but faith is the only means of feeling and experiencing it. On one hand, SK does not seem to share the anti-metaphysical attitude of the Liberals. However, he does show a preference for delegating to man the appropriation of God. Human subjectivity disposes of faith's claim and content. Faith is not a form of knowledge, rather it appears to be a relationship to Christ which assists the believer in better understanding his historical existence. This relationship is mediated through subjectivity. Bultmann and Tillich do not appear to be far removed from this position. For Bultmann, faith seems to result from human volition which chooses and decides to live for God. In confrontation with a choice, man must decide either for life or death. The resolution seems to result in an attitude or life-style which directs existence in one direction or the other. Again, one does not speak of God as present in any other terms than man lives as if this is the case. It is man who decides and interprets. For Tillich, the believer stands in faith by accepting and affirming the decision of the disciples. Their faith indissolubly united the portrait of Jesus with the reality of the New Being. This is the decision which man makes then and now. Faith becomes a way of "seeing" and "knowing" His presence in life. The responsibility for deciding falls to man. It was his initial faith which recognized Jesus as the Christ and it is his continued belief

which maintains His recognition. Again, God's separate reality cannot really help. His presence is felt through the mediation of symbols, but these depend upon man's faith and his resolve. Created goodness has never been actual and real in estranged reality. In KB, the presumptuousness of man seems to be tempered and conditioned by the reality of God. Faith is no longer interpreted as merely a feeling, a personal attitude, a life-style or an ideal. It becomes a form of knowledge which seeks to understand the reality of God. Faith-knowledge seems to be possible in that He is now given distinct and real status in KB's theology. God gives content to faith and provides the condition for its reception. Since His reality is no longer an effect or experience but something of independent substance, man cannot control and dominate the disposition of faith. God remains sovereign in this respect; man receives what He desires to reveal. As knowledge, faith presupposes something to be known. And KB's emphasis upon God's reality in Jesus Christ appears to make Him the object of knowing. It is never a naked knowledge, rather He is mediated through the tradition of faith, church, scripture and preaching. Man's knowing involves God's desiring to be known. And this transpires in confrontation with Jesus Christ. In this way, the human side of the God/man equation stands in polar tension with God's absolute freedom. Man's presumptuousness dissipates before His presence. In KB's terms, God is He of whom no greater can be thought.

One other theme comes to light. Lessing's propositions appear to imply the need for a stable and unchangeable point of reference in the contingency of life. Only necessary

truths seem to provide the sure and certain basis. Lessing's definition of the accidental appears to have enjoyed widespread acceptance. In Liberal thought, history's accidental determination received negative connotations which emphasized the dullness and neutrality of the world. The objective, material realm represented the sphere of possibility and probability. Its external facts are always open to quibbling and controversy. A more permanent and constant basis is required for personal well-being. Probability will not suffice. Consequently, the certainty of Christ's "inner-life" provided this foundation. Faith appears to contain something constant and lasting in the value and purpose which He displays. This dimension allows a point of reference which man can cling to in confrontation with the world. SK continues with Lessing's definition of history. Indeed, he takes this characterization to qualify each and every aspect of life. Nonetheless, SK views history as positive because God has revealed Himself there in the Absolute Paradox. While faith is not a form of knowledge, the suggestion seems to be that it does assist one in understanding existence. The Teacher delivers the Truth which is fundamental for life. The transitional sphere is complemented by His Truth which signals the presence of God. Man's life requires direction and purpose, and Jesus Christ is the source of satisfaction. He represents the infinite in the finite. In faith, man appropriates His Truth in every moment. This same theme recurs in Bultmann and Tillich. Bultmann understands faith's position in existential terms. But the choices he perceives

are limited to an either/or -- either life or death; either God or the world. Man is a creature living in the state of possibility. Indeed, his very nature includes action and choice. He is always before a decision. Life is obtained when he opts for God and His power. In this resolve he lives in His presence which is free from the possibilities of the past and the world. God makes authentic life possible by freeing man from the past determinations and decisions. In faith, man somehow partakes of God's unfettered possibility. In freedom of this sort, he achieves his historicity. Consequently, he seems to receive a heuristic perception which allows him to understand the world's relativity and therefore its complete inability to be the basis for real life. In this way, faith provides Jesus Christ as the sure and certain Word of God who creates the permanent situation for authentic life. In the Word, man stands before faith's either/or. Tillich seems to offer a variation of Bultmann's existential interpretation. For him, man's historicity also involves his becoming which expresses itself in decisions and actions. Historical life does not appear to possess the possibility for fulfilment in itself. The estranged reality of life seems alien to his real nature. Yet authentic historicity is permitted. For Tillich, faith provides the option for fulfilment. Through participation in the Christ-symbol, man receives direction and content for living out of the really real. By affirming and living the Christ-symbol, he may share in the meaning of Being-Itself. Indeed, the Christ-symbol opens him to the reality of the infinite which would

otherwise be hidden. Again, KB does not really alter man's need for the infinite dimension. As very God and very man, Jesus Christ is the source for understanding man's own nature as well as God's grace. In faith he perceives that the horizontal reality of life is vertically intersected by the distinct reality of God. In the moment of faithful understanding, man realizes his dependence upon Him. The fullness of existence appears to be achieved in conjunction with His presence. Indeed, God's nearness is actual and alive in the life of man in its own right. History is the place where He has revealed Himself and this is the place where He is also known. God's actualism and history's actualism are correlated in the person of Jesus Christ.

With these strands and tendencies displayed, it may be seen that Lessing's problem has been the platform for several variant though correlated responses. What apparently began as a simple statement about history and faith soon became an agonizing question for theology. Not only was the concreteness and reality of Jesus Christ jeopardized, but also the application and relevance of faith seemed to come into disrepute. Theology maintained His centrality in any disposition of faith's content and thus sought to answer Lessing in Christological terms. Yet Lessing has been seen to cast a shadow which is still present in contemporary discussions. As one possible answer, theology attempted to divide history into the objective, historical and the existential, historical. With this done, it endeavoured to place Christ in the latter context and to speak of Him in terms of significance and meaning. This option seems to be

viable until (a) the personality of Christ was revealed to be an undemonstrable article of faith and (b) the "Dass" or portrait of Jesus Christ as the New Being is seen in its tenuous factual grounding. When this is done, the relativity of the interpretation seems to become apparent. As a second approach, KB has endeavoured to connect history and faith in the person of Jesus Christ who is both objective, and existential, historical. God and man become distinct realities. The absolutely freely effecting cause and the freely effecting cause stand in correlation to each other. In a sense, KB turns the tables on Lessing by re-defining his terms. In this way, he apparently offers a quite different answer to the problem. The final disposition of Lessing's question and the adequacy or inadequacy of the several systems has been considered. Therefore, it seems possible to suggest that KB's alternative better handles the problem raised. In the main, a vast amount of difficulty arises from assuming faith's content to be necessary in Lessing's sense. This has apparently been assumed to mean something constant and unchangeable, even immoveable and static. SK seems to imply this of the necessary when he argues that it cannot be historical. The necessary simply is and does not participate in the transitional movement of life. The distinction by both Lessing and SK seems to be handled in logical and definitional terms. KB re-translates the necessary to mean the actualism of God in history. God's eternity absorbs the movement and historicity of becoming in His own terms. In Jesus Christ, He shows His complicity in human historicity.

It has not really helped to separate history into the impersonal and the personal. This only beclouds and confuses the issue. The day of reckoning still comes when the theologian will have to show the relation between the reality of faith and history. Bultmann attempts to overcome the obstacle by speaking of the Word of God. This is the constant element though it is repeated in proclamation. But from where does this Word come? After all, he assumes history to be the realm of the accidental. Tillich does not appear to fare any better. He proposes a union between the New Being and Jesus of Nazareth. The disciples accomplish this in their faith. But from where does the New Being come? Both Bultmann and Tillich seem to assume (a) that history is changeable and (b) that it cannot transcend itself. The Word of God and the New Being do not really seem to accommodate the problem. Consequently they do not seem to be able to sustain the whole weight of eternity. Lessing's problem was definitional in a very large measure. And KB attacks it in these terms. All of theology's symbols, myths, Words, New Beings and values do not really appear to bridge the logical problem of the "ditch" without a fundamental re-understanding of what is involved. It appears to be the insight of KB that the problem is hopelessly impossible without this reformulation. Consequently, the necessary content of faith comes into line with the accidental ground. Both are transitional and alive in complementary modes of historicity. But as it was suggested above, it may be that KB's answer also requires the complementation of a cosmological reformulation of the climate

of opinion which bred Lessing's problem. If this is the case, Lessing may provide the impetus for far more paper and print which proposes more answers and solutions to his persistent problem.

A P P E N D I X A

KIERKEGAARD'S PARADOX BASED
ON SELECTED REFERENCES FROM
THE KIERKEGAARD INDICES

VOLUME II

FUNDAMENTAL POLYGLOT

KONKORDANS TIL

KIERKEGAARDS SAMLEDE VAERKER*

* Compiled by Alastair McKinnon, E.J. Briel, Leiden,
The Netherlands, 1971.

The purpose of this exercise is to sift through various entries in The Kierkegaard Indices, Volume II, in order to glean some textual indication of Kierkegaard's use and understanding of paradox. Alastair McKinnon has strongly suggested that paradox is not intended to mean something irrational or absurd. On the contrary, he contends that Kierkegaard's usage implies something comprehensible and intelligible in its own right. The selections are taken from Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Indeed, these two works account for about two-thirds of the term's listing in The Kierkegaard Indices, Volume II. By restricting attention to these references, the term paradox appears to be used in a comprehensive and intelligible manner. Kierkegaard compares paradox with Reason, and he indicates that the latter can never explain the former. The paradox refers to the eternal in time. In Christian terms, Kierkegaard tells us that God, the Eternal, has become a particular man. As an imagination, Reason can understand this. But when faith presents the imagination as an actuality, Reason replies that this is absurd. Reason is able to speculate about God and an individual man, but Kierkegaard emphasizes that what is paradoxical is also real. This dimension of realness is the stumbling-block for Reason. In itself, the paradox is not paradoxical. It is paradox as such only in conjunction with an existing individual. The suggestion seems to be that man by nature lives in the world through his power of Reason. It does not appear that Kierkegaard is impugning its place in life, rather he appears to be accentuating a limitation of its

ability. In religious terms, this particular limitation has to do with the paradox -- with God in time. In confrontation with this fact, Reason can only find it absurd and unreasonable. But according to Kierkegaard, the Reason effects its own undoing in this encounter. Reason yields and the paradox bestows. It does not appear that Reason is annihilated. Rather, the supremacy of the Paradox is acknowledged. In the encounter, the paradox takes precedence over Reason and confers its own rationality and intelligibility. It is not explainable in Reason's terms, but yet the paradox does not convey gibberish. The paradox realigns the functioning of Reason in the light of God in time. The Reason never understands this in the sense that the paradox is explained. The paradox remains paradox as long as man exists. While Reason cannot apprehend it, faith is the vehicle which passionately affirms the paradox's actuality in and pertinence for life. In faith, existence appears to acquire a complementation which augments and amplifies Reason's grasp of reality. In faith, the believer is placed in the extremity of existence which vouchsafes his whole life in time. In faith, the paradox evidently offers a new organizing principle which relates the existing individual to the eternal. This organization appears to represent an heuristic frame of reference. More to the point, it seems that in Kierkegaard's terms the absolute distinction between God and man places the paradox outside of Reason's competence. This does not presuppose the paradox to be irrational, but rather it suggests that it offers a meta-rational basis of integration. In its own right and in its own sphere of

influence, the paradox interrelates the existence of the believer with the eternal while superceding the competence of Reason to explain it. From these observations and interpretations, it would seem to be the case that the paradox operates in a different continuum of meaning than the Reason. Consequently, this does not nullify or jeopardize its integrative and organizational ability, but it does suggest a dearth of comparison between the Reason and the paradox as Kierkegaard employs them.

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Philosophical Fragments: (see page 750-752)

Page/Line

- 46/12-13 However, one should not think slightly of the paradoxical; for the paradox is the source of the thinker's passion, and the thinker without a paradox is like a lover without feeling: a paltry mediocrity.
- 46/19 The supreme paradox of all thought is the attempt to discover something that thought cannot think.
- 48/24 The lover is so completely transformed by the paradox of love that he scarcely recognizes himself;
- 59/1 Thus our Paradox is rendered still more appalling, or the same Paradox has the double aspect which proclaims it as the Absolute Paradox; negatively by revealing the absolute unlikeness of sin; positively by proposing to do away with the absolute unlikeness in absolute likeness.
- 59/17 But this is what the Paradox also desires, and thus they [Paradox and Reason] are at bottom linked in understanding; but this understanding is present only in the moment of passion.
- 61/1 If the Paradox and the Reason come together in a mutual understanding of their unlikeness their encounter will be happy....

Page/Line

- 63/3 But precisely because offense is thus passive, the discovery, if it be allowable thus to speak, does not derive from the Reason, but from the Paradox; for as the Truth is index sui et falsi, the Paradox is this also, and the offended consciousness does not understand itself but is understood by the Paradox.
- 63/10-12 But if the Paradox is index and judex sui et falsi, the offended consciousness can be taken as an indirect proof of the validity of the Paradox; offense is the mistaken reckoning, the invalid consequence, with which the Paradox repels and thrusts aside.
- 63/15 The offended individual does not speak from his own resources, but borrows those of the Paradox;
- 63/27 Offense was not discovered by the Reason...for then Reason must also have been able to discover the Paradox.
- 64/1 No, offense comes into existence with the Paradox;
- 65/6 but since the Paradox has made the Reason absurd, the regard of the Reason is no reliable criterion.
- 65/13 The Reason says that the Paradox is the Paradox, quia absurdum.
- 65/15 The offended consciousness holds aloof from the Paradox and keeps to the probable, since the Paradox is the most improbable of all things.
- 65/23 since the Paradox is the Miracle!
- 66/4 When Reason takes pity on the Paradox, and wishes to help it to an explanation, the Paradox does not indeed acquiesce....
- 66/9 When Reason says that it cannot get the Paradox into its head, it was not the Reason that made this discovery but the Paradox....
- 66/15 All that the offended consciousness has to say about the Paradox it has learned from the Paradox....
- 67/29 But here the difference consists in the fact that the Reason yielded itself while the Paradox bestowed itself....
- 68/11 If God had not come himself, all the relations would have remained on the Socratic level; we would not have had the Moment, and we would have lost the Paradox.

Page/Line

- 72/9 and it has also been shown that the Moment is the Paradox....
- 73/3 when the Reason sets itself aside and the Paradox bestows itself.
- 74/2 if only the moment remains, as point of departure for the Eternal, the Paradox will be there.
- 76/13 But the Paradox unites the contradictories, and is the historical made eternal, and the Eternal made historical.
- 76/14 Everyone who understands the Paradox differently may keep the honor of having explained it, which honor he won by not being content to understand it.
- 81/16 Faith is itself a miracle, and all that holds true of the Paradox also holds true of Faith.
- 120/13 It is and remains the Paradox, and cannot be assimilated by any speculation.
- 123/9 But consequences founded on a paradox are humanly speaking built over a yawning chasm, and their total content, which can be transmitted to the individual only with the express understanding that they rest upon a paradox, are not to be appropriated as a settled state, for their entire value trembles in the balance.

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Concluding Unscientific Postscripts: (see page 752-755)

- 88/4 The paradoxical character of Christianity consists in its constant use of time and the historical in relation to the eternal.
- 95/21 thought wills the discovery of the paradoxical
- 95/26 The last thing that human thinking can will to do, is to will to transcend itself in the paradoxical.
- 95/27 And Christianity is precisely the paradoxical.
- 96/22 All Christianity is rooted in the paradoxical.
- 162/6-11 but in becoming aware of the paradox and holding the paradox fast every moment, fearing most of all an explanation which would take away the paradox, because the paradox is not a transitory form of relation of the religious in the stricter sense to the existing subject, but is essentially conditioned by the fact that a man is in existence, so that the explanation which takes away the paradox fantastically transforms at the same time the exister into a fantastic something or another... -- but such...is not a man.

Page/Line

- 177/38 corresponding to passion in the subject the truth becomes a paradox; and the fact that the truth becomes a paradox is rooted precisely in its having a relationship to an existing subject.
- 180/37 this truth must therefore be a paradox for him as long as he exists.
- 183/26 But the eternal essential truth is by no means in itself a paradox; but it becomes paradoxical by virtue of its relationship to an existing individual.
- 186/20 The paradox emerges when the eternal truth and existence are placed in juxtaposition with one another....
- 187/17 How does the paradox come into existence? By putting the eternal essential truth into juxtaposition with existence.
- 187/20 The eternal truth has come into being in time: this is the paradox.
- 188/1 But since the paradox is not in the first instance itself paradoxical (but only in its relationship to the existing individual)....
- 194/7 "But viewed eternally and from the divine standpoint...there is no paradox...."
- 194/37 That God existed in human form, has been born, grown up, and so forth, is surely the paradox sensu strictissimo, the absolute paradox.
- 195/3 but the absolute paradox, just because it is absolute, can be relevant only to the absolute difference that distinguishes man from God....
- 195/22 for in connection with the absolute paradox the only understanding possible is that it cannot be understood.
- 197/16 To explain the paradox: is that tantamount to reducing the term paradox to a rhetorical expression...?
- 203/8 and only when it becomes understood that there is no paradox or that the paradox is only paradoxical to a certain degree, only then is all lost.
- 206/31 And so it is here; the existing individual has by means of the paradox itself come to be placed in the extremity of existence.

Page/Line

- 206/36 And this is indeed granted to the highly unspeculative understanding between passion and the paradox, since the whole of life in time is vouchsafed, and the change comes first in eternity.
- 209/5 Faith has in fact two tasks; to take care in every moment to discover the improbable, the paradox; and then to hold it fast with the passion of inwardness.
- 265/23 The significance attached to time is in general decisive for every standpoint up to that of the paradox, which paradoxically accentuates time.
- 502/20 The misunderstanding is invariably due to the false notion that the incomprehensibility of the paradox must be related in some way to the difference between more or less understanding....
- 502/23 The paradox is related essentially to man as man.
- 514/21 In his misunderstanding he will understand Christianity as a possibility and forget that what is possible in the fantasy-medium of possibility... must in the medium of reality become absolute paradox.
- 514/25 the difficulty, the paradox, is that it is real.
- 515/2 But within the sphere of faith the moment can never arrive when he understands the paradox (in a direct sense);
- 515/18 In the fantasy-medium of possibility God can perfectly well for the imagination be fused with a man, but that this should occur in reality with an individual man, this precisely is the paradox.
- 528/2 The paradox consists principally in the fact that God, the Eternal, came into existence in time as a particular man.
- 529/18 and the absolute paradox is recognizable by the fact that every analogy is a fallacy.
- 536/36 The absolute paradox will maintain itself well enough, for in relation to the absolute, more intellect gets no farther than less intellect;
- 540/16 The formula [about faith] fits only the believer, no one else...but simply and solely the believer who is related to the absolute paradox.

TITLE CODES

ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS *

BI	<i>The Concept of Irony</i> , trans. Lee M. Capel; Harper and Row, New York; 1965.	CT	<i>Christian Discourses</i> , trans. Walter Lowrie; Oxford University Press, London; 1952. Also, paperback ed., Oxford University Press, New York; 1961.
EE1	<i>Either/Or</i> , vol. I, trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson with revisions by Howard A. Johnson; Anchor Books, New York; 1959.	LA	<i>The Present Age</i> , trans. Alexander Dru; Harper Torchbooks, New York; 1962.
EE2	<i>Either/Or</i> , vol. II, (as above).	KK	<i>Crisis in the Life of An Actress</i> , trans. Stephen D. Crites; Harper Torchbooks, New York; 1967.
T	<i>Edifying Discourses</i> , vol. I, trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson; Augsburg Publishing House, Minneapolis; 1962.*	LF	"The Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air", <i>Christian Discourses</i> , (as above).
FB	<i>Fear and Trembling</i> , trans. Walter Lowrie; Anchor Books, New York; 1954. Also paperback ed., Princeton University Press, Princeton; 1968.	YTS	"The High Priest" — "The Publican" — "The Woman that was a Sinner", <i>Christian Discourses</i> , (as above).
G	<i>Repetition</i> , trans. Walter Lowrie; Oxford University Press, London; 1946.	TSA	"Two Minor Ethico-Religious Treatises", <i>The Present Age</i> , Oxford University Press, London; 1949.
PS	<i>Philosophical Fragments</i> , trans. David F. Swenson with revision by Howard V. Hong; Princeton University Press, Princeton; 1964. Also, paperback ed., Princeton University Press, Princeton; 1967.	SD	<i>The Sickness Unto Death</i> , trans. Walter Lowrie; Anchor Books, New York; 1954. Also paperback ed., Princeton University Press, Princeton; 1968.
BA	<i>The Concept of Dread</i> , trans. Walter Lowrie; Oxford University Press, London; 1946. Also, Princeton University Press, Princeton; 1946.	IC	<i>Training in Christianity</i> , trans. Walter Lowrie; Oxford University Press, London; 1946. Also, paperback ed., Princeton University Press, Princeton; 1967.
TTL	<i>Thoughts on Crucial Situations in Human Life</i> , trans. David F. Swenson; Augsburg Publishing House, Minneapolis; 1941.	EOT	"An Edifying Discourse", <i>Training in Christianity</i> , (as above).
SV1 & SV2	<i>Stages on Life's Way</i> , trans. Walter Lowrie; Princeton University Press, Princeton; 1940. Also, paperback ed., Schocken Books, New York; 1967.	TAF	"Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays", <i>For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves!</i> , trans. Walter Lowrie; Princeton University Press, Princeton; 1944. Also, paperback ed., Princeton University Press, Princeton; 1968.
AE1 & AE2	<i>Concluding Unscientific Postscript</i> , trans. David F. Swenson; Oxford University Press, London; 1945.	TS	"For Self-Examination", <i>For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves!</i> , (as above).
LT	<i>Purity of Heart</i> , trans. Douglas V. Steere, revised ed.; Harper and Bros., New York; 1948. Also, Harper Torchbooks, New York; 1956.	DS	"Judge for Yourselves!", <i>For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves!</i> , (as above).
HLF & LE	<i>The Gospel of Suffering</i> , trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson; Augsburg Publishing House, Minneapolis; 1948 †.	BFF	"A Passing Comment on a Detail in Don Juan", <i>Crisis in the Life of an Actress</i> , (as above).
KG	<i>Works of Love</i> , trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson; Princeton University Press, Princeton; 1946.	FV	"On My Work as an Author", <i>The Point of View</i> , trans. Walter Lowrie; Oxford University Press, London; 1939.
		SFV	"The Point of View for my Work as an Author", <i>The Point of View</i> , (as above). Also, paperback ed., Harper Torchbooks, New York; 1962, (pp. 5-103).
		B21	"Articles in the Fatherland", <i>Attack upon "Christendom" 1854-55</i> , trans. Walter Lowrie; Oxford University Press, London; 1946.
		O	"The Instant", Nos. I-II, <i>Attack Upon "Christendom" 1854-55</i> , (as above).
		HCD	"What Christ's Judgement is about Official Christianity", <i>Attack Upon "Christendom" 1854-55</i> , (as above).
		O	"The Instant", Nos. III-VII, <i>Attack Upon "Christendom" 1854-55</i> , (as above).
		GU	"The Unchangeableness of God", <i>For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves!</i> , (as above).
		O	"The Instant", Nos. VIII-X, <i>Attack Upon "Christendom" 1854-55</i> , (as above).

* A number of these translations have appeared in new facsimile copy paperback editions since the making of this list.

* The references cited in this work are to the new, two volume paperback edition of *Edifying Discourses*. Those wishing to use the original four volume edition, of which this is a facsimile copy, may do so by making the following adjustments to the pagination for the various discourses: first and second, subtract 16; third, subtract 11; fourth and fifth, subtract 10; sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth, subtract 123; tenth, subtract 204; eleventh, add 12; twelfth, add 19; thirteenth and fourteenth, add 20; fifteenth, subtract 113; sixteenth, subtract 112; seventeenth, subtract 111; eighteenth, subtract 110.

† In this translation these two pieces appear in reverse order.

	T.	Dan. 3. udg.		Dan. 2. udg.		Eng.	
		s.	l.	s.	l.	p.	l.
overnaturlig (Forts.)							
Luft til, at puste hende op i overnaturlig Størrelse, at lade hende	SV1	47	34	59	34	61	30
jeg i denne næsten overnaturlige Tilstand ikke griber en Virkelighed,	SV2	30	23	220	27	198	31
stærk, overnaturlig stærk, det er qvindelig svag i Indbildningens	SV2	69	30	266	18	237	17
Overgangen fra at være i overnaturlig Størrelse ved det Ondes Magt	SV2	159	27	372	16	324	23
er i Fortvivlelsens Nød, har altid overnaturlige Kræfter, og derfor	SV2	189	19	408	9	353	20
og hvorledes han blev overnaturlig, ikke som den Religieuse bliver	SV2	248	26	478	18	411	29
søger at bringe det Religieuse frem i dets overnaturlige Størrelse,	AE1	56	12	52	26	60	15
og viser ham i overnaturlig Størrelse for den undrende Iagttagere:	AE1	116	3	125	3	125	8
Ligelighed, og hans overnaturlige Spændstighed Selvbeherskelse,	AE1	209	8	236	8	223	39
da reiser Frimodigheden sig med overnaturlige Kræfter,	LE	303	15	477	3	150	2
Dragt, i hvilken et overnaturligt Væsen har skjult sig. Naar nemlig	KG	90	12	105	27	72	43
Hemmelighed, i overnaturlig Størrelse iføre den Kløgtens,	KG	219	24	259	3	183	17
Pantheisme (Pantheismen)							
Atheisme, Pantheisme. cfr. 3,86 om Frankrigs religieuse Tilstand:	LP	50	38	91	37		
og til en vis Grad, hvad Hegel kalder Phantasiens Pantheisme ¹ ,	BI	146	3	204	28	132	38
nødvendig lader sig deducere af Pantheismen, saa følger deraf	BI	195	35	263	33	188	35
Pantheismen kan komme tilsyne paa to Maader, enten idet	BI	319	20	413	33	327	32
Kjedsommelighed er den demoniske Pantheisme. Bliver	EE1	267	27	302	24	286	1
I Pantheismen ligger i Almindelighed Bestemmelsen af Fylde,	EE1	268	29	303	33	287	6
at Synden er en Position, at det er Pantheisme og Rationalisme, og	SD	149	20	234	30	228	10
Uden denne Categorie har Pantheismen ubetinget seiret.	SFV	166	19	652	11	136	30
være Christus; og Pantheismen er et akustisk Bedrag, der forvexler	SFV	166	37	652	30	137	23
Paradox (Paradoxe, Paradoxet, Paradoxets)							
der ikke gaar af Veien for den tilsyneladende Paradox § 6:	BI	81	6	127	27	60	8
fra den Forskandsning, han havde indtaget bag sit dristige Paradox.	BI	158	18	219	19	147	12
frygtede man dog ikke for det Paradox, at det Mindste	EE1	52	32	42	2	51	22
saa trøster jeg mig igjen som saa ofte med Paradoxet, at man ogsaa	EE1	64	27	56	29	64	39
Bedrag er nemlig for Kjærligheden et absolut Paradox, og deri ligger	EE1	166	2	180	24	177	18
eller det Sympathetiske, saa er Paradoxet hævet, det er, Individet	EE1	166	11	180	34	177	28
over Reflexionen, det tænker vel ikke Paradoxet i den Forstand, at	EE1	166	12	180	36	177	30
begge Momenter i sig, og dette bringer den i Forhold til Paradoxet.	EE1	166	28	181	18	178	8
I de to beskrevne Tilfælde er Paradoxet vel ogsaa for Kjærligheden,	EE1	166	28	181	18	178	8
dette ikke, i sidste Tilfælde er Paradoxet for Kjærligheden.	EE1	166	30	181	20	178	10
Paradoxet er utænkeligt, og dog vil Kjærligheden tænke	EE1	166	30	181	20	178	10
elsket ham, og det er saaledes intet Paradox, og forsaavidt den maaskee	EE1	168	24	183	30	180	12
Paradoxet er allerede for hendes Sjæl, men saalænge hun	EE1	181	9	199	8	194	3
naar hun kommer til sig selv, da gjelder det om at tænke Paradoxet.	EE1	183	13	201	27	196	17
mellem den Maade, paa hvilken de, hver især, komme til Paradoxet.	EE1	183	20	201	35	196	26
der tvinger hende at stirre paa dette Paradox, om hun kan	EE1	184	12	202	34	197	21
det Tilfældige, og dette er det uhyre Paradox, at det Tilfældige er	EE1	216	8	240	17	232	6
hvilket er et Paradox for den sceniske Prestation og	EE1	257	10	290	9	277	8
Det synes et Paradox og er det ogsaa for Følelsen.	EE1	274	36	311	18	294	11
faar i ethvert Moment Oie paa hiint uhyre Paradox, der er Indholdet	FB	32	20	95	17	44	7
falder jeg ned, da det, der bydes mig, er et Paradox.	FB	32	31	95	28	44	18
første Bevægelse; man vil suge Leve-Viisdom ud af Paradoxet.	FB	36	7	99	28	48	14
den er ikke Hjertets umiddelbare Drift, men Tilværelsens Paradox.	FB	44	36	110	8	58	9
end min evige Bevidsthed høre der Tro, thi dette er det Paradoxe.	FB	45	35	111	13	59	11
men der hører et Paradox og ydmygt Mod til nu at gribe	FB	46	16	111	34	59	33
eller lad os lære at forferdes ved den uhyre Paradox, der er hans	FB	49	29	115	33	63	24
for at see, hvilket uhyre Paradox Troen er, et Paradox,	FB	50	17	116	27	64	16
hvilket uhyre Paradox Troen er, et Paradox, der formaaer at	FB	50	17	116	27	64	16
en hellig og gudvelbehagelig Handling, et Paradox, der giver Abraham	FB	50	18	116	28	64	17
Troen er nemlig dette Paradox, at den Enkelte er høiere	FB	52	4	118	13	65	28
Troen er netop dette Paradox, at den Enkelte som den Enkelte	FB	52	32	119	9	66	22
det er og bliver i al Evighed et Paradox, utilgængeligt for	FB	52	39	119	17	66	30
Og dog er Troen dette Paradox eller ogsaa (dette er de	FB	53	1	119	18	66	31
At dette Paradox for den Enkelte let kan forvexles med	FB	53	6	119	23	66	37
nogle Kjendetegn, at man kunde adskille Paradoxet fra en Anfægtelse.	FB	53	12	119	30	67	5
hvis Liv ikke blot er det mest Paradoxe, der lader sig	FB	53	22	120	6	67	17
Dette Paradox lader sig ikke mediere; thi saasart han begynder	FB	53	25	120	9	67	20
det Guddommelige og derfor lader det Paradoxe deri sig mediere i det	FB	56	20	123	26	70	36
Dette er det Paradox, ved hvilket han bliver paa Spidsen,	FB	58	2	125	20	72	28
ikke kan gjøre tydeligt for nogen Anden, thi Paradoxet er, at han som	FB	58	3	125	21	72	30
Hans Berettigelse er igjen det Paradoxe; thi dersom han	FB	58	5	125	23	72	32

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Paradox (Forts.)							
thi da kommer man slet ikke til Paradoxet, at den Enkelte	FB	58	11	125	30	72	39
i vor Tid hører et Svar i Retning af Paradoxet, da lyder det gjerne	FB	58	15	125	34	73	5
i Bevidsthed af, at han er et Paradox, der ikke kan gjøre sig	FB	58	17	126	1	73	7
Angsten, Nøden, Paradoxet vil man ikke vide Noget af.	FB	59	14	127	4	74	11
lige berettiget. Man udelader Nøden, Angsten, Paradoxet. Min Tanke	FB	60	22	128	19	75	26
op denne Tid den er Angstens, Nødens og Paradoxets.	FB	60	30	128	27	75	35
ved at være fritagne for Nøden og Qvalen og Paradoxet, men bleve det	FB	61	7	129	10	76	15
i det forjættede Land. Man glemmer Angsten, Nøden, Paradoxet. Var	FB	61	19	129	22	76	28
Minut en Morder, eller vi staae ved det Paradox, der er høiere end	FB	61	29	129	33	77	1
end det Almene. Dette er Paradoxet, som ikke lader sig mediere. Det	FB	61	33	130	3	77	5
Troen derimod er dette Paradox, at Inderligheden er høiere	FB	64	6	132	14	79	8
Troens Paradox er dette, at der er en Inderlighed, der	FB	64	15	132	24	79	18
Troens Paradox er da dette, at den Enkelte er høiere	FB	64	37	133	12	80	3
Paradoxet kan ogsaa udtrykkes saaledes, at der er en absolut Pligt	FB	65	2	133	16	80	7
Dette Paradox lader sig ikke mediere; thi det berør netop	FB	65	15	133	30	80	23
I Fortællingen om Abraham finde vi et saadant Paradox.	FB	65	30	134	11	81	5
Troens Paradox har tabt det Mellemliggende i: det Almene.	FB	66	1	134	21	81	17
Troen er dette Paradox, og den Enkelte kan aldeles	FB	66	7	134	27	81	25
Ridder derved, at han tager Paradoxet paa sig, eller han bliver	FB	66	13	134	33	82	2
Betrager jeg derimod Opgaven som et Paradox, saa forstaaer jeg	FB	68	17	137	14	84	18
jeg forstaaer den saaledes, som man kan forstaae et Paradox.	FB	68	18	137	15	84	19
Men dette er Nøden og Angsten i Paradoxet, at han,	FB	68	29	137	27	84	31
og saa snart den Enkelte er kommen ind i Paradoxet, kommer han ikke	FB	69	2	138	5	85	5
Kirkens Idee; han kommer ikke ud af Paradoxet, men maa enten finde	FB	69	3	138	6	85	6
os saa lidt nærmere overveie Nøden og Angsten i Troens Paradox.	FB	69	36	139	4	86	5
han ikke hente hos noget Menneske; thi saa er han udenfor Paradoxet.	FB	71	37	141	18	88	16
lod der sig dog ud af Paradoxet construere nogle Kjendetegn,	FB	73	5	142	30	89	32
paa at springe af fra Paradoxets trange Vei og blive en tragisk Helt	FB	73	8	143	2	89	35
Troens Ridder derimod han er Paradoxet, han er den Enkelte,	FB	73	14	143	8	90	3
er der en saadan, da er den det beskrevne Paradox, at den Enkelte som	FB	74	16	144	17	91	10
Skjulthed, saa staae vi ved Paradoxet, der ikke lader sig mediere.	FB	75	13	145	13	91	32
at den æsthetiske Skjulthed og Paradoxet vise sig i deres absolute	FB	78	3	148	24	94	31
da støder jeg bestandig an paa Paradoxet, det guddommelige og	FB	80	28	151	29	97	24
Fordi det dog var muligt, at den kunde kaste et Lys over Paradoxet.	FB	84	24	156	25	102	11
Forhold til ham, saa ere vi ved Paradoxet, dersom det ellers er til	FB	85	13	157	14	102	35
er Analogien, Modstykket til hiint Paradox, om hvilket vi tale.	FB	88	27	161	16	106	33
ægter da Agnete. Inidertid maa han tie til Paradoxet. Naar nemlig	FB	89	23	162	25	108	2
allerede i Retning af det demoniske Paradox høiere end det Almene,	FB	90	2	163	3	108	10
istand til at kunne gjøre det Almene, og nu Paradoxet gjentager sig.	FB	90	18	163	20	108	28
thi Havmanden kommer netop ved Paradoxet til at ville realisere	FB	90	20	163	23	108	31
Saadanne Naturer ere fra Grunden af i Paradoxet, og de ere	FB	96	3	170	5	115	13
fortabes i det demoniske Paradox eller frelses i det guddommelige.	FB	96	5	170	7	115	16
til det Almene, og bragt i Forhold til Paradoxet, hvad enten han i	FB	96	35	171	5	116	11
man ikke Sligt. Skal han tie, saa maa han ind i Paradoxet. — Endnu	FB	97	43	172	35	117	40
I saa Fald er han i Paradoxet, men i saa Fald er hans Tvivl	FB	100	28	175	24	120	32
en Analogi, maatte det være Syndens Paradox, men dette ligger igjen	FB	101	17	176	19	121	27
Nu staae vi da ved Paradoxet. Enten kan den Enkelte	FB	102	3	177	12	122	17
atter synes her, at Paradoxet er det Letteste og Nemmeste af Alt.	FB	102	7	177	16	122	22
om den end ikke kan tænkes i Almindelighed; thi saa hæves Paradoxet.	FB	102	11	177	20	122	27
Nøden og Angsten i Paradoxet laae, som ovenfor udviklet,	FB	106	17	182	12	127	15
med mindre man vil have ham ud igjen af Paradoxet, saaledes,	FB	106	19	182	14	127	18
vilde han ved en saadan Tale falde ud af Paradoxet, og hvis han	FB	106	29	182	25	127	28
og forsaavidt jeg kan forstaae Paradoxet, kan jeg ogsaa	FB	106	34	182	30	127	34
men kun forstaae ham saaledes, som man forstaaer Paradoxet.	FB	107	35	184	3	129	5
Enten er der da et Paradox til, at den Enkelte som den Enkelte	FB	108	12	184	21	129	25
Phedrus § 229 E). Dette synes et Paradox. Dog skal man ikke tænke	PS	38	9	230	18	46	11
Dog skal man ikke tænke ilde om Paradoxet; thi Paradoxet er	PS	38	10	230	19	46	12
ikke tænke ilde om Paradoxet; thi Paradoxet er Tankens Lidenskab, og	PS	38	10	230	19	46	12
og den Tænker, som er uden Paradoxet, han er ligesom den Elsker	PS	38	11	230	20	46	13
Dette er da Tænkningsens høieste Paradox, at ville opdage	PS	38	16	230	25	46	19
egen Undergang. Saaledes er det jo med Elskovens Paradox. Mennesket	PS	39	25	232	13	48	16
da vaagner Selvkjærlighedens Paradox som Kjærlighed til	PS	39	26	232	14	48	17
nu den Elskende ved dette Kjærlighedens Paradox bliver forandret,	PS	40	2	232	20	48	24
virker hiint Forstandens anede Paradox igjen tilbage paa Mennesket	PS	40	6	232	25	48	29
fatte dette? Her synes vi at staae ved et Paradox. Blot for	PS	46	16	240	11	58	5
Saa bliver da Paradoxet endnu forfærdeligere, eller det samme Paradox	PS	46	37	240	33	59	1
endnu forfærdeligere, eller det samme Paradox har den Dobbeltthed, ved	PS	46	37	240	33	59	1
Lader nu et saadant Paradox sig tænke? Vi ville ikke forhaste	PS	47	3	241	3	59	7
Forstandens Undergang er det jo ogsaa Paradoxet vil, og saaledes ere	PS	47	11	241	12	59	17
Saaledes ogsaa med Paradoxets Forhold til Forstanden,	PS	47	26	241	28	60	3

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Paradox (Forts.)							
Dersom Paradoxet og Forstanden stode sammen i den fælleds	PS	48	1	242	1	61	1
og stirrer næsten som en Betler paa Paradoxet, forstenende i sin	PS	48	26	243	2	62	10
vil tale saaledes, ikke Forstanden, men Paradoxet; thi som Sandheden	PS	49	15	243	19	63	1
sui et falsi, saa er Paradoxet det ogsaa, og Forargelsen forstaaer	PS	49	16	243	20	63	2
forstaaer ikke sig selv, men er forstaaet af Paradoxet. Medens	PS	49	17	243	21	63	3
fra dens modsatte Kant, saa er det dog Paradoxet, som gjenlyder i den,	PS	49	19	243	23	63	5
Men er Paradoxet index og judex sui et falsi, saa kan Forargelsen	PS	49	20	244	1	63	6
betrages som en indirecte Prøve paa Paradoxets Rigtighed;	PS	49	22	244	4	63	9
er den Usandhedens Consequents, med hvilken Paradoxet støder fra sig.	PS	49	23	244	5	63	10
taler ikke af sit Eget, han taler af Paradoxets, ligesom Den, der	PS	49	25	244	7	63	12
desto mere viser det sig, hvor meget Forargelsen skylder Paradoxet.	PS	49	28	244	10	63	15
Forstand udvikler, opdager hverken Paradoxet eller Forargelsen.	PS	49	37	243	33	63	29
thi saa maatte Forstanden ogsaa have kunnet opfinde Paradoxet; nei,	PS	50	2	244	12	63	18
nei, med Paradoxet oliver Forargelsen til; oliver den	PS	50	2	244	12	63	18
Statueres Oieblikket, da er Paradoxet der; thi i sin	PS	50	6	244	17	63	25
thi i sin meest abbrevierede Form kan man kalde Paradoxet Oieblikket:	PS	50	7	244	18	63	27
da den jo er Forargelse paa Paradoxet, og Paradoxet atter	PS	50	17	244	29	64	12
jo er Forargelse paa Paradoxet, og Paradoxet atter er Oieblikket.	PS	50	17	244	29	64	12
at Oieblikket er Daarskaben, Paradoxet er Daarskaben; hvilket er	PS	50	26	245	4	64	28
hvilket er Paradoxets Fordring paa at Forstanden er	PS	50	26	245	4	64	28
men da Paradoxet har gjort Forstanden til det Absurde,	PS	50	29	245	7	65	1
Forargelsen bliver da udenfor Paradoxet, og Grunden er,	PS	50	32	245	10	65	6
ikke opdaget det, da det tvertimod er Paradoxet, som opdagede det,	PS	50	34	245	12	65	9
Forstanden siger, at Paradoxet er det Absurde, men dette	PS	50	35	245	14	65	11
kun en Vrengen efter, thi Paradoxet er jo Paradoxet, quia absurdum.	PS	50	36	245	15	65	13
kun en Vrengen efter, thi Paradoxet er jo Paradoxet, quia absurdum.	PS	50	36	245	15	65	13
Forargelsen bliver udenfor Paradoxet og beholder Sandsynligheden,	PS	50	37	245	16	65	15
og beholder Sandsynligheden, medens Paradoxet er det Usandsynligste.	PS	50	38	245	17	65	16
det, men den snakker kun Paradoxet efter Munden, hvor underligt	PS	50	39	245	18	65	18
det end synes; thi Paradoxet siger selv: Komedier og Romaner	PS	51	1	245	19	65	19
Forargelsen bliver udenfor Paradoxet, hvad Under, da Paradoxet	PS	51	3	245	21	65	22
bliver udenfor Paradoxet, hvad Under, da Paradoxet er Underet?	PS	51	4	245	22	65	23
tvertimod det var Paradoxet der anviste Forstanden Pladsen	PS	51	5	245	23	65	24
sig ag sin Herlighed i Sammenligning med Paradoxet, der er det	PS	51	11	245	30	65	32
ikke opfundet dette, men Paradoxet er selv Opfinderen, der overlader	PS	51	12	245	31	66	1
vil forbarme sig over Paradoxet og hjælpe det til Forklaringen,	PS	51	14	245	33	66	4
hjelpe det til Forklaringen, saa finder Paradoxet sig vel ikke deri,	PS	51	15	245	34	66	5
Naar Forstanden ikke kan faae Paradoxet i sit Hoved,	PS	51	18	246	2	66	9
Forstanden ikke opfundet Dette, men Paradoxet selv, der var paradox	PS	51	19	246	4	66	10
Alt hvad den siger om Paradoxet, har den lært af dette,	PS	51	23	246	8	66	15
alle de Ytringer, Du lægger Paradoxet i Munden, tilhøre slet	PS	51	28	246	13	66	21
— „Hvorledes skulle de tilhøre mig, da de jo tilhøre Paradoxet.	PS	51	29	246	14	66	23
men netop de, som holdt fast ved Paradoxet, og dog tale de som	PS	52	7	246	32	67	13
at Paradoxet saaledes ligesom tager Forargelsen Brødet	PS	52	10	247	2	67	17
Forstanden opgav sig selv, og at Paradoxet hengav sig selv (halb zog	PS	52	19	247	13	67	29
blev Alt socratick, vi fik ikke Oieblikket og gik glip af Paradoxet.	PS	53	9	247	26	68	11
og viist, at Oieblikket er Paradoxet, og at vi uden dette	PS	55	38	250	33	72	9
kommer nu den Lærende i Forstaaelse med dette Paradox, thi vi sige	PS	56	13	251	13	72	27
thi vi sige ikke at han skal forstaae Paradoxet, men kun forstaae,	PS	56	14	251	14	72	28
han skal forstaae Paradoxet, men kun forstaae, at dette er Paradoxet?	PS	56	15	251	16	72	30
det skeer naar Forstanden og Paradoxet stode lykkeligen sammen i	PS	56	16	251	17	72	31
Forstanden skaffer sig selv til Side og Paradoxet giver sig selv hen;	PS	56	17	251	18	72	32
der er entlediget, ei heller ved Paradoxet, der giver sig hen,	PS	56	19	251	20	73	3
maa da vel være hin omtalte Betingelse, som Paradoxet giver med.	PS	56	23	251	24	73	8
os ikke glemme dette, at dersom Paradoxet ikke giver Betingelsen med,	PS	56	24	251	25	73	9
som Udgangspunkt for det Evige, er Paradoxet tilstede.	PS	57	4	252	11	74	2
Troen, hvis Gjenstand er Paradoxet, men Paradoxet forener netop	PS	58	26	254	7	76	12
Gjenstand er Paradoxet, men Paradoxet forener netop Modsigelsen, er	PS	58	27	254	8	76	13
Enhver der forstaaer Paradoxet anderledes beholde den	PS	58	28	254	9	76	14
Modsigelse er atter Troens Gjenstand, og er Paradoxet, Oieblikket.	PS	59	13	254	35	77	11
ikke til men fra, ikke hen Til Paradoxet, men Tilbage fra Paradoxet,	PS	60	39	256	35	80	25
Men saa er Troen jo lige saa paradox som Paradoxet? Ganske rigtigt;	PS	61	29	258	4	81	12
hvorledes skulde den ellers i Paradoxet have sin Gjenstand og	PS	61	30	258	5	81	13
og Alt hvad der gjelder om Paradoxet gjælder ogsaa om Troen.	PS	61	32	258	7	81	16
Til Paradoxet, men Tilbage fra Paradoxet, tilbage forbi Socrates og	PS	61	34	257	30	80	26
indslaaer, at han ikke gaaer til Paradoxets Forførdelse, men springer	PS	65	33	262	31	87	22
Faktum kom ind i Verden som det absolute Paradox, saa hjælper alt	PS	86	1	287	1	119	1
bliver i al Evighed Consequentser af et Paradox, og altsaa definitivt	PS	86	2	287	2	119	3
definitivt netop ligesaa usandsynligt som Paradoxet, med mindre man	PS	86	3	287	3	119	4
fik tilbagevirkende Kraft til at omskabe Paradoxet, hvilket vilde være	PS	86	5	287	6	119	6

Paradox (Forts.)

det er og bliver Paradoxet og lader sig ikke tilspeculere.
Men Consequentser, der ere hyppede paa et Paradox, de ere jo, den Overenskomst, at det er i Kraft af et Paradox, er jo ikke at
Han vil vel endog ansee Raadet for et Paradox, og være sky
Christendommens Paradox ligger i, at den bestandig bruger Tiden
med et Paradox, samt om at Forskjellen mellem den samtidige
lyrisk søger ud over sig selv, er den villende opdage det Paradoxe.
Tienkning kan ville er at ville ud over sig selv i det Paradoxe.
det Paradoxe. Og Christendommen er netop det Paradoxe. — Mendelsohn
i Paradoxet, man antage nu dette (s): være en Troende),
eller man forkaste det (netop fordi det er Paradoxet)
tilveie, men i at blive opmærksom paa Paradoxet, og i hvert Oieblik
i hvert Oieblik at fastholde Paradoxet, netop befrygtende allermeest
en Forklaring, der tog Paradoxet bort, fordi Paradoxet ikke
bort, fordi Paradoxet ikke er en transitorisk Form af det i strengeste
saa at den Forklaring, der tager Paradoxet bort, tillige phantastisk
til Lidenskab svarer Sandheden som et Paradox, og det at
og det at Sandheden bliver Paradoxet, er netop begrundet
bliver til Gjengjæld ikke noget Paradox, men det erkjendende Subjekt
og derfor maa blive ham et Paradox, saalænge han eksisterer,
saa er Sandheden objektivt bestemt Paradoxet; og det at
og det at objektivt Sandheden er Paradoxet, viser netop,
Paradoxet er den objektive Uvished, der er Udtrykket
seet tilfældig, dens Grad og Omfang ligegyldig), er Paradoxet.
er den evige væsentlige Sandhed selv ingenlunde Paradoxet, men er det
speculativt og evigt seet er der intet Paradox, men Vanskeligheden er,
Sandheden som Paradox bliver en Analogie til Paradoxet sensu
som Paradox bliver en Analogie til Paradoxet sensu eminentiori,
til Hinder for at tale om Paradoxet med Hensyn til Socrates og Tro,
Det socratiske Paradox laa i, at den evige Sandhed forholdt
Paradoxet fremkommer naar den evige Sandhed og det at eksistere sættes
det at eksistere mærkes, bliver Paradoxet tydeligere og tydeligere.
Sandhed forholdt sig til den Eksisterende, blev Paradoxet til.
lad os antage, at den evige væsentlige Sandhed selv er Paradoxet.
Sandhed selv er Paradoxet. Hvorledes fremkommer Paradoxet? Ved at
sette det sammen i Sandheden selv, saa bliver Sandheden et Paradox.
er bleven til i Tiden. Dette er Paradoxet. Blev Subjektet i
evige Sandhed forholder sig til en Eksisterende, bliver den Paradoxet.
Paradoxet støder i den objektive Uvished og Uvidenheden
Men da Paradoxet ikke i sig selv er Paradoxet, støder
Men da Paradoxet ikke i sig selv er Paradoxet, støder det ikke
Naar Paradoxet selv er Paradoxet, støder det fra i Kraft
Naar Paradoxet selv er Paradoxet, støder det fra i Kraft
da med Sandheden imod sig som Paradoxet, i Sydens Angst
er der intet Paradox — saa skal jeg ikke kunne afgjøre,
jeg i Smulerne blot eksperimenterede Paradoxets Tankebestemmelse frem,
at lade Paradoxets Nødvendighed blive tydelig, hvilket,
altid er noget Andet end speculativt at hæve Paradoxet.
den har forkyndt sig som Paradoxet, og fordret Troens
til at gaae Objektivitetens Vei, har forkyndt sig at være Paradoxet.
Christendommen Paradoxet, Existentens Afgjørelsens Tid:
guddommeligt, theocentrisk seet er der intet Paradox.
var Inderligheden, og derfor Paradoxet for at støde objektivt fra,
theocentrisk seet er der intet Paradox, den sande Speculation bliver
bliver derfor ikke staaende ved Paradoxet, den gaar videre
der eengang for alle er Paradoxet og paa ethvert Punkt paradox,
o.s.v., er vel Paradoxet sensu strictissimo, det absolute Paradox.
er vel Paradoxet sensu strictissimo, det absolute Paradox.
Men som det absolute Paradox kan det ikke forholde sig
Det relative Paradox forholder sig til den relative Forskjel mellem
mindre kløgtige Hoveder, men det absolute Paradox, netop fordi det er
gjør Forstaaelsen af Paradoxet commensurabel for Forskjellen mellem
at det jeg har forstaaet ikke er det absolute Paradox, men et relativt,
thi det absolute Paradox kan der kun forstaaes om, at
det er netop det, som Paradoxet siger, der blot støder
„Spekulationen derimod antager vel Paradoxet, men bliver ikke
man vel nok nødt til at blive staaende ved Paradoxet, naar dette netop
Forklaringen af Paradoxet tydeliggjør hvad Paradoxet
af Paradoxet tydeliggjør hvad Paradoxet er, og tager Dunkelheden
Berigtigelsen tager Paradoxet bort og tydeliggjør, at

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	s.	l.	s.	l.	p.	l.
PS	87	8	288	9	120	13
PS	88	39	290	15	123	9
PS	89	3	290	18	123	12
SVI	19	17	26	8	31	23
AEI	82	18	83	31	88	4
AEI	83	37	84	30	89	35
AEI	89	22	92	17	95	21
AEI	89	27	92	23	95	26
AEI	89	28	92	24	95	27
AEI	90	22	93	25	96	22
AEI	90	24	93	27	96	24
AEI	152	2	167	25	162	6
AEI	152	2	167	25	162	6
AEI	152	3	167	26	162	7
AEI	152	4	167	27	162	8
AEI	152	7	167	31	162	11
AEI	166	1	184	18	177	38
AEI	166	1	184	18	177	38
AEI	166	5	184	23	178	3
AEI	168	35	187	35	180	37
AEI	171	1	190	19	183	21
AEI	171	2	190	20	183	22
AEI	171	5	190	23	183	26
AEI	171	10	190	28	183	31
AEI	171	11	190	29	183	32
AEI	172	21	192	15	185	24
AEI	172	32	192	27	185	34
AEI	172	32	192	27	185	34
AEI	172	39	192	34	185	40
AEI	173	25	193	21	186	8
AEI	173	35	193	31	186	20
AEI	173	37	193	33	186	23
AEI	174	26	194	31	187	15
AEI	174	28	194	33	187	17
AEI	174	28	194	33	187	17
AEI	174	31	195	2	187	20
AEI	174	31	195	2	187	20
AEI	175	7	195	17	187	37
AEI	175	7	195	17	187	37
AEI	175	8	195	18	187	38
AEI	175	9	195	19	187	39
AEI	175	13	195	24	188	5
AEI	175	13	195	24	188	5
AEI	175	19	195	30	188	12
AEI	177	25	198	16	190	29
AEI	177	39	198	31	191	7
AEI	178	1	198	32	191	8
AEI	178	3	198	34	191	10
AEI	178	6	199	2	191	13
AEI	178	34	199	33	192	4
AEI	179	2	200	5	192	11
AEI	179	10	200	14	192	20
AEI	179	37	201	9	193	12
AEI	180	29	202	7	194	7
AEI	180	30	202	8	194	8
AEI	181	9	202	28	194	27
AEI	181	19	203	4	194	37
AEI	181	20	203	5	194	39
AEI	181	20	203	5	194	39
AEI	181	21	203	6	195	1
AEI	181	23	203	8	195	3
AEI	181	34	203	20	195	14
AEI	181	39	203	26	195	19
AEI	181	39	203	26	195	19
AEI	182	3	203	29	195	22
AEI	182	14	204	6	195	35
AEI	182	20	204	13	196	3
AEI	182	30	204	23	196	14
AEI	182	31	204	24	196	15
AEI	182	32	204	25	196	16

	T.	Dan. 3. udg.		Dan. 2. udg.		Eng.	
		s.	l.	s.	l.	p.	l.
Paradox (Forts.)							
bort og tydeliggjør, at der intet Paradox er; men dette Sidste	AEI	182	32	204	25	196	16
men dette Sidste er jo ingen Forklaring af Paradoxet, men vel en	AEI	182	33	204	27	196	17
af Paradoxet, men vel en Forklaring af, at der intet Paradox er.	AEI	182	34	204	28	196	18
Men dersom Paradoxet fremkommer ved at det Evige og et eksisterende	AEI	182	34	204	28	196	18
tager da Forklaringen, som den tager Paradoxet bort, ogsaa det	AEI	182	36	204	30	196	21
Altsaa den Forklaring af det absolute Paradox, at der intet	AEI	183	1	204	34	196	25
at der intet Paradox er uden saadan til en vis Grad,	AEI	183	2	204	35	196	26
Forklaringen er, at Paradoxet kun er saadan til en vis Grad, og	AEI	183	4	205	2	196	29
Og naar saa En taler om det absolute Paradox, der er Jøder	AEI	183	9	205	8	196	34
selv erklærer sig at være Paradoxet, saa er Speculationens Forklaring	AEI	183	23	205	23	197	12
At forklare Paradoxet er det at gøre det Udtryk Paradox	AEI	183	27	205	28	197	16
er det at gøre det Udtryk Paradox til et rhetorisk Udtryk,	AEI	183	27	205	28	197	16
I saa Fald bliver jo dog summa summarum, at der intet Paradox er.	AEI	183	30	205	31	197	20
ham at jeg siger dette, som kunde jeg ogsaa have Paradoxet, ingenlunde,	AEI	183	32	205	33	197	22
med mindre Ophævelsen mere angik Professoren end Paradoxet, saa han,	AEI	183	35	206	2	197	25
han, istedenfor at have Paradoxet, selv blev en betænkelig phantastik	AEI	183	35	206	2	197	25
Det at forklare Paradoxet vilde da være dybere og dybere	AEI	183	38	206	5	197	29
da være dybere og dybere at fatte, hvad et Paradox er, og at Paradoxet	AEI	183	39	206	6	197	30
og dybere at fatte, hvad et Paradox er, og at Paradoxet er Paradoxet.	AEI	183	39	206	6	197	30
og dybere at fatte, hvad et Paradox er, og at Paradoxet er Paradoxet.	AEI	184	1	206	7	197	31
set Paradoxet saaledes var Grænsen for en Eksisterende Forhold	AEI	184	4	206	10	197	34
saa vil Paradoxet heller ikke være til at forklare ved Andet,	AEI	184	6	206	12	197	36
udtrykker selv det absolute Paradox (thi Speculationen er ikke bange	AEI	184	8	206	14	197	39
Professorer og Privat-Docenter, da var den et Paradox for Alle; i	AEI	184	14	206	21	198	6
er Privat-Docent, altsaa er den kun et Paradox for Ni af Ti.	AEI	184	16	206	23	198	8
saa vil Christendommen have ophørt at være et Paradox.	AEI	184	19	206	26	198	11
— Den der derimod vil paatage sig at forklare Paradoxet, han vil da,	AEI	184	20	206	27	198	13
netop samle sig paa at vise, at det maa være et Paradox.	AEI	184	21	206	28	198	14
naar det Afgjørende, naar Paradoxet nedsettes til et relativt Moment,	AEI	186	5	208	24	200	3
saa vil dette sige, at der er intet Paradox, ingen Afgjørelse, thi	AEI	186	6	208	25	200	4
thi Paradoxet og det Afgjørende er netop ved deres Gjenstridighed	AEI	186	6	208	25	200	4
For dem er den Paradoxet, men Spekulantens veed at have Paradoxet.	AEI	186	20	209	6	200	20
For dem er den Paradoxet, men Spekulantens veed at have Paradoxet.	AEI	186	21	209	7	200	21
Lad os tage Syndsforladelsens Paradox. Syndsforladelsen	AEI	187	11	210	3	201	15
lige imod sig maa saa Troens Inderlighed gribe Paradoxet; og netop at	AEI	187	25	210	18	201	31
Fortvivlelsen Vending blot for at opdag Paradoxets Vanskelighed,	AEI	187	36	210	29	201	41
Deel tilbage til ved den at forklare Paradoxet — men derfor kan der	AEI	187	37	210	30	202	30
en troende Menighed kan nemlig kun Paradoxet forkyndes af en Troende,	AEI	188	8	211	9	202	9
altsaa Synds-Forladelsen er et Paradox (almindelig Spænding),	AEI	188	10	211	11	202	12
Spekulationen bliver ikke staaende ved Paradoxet, den forklarer det	AEI	188	13	211	14	202	15
Sæt nu Synds-Forladelsens Paradox havde sin Grund	AEI	188	25	211	27	202	29
dette Forklaringen, at det er og bliver et Paradox, og da først Alt	AEI	189	3	212	7	203	8
naar Nogen fatter, at det intet Paradox er, eller kun til	AEI	189	4	212	8	203	10
Dersom Spekulantens forklarer Paradoxet saaledes, at	AEI	189	24	212	30	203	32
at Paradoxet altsaa ikke er den evige væsentlige Sandheds væsentlige	AEI	189	25	212	32	203	33
naar den Eenfoldige troer Paradoxet, og Spekulantens veed	AEI	190	2	213	14	204	12
Vise tillige veed af, at det maa være et Paradox, det Paradox, han	AEI	190	5	213	17	204	15
at det maa være et Paradox, det Paradox, han selv troer.	AEI	190	5	213	17	204	15
den Vise veed ikke noget Andet om Paradoxet, men han veed	AEI	190	7	213	19	204	17
Andet om Paradoxet, men han veed af, at han veed det om Paradoxet.	AEI	190	7	213	19	204	17
eenfoldige Vise vil da fordybe sig i at fatte Paradoxet som Paradox,	AEI	190	8	213	20	204	18
vil da fordybe sig i at fatte Paradoxet som Paradox, og ikke indlade	AEI	190	8	213	20	204	18
og ikke indlade sig paa at forklare Paradoxet ved at forstaae,	AEI	190	9	213	21	204	19
Christendommen er Paradoxet, Paradox og Lidenskab passe ganske	AEI	192	11	216	2	206	25
er Paradoxet, Paradox og Lidenskab passe ganske for hinanden,	AEI	192	11	216	2	206	25
og Paradoxet ganske for den i Eksistensens Yderste Bestedte.	AEI	192	12	216	4	206	26
der saaledes passe for hinanden som Paradox og Lidenskab,	AEI	192	14	216	6	206	28
her, at den Eksisterende ved Paradoxet selv er bestedt i Eksistensens	AEI	192	17	216	9	206	31
Forstaaelse mellem Lidenskab og Paradoxet, thi hele Tiden	AEI	192	22	216	15	206	36
en eenfoldig Viis, der søger at fatte Paradoxet, vil bestrebe sig for	AEI	192	27	216	20	207	2
selv om der i Paradoxet var en lille Rest af guddommelig Vilkaar,	AEI	192	29	216	23	207	4
og i ethvert Oieblik opdage Usandsynligheden, Paradoxet, for da med	AEI	194	26	218	30	209	3
at det Usandsynlige, det Paradoxe er Noget, som Troen	AEI	194	28	218	32	209	5
sig selv virksom til det Usandsynlige og det Paradoxe, selv virksom i at	AEI	194	38	219	8	209	15
thi det Usandsynlige og det Paradoxe er ikke til at naae	AEI	195	3	219	12	209	19
ikke de dobbelt reflekterede religiøse Kategorier i Paradoxet.	AEI	214	28	242	28	229	28
Tro, Paradoxet og andet saadan, der væsentligen forholder	AEI	225	21	255	32	240	27
bliver dog Afgjørelsen ikke sat i et Paradox, og den metaphysiske	AEI	226	27	257	11	241	33
den evige Sandhed som Paradoxet ved at være blevet til	AEI	227	2	258	2	242	1
kun tænke en evig Salighed, det Paradoxe ligger derfor, fuldt saavel	AEI	227	28	257	34	242	33

	T.	Dan. 3. udg.		Dan. 2. udg.		Eng.	
		s.	l.	s.	l.	p.	l.
Paradox (Forts.)							
I Paradoxet er det omvendt, der er Aanden tilskyndende,	AE1	227	41	258	34	242	45
Humoren medtager da ikke den lidende Side af Paradoxet, og ikke den	AE1	244	34	279	4	259	17
er den umodne Humors Forfalskning af Paradoxet som Incitament for	AE1	245	8	279	17	259	31
Sag bliver det med Paradoxet, Christendommens uforandrede Vilkaar,	AE1	246	17	280	33	261	1
Nei, det christelige Paradox er ikke saadan Dit og Dat, noget	AE1	246	34	281	16	261	18
for ethvert Standpunkt lige til Paradoxet, der paradox accentuerer	AE1	251	3	286	18	265	23
er at ville troe, og udtrykker det paradox Forhold til det Paradoxe.	AE2	28	35	312	3	288	2
synes dog næstendeels lidt for Meget af det Paradoxe.	AE2	65	33	356	19	329	13
Men hvad er det Modsatte af Mediation? Det er det absolute Paradox.	AE2	75	19	367	31	338	32
paradoxe Accentuation af Existenten, paa Paradoxet, paa Bruddet med	AE2	204	37	522	31	473	37
end den skjulte Inderlighed, forholder den sig dog til Paradoxet.	AE2	204	40	522	34	473	39
Dette er Paradoxet (hvorum henvises til det Foregaaende	AE2	205	18	523	8	474	16
med mindre den Existerende selv er Paradoxet, ved hvilken Bestemmelse	AE2	206	36	525	1	475	34
1. Synds-Bevidstheden er det Paradoxe, og ved den ganske consequent	AE2	206	37	524	33	475	37
ved den ganske consequent igjen Det det Paradoxe, at den Existerende	AE2	206	38	524	34	475	38
Christelige, kan det gjelde og om Paradoxet, at det at lide uskyldigt	AE2	207	9	525	10	476	7
Kjendet paa Christendommen er Paradoxet, det absolute Paradox.	AE2	211	20	530	15	480	21
Kjendet paa Christendommen er Paradoxet, det absolute Paradox.	AE2	211	20	530	15	480	21
en saakaldet christelig Speculation hæver Paradoxet, og gjør denne	AE2	211	21	530	16	480	22
thi i Forhold til det Evige er en Nyhed rigtignok et Paradox.	AE2	211	40	530	35	480	41
høiere, men ogsaa kun i Kraft af Paradoxet, og for at blive opmærksom	AE2	223	37	545	32	492	37
og for at blive opmærksom paa Paradoxet maa man have den Bestemmelse	AE2	223	38	545	33	492	38
taget sig Christus og Christendommen og det Paradoxe og det Absurde,	AE2	226	12	548	7	495	4
A høiere end B, thi saa er Paradoxet, det Absurde o.s.v.,	AE2	227	20	549	21	496	11
heller ikke cengang være den Troende det Paradoxe og saa underhaanden,	AE2	227	31	550	6	496	22
kan ikke blive staaende ved ikke at forstaae Paradoxet, fordi det er	AE2	227	35	549	30	496	37
Det Paradoxe ligger i, at dette tilskyndende æsthetiske Forhold,	AE2	229	28	552	15	498	14
At dette ikke lader sig tænke, er jo netop det Paradoxe.	AE2	230	7	552	23	498	22
Men fastholdes Paradoxet ikke saaledes, saa er Religiositeten	AE2	230	8	552	24	498	23
trods Christendommens Paastand, at det Paradoxe, den taler om,	AE2	230	11	552	27	498	25
forskjelligt altsaa fra et relativt Paradox, der høchstens vanskeligt	AE2	230	12	552	28	498	26
hvad der kan og skal og vil være det absolute Paradox, det Absurde,	AE2	230	22	553	3	498	36
i Forhold til det væsentligen Paradoxe at see Forsøgene paa	AE2	230	27	553	8	499	1
da det absolute Paradox netop frabeder sig al Forklaring;	AE2	231	2	553	18	499	11
eller parallelliserer Paradoxets Uforstaaelighed med Andet o.s.v.	AE2	231	6	553	22	499	15
hvorfor den bliver Paradoxet saa længe der existeres,	AE2	231	20	554	3	499	30
men i Forhold til det absolute Paradox er denne Skimten og Missen	AE2	231	37	554	21	500	9
i Ave ved at forkynde, at Paradoxet ikke kan og ikke skal forstaaes,	AE2	232	24	555	13	500	36
at Paradoxets Uforstaaelighed skulde forholde sig til Differentsen	AE2	234	9	557	11	502	20
Paradoxet forholder sig væsentligen til det at være Menneske,	AE2	234	12	557	14	502	23
at være naglet til det Paradox at have begrundet sin evige Salighed	AE2	244	27	569	9	512	25
fordi vi i Forhold til Paradoxet og det Absurde ere alle	AE2	246	2	570	27	513	35
til fra den at bestemme Paradoxet (Christendommens Nyhed er	AE2	246	20	571	11	514	12
omvendt tilbagekalde Paradoxet ved Hjælp af Analogien,	AE2	246	22	571	13	514	14
Anvendelse derfor er Analogiens Tilbagekaldelse, ikke Paradoxets.	AE2	246	24	571	15	514	15
i Virkelighedens Medium maa blive det absolute Paradox.	AE2	246	30	571	22	514	21
Virkeligheden er det Høieste, det Paradox; thi Christendommen som	AE2	246	33	571	25	514	24
ikke vanskelig at forstaae, Vanskeligheden og Paradoxet er, at det er	AE2	246	35	571	27	514	25
Den der forstaaer Paradoxet (i Betydning af at forstaae	AE2	247	11	571	42	514	38
Lidenskab greb som det absolute Paradox (ikke som det relative,	AE2	247	14	572	3	514	40
meget godt vedblive at bevare sit Forhold til det absolut Paradoxe.	AE2	247	21	572	11	515	1
at han forstaaer det Paradox (i ligefrem Betydning):	AE2	247	22	572	12	515	2
der forstaaer Paradoxet, vil misforstaaende glemme, at Christendommen	AE2	247	29	572	19	515	8
at Christendommen er det absolute Paradox (ligesom dens Nyhed den	AE2	247	30	572	20	515	9
til Virkelighed, og netop dette er det Paradoxe, ikke det Fremmede,	AE2	247	33	572	24	515	12
Den der forstaaer Paradoxet vil glemme at han ved at forstaae	AE2	247	36	572	27	515	14
men i Virkeligheden med det enkelte Menneske er netop Paradoxet.	AE2	248	1	572	31	515	18
Men Paradoxet, der fordrer Troen mod Forstand, udviser strax	AE2	251	6	576	13	518	22
Forargelse der lider, eller den der spotter Paradoxet som Daarskab.	AE2	251	9	576	16	518	25
Pointet jo netop er, at det er Synderen der søger hen til Paradoxet?	AE2	256	26	582	33	524	11
Discipline en Smule fra sig ved Hjælp af et Paradox; ja det er	AE2	258	14	585	2	526	2
er ved Paradoxets Fjernhed at sikre sig mod al Nærgaaenhed.	AE2	258	17	585	6	526	5
Det Paradox ligger i at gjøre et Barn til Paradigma;	AE2	258	24	585	13	526	13
at dette er Paradoxet i Modsetning til at være kommen i Herlighed.	AE2	260	15	587	14	528	1
Paradoxet ligger hovedsageligen i, at Gud, den Evige, er bleven til	AE2	260	16	587	15	528	2
saa kan det ikke blive opmærksomt paa det absolute Paradox, men har en	AE2	260	24	587	23	528	9
barnagtige Orthodoxie denne Fornedelse som Paradoxet: saa viser den	AE2	260	30	587	30	528	15
saa viser den eo ipso, at den ikke er opmærksom paa Paradoxet.	AE2	260	31	587	31	528	16
Det Paradoxe er, at Christus er kommen til Verden for at lide.	AE2	261	20	588	26	529	6
videre en Landstorm af Analogier Paradoxets uindtagelige Befæstning.	AE2	261	22	588	28	529	8

Paradox (Forts.)

og det absolute Paradox er jo kjendeligt paa, at ethvert Analogon (den mythiske Commensurabilitet), ikke Paradoxet, hvem Ingen kunde Det Paradoxe ligger netop i, at Det gjelder som det høiere Det absolute Paradox skal nok hævde sig selv, thi i Forhold Dette Hvorledes kan kun passe til Eet, til det absolute Paradox, og alene paa den Troende, der forholder sig til det absolute Paradox, det eminenteste Hoveds grundigst gennemtænkte Mening er et Paradox, hvormod det Paradoxe og Troen danner en kvalitativ Sphære bringe, bruger Udtrykket „Paradox“, bruges dette dog kun i uvæsentlig uvæsentlig Forstand om det transitoriske Paradox, om Anticipationen, men jo mere han kommer til sig selv, jo mere forsvinder det Paradoxe, forud for sin Tid og derfor staae som et Paradox, men tilsidst vil Slegten dog saaledes assimilere sig det eengang Paradoxe, saa det ikke han kan have at forkynde, er det væsentlige Paradoxe, thi det væsentlige Paradox er netop Protesten mod Immanentens. Betragtning vil vistnok synes mange et Paradox, en Overdrivelse, den er heller ikke et Paradox, tværtimod en consequent Criterium: det Absurde, Paradoxet, Forargelsens Mulighed. Christendommen derimod fæster Ende ved Hjælp af Paradoxet. Og det forstaaer sig, Paradoxet, Troen, Dogmet, disse — dog ikke som kunde det begribes, men som et Paradox, der maa troes, — og Menneske maa være befæstet som den er det i Paradoxet og Troen, en ganske anden Forstand Forargelsens Mulighed, det Paradoxe i sig. Det Paradoxe er nemlig Consequentsen i Forhold til Læren maa troes, da det jo er det Paradoxe, som intet Menneske kan begribe) vel at mærke betrygget i Paradoxet og Forargelsens Mulighed) hvilken principielt forholder sig til Paradoxet (Christus) den vedbliver saa at stirre paa det ene og samme Punkt, paa Paradoxet. Negten af Christus som Paradoxet ligger naturligviis igjen Negten kan „vide“ om „Christus“; han er Paradoxet, Troens Gjenstand, kun Han er Paradoxet, som Historien aldrig kan fordøje eller omsætte Kraft ud af Christendommen; Paradoxet afspændtes, han blev Christen historisk Person, da han som Paradoxet er en hoist uhistorisk Person. Gud-Mennesket er Paradoxet, absolut Paradoxet; derfor Gud-Mennesket er Paradoxet, absolut Paradoxet; derfor er det ganske men declamerende lægger Alt, selv Paradoxet, ud i et uadskillelig fra og væsentligere end Læren, er et Paradox, saa er al fra det Christelige Forargelsen, Paradoxet o.s.v., anbringer istedet:

Paradoxer

skjøndt man ellers hadede Paradoxer, frygtede man dog har Dristighed nok til at overbyde Dig i Paradoxer, naar den næsten Forstand Dristighed til at overbyde Dig i Paradoxer; thi den har hvilket vil sige, at der kun er relative Paradoxer, den er — ikke Vel har nemlig Humor ogsaa med Paradoxer at gjøre, men kniber

Penge

som endnu tænker paa Naomi og samler Penge for engang at hjælpe hende, Faderen i ikke at tilbagebetale de laante Penge, saa udvikler han han ikke har bekymret sig om at samle Penge, ikke om Huusholdningen, Indgriben gjorde galt, ved ikke at tage Penge for sin Underviisning. Bravour omtaler, at han ikke tog Penge for sin Underviisning¹. i omvendt Forstand blev incommensurabel for Penge og Penges Værd. han lader ham ikke blot modtage Penge, men endogsaa Meelsække Fortjenstligt, at han ikke tog Penge for sin Underviisning, ikke at al sand Underviisning er incommensurabel for Penge, og vel er at det i og for sig er urigtigt at tage Penge for sin Underviisning. fordi, dersom han havde Penge, det intet Tab var for fordi, da overhovedet Penge ingen Realitet havde for ham, Straffen enten han udredede mange eller saa Penge, det vil sige, han kan udrede, da Penge nemlig ingen Værdi har for ham. De vare allevegne, som man siger, ligesom gale Penge. Interesse var, næst efter den at tjene Penge, at faae Indflydelse paa Næst Uafhængighed elskede hun Penge umaadeligt, som sine Gunstbeviisninger ikke altid tog Hensyn til Penge, han synes for der bestemte hendes Valg, ikke var Penge, at ville lade

T.	Dan. 3. udg.		Dan. 2. udg.		Eng.	
	s.	l.	s.	l.	p.	l.
AE2	261	32	589	3	529	18
AE2	262	37	590	15	530	22
AE2	268	40	597	35	535	42
AE2	269	23	598	17	536	36
AE2	272	33	602	13	540	7
AE2	273	7	602	23	540	16
LA	97	10	115	5	79	26
TSA	52	32	113	6	141	29
TSA	53	7	113	21	142	19
TSA	53	9	113	23	142	22
TSA	53	12	113	27	143	4
TSA	53	13	113	28	143	6
TSA	53	14	113	29	143	7
TSA	53	33	114	14	144	4
TSA	54	2	114	22	144	16
SD	81	17	153	18	155	17
SD	81	23	153	24	155	23
SD	136	24	219	24	214	7
SD	145	37	230	26	224	17
SD	149	4	234	12	227	27
SD	150	13	235	32	229	10
SD	151	20	237	12	230	28
SD	151	36	237	30	231	7
SD	151	37	237	31	231	9
SD	157	5	244	16	237	6
SD	167	16	256	19	248	20
SD	178	6	269	12	260	6
SD	179	22	271	8	261	35
SD	179	38	271	25	262	14
IC	36	6	42	20	28	11
IC	40	25	47	32	33	15
IC	45	2	53	1	38	8
IC	70	29	84	6	67	30
IC	86	28	104	7	85	2
IC	86	28	104	7	85	2
IC	105	16	125	25	106	13
IC	121	26	145	5	123	25
O	177	3	201	9	162	34
EE1	52	32	42	2	51	22
EE2	107	15	122	28	113	32
EE2	107	17	122	30	113	34
AE1	183	3	205	1	196	27
AE2	204	40	522	34	473	39
LP	55	38	98	7		
BI	180	7	245	23	171	23
BI	210	24	281	29	205	21
BI	215	19	288	9	211	1
BI	215	21	288	11	211	3
BI	215	24	288	15	211	6
BI	215	38	288	33	211	37
BI	216	11	289	3	211	27
BI	216	14	289	6	211	30
BI	216	18	289	11	211	35
BI	222	12	296	11	218	25
BI	222	16	296	15	218	30
BI	222	18	296	17	218	32
BI	224	14	298	31	221	1
BI	229	8	304	9	226	9
BI	230	21	305	18	227	5
BI	303	31	394	35	310	7
BI	304	18	395	28	310	35
BI	304	19	395	29	310	36

A P P E N D I X B

MARTIN KÄHLER'S
THE SO-CALLED HISTORICAL JESUS
AND THE HISTORIC,
BIBLICAL CHRIST*

* Translated by Carl E. Braaten, Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1966.

The thought of Martin Kähler provides an interesting additive to the transition that evolves in the Liberal distinction between external and personal facts. The Liberals appear to have bifurcated the person of Christ into the external details of His physical presence and into the personal fact of His "inner life". The emphasis upon the personal dimension of faith's content was assumed to provide the sure and certain basis for faith's relevance. The reality of His "inner life" was apparently associated with meaning and value. In the biblical narrative, one can discern the irresistible power and force of His personality. Amid the contingency and probability surrounding the details of His person, one can personally experience the immediate reality of His intimate, subjective life. Consequently, a shift in emphasis appears to have taken place. The Liberals do not seem keen to insist upon the factual aspect of His person other than to say that He was a real man. The incertitude of historical knowledge was evidently too unsure a foundation on which to establish faith. However, the Liberals did utilize historical research in order to retrieve Christ's personality. But the application of the method stopped at the point of this discovery. Its undemonstrable power provides the bedrock for the content of faith. His personality is the authenticating factor which insures the relevance of the message. Needless to say, the Liberal answer to Lessing's problem was short-lived. Kähler seems to offer a variant to the Liberal position. For him, it is no longer legitimate to bifurcate Jesus Christ into the historical and faithful

components. One of the reasons for this position shows itself in Kähler's attitude toward the "Life of Jesus" method. "How many authors of the 'Lives' blithely compose epics and dramas without being aware that this is what they are doing! And because this is done in prose...people think that this is merely a presentation of the historic, biblical picture of Christ. Far from it!" (57) This method seeks to dissect the narrative in the hope of bringing from concealment the Jesus Christ behind the faith-claims. To accomplish this task, the "Life of Jesus" scholar manipulates the text in order to gain the data which he deems pertinent. But Kähler complains that in the end the Jesus that is constructed is nothing more than a replica of the scholar's imaginings. To succeed in his task, the scholar fails to realize the peculiar nature and special reference of the biblical material. One is not simply dealing with an historical document from which it is possible to glean facts and details. Historical research may assist faith in the explication of its message. But in the "Life of Jesus" approach, this research has turned against faith and no longer safeguards and interprets the "solid core of the content of faith". For Kähler, this "solid core" is the biblical Christ. He is the great power which sustains the vitality of Christianity. It is just too simple a matter to dispose of faith by treating it as nothing more than history. But Kähler persists in maintaining that the biblical material mediates something uniquely significant for the present. Christ's contemporaries evidently perceived something unique in His person. Scripture allows the present

to have contact with Him. Indeed, the scriptures are not mere objective reports of historical investigators who were simply chronicling the events of His life. Rather, Kähler sees them as testimonies and confessions by people who believed in Christ. Consequently every detail of the biblical recollection displays its religious significance. The narrative presents Him as giving the assurance and impression that the way to the Father is through Him. The Christ the scriptures present in their totality is not a legend but a real human life. Kähler admits that this material is not enough to write a "Life of Jesus", but it is quite sufficient for the faith. The scripture provides "the knowledge of faith concerning the person of the Saviour". What is most decisive is the crucifixion and resurrection. This is the two-fold end of His work.

That work is accessible to each of us: in the church as it marches through the centuries, in the confessing word and confessing deed of our fellow Christians, and in the living faith which Christ himself has evoked from us. The passionately held dogma about the Saviour vouches for the reliability of the picture transmitted to us by the biblical proclamation of Jesus as the Christ. (95)

As a result, the biblical picture and proclamation both recollect and confess the historic, biblical Christ. In communication with the text, man apparently experiences these recollections and confessions for himself. But more is also involved, "in presupposition and intention the recollections always witness to something which lies beyond mere historical factuality -- something which we call revelation or salvation " (126). Kähler appears to be striking a very new tone. He does not want the text to be viewed as simple history. But

he does want to maintain that it is not a legend, but that it is dealing with a real person. This person is not exhausted in a complete remembering of His historical factuality. Christ's person is known in its historic-supra-historic effect. Historical research evidently cannot pursue the latter dimension. Yet Kähler is not keen to deride this aspect. It may be that he is implying the limitation of competence for the historical, objective method. However, he does seem to mediate the multi-dimensional make-up of Christ (1) by allowing scripture to be seen as a recollection of a real life, (2) by complementing the recollection with the confessional, and (3) by presupposing a revelational and salvific reality which is the basis for (1) and (2). This latter reality stands beyond mere historical factuality. The fact of scripture finds its grounding in the recollection/confession of Christ's contemporaries. This complex presupposes someone to be remembered and believed. But the nature and significance of the recollection/confession always witnesses to a reality beyond present limits of comprehension. The suprahistoric dimension of Christ places Him beyond historical research. As a result, Kähler affirms that "the biblical documents would have a reliability which lies completely beyond proof..." (126). In this respect, scripture is not a naked historical record. Rather, it is the occasion for faith and salvation. It contains the Word of God which effectively preserves and mediates the reality of the historic, biblical Christ. Ultimately, the vitality and the preservation of this entire structure depends upon the work of God.

The Bible is not the Word, but it is the means for its transmission. In communication with Scripture, the hearer may understand the Word as living and revealing "the life-giving and life-determining self-disclosure of the living God which comes through human speech..." (140). Thus the Bible is the normative document which transmits the recollection/confession complex into the present. This is the place where man encounters Jesus Christ as an historic, biblical reality. The Jesus of history and the Christ of faith coalesce and conjoin for Kähler in the Jesus Christ portrayed in the whole Bible. For him, there can be no differentiation between the "historic" and the "biblical" Christ. The sure and certain basis of faith's ground rests within the recollection, confession, proclamation, and presence of the living Christ mediated through scripture.

Kähler's understanding of Jesus Christ effects an interesting possibility in conjunction with the Liberal position. The Liberals spoke of His significance and value for man. They also suggested that His importance becomes contemporaneous through the immediate impression which His "inner life" makes. Kähler also speaks about the significance of Christ and of His impression upon the believers. But Kähler does not deal with His personality or "inner life". He is interested in portraying a whole person in His full meaning and import as mediated through scripture. The Liberals appear to be quite content to open the biblical material to the dissecting talents of historical research. Indeed, Harnack sought to trace the development of dogma in

historical terms and thus release the message of faith from the grip of historical accretions. Consequently, Harnack seems to typify the Liberal bifurcation of Jesus Christ into historical and faithful components. As well, it is essential to remember that the Liberal position possessed a strong undercurrent of anti-metaphysical presumption. Historical method represented a congenial approach to a document which Liberal theology understood in very historical terms. Jesus Christ and His faith were indeed constituents in the world process and thus were specimens to be analyzed. In contradistinction, Kähler did not agree that the biblical narrative is simply an historical document susceptible to historical inquiry. Kähler appears to proffer a "Closed Door" policy to any research and investigation which desires to interrogate and question the "solid core" of faith. It may be suggested that he interpreted reality in terms different than the Liberals. His position on the Christ may possibly imply that the biblical picture represents a point of interpenetration between the historic and suprahistoric. In other words, it may be that Kähler understood the Christ to be more than value and significance and effect in His suprahistoric dimension. As a consequence, Kähler may have presupposed an implicit cosmology which ran counter to the Liberal climate of opinion. (This latter suggestion seems to be doubted by Bultmann and Tillich, who both appear to interpret Christ's suprahistoric effect in terms of meaning and authenticity.) But for his own part, Kähler is not willing to permit the biblical narrative to be treated as history per se.

The Liberals suspend inquiry at the point of Christ's "inner life". Kähler suspends inquiry with the narrative itself. It is here that Jesus Christ is encountered. His uniqueness evidently flows over into the Bible which partakes of His inexplicable quality. The recollection/confession complex represents the medium for encountering Him. The Bible is a witness and testimony to the reality of His historic-supra-historic person. The uniqueness of Christ stands beyond mere historical factuality. But Kähler does not want to give the impression that the text simply deals in legends. The decisiveness of His crucifixion and resurrection seem to signify the primary level of facticity. However, this facticity does not appear to be open to scientific research. The intention of His work in dying and rising manifests itself as the moment of salvation and revelation culminating in the faith of man. Kähler contends that the confessions of Christ's contemporaries suggest the historic reality behind and beyond them. But his refusal to treat the confession as a mere product of history also seems to suggest that the reality is beyond the limits of factual determination. Nonetheless, Christ remains a living and real person even though His uniqueness defies analogy as well as naked historical scrutiny. As a result, research may assist faith in defining its content, but it cannot turn against faith and employ its method to perview what stands beyond historical accounting. As an alternative to the Liberal "inner life", Kähler suggests the historic, biblical Christ. He is met in the Bible which represents the Word of God. The life-giving and -determining self-disclosure of God in Christ

preserves and initiates the faith. As well, it is the work of God which preserves and permits the Bible to function as His Word. In this way, Kähler seems to be offering an alternative to the Liberal's position. In his own way, he may be implicitly refuting the anti-metaphysical bias they possess. If not, he is at least proposing another way of viewing Christ in the anti-metaphysical tradition. Kähler does not appear willing to relinquish His uniqueness. Christ continues to impress man with His significance, but historical research no longer strips away at the facts. Rather, the whole biblical picture represents the historic person.

Yet it does seem that Kähler may be interpreted to draw a distinction between the external facts of physical observation and their religious significance. What seems to have taken place is (1) the factuality now recedes to the twilight zone of historical discovery -- revelational and salvific qualities lie beyond objective retrieving -- and (2) this twilight reality produces a confessional superstructure which (a) presupposes and intends a suprahistoric reality and (b) witnesses to its present importance. This shift relies upon the work of God as well as the tradition of faith, the confessing and living of the Christian, and the continued proclamation of the Word. In a sense, the clarification of His uniqueness can be attained through the interpretation attached to His suprahistoric dimension. Now if one follows Bultmann's "pre-understandings", the work of God becomes something quite tenuous and beyond experience. One can live as if God is active, but this will depend upon the

interpretation accorded to the as if. In this way, Kähler's under-girding of the historic, biblical Christ by the work of God can be interpreted away. The uniqueness of Christ apparently depends upon the continuing presence of God. Kähler suggests this when he qualifies the reception and confession by God's initiative. But Bultmann appears to approach Kähler's Christ with a strong anti-metaphysical presumption. He can speak of God only indirectly and tenuously. God is known through His effects and even then He remains mysterious and hidden. This interpretation which reflects the Liberal position apparently has side-effects upon God's underwriting the historic, biblical Christ. The supra-historic dimension appears to become as indirect and tenuous and as mysterious and hidden as is God Himself. Indeed, the uncertainty here may well result in a suspension of judgment about the suprahistoric. Bultmann's "pre-understanding" does seem to suggest this. And part of the gist of this interpretation may result from Kähler's use of the word effect in speaking of Christ's work. The Liberals understood this term in their complex of meaning. And possibly had Kähler amplified the uniqueness of Christ by proposing a conceptual understanding of it, his use of effects and impressions may not have accrued the Liberal connotations. Indeed, it does seem that Bultmann, in part, is effecting this type of transition. Nonetheless, he can accept Kähler's position which places the objective reality of Christ beyond historical method. In this way, the text is still treated as a confessional document. Confession would seem to pre-

suppose Jesus' recognition as the Christ. The theologian would not have to deal with what lies behind this recognition since it functions as the root fact of faith. Its importance is its religious significance and not its historical detail. The theologian can dispense with the historic person and proceed to the weightier business of understanding His historic meaning. In this interpretation, one does not resort to transcendent verification and authentication. The "pre-understandings" dispose of this. Meaning is now understood in human, personal and subjective categories. As a result, one can treat the biblical recollection/confession in anthropological terms. Consequently, Kähler's historic, biblical Christ can be seen as the root fact which demands illumination in present categories. One is permitted to speak of the Word of God, of His life-giving self-disclosure, and of His work, but Bultmann is quick to interject that these terms must be interpreted for the present context and climate of opinion. In the end, interpretation may well out-balance the reality interpreted. And as a consequence, the objective foundation becomes separated from and superceded by its existential meaning.

Briefly as an alternative to Bultmann, one can view Kähler through Barth. In his terms, substance and reality are accorded to God and His work. The historic, biblical Christ remains real and distinct from man's confession of Him. As a complementary additive to Kähler, one can follow Barth and attribute to God in Christ absolute freedom as opposed to human finite freedom. In this way, faith in the historic, biblical Christ remains protected in confession and proclamation.

But He also exercises influence and power upon man.

In Barth's terms, God's existence presupposes man and his faith. Instead of faith and its confession falling to human disposition, God mediates and initiates its possibility through His objective self-disclosure in Jesus Christ and through His active personal presence in the Spirit. In the end, man and God appear to remain real and distinct though correlated and interconnected in the historic, biblical Christ. Therefore, Barth's interpretation of the reality of God in Christ allows the undergirding of Christ to be sustained by an entity which can be known in faith.

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